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| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Visit of NIDS Delegation to IDSA | May 24, 2010 | Round Table |
A 16-member delegation from the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, led by Major General Seiichi Takeuchi visited the IDSA on May 24 and held discussions on issues of mutual interests and concerns between India and Japan. The IDSA team was led by Dr. Thomas Mathew, Deputy Director-General of IDSA and consisted of members of the IDSA’s East Asia cluster. At the outset, Dr. Mathew extended a warm welcome to the NIDS delegation and expressed satisfaction over the growing cooperation between India and Japan in many fronts. He observed that the security interests of India and Japan converge on many fronts, with maritime security including Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) remaining an issue of paramount concern for the two countries. He noted that 90 to 92 per cent of Japan’s imports pass through the Indian Ocean. Similarly, SLOCs are important for India as a large amount of India’s exports and imports pass through the Indian Ocean. He urged greater cooperation between the two countries in the fields of security and economy. He also observed that India believes in peaceful cooperation but at the same time it wants that no country is able to dominate the Asian region. He also made the point that though India wants peace, it is concerned with China’s defence spending and its plans to build a blue water navy and highlighted the fact that Japan has also asked for transparency from China on its defence spending. As regards economic cooperation, he highlighted the fact that Japan has been the largest donor and its development assistance has made visible impacts in India, with the Delhi Metro a symbol of such cooperation. He also noted that Japan’s growing FDI in India is more than that in China and termed it a matter of confidence. He concluded that bilateral relations are satisfactory and observed that he finds the present situation between the two democracies most appropriate to take the relationship forward. On behalf of the NIDS, Maj. Gen. Seiichi Takeuchi welcomed Dr. Thomas Mathew’s remarks by observing that “your words are very warm”. He expressed satisfaction over the growing number of Indian students in Japan and academic exchanges taking place between the two countries. He said that the incident of Allondra Rainbow, the Japanese ship that was rescued by the Indian Coast Guard from pirates, set an example for the Japanese to seek defence cooperation with India which has grown over the years. But he also highlighted that this cooperation should not be limited to the naval sphere and should go beyond so as to “deepen this relationship” further. He also expressed satisfaction over regular meetings between the Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two countries. He also suggested that both IDSA and NIDS should pick up more topics for research. During the meeting, Air Cmde. Ramesh Phadke presented a briefing on China. He said that China is an important neighbour for both India and Japan. The Rise of China makes it necessary to try and understand China in a better way. He also observed that India’s relationship with China was sound and based on five peaceful principles. But after events in Tibet in 1958 and 1962 border clashes, the relationship remained frozen. He also appraised the NIDS delegation about India’s official position and said that China continues to be in illegal possession of some Indian territories especially in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. He said that both countries signed two treaties during the Prime Ministership of Narasimha Rao, but after 13 rounds of negotiations on border issues, there has not been enough progress. He also highlighted the fact that India is not inclined to embark on an arms race. The un-demarcated border, however, poses concerns. He also reminded the delegation of China’s intention to increase its sphere of influence in the South China Sea and opined that “we fear that the development can cause concern for Japan and India.” He also touched upon other areas such as China’s military modernization and its cyber warfare capabilities, which are causing concern among the international community and suggested that both India and Japan need to understand China better. Dr. Ashok Behuria presented a briefing on developments in South Asia. According to him, South Asia is passing through a critical phase at present. In the last few years, almost all the states in the region have reverted to democracy. This positive development, however, coincided with the emergence of an asymmetric threat, particularly from non-states actors. When Maldives and Bhutan adopted democracy, India encouraged that step. However, transition to democracy has not been very peaceful in the context of South Asian states. In this context, examples of Bangladesh and Nepal can be cited in particular. In Bangladesh, the current Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina is struggling to sustain democracy. The last few years have also witnessed dramatic changes in Indo-Bangladesh relations. In Nepal, the political reconciliation process with the Maoists is in turmoil. How to bring this revolutionary group into the mainstream has been an issue of concern so far. Recently, in early May, the Maoists staged a mass scale demonstration which caught the attention of international community. Being a close neighbour, India has been following the developments in Nepal closely. A similarity can be drawn between Nepal and Sri Lanka, as the island country