Events

Venue: Room No: 005, IDSA

Tentative Programme

1000-1030 hrs
Introduction
Presentation on Developments in PoK

1030-1330 hrs
Current Developments in PoK and Options for India
Chair: Riyaz Punjabi

1330 hrs LUNCH

US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, Michele Flournoy today delivered an address at IDSA on India-US strategic partnership and participated in the interactive session that followed with the scholars of the institute and select invitees. In her opening address, she underlined the importance of India in solving both regional and global problems. The depth of the partnership could be gauged from the pace at which the strategic partnership has progressed she added.

She reiterated that the US was committed to a long-term strategic partnership with India as the interests of both nations converged over a wide spectrum. These ranged from Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Indian Ocean region, interests in the global commons, among others. Flournoy asserted that India was an indispensable partner to realising the US’s regional and global strategic objectives. Referring to the concerns expressed in New Delhi on the commitment of the Obama administration to further strengthening the relationship, Ms. Flournoy assured the audience that the present administration is as committed as the previous administrations in furthering the partnership.

Speaking on Afghanistan, Ms. Flournoy clarified that July 2011 was not a withdrawal point for US forces from that country but an ‘inflection point’ which indicated that the ongoing surge of US troops will end. She added that the US will continue to be heavily engaged even beyond that point. In this context, she appreciated India’s constructive role in providing developmental assistance and acknowledged the sacrifices made by Indian personnel while carrying out their activities.

Ms. Flournoy stated that the US was trying to build trust with the Pakistani leadership and that there has been an increased commitment from that leadership to combat extremism which has begun to haunt them as well. She added that the defence equipment the US was providing Pakistan like F-16 aircraft was being used in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns.

The Indian Ocean region according to her was an important area of US strategic interest, as noted in the Quadrennial Defence Review 2010. These were also the waterways on which India depended for her energy imports. China in recent past was also evincing a keen interest in the Indian Ocean. On China specifically, Ms. Flournoy stated that the US was watching its rise with great interest. While seeking a positive, cooperative relationship with China, the US was also encouraging it to be more transparent in its strategic goals.

Ms. Flournoy noted that in order to deal with trans-national threats like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime security, cooperative, multi-lateral approaches would be useful. In this regard, she pointed out the efficacy of such multi-lateral responses like the post-2004 Tsunami rescue efforts. She concluded by emphasising the need for India and the US to capitalise on the remarkable progress made so far in the bilateral relationship. She called for a better understanding of each other’s processes and procedure in the defence field in order to further strengthen defence cooperation. Another aspect could be for both the countries to make operational cooperation procedures to undertake high-seas patrolling for instance.

Concluding her remarks, Ms. Flournoy stated that given that India and the US share a deep commitment to long-term cooperation, both the countries can form an enduring partnership to increase peace and security both regionally and globally.

In the Q&A, members of the audience raised questions about the continuing US arms supplies to Pakistan and the negative effect of such a policy on the security situation in the sub-continent. Ms. Flournoy stated that the US was mindful of such concerns. She however reiterated that US arms were primarily intended to assist that country in dealing with the menace of terrorism.

On Iran, she stated that India and the US shared the same objective on not wanting to see a nuclear-armed country but may be differed on the way to achieve that objective. She reiterated that the prospects of dialogue and negotiation with the Iranian regime were open and that the US was forced to follow the sanctions path given the Iranian intransigence in not fulfilling their international obligations.

She held out the prospects of greater cooperation in the defence realm between India and the US and pointed out that over 90 per cent of license requests from India were approved. She however acknowledged that the US export control system was cumbersome, antiquated and needed to change in order to accommodate the changing US security interests.

Ms. Flournoy informed the audience that the US was aware of ‘seam’ issues between the Central Command and Pacific Command and India’s concerns in the matter. She added that new commanders at both these commands would address the issue actively.

On Afghanistan, Ms. Flournoy stated that the building up of capacities of Afghan security forces was of prime importance. She also reiterated the importance of more representation in governmental structures by all sections of the Afghan society in order to address the root causes of the problem in that country.

