Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Transformation of Conflict: An Analysis of “Op Sadbhavana” in Jammu and Kashmir | April 16, 2010 | Arpita Anant | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Prof. Amitabh Mattoo Dr. Arpita Anant’s paper notes that traditionally the Army defends the borders and, whenever called in, helps in counter-insurgency operations and provides aid to the victims of calamities. However, in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the Indian Army has extended its mandate to rebuild the lives of people devastated by terrorism. Operation Sadbhavana (meaning Goodwill), launched in 1998, is an unique attempt to apply the healing touch to win the hearts and minds (WHAM) of people by promoting development activities focuses on their basic needs. The author points out that the doctrine of sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army released in January 2007 gives a central place to WHAM in counter-insurgency operations. Such attempts, it is envisaged, would provide the healing touch during conflict and win over the alienated sections of people in the conflict zones. According to Dr. Anant, from 1998 to 2008, a total of Rs. 276.08 crore, allocated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), was spent on various multi-faceted activities under this operation. The Army has been running schools and orphanages, improving the living standard of the locals by constructing roads and bridges, installing hand pumps and electrifying villages and giving them free medical services. Excursion and education tours have also been organised during this period. Dr. Anant asserts that implementation of the projects under this initiative has had an extremely positive impact on the minds of the local population. Various educational schemes and women empowerment centres have helped in employment generation and transformed many lives. Numerous other community development and healthcare projects have helped in mitigating the hardships of the common man. The author’s tête-à-tête with the civil administration reveals that most of them were very candid in admitting that the Army brought schools, walking tracks/roads, small bridges and doctors in areas where the state government could not reach in the difficult years of the insurgency. However, a common refrain was that there is scope for improvement in coordination between the Army and civil administration. Dr. Anant’s interface with journalists reveals that although the initiative of the Army is very praiseworthy, real peace will come only with the resolution of the political problem. Some educationists believed that the Army’s initiatives are lacking involvement of the youth in the age group of 18 to 21 years who constitute 60 per cent of the population. Her discussions with the Army reveal that Operation Sadbhavna had a positive impact on the relationship between the people and the Army. However, some Army officials did believe that the actual impact is only between 50 to 75 per cent of the desired targets. Dr. Anant’s conclusion is that Operation Sadbhavana has certainly been a successful effort. Although it adds to the responsibilities of the Army, it has certainly salvaged its image. The ease with which people were interacting with Army officials made this obvious. The unending list of demands, which ought to be fulfilled by the civil administration, also proved the same. She points out that the comfort level between the military and the people seemed higher in the Jammu region than in the Valley. Also, in some places people spoke highly of the Army officials they were interacting with and remembered some officers who had been posted out, indicating that personalities made all the difference. Dr. Anant’s paper suggests following measures for better results:
Discussion:
Report prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South Asia | |||
India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials | April 16, 2010 | Rajaram Panda | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Prof. V. P. Dutt Dr. Rajaram Panda presented his paper titled India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials on Friday, April 16, 2010. The paper’s main focus was on maritime cooperation between India and Japan and more specifically on the strategic dimensions of this cooperation. Dr. Panda argued that the looming Chinese shadow is the rationale behind this cooperation. First, he defined what a ‘strategic partnership’ means, arguing that the canvas of a “strategic relationship” was much larger than mere “political relationship”. A strategic partnership includes “defence, economic, and security dimensions in the relationship.” Dr. Panda emphasized that there was a great convergence of interests between India and Japan in the maritime domain. He highlighted India’s unique geographical position, which makes its cooperation extremely critical for Japan in securing its sea lanes. Much of Japan’s international trade is dependent upon safety of its sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. He argued that security of Japan’s maritime and energy supplies prominently figured in its security calculus. Dr. Panda discussed two high-level important visits in detail: the first being Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit to Japan, and the other Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India, which he characterized as a landmark visit. During this visit, an Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was adopted. This plan delineated a host of issue-areas in which a meaningful