is also facing a critical situation as far as reconciliation of the Tamil ethnic minority is concerned. While discussing recent developments in Afghanistan, Dr. Behuria stated that so far the Af-Pak strategy of the US has failed to achieve the desired goal. It has been opined that a regional and international consensus is required to deal with Afghanistan. But due to the rivalry between India and Pakistan, such a consensus remains elusive. At present, reconciliation between the Afghanistan government and Taliban is posing a serious challenge. Both the US administration and the international community consider Pakistan as the link between the Afghan government and the Taliban in war-torn Afghanistan. But so far, Pakistan has not delivered much on this front. The reconciliation process in Afghanistan has been further affected by Taliban’s refusal to abide by the existing law of the country and its insistence on introducing Islamic Sharia law instead. Pakistan has problems of its own. At present, it is suffering from Islamic radicalization. Over the years, Pakistan has always tried to make a distinction between good Taliban and bad Taliban, good Jihadis and bad Jihadis. The Taliban militants involved in anti-India operations are treated by Pakistan as good Taliban. Its lack of sincerity in fighting terrorism head-on can be clearly seen in its deliberate failure to capture the perpetrators of the 26/11 attack in Mumbai. This has not only slowed down the peace process between India and Pakistan, but also hampered meaningful progress in bilateral as well as regional economic cooperation. China-Pakistan nuclear missile cooperation has also been an issue of great concern to India. Over the years, Pakistan has been alleging India of harbouring a hegemonic approach towards South Asia. But it cannot overlook the fact that India has been very accommodative towards its neighbours. In fact, despite its rivalry with Pakistan, India offered the latter the status of ‘Most-Favoured Nation’. But so far, it has not been reciprocated by Pakistan. At a time when South Asia is attracting considerable international attention, Pakistan may have to change its attitude towards India and other South Asian neighbours under international pressure. A positive attitude on Pakistan’s part can go a long way in bringing peace and prosperity to the region. Report prepared by Shamshad Ahmad Khan and Pranamita Baruah |
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| From Islamization to Talibanization: Pakistan's drift towards 'Lebanonisation' | June 11, 2010 | P. K. Upadhyay | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Prof. Satish Kumar Paper SummaryThe creation of Pakistan was a unique human-political experiment, in which an effort was made to create an Islamic, but sectarian-secular state in which state and religion were to co-exist side-by-side and the socio-political interaction of its subjects was not to be affected by their differing sectarian Islamic identities, beliefs, practices and commitments. It was the Barelvis of North India and the Muslim Leaguers of Central India, East Bengal and West Punjab who spearheaded the movement for creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Later, they were joined by the Deobandis, to create a truly Islamic Pakistan in which the Islamic Law – the Shariat – would be supreme. The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan declared Pakistan to be an “Islamic Republic”. In the 1970s, the concept of Pan-Islamism encouraged by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was instrumental in building a close linkage between Pakistan’s radical Deobandis and the Saudi Wahabis. This increased cooperation had major implications for the growth of radical Islam in Pakistan in particular and in the entire region as a whole in the next decade. Radicalism received a further boost as the madarssas run by Deobandi groups like the Jammat-e-Islami (JI) and other radical Islamic right groups began to be used to brainwash and indoctrinate the youth. The next phase in radicalization of Pakistani Islam under Deobandi influence came during General Zia-ul Haq’s period. General Zia contended that since Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, it should be supreme in the country. In the late 1970s, the Soviet entry into Afghanistan enabled Pakistan to play the great game of espionage and subversion in Afghanistan. Pakistani Islamic parties could also operationalise a wider plan for launching global Islamic activism under Pakistani leadership. By the end of 1980, not only massive US military and economic aid was flowing into Pakistan for the Pakistanis and the mujahideen, also, over 1 million Afghan refugees entered Pakistan. They became the recruiting ground for the Afghan Islamic mujahideen groups and their Pakistani Deobandi/Wahabi supporters. In the 1990s, a group of 200 theological students from Pakistani Deobandi Islamic seminaries - the Taliban (Students) – mysteriously emerged and entered Kandahar from Pakistan. With clear Pakistani official directions and overt and covert assistance, they took over arms and other local assets of Afghan warlords, including those of Gulbudin Hikmatyar. Soon, except for the northern parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban brought almost the entire country under its control. They began to implement strictest Shariat as per the Deobandi interpretation. Afghanistan was declared by the Taliban as “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” in 1996 after the capture of Kabul. During post 9/11 period, Pakistan had to end its open support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It