In reply to a question, Ms. Flournoy reiterated that the US was concerned about both the intentions as well as capabilities of China, specifically their anti-ship missiles, ASAT weapons, cyber capabilities, among others. She pointed out that the Chinese were indulging in assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, which was unsettling its neighbours.

N.S. Sisodia, Director General, IDSA, introduced Ms. Flournoy and thanked her for sharing her thoughts on the India-US bilateral relations. Amb. Shyam Saran, chaired the session.

Report prepared by S. Samuel C. Rajiv, Associate Fellow, IDSA.

Chairperson: Maj Gen (retd) D. Banerjee, AVSM
Discussants: Col. Vivek Chadha and Shri Anit Mukherji

Ali Ahmed introduced the paper by saying that he is going to bring the practise out of the theory. He assessed the utility of force for India in addressing its Pakistan problem. He explained that India has been a victim of Pakistan’s proxy war for over two decades and relations between the two countries remained very adversarial with costs, risks, uncertainties and opportunity costs. To deal with this problem, India has been adopting a strategy of restraint against Pakistani provocations through subconventional deterrence where option for use of force is being kept in reserve. But the continuation of Pakistan’s proxy war against India proves that subconventional deterrence is only partially effective. In recent years, India has been attempting to strengthen its deterrence by both defence acquisitions and doctrinal evolution. He pointed out that thinking through the possibility of use of force can help addressing the Pakistan problem. He, however, said that any kind of use of force must be in light of India’s national aims and objectives.

He provided an overview of political and strategic aims for India in addressing its Pakistan problem with use of force. He also provided operational objectives that are to be provisioned by the implementation of the service doctrines, to include Cold Start. He opined that once strategic objectives are achieved in light of political aims, joint objectives are framed from which, in turn, service specific objectives are derived. He also spoke about the diplomatic and intelligence instruments for achieving the stated objectives. He emphasised that at the diplomatic level, use of India’s soft power, economic leverage and the influence of the Diaspora would be more useful.

In the second part of his presentation, he outlined the conflict scenarios in which military forces are likely to be used. He said that the proximate cause of conflict between the two countries is most likely to come out from a terrorist attack of the magnitude of Mumbai 26/11 and its linkage with the Pakistan establishment would compel India to take military action. He suggested that for India to see the gains, economic consequences of such military actions need to be calculated before hand. In the light of aims, objectives and methods, he also outlined the three possible outcome scenarios of such military actions as benign, benign-malign and malign scenarios.

He identified that use of force can be more effective if it is melded with other instruments of national power. Besides, sweeteners need to be offered to Pakistan; otherwise it would turn into a risky coercive exercise into one of compellence with questionable efficacy. He said that given the attendant problems of application of force, a non-military resolution of outstanding issues must instead be pursued in right earnest. In the end, he said that a limited war is useful in conditioning Pakistan, but for that diplomatic and political prongs need to be worked as much as the military and intelligence prongs of strategy.

Anit Mukherji suggested that the paper needs to include interviews of government officials in defence services, ministry of defence, politicians, experts, etc. He opined that there is not much of discussion on military doctrine in India. So far the Cold Start doctrine has not been operationalised in India. To destroy terrorists camps, could army really operationalise this. In case of full-fledged war, it could not be operationalised. He suggested that the lessons learned during Operation Parakram need to be studied.

Col Vivek Chadha said that utility of force need to be assessed taking into account three areas where international conflict still prevails i.e. i) Afghanistan, ii) Iraq, and iii) West Asia. He said that force is not always necessary to achieve the stated strategic objectives. For instance, despite military mobilization during Operation Parakram, how far those objectives were achieved. So far as Kashmir issue is concerned, its solution lies more within than outside. The issue can be resolved within politically and through socio-economic measures. He pointed out that India needs to resolve Kashmir issue within to keep Pakistan out. He suggested that one must look at the timeframe and location of such military actions.

Cdr. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar suggested a focus on two aspects: i) Grand strategy and ii) Use of military doctrine. He said that these two should be prepared and assessed before taking any military actions. In case of grand strategy, national values and interests need to be clearly defined and political direction taking into account the international legal limitations should be shaped accordingly. He added that operationalisation of war doctrines and its consequences must be assessed in advance to see military gains.