strategic partnership could be built. However, he highlighted the Japanese stand on India’s nuclear programme as a major irritant in what is an otherwise cordial relationship. DiscussionAmb. Rajiv Sikri argued that the economic aspect of the strategic partnership should be part of this paper. He further argued that the China factor was an important factor shaping this strategic partnership, but it was not the only factor. There are other important factors also which require due focus. Besides, the importance of China factor will keep varying depending upon who is in power in Japan. The India-Japan relationship is not that undifferentiated as it is being considered. There are more nuances involved in it. He was of the view that the US-Japan alliance had not outlived its utility and should not be underestimated. As to the definition of strategic partnership, he said that India had very loose definition of the partnership. He further argued that a strategic partnership basically meant macro-level understanding, not micro. It should be dealt with on that level only. On the question of Japanese investment in India, he said that Japanese businessmen should understand how business was done in India. He argued that there was no point in Japanese businessmen constantly complaining about India’s business environment. They should follow the example of Korean businessmen and introspect how they have succeeded in India. Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari raised some fundamental questions. He asked: if Japan was considered to be a declining power then why there was a need for an India-Japan strategic partnership. Similarly, why have a strategic partnership with the United States if it is actually declining. If the argument behind these strategic partnerships is a rising China then one must ask as to why China would not be a responsible power. Expressing doubts about China’s rise as a responsible power reflects the influence of Western thinking. He also said that the sea lanes had never been disrupted since World War II, thus, the security of sea lanes is not the biggest issue. He argued that we should not be uncritical of Western wisdom, which had actually projected India as a maritime threat in the 1970s. He further argued that the strategic partnership between India and Japan was ambivalent and Japanese perception of India was changing very slowly. Incidentally, he said that there was a minority view in Japan that favoured India’s nuclear programme. Brigadier Rumel Dahiya argued that the geostrategic importance of Japan must be assessed while exploring any strategic partnership. Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan mentioned that the economic aspect needs to be probed more. He further argued that India-Japan defence cooperation has not been strong. He argued that we should also try to understand Japanese laws and constitution, which prevents Japan from participating in any collective security mechanism. Concluding the discussion, Professor V.P. Dutt said that he felt that Japan’s new foreign policy was dubious, ambiguous and uncertain. He was of the opinion that Japanese leaders were making very vague statements about their foreign policy and they themselves may not be very clear as to what they want. He raised a larger philosophical point – the Japanese public seems to have lost interest in foreign affairs. Now, the question is whether Japan will remain confused or it will become even more confused. Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Assistant, IDSA |
East Asia | ||||
Maoist Mass Organisations and Mass Movement | April 23, 2010 | P. V. Ramana | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya, SM According to Dr. P.V. Ramana, in order to succeed in its revolutionary agenda of the armed overthrow of the state, a Communist group requires three magic weapons – strong Party, strong Army and United Front. The last of these involves the ‘mobilization of people’. His paper focuses exclusively on Maoist Mass Organisations or Front Organisations. The author explains that the Maoists have several mass organisations, at the State level as well as at the All India level (AIMOS), which are primarily of three types: 1) Underground Revolutionary: these are built clandestinely and conduct secret propaganda. 2) Open or semi-open Revolutionary: these directly serve the people’s war as long as there is room for undertaking open revolutionary activities. 3) Mass organisations not directly linked to CPI (Maoist): these are broad-based, not directly linked to the Maoist parent outfit, and function under cover with a limited set of activities as its mandate. This type can be further subdivided into three broad categories: (a) fractional work, (b) party-formed cover organisations, and (c) legal democratic organisations. Dr. Ramana elucidates the utilities of Mass Organisations for the Maoists as: One, they spread the ideology of the outfit among the people in the areas of their operation. Two, they serve as a recruiting base, or catchments, for the underground. Three, to watch for the future leadership of the outfit emerge from among the ranks of the Mass Organisations. He quotes the example of Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishenji and Naveen who were leaders of the Radical Students Union in Andhra Pradesh and Delhi, respectively. Four, members of Mass Organisations are drafted into the ‘people’s militia’, or the Base Force. Five, Mass Organisations would enable the Maoists to be ‘heard and seen.’ Dr. Ramana asserts that the availability of a large number of people as members of mass organisations has enabled the Maoists to create vast numbers of cadres for the people’s militia in the rural and tribal hinterland, who have participated in all the large-scale synchronized attacks on multiple targets in different parts of the country in Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal, beginning with the Koraput raid of February 6, 2004, and acquired a new proficiency and vigour in the Jehanabad Jail Break in Bihar on November 13, 2005. Dr. Ramana points out that the entire work of the Mass Organisations is guided and supervised by a committee appointed by the apex and all-powerful Central Committee. This committee is known as the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), formed for the first time in 2001. The purpose of SUCOMO is to provide direction on the issues that need to be taken-up by the Mass Organisations and to provide coordination at the all-India level for State-level Mass Organisations and All India Mass Organisations (AIMOs). In the next section of the paper, the author cites two cases from Andhra Pradesh where Mass Organisations got defunct after being quite active and popular for a while. Highlighting the case of Singareni Karmika Samkhya (SIKASA), the author mentions that SIKASA took up various issues that mattered for the people dependent upon the Singareni Collieries. These included mine safety, better working conditions and wages, exploitation of miners, rampant alcoholism, goondaism and exploitation by contractors. To implement its directives, the tool it used was “terror”. However, towards the latter half of the 1990s, the downfall of SIKASA commenced. The reasons included: the collieries accumulated losses of Rs. 1,250 crore and was referred to the BFIR; severe police crackdown commenced; and liberalisation policies came into force. Highlighting the case of the Andhra Pradesh Radical Students Union (APRSU), Dr. Ramana mentions that in the initial years APRSU went through a prolonged debate on whether its mandate should be to limit itself to addressing students’ problems alone, or to make it a part of the New Democratic Revolution and help build and lead the agrarian revolution in the villages. The latter view prevailed. The various issues taken-up by APRSU during the period of its active functioning, either when it was underground or worked openly, included: opposing detention system in schools, better facilities in welfare hostels, scholarships for students, reservation for the underprivileged in educational institutions, Karamchedu dalit massacre by upper caste landlords, opposing New Education Policy, protest marches against alleged fake encounters, etc. Nevertheless, towards the beginning of the mid-1990s, the downfall of APRSU commenced and now it is defunct. While the leadership loss contributed significantly to the slow demise of the APRSU, new ‘economic opportunities’ which threw open several avenues for the angry youth also played an important role in failing to attract students towards the Maoist-fold. According to Dr. Ramana, among all the states in the country, Mass organisations are most active and vibrant in the Bastar region in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. In the Dandakaranya region the Mass Organisations in operation are: DAKMS: The organisation started its activities in 1981 in Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh. A person who is at least 16 years of age and is a resident of the village is eligible to become a member of the particular village unit of DAKMS. However, landlords, lumpen elements and those suspected to be linked to the police are not granted membership of the unit. The objective in forming DAKMS was to protect the self-respect of the tribal (adivasi) populace, declare Dandakaranya as a ‘liberated area’, prevent religious conversions, fight for the rights of the tribal populace over the land, fight against privatization and the entry of multi-national corporations (MNCs), to fight for better wages and working conditions of the labour involved in collecting kendu leaf (similar to beedi leaf), bamboo fellers, and so on. KAMS: It is one of the most active mass organisations that operates in the Dandakaranya region and fights for the rights of tribal women. All women who are above 16 years of age are eligible to become members of the village unit in which they are resident. AKCS: It was founded in 1997 to fight for the rights of students and for solving their problems. Some of the issues taken-up by the organisation included effective implementation of mid-day meal scheme in schools, provide text books free of cost, grant scholarships, etc. KABS: It was founded in 1998, in the Konta and Basuguda areas of Dantewada district (South Bastar). All children between the ages of five and 15 are eligible to become members of KABS. The underlying motive behind forming this organisation seems to be ‘to catch them young’. Dr. Ramana concluded his presentation by assessing that on a broader national scale, the Maoists do not have a ‘mass base’, contrary to the impression that is created, which is essentially because recurring and frequent acts of ‘violence’ widely dispersed in different parts of the country attract publicity and visibility. The author, nevertheless, warns that it should be noted with concern that even the miniscule support they had built over the years has sufficient ‘nuisance value’ for the Indian state. Discussion
Report prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi |
Terrorism & Internal Security | |||