was also forced to get more deeply involved with US operations against Taliban/Al-Qaeda in return for easing of US sanctions and receiving massive economic and military assistance from it. However, these measures were either merely cosmetic, or were not taken to their logical end and remained half-hearted, designed to please western audiences. After the fall of Taliban in late 2001, Pakistani militants siding with them came back home to further the experiment of introducing Islamic order as per Deobandi/Wahabi precepts in the tribal hinterland of Swat and other areas of FATA. Pakistani government’s inadequacy in dealing with the Taliban became apparent in April 2009 as President Asif Ali Zardari sanctified an agreement (also known as the Swat deal) through an ordinance imposing Shariat in the Swat Valley and the surrounding areas effectively empowering the Taliban and other groups. This followed the passage of a unanimous resolution on the subject by the Pakistani Parliament. According to the author, the core of the problem lies in the lack of public debate within Pakistan over issues regarding how to deal with the present danger from radical Islam. He, however, believes that it would still be difficult to Talibanize the whole Pakistani society. The Taliban are likely to encounter stiff resistance from the Barelvis (constituting more than 50 per cent of Pakistani Muslims), the Shias (constituting roughly 30 per cent), Muhajirs and the ethnic Sindhis. The Pakistan Army and the ISI now appear to be plumping for exploiting the mass-based evangelical movement of Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) to ideologically take on the Taliban and their allies. However, if TJ begins to undercut Taliban’s ideological base, the latter may take recourse to targeting TJ leaders and cadres as it has done with Barelvis and others. That would either dissipate TJ influence as an ideological counter to the Taliban, or force it to arm itself for self-defence. If that happens, it could be the actual beginning of ‘Lebanonization’ of Pakistan. Under this situation, the country could get carved up in various pockets of militarised ethno-sectarian influences and as a consequence the reach and the role of the Government and its institutions may be truncated, creating a Lebanon-like situation. PK Upadhyay concluded the paper by stating that Pakistan can still overcome this serious existential challenge. For that it has to totally transform itself from what it has become in the past sixty years since independence. It has to make the tough choice of either picking up the secularist trail of Jinnah or choosing to go the Lebanese way. Discussion and Suggestions
Report prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant, IDSA. |
South Asia | ||||
| Madhesi Movement in Nepal: Implications for India | May 28, 2010 | Nihar R. Nayak | Fellows' Seminar |
Dr. Nihar Nayak began by offering some basic facts about the Madhesi movement. Although there exist a number of versions about what the word ‘Madhes’ stands for, the most popular or accepted version is that it refers to ‘Madhya-desh’, a region between the hills and the plains. Also known as ‘Terai’, Madhes region consists of twenty districts, all of which share their borders with India. Many Madhesis are of Indian origin and thus have strong socio-cultural ethnic linkages across the border. In the paper, Dr. Nayak flagged three questions: Is the Madhes issue likely to bring in deep-rooted conflict in Nepal? Can external forces take advantage of the situation to India’s detriment? How will Madhesi politics determine the future of Nepal politics and India-Nepal relations in the future? Over the years, Madhesis have suffered from a sense of discrimination and consequent deprivation. They also feel exploited and discriminated against by the upper caste Pahadi migrant communities. Hindi-speaking Indian Madhesis particularly feel discriminated against by the Nepali state due to the following factors. Firstly, Indian Madhesis, under the Citizenship Act of 1964 and the Constitution of 1990, were debarred from citizenship certificates, due to which they could neither acquire land ownership nor could avail government benefits. Although the Citizenship Law was amended in November 2006 making it possible for people born in Nepal before 1990 and those residing there permanently to acquire Nepali citizenship, it has been alleged that many Madhesis and Dalits are still deprived of citizenship. It has also been alleged that instead of taking into consideration the Madhesis’ cultural affiliation with India, the Nepali government has adopted a discriminatory attitude towards this group by trying to introduce compulsory Nepali language for both official work and as the medium of education in the Madhes region. Despite the fact that the Madhesi population constitutes nearly one-third of the Nepali population, their share at the level of gazetted level employees is merely 9.9 per cent. Madhesi people have also voiced concerns about the economic exploitation of the resource-rich Madhes region by the Nepali government. Although Madhes contributes 70 per cent of the agricultural production of Nepal, 65 per cent of the GDP, and 76 per cent of the country’s total revenue, the infrastructure in this region is considered to be much poorer than in the hill areas. Allegations have also been made regarding how during the monarchy, in the name of land reform, land belonging to Madhesi people were given away to Pahadis. A feeling of deprivation and exploitation made the Terai or Madhes region a hub of the pro-democratic movement during the 1950s and 1960s. During that