Professor Sumit Ganguly suggested four areas of focus. First, the presenter needs to come out clearly to describe what lessons could be learned from Bernard Brodie and Clausewitz for India-Pakistan context and how could they be useful in explaining the possible use of force in India-Pakistan conflict. Second, he said that the deterrence strategy has failed in the context of Pakistan and it has its limitation to deter Pakistan to undo something that has already been done. Third, citing the US strategic goal of regime change in Iraq and its ramifications, Prof. Ganguly pointed out that no Indian would like to change the regime in Pakistan. Finally, he suggested that the political, strategic and military deterrence strategy that the presenter has proposed is abstract, and that he needs to explain what exactly could be carried out through these strategies. He added that in case of India-Pakistan conflict, diplomacy will play a crucial role than military strategy.

Discussion

• In the 1980s NATO had created the Air Land Battle Doctrine in Europe to fight against the USSR. However, it used this doctrine only during Iraq war. There was a Pakistan connection in September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as in the recent Times Square plot. Mr. K. Subrahmanyam asked as to why did not the US carry out military operations against Pakistan?
• One participant asked how the three scenarios detailed by Ali Ahmed applied to incidents like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks? Moreover, the idea of sweetener has to be fleshed out.
• Another participant pointed out that one does not go to war to concede. Moreover, if the fundamental cause of using force against Pakistan is regime change, then it would bring about the worst result. Instead, the focus should be on changing the behaviour of the Pakistan Army.
• How can a limited war gravely affect India’s economy? This assertion needs to be substantiated. Second, a limited war cannot be fought to effect regime change in Pakistan, but at best to influence the calculations and strategy of Pakistan. Moreover, to talk about a general peace with Pakistan at the end of such a conflict is also far-fetched. Further, instead of attempting the rather difficult task of compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism, it would be far more easier for India to exploit the internal turmoil within Pakistan as a means to influence its decision makers.
• In view of the escalation and de-escalation of war, de-escalation of war is a very rational choice for India while escalation of war is a rational choice for Pakistan. By escalating limited war, Pakistan can build international pressure on India. Question is what would be Pakistan’s nuclear option during this limited war.
• So far as giving sweeteners to Pakistan is concerned, this has failed in the last 60 years. Whether Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore diplomacy or Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s opening to Pakistan and providing money to flood victims, everything fails. During Kargil war, it was because of US and China’s pressure that Pakistan withdrew troops from Line of Control. Then what kind of sweeteners do you want to give to Pakistan? What is your framework? What you want to exclude and include?
• Engagement through dialogue fails against Pakistan and does not help improve the situation. Can military and intelligence strategy make Pakistan hesitant?
• Many people are worried about the Cold Start doctrine. It was prepared after Operation Parakram. India has fought four wars with Pakistan. After the incidence of 26/11 Mumbai attack, where you could put the Cold Start doctrine against Pakistan. During chemical or biological war what could be done?
• In the last ten years, the international environment has changed significantly. The US fought two wars – Afghanistan and Iraq which led to geopolitical change in this region. India links Pakistan in its Central Asian strategy. India and Pakistan relations will depend on this. What can be done in this regard?

Chairperson’s Remarks

Maj Gen Banerjee complimented Ali Ahmed and said that the paper can be summarized in two points i.e. i) Utility of force against Pakistan and ii) Search for a doctrine to do that which will continue. He pointed out that the use of nuclear option between India and Pakistan will be trilateral where China will be included. However, he emphasized that nuclear exchange between the two countries during a crisis will tantamount to a policy failure. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement.

Report prepared by Dr. Saroj Bishoyi, Research Assistant, IDSA

Chairperson: Ambassador C Dasgupta
Discussants: Professor Sujit Dutta and Dr. Srinath Raghavan

The presenter identified the more aggressive stance taken recently by China in staking territorial claims over the North Eastern parts of India as the key motivation for undertaking her study. She also expressed her desire to reach out to the people of the region through her paper. The differences in perceptions between India and China over the line of demarcation of the Sino-Indian border, with the McMahon line denounced in China as an imperialist imposition, was identified as a continuing problem. She then went on to examine the Chinese position on the boundary question from realist, constructivist and neo-liberal perspectives.