Space Assets and India’s Capability (Specific to Satellite Communication for Defence Forces up to 2020 and Beyond) | February 26, 2010 | Deepak Sharma | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Colonel Deepak Sharma treated the subject from the larger point of view of national security. He argued that space assets constitute a sub-set in the broader structure of national security, and highlighted the important role they play in military defence. According to him, imagery, navigation, signals intelligence, telecommunication, early warning and meteorology are the key satellite functions that are vital in military operations. Besides, on a strategic planning level, satellite communication would also be crucial to maintain and sustain troops deployed outside. After introducing the theme and its relevance in general, Sharma defined what he means by space system. He argued that space system meant both a satellite and its ground station(s), with trained and technically competent manpower attached to them. After this he produced various tables, graphs and charts giving a break-up of country-wise and function-wise statistics, and budgetary estimates of various countries. According to the statistics provided by him, more than half of the satellites orbiting around the earth are for communication purposes. Also, the United States dominates commercial and military space. In this section, he undertook case studies of American, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani space programmes and provided a comparative perspective. As for an Indian military space programme, he argued that “sufficient space capability exists with India to meet the requirements of its defence forces.” He argued that the Indian armed forces should demand for dedicated satellite facilities only when ISRO is unable to fulfill their requirements. He made a case for one competent and qualified agency in each service Headquarters for space systems that should be fully responsible to conceptualize, plan and implement the project in totality. He recommended that Indian space strategy should be region-focused as its strategic concerns are basically regional. Aspiring for global reach through satellites is neither reasonable nor fesible for India. As to the question of security of space assets, he argued that much of the fear is misplaced. Identifying an enemy’s satellites orbiting around the earth and, then, damaging or destroying them is not that easy, technologically. He advised that instead of being over anxious about the safety and security of satellites in space, the somewhat neglected aspect of security of space assets on the ground requires greater attention because the operation of satellites depends upon space centres on the ground. Col. Deepak Sharma’s presentation was followed by a very fruitful discussion. Mr. Yadvendra Singh argued that the effective use of space military technology by the United States in recent wars has prompted other countries to develop this technology. He pointed out that the United States heavily used commercial satellites for military communications in the Gulf Wars. Thus, using commercial satellites for military purpose is also a part of strategy. He also pointed out that the consequences would be grave if satellite systems were to collapse even for a single day. The damage incurred by such a failure would be 100 times more than in a war. He said that sharing of space and allocating coordinates will be a major issue in international politics in future because countries cannot place their satellites in orbit arbitrarily. Notwithstanding the fact that India started its space odyssey relatively late, its progress in space science has been impressive. Further, he said that Chinese business acumen and hard-bargaining have benefited its space programme a lot. Likewise, the Indian space programme can also take advantage of the worldwide recession and exploit the opportunities presented by it. Col. Navjot Singh averred that Deepak Sharma has performed a commendable job by highlighting the significance of ground space assets. He said that Sharma’s presentation has given ample food for thought. He highlighted the need of adequate laws for the safety and security of space assets and penalization of violators. Dr. Pankaj Jha raised several meaningful questions. He wanted to know what India was doing to tackle its vulnerabilities? What international agreements were there to assuage vulnerabilities? What was the international position on debris in space? The other internal discussant Mr. Kartik Bommakanti raised an important methodological issue of academic citation and validation. Air Commodore (Retd.) R.V. Phadke said that Sharma’s paper has done yeoman service to the IDSA as the institution was ‘technologically challenged’ and had shown relatively less interest in such studies. He noted that this was the first time that India’s capabilities were discussed; otherwise the general trend has been to highlight deficiencies only. The Chair, Dr. Arvind Gupta, wound up the session. In his remarks, he emphasized the point that the services would have to explain why they need dedicated satellites. He reiterated the point that our space and strategic community should start deliberating about rules of space sharing as it would be an important issue in times to come. Besides, the issue of debris has also the potential of becoming an important issue in international politics. India should not be caught in a NPT-like situation. Therefore, he insisted that there should be a national space policy. Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh |
Military Affairs | |||