time, perceiving India as anti-establishment and the Madhesis as India’s agents, and fearing that Indian immigrants in Terai might prompt India to claim it as Indian territory, the Nepali elite adopted stringent policies to curb the Madhesis’ activism. But this led to the emergence of identity-based movement in Madhes, particularly with the formation of two groups: the Nepal Terai Vongress led by Vedanta Jha in 1951 and the Madhesi Mukti Andolan led by Raghunath Thakur in 1956. At present, numerous political parties and non-state actors are involved in the Madhesi cause. In this context, examples of Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP), etc., can be particularly cited. There also exist a number of major armed groups in the Terai region, such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), Terai Cobra, Nepal Defence Army (NDA), Nepal Janatantrik Party (NJP), and Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj (CBES). Although all these forces are involved in armed revolution in Nepal, there seems to be a divergence in the goals each of them aspires to achieve. While JTMM demands the establishment of an autonomous Terai region, and Terai Cobra aspires to launch an armed separatist struggle for a sovereign Terai state, the objective of NDA is to form a Hindu army with suicide bombers to fight against religious extremism, conversion, as well as Maoists. Similarly, while as a royalist outfit, the NJP aspires to retain constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy in Nepal, the CBES basically demands the establishment of a Chure Bhawar federal region in Terai and is opposed to ‘one Madhesh one Pradesh’ demand. There are reports of ‘internal tensions and lack of clarity on immediate demands and long term strategy’ of Madhesi groups. While the Madhes-based parties take a soft stand on the issue, the armed groups are demanding nothing less than sovereignty. Moreover, the Madhesi political parties are in a dilemma especially regarding whom to take sides with among the major parties. They cannot support a liberal democratic government in Kathmandu as their autonomy demand would be lost. They cannot really support the Maoists basically due to the prevailing fear of losing a multi-party democratic system in Nepal under a Maoist led government. In the meantime, due to their involvement in kidnapping, killing and extortion, some armed groups involved in the Madhesi cause are often dismissed as criminals by most Madhesis themselves. In this scenario of diffused leadership and objectives, the future of the Madhes cause remains uncertain. In his presentation, Dr. Nayak tried to draw attention to the fact that unstable Nepal, particularly the border regions of Terai, can provide avenues for both China and Pakistan to encourage anti-India elements there, through arms and fake currency trafficking, madrasas, terrorist outfits, etc. Reportedly, China has already extended its support to the faction of the MFJ led by Upendra Yadav. In recent time, the United States too has taken particular interest in the developments of Madhesi region. Although it has listed JTMM on the US terrorist list, it granted a visa to Upendra Yadav to attend the Terai Diaspora event held in Washington. Over the years, while treating Madhesi issue as an internal matter of Nepal which can be resolved by accommodating minority rights within the new Constitution, India has largely taken a stance of non-interference. Even then, the Pahadis often allege India of encouraging the ‘one Madhes, one Pradesh’ demand. According to Dr. Nayak, if such perceptions gain further ground, it would aggravate the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal and consequently give more space to China and Pakistan to use Nepal as a hotbed for anti-India activities. Ironically, the Madhesis accuse India of neglecting the Madhesi movement. Recently, in June 2009, allegations were raised regarding India’s involvement in engineering divisions in the MJF. Debate has also been brewing in the Terai that the Madhesis have failed to take any concrete decision about their future because of India’s support for the liberal democratic parties opposed to ethnic-based federalism. According to Dr. Nayak, anti-Indianism of the Madhes movement is likely to affect India’s economic interests in Nepal. Frequent protests will affect India’s trade and commercial relations with Nepal. It will also affect India’s hydroelectric projects and the business operations of Indian investors in Nepal. Since the Terai is the link between India and northern Nepal, a troubled Terai may affect “every major highway, custom point. The industrial, economic, and other fertile resources of Nepal are in Madhesh, helping circulate trade relationship.” Under the prevailing circumstances, India is faced with certain difficult choices. Any constructive attempt by India to salvage the Terai situation through proactive involvement is likely to be interpreted as unnecessary intervention in the internal affairs of Nepal and upset its Pahadi constituency and Nepal Army. At another level, passive indifference to developments in Terai will be misconstrued as shirking of responsibility by observers at home as well as by the Madhesis themselves. India cannot possibly afford to ignore developments in Nepal and especially the discrimination in Terai. At present, the best approach for India seems to be to work as a positive facilitator to strengthen the capacity of various democratic institutions to resolve the social tensions in Nepal in general and in Terai in particular. Given India’s leverages in Nepal, India could also make an earnest effort to bring all political parties together to have a dialogue on the contentious issues. Important points raised during the discussion of the paper:
Report prepared by Pranamita Barua, Research Assistant, IDSA |
South Asia | ||||
| The Emerging Nuclear Security Regime: Challenges Ahead | June 25, 2010 | Rajiv Nayan | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Ambassador R Rajagopalan
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Nuclear and Arms Control | ||||
| Illegal Bangladeshi Migration to India: Impact on Internal Security | May 07, 2010 | Anand Kumar | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Shri Ajit K Doval Stating that that they are around 10-20 million illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India, Dr. Anand Kumar emphasized the need to understand the security aspects of illegal migration. The 9/11 Commission report points out that practically no communication existed between the security system and the immigration department. Unchecked and unregulated migration flows together with high fertility rates could create an explosive situation. While urbanization is prompting migration towards industrialized nations, the author pointed to lax immigration control which allowed terrorism to grow thus weakening the internal security. He pointed out that the main problem inherent with illegal migration was the lack of cooperation of Bangladesh on the issue. He pointed out that sending migrants to other countries is the undeclared objective of the foreign policy of Bangladesh. Though attempts have been made in India to prevent illegal migration, they have been relatively weak. The author stated that the socio-political movement started by the Assamese people in 1979 to evict illegal Bangladeshis ended in Assam Accord in 1985. In April, 2005 a youth organization, Chiring Chapori Yuva Mancha began a campaign against the illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. Illegal Bangladeshi Migrants are also threat to language and culture of Assam. ULFA which arose as a protest against Bangladeshis lost credibility only when its leaders took shelter in Bangladesh after the Bhutanese operation against the group in December 2003. Arrest of Bangladeshi national S. M. Alam in January 2008 by Assam Police revealed ISI’s plan to turn northeast into a volatile region. The migrants have also spread into other places like Dimapur and Kohima. The illegal migrants are not involved into terrorism in a big way, but involved in gun running, fake currency rackets and drug running. Growing population pressure in Bangladesh acts as a push factor whereas growing Indian economy, relatively less pressure on land and weak state resistance act as pull factor. Islamic fundamentalist extremist groups are growing in Bangladesh and they are able to expand their activities in West Bengal as well. Some of such organistaions are Jamait-e-Islami-e-Hind, Jamait-Ahle-Hadis, Students Islamic Organization (SIO), Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Tabligh-e-Jamat. Four of them are most active. Meetings have taken place between Jamaat-e-Islami and West Bengal based radical Muslim organizations and it is believed that ISI is behind them. There has been a growth of unauthorized, illegal madrassas all over West Bengal particularly along the Bangladesh border. They are also using Kolkota and Agartala as bases being close to the border and people from both sides speak the same language. There are also groups which are directly involved in subversive activities such as HUJI. Siliguri town acts as gateway to Guwahati, Gangtok and Kishengunj and also shares the border with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. Important highways, railways tracks, vital installations such as the airfields of Bagdogra and Hashimara and oil pipelines are located here. Increase in Muslim population in Siliguri and adjoining areas has grown at an astonishing 150% in the past seven years. There are villages in and around Siliguri which have curious population mix and often act as heaven for ISI operatives. The villages have some 2,000 Pashto and Baloch settlers from Afghanistan along with 6,000 Iraninas. The increased activity of the ISI has endangered the security of the Siliguri corridor. ISI attempted sabotage in 1999 following a bomb blast at New Jalpaiguri Station. Options for India:
The author concluded by pointing out that the illegal Bangladeshi migration was not the core focus of the government but it has been forced to take a close look at the problem as the terror incidents grew in intensity and frequency. He emphasized that India must go for better border management and effective record keeping of its nationals so that outsiders are easily identified and discouraged from infiltrating. Discussion:
Report Prepared by Mr Pramod Jaiswal, Research Assistant, IDSA |
South Asia | |||
| India - Africa Partnership: What the future holds? | April 28, 2010 | Conference |
The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi held a national seminar on India-Africa Partnership: What the Future Holds on Wednesday, April 28, 2010. It was organized to discuss and evaluate the future of India’s historic ties with African countries. During the Seminar it was acknowledged that Africa is going through transformation not only in conflict resolution and peace but also in its economy. Its geopolitical significance has increased in the strategic calculus of major powers. Secondly, the traditional approach based on the emotional quotient is not going to work any more now in the prevailing scenario. India needs to look at Africa in a renewed sense and there should be a proper approach to study the same.
