Events

On July 1, 2014, a group of senior Congressional Staff visited IDSA for a briefing and interaction with scholars. The discussion covered a wide range of issues pertaining to India-US relations, regional security issues and other pressing foreign policy issues. Such interactions are generally efforts to educate US Congress on issues relating to India as well as India-US relations.

The IDSA participants briefed the delegation on important issues of energy, defence, technology transfer, nuclear liability, and trade and investment. The congressional staffers were also briefed on India’s security environment pertaining to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, China and other security issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, maritime security challenges, and the emerging trends in the Indo-Pacific. The issues of energy, nuclear liability, current situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran’s nuclear programme attracted much of the attention during the interaction.

On energy, it was pointed out that though the energy consumption has rapidly increased, a large number continue to still live without having electricity. The growing energy challenges are also affecting India in achieving its developmental goals. India is thus competing and cooperating with a lot of countries to ensure its energy security. To meet its growing energy needs, it has made some substantial progress in renewal energy sector but that is not sufficient. Given the present energy scenario, how India is going to address its growing energy needs is a question of utmost importance. Particularly, because of the connection between India’s security policies and external security environment which affect its energy security. For instance, India has very important relationship with Iran. In fact, it is India’s second largest oil supplier and also strategically very important for India. Though India has taken a stand against Iran’s nuclear programme in line with international community, the ongoing crisis over it and the sanctions has been affecting India’s energy imports from it. Iraq is another largest supplier of oil to India but the unfolding of current crisis has raised serious concerns as well. In this context, it was highlighted that the Shale Gas revolution in the US is extremely important for India. However, the two sides need to speed up their negotiations to further enhance their cooperation in this field. On civil nuclear cooperation, it was broadly pointed out that despite existing Indian nuclear liability law there are ways to enhance cooperation by addressing the concerns over it.

On the India-US defence cooperation, it was highlighted that in the last three years India-US defence forces have conducted over fifty joint military exercises, including ‘Malabar’ naval exercise. Besides, defence trade between the two countries have increased significantly. India has bought over ten billion dollar defence equipment such as C17, P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft from the US in recent past. It was underlined that while India is regarded as a ‘lynchpin’ in the US rebalancing strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region, it, however is not clear what exactly the strategy means, what are its limits, how far the US is committed to the defence and security of its allies and partners, etc. While some point out this strategy is primarily driven by economic and political dimensions, others see it purely from military dimension which aims at maintaining balance of power in the region. Though the US military strategy has been taking shape, the sudden rise of conflicts in the greater Middle East region has led to the shifting of its focus towards this region again. Nonetheless, it is expected that India-US defence cooperation is most likely to grow in coming years, including in the field of defence technology transfer, joint research & development, and co-production.

It was highlighted that there is rapidly shifting of balance of power in the world and the rise of China has implications for both India and the US. So far as India’s relations with China are concerned, China is an important neighbour of India and the fundamental foreign policy principle of India is to engage China but with a caution. While economic relations between the two countries has grown rapidly, there are significantly problems exist, including the border problem. Besides, the security issues involving China’s military modernisation, its aggressive military posture in South China Sea, and its growing maritime footprints in Indian Ocean Region are increasing concerns for Asian countries as well as for India. In general, though the overall US foreign policy towards South Asia, South East Asia and Middle East effect India, the direction of Sino-US relationship is a major concern for India.

The issue of Afghanistan also attracted attention during the interaction. It was noted that a swift transition is taking place in Afghanistan which requires continued attention from international community for at least next one decade in establishing a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. Last ten years of international communities engagement with Afghan cause is very encouraging, but it is now dwindling down because of the rise of domestic issues in the US and the Europe. It was stressed that the failure of Afghanistan will have disastrous consequences for the entire regional security, including the areas spanning from Central Asia to Mediterranean. In this regard, the case of Iraq was cited as clear evidence. So far as Pakistan is concerned, they have the taste of their own medicine. It has been raising the militant forces particularly against India and also against Afghanistan. It has been using Afghanistan as its strategic depth. At this junction, these forces are harming Pakistan as well. They are now unleashing their forces everywhere. Pakistani Army has taken a stand and engaging them in the tribal areas. However, this will not be easy for Pakistan Army to handle these forces. As the immediate neighbour of Afghanistan and Pakistan, India has been grappling with these security problems over the years. India-Afghanistan relations, including the trade and commerce relations are major victim of this. It was therefore emphasised the greater necessity of continued international attention to this region, especially in nudging the Pakistan in the right direction.