Sustaining Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare | March 12, 2010 | K C Dixit | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Ashok Mehata Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta stated at the very outset that India fought its last conventional war in 1971. Since then, it has been fighting only sub-conventional wars. However, the real spurt to sub-conventional wars that India has been fighting came in the 1980s with the surge of Sikh and then Kashmiri militancy. As for the term ‘sub-conventional war’, he said that it simply denotes to anti-terrorist or counter-insurgency operations. He argued that India would continue to fight this mode of warfare for one or two generations more at least. Therefore, he argued, the study done by Col. K. C. Dixit was very relevant from the academic as well as policy points of view. Colonel K.C. Dixit, a Research Fellow at IDSA, examined in his paper the issue of how to keep soldiers’ (in Army tradition the word ‘soldier’ is generically applied to officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks) motivation high in the difficult conditions of sub-conventional war. What makes his paper really noteworthy is that it is based on an extensive field trip and personal interviews conducted by him. He went to Jammu and Kashmir in December 2009 and visited army units where he interviewed 880 soldiers. The interviewees were classified in three categories: officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks. He asked them 36 questions, which were wide ranging and covered the entire gamut of a soldier’s life. On the basis of responses given to his questions, he arrived at certain conclusions. He began by putting forward a simplified version of the definitional aspects of motivation. Then, he dwelt into the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare, juxtaposing it with conventional warfare. He then elaborated upon the factors affecting motivation in sub-conventional warfare. He recounted the absence of cooperation from the side of civil authority, media propaganda, lack of intelligence resulting in difficulty in identifying militants, pressing demand for quick reaction, problem with soldiers adapting to a new environment, problem of command and control, insistence on use of minimum force, unsatisfactory living conditions, pressures from human rights organizations, as prominent factors affecting motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare. After analyzing factors affecting motivation, he brought forward his conclusion that the conditions necessary to keep Indian soldiers motivated are far from being satisfactory. Here, he made some recommendations to improve the level of motivation among soldiers. His recommendations covered areas like training, organizational set up, judicious involvement and participation on the part of soldiers at various levels in decision-making, unit cohesion, making tasks challenging, exciting and meaningful, media management, the handling of junior leadership, delegation of powers, and many others. He finished his presentation by making a passionate plea for improving and sustaining motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare. The discussants were unanimous on the fact that the study done by Colonel K.C. Dixit was of immense significance and would surely help improve the working conditions of the Indian Armed Forces and increase their efficiency. However, they and other scholars present during the session made some valid methodological points, which needed to be addressed. Col. K.C. Dixit accepted these points and assured that he would accommodate them in the subsequent and final draft. Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh. |
Military Affairs | |||
The Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Implications for India | March 22, 2010 to March 23, 2010 | Conference |
The Quinquennial Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is scheduled for May 2010. The RevCon comes at a time when the global nuclear environment has become complex and turbulent. The issues before the 2010 RevCon are both structural and substantive. The NPT, which, came into force in 1970 and extended indefinitely in 1995, is assumed to be cornerstone of nuclear non proliferation regime. Yet, the treaty remains controversial on many counts, the most notable being the differing obligations for the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS). The NWS have not kept their promise of addressing the issue of global nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty, and instead have postponed disarmament under the guise of various technical and procedural issues. Since the 2005 RevCon, there have been significant developments in non-proliferation regime which will influence the outcome of 2010 RevCon. To begin with, the change of leadership in the United States, with President Barrack Obama articulating his country’s commitment to universal nuclear disarmament, may be a promising sign towards reviving efforts to move towards complete elimination. Obama’s vision presents the notion that the success of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the movement towards complete nuclear disarmament are strongly interlinked. The outstanding issues from 2005 also continue to remain contentious. This includes the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme and the efforts to reduce states access to nuclear energy (Article IV), North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty and the question of universalisation. The strengthening of the safeguards