Need to Develop Strategic Ties: The conference reiterated that India and Africa share an old civilisational link, a shared legacy of anti-colonial struggle and an emotional bonding. It was Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who laid down India’s Africa policy for the first time in a positive manner. Anti-imperialism was given special emphasis in his policy. In the post Nehruvian period, particularly in the 1960s and early 1970s, India had a great impact on African countries. During the Cold War, India’s relation with Africa was ‘selective’, due to ongoing bloc politics. Even after the end of the Cold War, Africa was basically treated as a marginalized continent. But over the years, due to factors like democratization, introduction of multiparty election system, and rising GDP have helped many African countries to improve their image at the international level. Over the last few years, the relationship has entered a realistic phase. India’s status as a rising power and its increasing dependence on energy resources brought about a new dimension in India-Africa relations. Mutual cooperation became important. The 2008 India-Africa Summit was a path breaking development in strengthening relations further as the summit emphasized particularly on India’s engagement in developing peace and security in the African region. However, it was noted that there is a lack of coherence in India’s Africa policy. It was felt that most African countries give India high regard, look up to India, and appreciate it for its non-intrusive policy which is rare by any major country. However, India has not capitalized on the goodwill it enjoys in Africa because of a lack of vision in its foreign policy. India’s Africa policy had been ‘request-based’ instead of ‘initiative-based.’ The ‘request-based’ approach is more rewarding as it increases bargaining power. Now it is high time India looked at Africa from a strategic point of view and planned accordingly; otherwise it will miss the opportunity. India has already developed strategic partnerships with African countries like Nigeria and South Africa. It has also established defence cooperation with thirteen African countries. India’s contribution towards peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in various parts of Africa since the 1960s has been highly appreciated. At present, the Indian government is basically focusing on training and capacity building in peace keeping in Africa. Role of Major Powers: Africa has now become a central issue in great power politics. The United States (US), the European Union (EU) and China are the major powers in the context of Africa. Africa’s natural resources and the post-9/11 security scenario are two important drivers of great power competition in Africa. In recent times, US engagement with Africa has increased manifold after the American embassies in Africa were bombed in 1998. Although the United States has always used aid as a foreign policy tool in Africa in the post-World War II period, a new set of countries is receiving much higher aid in the wake of 9/11, reflecting American priorities. Africa-EU relations stabilized after the Africa-EU Lisbon Conference. However, trade balance heavily favours the EU; and Africa’s distrust of European countries continues. China is an important power in the African context. It has dramatically increased its physical presence and visibility by sending huge numbers of Chinese workers and officials there and is cultivating rapport with African governments by using their services, whereas India lags far behind on this account. On the competition between India and China in Africa, it was felt that India can compete with China in certain sectors of economy and in certain African regions. India’s pace of engagement there is much slower than that of China. The biggest advantages for India is that African countries have never considered it as an interventionist power since, unlike China, it does not follow a policy of labour-capitalism, which means that Indian companies do not bring labourers from India. By and large they provide employment to local African people only. India should continue to send troops for Africa missions under the aegis of the United Nations. It should train African militaries and help African countries build capacity. As far as the Russian role is concerned, it is still an emerging power in Africa, though in the last five years its interest in Africa has increased. Focus on West Africa: During the conference special mention was made of the West African region. Despite its richness in natural resources including iron ore, gold, diamond, and minerals, West Africa has faced the problem of lack of transparency in managing resources. West Africa suffers from a number of political and security concerns as well. Peace and stability is troubled by conflicting relations among major groups in the region. Most such conflicts are long drawn and involve more than one country. Tribal loyalty is another major problem. As national boundaries are not clearly defined among West African countries, the distribution of population belonging to a tribe has emerged as a big security issue. People belonging to the same tribe inhabit different countries and many times tribal loyalty supersedes statehood. Frequent coups are another security problem in West Africa. Moreover, prolonged military rule in many West African countries has led to the rise of militarism in that region. Territorial and maritime boundary disputes also pose great security concerns in West Africa. However, the most serious security threat is that of international terrorism and the possible connection between terrorist groups and drug mafia. As far as terrorism is concerned, the example of AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) is often cited. In 2005, a US government report stated that South Africa, Nigeria and the Trans-Sahara region have emerged as major hubs of international terrorism. The possibility of growing linkage between terrorist organizations and drug mafia has posed another major security threat for the West African region as well as for the international community. Although maritime security issues concerning West African region are treated seriously by the US and the EU, at present India does not consider it a major concern and has shown greater concern towards similar issues in the Indian Ocean littoral of the African continent.