Describing China’s approach as “two-track”, Dr. Goswami underscored China’s enhanced economic and diplomatic engagement with India alongside persistent territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Within the framework of realism, the paper argued that China was following a "balance of power" framework vis-a-vis the India-US strategic partnership by upping the ante in Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that India remains tied down by its territorial disputes with China, and is wary of its physical presence in the eastern border. The paper also extensively reviewed the ideational factors underlying such claims as well as their expression both in rhetoric and on the ground. Chinese perceptions of India’s strategic perspectives including its position on issues relating to Tibet - were examined. Viewed from one theoretical lens, Chinese claims were attributed to the neo-liberal school regarding exploitation of local mineral resources including hydro-electric power potential. Infrastructure development sponsored by China and India’s neglect of the same were seen to foster a sense of alienation among communities in the North East.

Possible alternative scenarios, based on local narratives as well as on China’s evolving perception of itself as a player in the international system, were outlined. A policy of aggressive deterrence on India’s part, coupled with robust diplomatic action, was advocated. “Act Local, Think Global” was the message.

External Discussant: Dr. Srinath Raghavan

Dr. Raghavan drew attention to the intricacies of boundary demarcation processes and their implications for the case under discussion. He questioned the validity of the realist hypothesis that Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh were informed by an intent to “balance” India or the United States or both. On the theoretical front, he also did not find any merit in the neo-liberal model as yielding an enhanced understanding of the situation .

In his analysis, China’s approach has been consistently marked by a preference for inter-sectoral bargaining and as such, its stance on Arunachal Pradesh may not be construed as overly aggressive. He ended by projecting a scenario where the boundary dispute between India and China might at some stage be resolved despite all its apparent intractability.

External Discussant: Prof. Sujit Dutta

Prof. Dutta took the view that the contribution to enhancing the very limited understanding of local perceptions and spectrum of opinion on various key questions in the North East - was the most significant potential contribution of the paper. He cautioned against direct deployment of International Relations theories in deconstruction of Foreign Policy. Instead he favoured “Group-thinking Theory”, “Rational Choice Theory” and such other cognitive theories that account for domestic motivations and decision-making for delivering richer analytical output.

In his opinion, the balance of power paradigm fell short of explaining Chinese behaviour as India’s partnership with the US is nowhere near as developed as to pose a threat to and elicit fearful reactions from China. On the practical side he explained the futility of attempting a bargain revolving around the settled population principle. On the question of Tibet he lamented the near-absence of diplomatic engagement by China, characterizing its approach as self-serving.

Internal Discussants

The first internal discussant suggested that China’s stance vis-à-vis the North East and perceptions within the North East on critical issues could more usefully form the subjects of two separate papers. He contended that different theoretical perspectives were instrumental in decoding varied and separate aspects of the problem, pointing to corresponding policy implications.

China’s internal nationalist discourse and its staunchly anti-imperialist tenor were singled out by the second internal discussant as factors laden with implications for policy analysis and diplomatic engagement.

Open-floor Discussion

One participant described the significance of shared tribal affinities across borders in the region, asking why there have been no Chinese overtures to populations south of the McMahon line. For purposes of the study, he recommended closer examination of the chronology and record of India’s policy pronouncements and actions in the North East over past decades. For a more balanced picture, one participant suggested incorporation of Chinese writing on the subject.
According to one intervention, regional affinities in the North East have tended to vary across time and tribal divisions. The role of elites in the North East in playing up the Chinese threat to attract attention from the Indian centre was also mentioned. Water security and the related significance of the Bramhaputra were posited as considerations gaining in importance in China’s strategic calculus over coming decades. Threats posed to indigenous culture in the North-East by recent developments and interactions with surrounding regions were argued to be serious concerns. Addressing developmental concerns in the North East was argued as central to any sustainable resolution of on-going disputes. The gaping need for an in-depth ethnographic study of local conditions and aspirations was repeatedly raised in the house.

Chairs Summary

The Chair advised sharper definition of the research question, as the explanations for China’s original claims and its resurgent pursuit of these claims are likely to be different. He argued for paying closer attention to the growth-rate differential north and south of the McMahon line to discern implications for the future. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion.

Report prepared by Kalyani Unkule, Research Assistant, IDSA