system by reaffirming obligations present in Article III of the NPT also forms a key issue wherein the issue of non-compliance is likely to be addressed. This issue is tied with the inalienable right of countries to access and develop nuclear energy, as well as fuel supply assurances for non- nuclear weapon states. The 2010 RevCon is the first after the landmark India-US nuclear deal, which was formulated outside the NPT framework. As one of the initiators of the treaty for nuclear non-proliferation four decades ago, India feels the treaty will not fulfill its mandate unless it initiates a process towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. With the Obama administration planning to revive the NPT and its adjunct mechanisms, there is now increasing pressure on India to accede to the NPT. On the one hand, a measure like UNSC Resolution 1887 asks all NPT non-signatories to join the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, and on the other, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Secretary Hillary Clinton indicate full partnership for India in an amended or restructured NPT. There is a need to address the complexities surrounding the 2010 NPT RevCon and to explore India’s policy option vis-a-vis the NPT and the nonproliferation regime. The following broad areas could constitute the basis for an informed analysis and debate for the two-day conference on The Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Implications for India
The format of themes and presentations at the conference could be as follows: First Day (Monday, March 22, 2010)0930-1030 Inaugural Session Session-I: Non-proliferation Regime and the NPTThis session could examine the key and continuing role of the NPT in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The presentations could examine the various dimensions of the crisis in the NPT and the potential shape of the treaty in the 21st century. Chairperson: Lt. Gen. V. R. Raghavan 1400-1700 Session-II: Nuclear Energy and the NPTThe second session, formatted as a panel discussion, could primarily ascertain the issues and problems pertaining to nuclear energy (Article IV) within the NPT framework. The central theme of the session could be to assess the impediments to nuclear commerce caused by increasing non-proliferation obligations. Key issues for debate could include multilateral approaches to fuel-cycle processes, fuel supply assurances, international fuel banks as well as influx of proliferation-resistant recycling technologies, including curbs on transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Chairperson: Dr. M. R. Srinivasan Second Day (Tuesday, March 23, 2010)0900-1100 Session-III: Challenges before the NPT (Structural Issues)The primary structural challenges confronting the NPT system could be the broad theme of this session. The presentations could touch upon significant structural issues like the withdrawal clause (Article X), negative security assurances, strengthening the safeguard mechanism including the Additional Protocol, nuclear and WMD terrorism, etc. Chairperson: Shri. K. Santhanam 1115-1315 Session-IV: Challenges before the NPT (Country-cases)Continuing with the examination of structural issues, this session would primarily explore the challenges caused to the NPT from individual nations, both state-parties and non-signatories. The focus of discussions could be on non-compliance, violations as well as challenges imparted by non-state actors, which could affect not just the NPT but also the non-proliferation regime. 1400-1630 Session-V: The NPT and Nuclear DisarmamentThis panel discussion could explore the opportunities and challenges to nuclear disarmament through the NPT route. The focus of debate could be the capability and potential of the NPT system to move towards the goal of total elimination. The discussions could also examine the relevance of alternate disarmament routes like the Nuclear Weapons Convention and how India could contribute to this process. 1645-1830 Session-VI: India and the NPTThe concluding session could address the opportunities for and contours of India’s potential engagement with the NPT and the terms of such engagement. This also encompasses assessments of the possibilities of widespread reforms in the NPT structure, including prospective restructuring of accession provisions. The presentations could thus also explore the merits and prospects of India’s accession, and the options available for the same. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) | ||||
India-US relations | March 16, 2010 | 1100 hrs | Round Table |
Discussion on the book In Search of Congruence: Perspectives on India-US Relations under the Obama Administration and current state of India-US relations |
|||||
Defence Budget (2010-2011) | March 11, 2010 | 1000 to 1300 hrs | Round Table | Defence Economics & Industry | |||||
Future of International Climate Regime | March 15, 2010 | Round Table |