Over the years, the Indian economy has become increasingly dependent on natural resources imported from Africa. 16 per cent of India’s crude oil import is from African countries, mainly Nigeria, Egypt, Liberia and Sudan. Acquiring assets, particularly in the hydrocarbon and fertilizer sector, has been emphasized by India. BHEL is currently exploring the possibility of strengthening its relations with Nigeria in the power sector. Of late, many African countries are offering agricultural land to other countries, including India. Indian private sector companies have taken special interest in the African agriculture sector. Both India and Africa have expressed a commitment to reducing trade barriers and transferring skills to the youth, while also encouraging student scholarships and bridging the digital divide. Institutionally, business chambers in both India and Africa have important roles to play. Indian companies have made efforts to break perceptions and increase confidence among their African partners. Steps like doubling trade, adopting a regional approach to investment, helping each other develop a vibrant economy, promoting agriculture and green technologies, engaging Indian expertise in African rural electrification process, and promoting joint ventures in alternative sources of energy etc. should be adopted to improve the economic relationship. India's contribution towards capacity building in Africa stands at $10 billion. India’s size and rapid economic growth are central towards this change in policy. But also, India’s efforts to secure oil, its growing clout in international affairs, and improved relations with the West and relations with countries in its extended neighborhood have played a role in this Africa engagement. India follows an asset-acquisition policy in the energy sphere. 10 per cent of the world’s oil resource and 8 per cent of gas resources are in Africa. It has also become an important alternative source of energy after the Middle East. Yet, mutual partnerships do not mean benevolence. Instead of following a mercantilist approach, India needs to build capacity for refining and set up "down stream industries". India should aim towards Africa’s sustainable development and the Indian government should be bolder in its approach to Africa. Conflict Resolution: Most conflicts in Africa are driven by internal factors, particularly ethnic antagonism. However, ethnicity is not the only factor. Many other factors are equally responsible for the occurrence of civil war within African countries. Ethnicity is just one of those factors which get channelled into the eruption of civil strife. Failure of state institutions in allocating national resources adequately has emerged as a serious problem. Nation building is another problem. The colonial legacy has created antagonism among African countries, which often lead to conflict and violence. In conflict resolution of Africa India could extend its help in training African military personnel, police as well as peacekeepers in resolving conflict. As democratization is the most effective tool in resolving disputes, India can be instrumental for the African states in transferring power in a peaceful manner. India’s assistance in conducting election in African states can also be of tremendous help. Active involvement on India’s part in the development process of Africa will boost India-Africa relations to a large extent. Security Ties: If India aspires to have a long term relationship with Africa, it will certainly need to bring in a security dimension. Instead of emphasizing on the economic aspect alone, India should extend its military support particularly towards non-military activities in Africa. At present Africa is facing a number of major security challenges, including poverty, pandemics, lack of governance, and so on. Regional and international organizations are not doing much to resolve such problems. UN missions, in particular, are losing their credibility in Africa at a fast pace, simply because these missions are not robust enough to face the regional issues. While socio-economic engagement with Africa is necessary, military commitment towards non-military missions, especially humanitarian assistance, should be given much more emphasis. To have much closer relations with the African people, India needs to adopt such a policy towards Africa. This kind of ‘soft power’ approach in resolving security problems in Africa will offer India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa a unique component. Such a change is necessary in India’s approach when Africans have increasingly come to regard the United States as a runaway military power and China as a power with an exclusively mercantile interest. To bring about such a dramatic change in India’s policy toward Africa will be quite difficult, particularly because the Indian establishment is known for its risk aversion. But if India really aspires to develop a long term strategic partnership with Africa, such a step is worth taking. Diaspora: Diaspora has been an important driver of the Indo-Africa partnership. However, one of the problems is that India has not been able to convert the two million strong diaspora into a resource. The dialpora’s experience of integrating with Africa has been very diverse, so the community cannot be treated as a monolithic entity. The countries that house sizable numbers of the Indian diaspora have a different experience from others. Indians in South Africa are higher up the ladder in education than whites. Their contribution to the apartheid struggle and freedom movement was alongside the blacks. But it remains a tiny minority and hence feels threatened. There are several issues that need to be addressed:
Also, there are doubts on whether India was doing enough to engage the diaspora. Such an engagement should become a strategic necessity, and not simply a choice. The real question is whether India has the political will to take such a step. The conference ended with acknowledgement of the various patterns of India’s engagement with Africa. It was emphasized that in future, the economic engagement of the continent will be led by the private sector with a considerable reduction in the role of the government. In recent years, China has made inroads in Africa. However, there should be a sense of caution that Africans do not view India and China as rivals who are engaged in creating their spheres of influence there. It was suggested that IDSA could generate new ideas that could further lead to cooperation and commitment between India and Africa. At the same time IDSA should interact with similar think tanks/institutions in African countries. It was recommended that with the growing strategic importance of Africa, the Indian government will have to device a coherent policy to address its interests in the continent and relate them to African needs. Prepared by Ruchita Beri with inputs from P. K. Pradhan, Priyanka Singh, Prashant Kumar Singh, Pranamita Baruah and Mayank Bubna. Programme and Concept Note |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | |||||
| Special Address - Global Security Challenges: A Finnish Perspective | April 27, 2010 | 1500 to 1630 hrs | Speeches and Lectures |
Venue: Auditorium, IDSA Programme1500 Hrs 15:05-15:10 15:10-15:45 15:45-16:00 16:00-16:05 16:05-16:30
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| 9th IDSA-BESA Bilateral Dialogue | April 13, 2010 | Bilateral |
Venue: Board Room (First Floor), IDSA
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| BSF Comdt Course – 2 (Level-1) | December 13, 2010 to December 24, 2010 | Training Capsules |
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| DIG Course -2 (Level-2) | November 01, 2010 to November 05, 2010 | Training Capsules |
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The participants in the seminar were from different fields. The Indian diplomatic community was represented by Ambassador Shashank, Former Foreign Secretary, Ambassador R. Rajagopalan, Mr. Gurjit Singh, JS (E&SA) MEA, Dr. Ausaf Sayeed JS (WA), MEA, and Ambassador V. B. Soni. The eminent panelists from the academia included Prof. Rajen Harshe, Vice Chancellor Allahabad University, Prof. Sanjukta Bhattacharya, Jadhavpur University, Prof. Ajay Dubey, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Prof. Aparajita Biswas, Mumbai University, Dr. Bijay Pratihari and Dr. Jamal M. Moosa from Jamia Milia Islamia. Panelists from IDSA included Mr. N. S. Sisodia, DG IDSA, Dr. Arvind Gupta, LBSC, Prof. P. Stobdan, Senior Fellow, Ms. Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate, Col. Raj Shukla and Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Research Fellows. The following issues were highlighted in the seminar: 
Trade and Investment: In case of trade too, West Africa remains important for India. The very fact that India’s trade with West Africa constitutes the major portion of its total trade with the whole of Africa is indicative of that. It is worth noting that India’s trade with West Africa alone constitutes around US $16 billion, while the total amount of its trade with the entire African continent is around US$ 39 billion. In recent times, the Indian government has tried to deepen India’s relations with African countries through the India-Africa Forum. Over the years, it has been increasingly argued that India should focus more on large projects that can have a long term impact on India-Africa relations. In this context, cooperation in infrastructure development needs special mention. It is also suggested that India should emphasize on people-to-people contact, particularly through exchange of delegations. India should also treat Africa as an equal partner in marching towards the twin goals of peace and prosperity. India should expand its business relations with Africa, but at the same time it must be mindful of African sentiments.