Climate change is on top of the international and national political and strategic agendas. Post Copenhagen climate conference of December 2009, this was the first event organised by the non-traditional security cluster at IDSA. The speaker covered the following topics: Dr. Köberlein gave an overview of the occurrences in Copenhagen and the outcomes of COP 15. On the negative side, he assessed that the Copenhagen meeting was poorly organised by host Denmark, while the UN was found wanting and incapable of moderating the event towards an effective and fair deal. AOSIS states and LDCs were ignored whereas China and the United States played a power game which finally led to the meagre output. The Group of 77 proved to be disunited and non-adept in addressing its negotiation position. Copenhagen did not deliver a legally binding treaty which addresses the comprehensiveness of the climate threat but only a political declaration that has little value. Equity was never an issue in Copenhagen and adaptation was totally neglected. No funding mechanism was introduced and no funds assured so that it is unclear how mitigation and adaptation measures are to be financed. On the positive side, a new grouping BASIC was established which also included the United States. Moreover the 2 degree Celsius benchmark for dangerous climate change was universally accepted, and the ongoing validity of the Bali Action Plan to be finalised in Mexico at COP 16 gives hope for more target-oriented action in 2010. Dr. Köberlein claimed that climate science is far ahead of climate politics. There is scope and urgency for IPCC to improve and re-establish the faith of people in its work after the inapposite debate on the errors in the glacier study. For achieving this, IPCC requires a better communication strategy, an independent body that monitors and creates an outside expertise for peer-review. The best institution to host climate negotiations is the UN and UNFCC. But it has to define anew its role and strategy. A new president after the resignation of Yvo de Boer as well as a new approach in consensus finding might be the answer. G 20 was used in the last year as an alternate forum for climate negotiations and certain issues were hijacked. Yet, as LCDs and AOSIS states are excluded from G-20, this platform will never be able to address the principles of the climate conventions. Major Economies Forum as well was introduced by the United States to undermine the UN process. But since it does not have any universal support or legitimacy it is only a competing platform to the UN process and hence shall be elided. The EU was sidelined at Copenhagen and there is lack of leadership as compared to earlier COPs. This was mainly due to the global economic and financial crisis and the disparities amongst the 27 member states. Yet, its present approach to reduce 20 per cent of its emission till 2020, increase energy efficiency by 20 per cent and have 20 per cent of renewable energy in its energy mix is still the most ambitious approach to combat climate change. As far as Germany is concerned, it leads in climate policy. German Chancellor Merkel played a leading role when introducing climate change in the G-8 process in Heiligendamm in 2008. It leads in the promotion of renewables and also has the highest ambitions in terms of CO2 emission reduction till 2020 (40 per cent as compared to 1990). Germany can be seen as the initiator of a green market economy which has created more than 250,000 jobs in green technologies. It is also the leader in creating ideas in order to transform its economy to a low carbon economy (Green Deal, Feed-in Tariffs, renewable energy technologies). The challenges are in reaching consensus in international politics. Hence the first preparatory meeting at Bonn in April 2010 would play a crucial role to overcome the climate impasse. There is a need to build international institutions for finance transfer, a so-called Reserve Bank of Climate Change which gives stimuli and monitors the flow of funds. There is also need for a compliance mechanism which deals with countries violating the climate treaty. In equity matters the speaker felt that there was a need to redefine the principle of equity and spell out the meaning of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. It will be necessary to regroup the Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries since there are vast differences between countries such as Bangladesh and South Korea for example which are non-comparable. At the national level also equity needs to be addressed and a concept of vulnerability developed (vulnerability index). The speaker also introduced three equity approaches by Think Tanks. He handed out a report by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) titled “Solving the Dilemma: The budget approach” which was released by the German government prior to the Copenhagen meeting, the ‘Greenhouse Development Rights Approach’ which was published by HBF (Dr. Köberlein made the HBS paper of February 2010 on “Failure or Opportunity? A Regional Analysis of Copenhagen Climate Conference and How its Outcome Has Been Perceived” available). Besides, he distributed a report by HBF, India: Emerging Leadership on Climate Change written by Malini Mehra in December 2008. During the discussion it was brought out that equity and per capita emission rights will remain key issues. India’s contribution is the least and only flows are being highlighted and not the stocks. Impact of mitigation actions by India will be minimal as it is still low in per capita terms. Indian emissions are three times less compared to China’s, which is nearly at par with France on per capita terms. Ethics of over-consumption was also highlighted with the hope that the USA, the biggest polluter, will also be willing to be part of a deal. Issue that might create problems in future will be a compliance mechanism and a universally accepted definition of equity in the climate regime. Report prepared by P.K. Gautam |
Non-Traditional Security | |||||
India's Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb | February 26, 2010 | 1500 to 1700 hrs | Book Discussion Forum |
Venue: Seminar Hall No 1, IDSA by Dr Priyanjali Malik |