In addition, given India’s deep strategic interests in the West Asia, India is worried about the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. The rise of terrorist groups, particularly al Qaeda and ISIS are matters of serious concern for the region as well as for India. The continuing instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq will give fillip to such groups. There is need of regional and international cooperation to address the threat of terrorism as well as the current crisis in Iraq. It was strongly believed that development of a more inclusive and secular Iraq government would serve the interests of all Iraqi people and also the region.

Finally, it was expressed that the emergence of India as a world power will have positive impact on Asia’s peace and security which is very critical to American foreign policy interests in the region and beyond. India, however, needs to play a leadership role in Asia. In this regard, suggestions were made that the US must help India in at least three key areas: innovation and technology, establishing indigenous defence industry, and mitigating the challenge of energy security which will significantly help India’s rise. It was noted that this will be critical for India’s rise as well as for the progress of India-US relations.

Congressional Staff Participants:
Ms. Reva B. Price, Director, Outreach, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi
Mr. Thomas S. Kahn, Staff Director, House Committee on Budget
Mr. Robert Saul Lattin, Policy Analyst, Deputy Director, Communications, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr. Yuri Rega Beckelman, Legislative Director, Congressman Mark Takano
Mr. Mathew Steven Weiner, Legislative Director, Congresswoman Susan Davis
Ms. Jessica Maren Schwartz, Legislative Director, Congressman Steve Israel
Mr. Michael Damast Fleischman, Legislative Director, Congresswoman Grace Meng
Mr. Evan Nathan Polisar, Press Secretary, Legislative Assistant, Congressman Alcee Hastings
Ms. Lauren Helene Shapiro, Legislative Assistant, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney
Ms. Elizabeth Stuart Leibowitz, Legislative Correspondent, Congressman Robert Brady

IDSA Participants:
DG, IDSA, Dr Arvind Gupta
DDG, IDSA, Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)
Dr Ashok Behuria, Research Fellow, IDSA
Ms Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Research Fellow, IDSA
Dr Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow, IDSA
Prof S.D. Muni, Distinguished Fellow, IDSA
And, a number of other IDSA and visiting scholars

Report Prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi, Researcher, IDSA, New Delhi

Chair: Vice Admiral Anup Singh (Retd)
External Discussants: Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) and Gp Capt Vivek Kapur
Internal Discussants: Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) and Gp Capt Naval Jagota

The paper was an attempt to bring out the necessity to establish unified commands for enhanced jointness and integration at the strategic and operational level in the Indian context. While delving on the essential arguments for and against unified commands, the paper outlined various options available for India for establishing unified commands.

The author argued that jointness and integration of the military is an inevitable requirement for the modern day battlefield. The principles underlying these features are inter-service cooperation and economy of effort, both of which are crucial to war-fighting. Unified commands that come about as a consequence of the said principles provide synergy to military endeavours. But integration and jointness are contingent upon the presence of an effective higher defence organisation. The lack of strategic thinking within the politico-bureaucratic establishment in India has, however, resulted in a higher defence structure, which excludes the services from the process of defence decision-making. The services too haven’t been united in demanding the appointment of a CDS. Despite the acknowledgement of the tremendous operational and administrative benefits that would accrue by having unified commands – theatre commands has not come through.

The author concluded that the biggest challenge to jointness in India is to bring about an attitudinal shift by turning the sense of insecurity and mutual suspicion into a sense of belongingness amongst the services as well as the politico-bureaucratic establishment. Taking clue from UK and USA in this regard, the paper stressed that the change will need to be implemented top down for it to take root and be effective.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:

• One of the reasons for the slow progress in the direction of unified commands in India; it was argued is the lack of informed debate and making a strong case for it. The concept of a mountain strike corps germinated in 2004 and became a reality almost a decade later. Similarly, if we start pushing the case for unified commands now; sooner than later the idea will get traction in the policy making circles.
• It was observed by many participants that change of mindset is most essential in order to make any headway in the direction of jointness as equipment; resource issues, etc. come only next. Jointness can be managed by adjusting attitudes. Personality-cult has been the bane of India in all walks of life and military is no exception.
• The role of Air Force since independence has been very crucial. Even during the 1948 crisis, the Air Force played a very important role in pulling off victory. Similarly, in Siachen, though army is on the front the logistics support provided by the Air Force is key to sustaining Army’s presence.
• It was argued that the essence of unified command is to empower theater commanders which will increase the functionality of operations.
• One impediment in establishing unified commands in India is that it will undermine the role and importance of service chiefs as in the case of USA. However, sooner or later it will happen.
• It was argued that jointmanship should be the first step in order to achieve jointness. From the former will follow everything else; joint planning, procurement, training etc. In essence, jointness should flow from oraganisation and not the other way round.
• One argument was that theater commands in India are inevitable, but the tendency to draw comparison with US theater commands is erroneous as the latter’s area of interest and influence are far stretched and vast. Moreover, the resources at the disposal of the US theater commands are huge compared to India.
• Civil-military integration should be one of the key areas to work on in order to achieve jointness in its totality. To date there has been constant turf battle going on between the two which is detrimental to the interest of the armed forces.
• The role of HQ IDS was discussed at length. It was opined by many that HQ IDS is the prime example of jointness in India and since its inception has played a pioneering role in ensuring synergy among the services. It strengthens the case for jointness in India.
• It was argued that the paper would enrich if it analyses the operational arguments to support the case for unified commands. A case in point is out of area contingencies. Similarly, scenarios in which the armed forces could be tasked to operate under unified commands be explored. We have many examples in the past viz; IPKF, Maldives, and evacuation of Indians from the gulf region.
• The author gave four models of unified commands and recommended the one most suitable for India. It was suggested that the paper would benefit if it analyses the pros and cons of all the four models and then arrive on the recommended model.
• The author was advised to explore the role of information technology in enhancing jointness.
• It was also suggested to analyse the reasons for Air Force’s reluctance or not so enthusiastic support to unified commands. May be geographical commands are more relevant for army and navy and not for air force which can deploy resources quickly in any theater.

The East Asia Centre, IDSA, in collaboration with the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Delhi, organised a one-day conference titled “60th Anniversary of Panchsheel: Relevance for India-China Relations” on 11 June 2014. The conference had three sessions, besides the inaugural one. The Chinese delegation included former Chinese Ambassador to India, Mr. Zhou Gang, Professor Shen Dingli of the Fudan University, Mr. Ye Hailin from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Prof. Chen Jidong from the Sichuan University and Prof. Deng Junbing of the Sundaya Consultancy of Association of Former Diplomats of China. The Welcome address was delivered by Dr Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA, followed by the Keynote address by His Excellency Ambassador Mr Wei Wei. A Special Address was delivered by Shri Tarun Vijay, Honourable Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha. The Indian participants included former Indian Ambassador to China, Nalin Surie, former Ambassador R.S. Kalha, Prof. Sujit Dutta from the Jamia Millia Islamia University, Prof. Madhu Bhalla from the University of Delhi, Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Mr. Jayadeva Ranade from the National Security Advisory Board and Dr. Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow& Centre Coordinator, East Asia in IDSA.

Inaugural session

Welcoming the participants, the IDSA Director General, Dr. Arvind Gupta, underscored that the five principles of Panchsheel provide a basis for not only interstate relations but also the construction of a new international order. While the coming together of the two great civilisations led to great expectations, the warmth between the two countries was rather short-lived and the psychological scars of the 1962 war stayed on. The boundary issue continued to remain unsettled and constituted a major obstacle in the development of bilateral relations. The two counties had shown maturity in restoring their bilateral relations and had developed consensus concerning these relations.

India and China were sensitive to the emergence of new global and regional realties as the older world order gave way to a newer one. These changes had generated fresh challenges and also offered opportunities for the two countries to work together. India and China needed to cooperate if this century was to be the Asian century. In what ways could the two countries revive the spirit of Panchsheel and work together for their mutual benefit and for regional and global peace? How relevant was Panchsheel in today’s world characterised by globalisation, which cut across boundaries and intense mutual dependencies?

Delivering the keynote speech, the Chinese Ambassador to India, His Excellency Mr. Wei Wei traced the trajectory of Panchsheel and emphasised that its principles constituted the fundamentals of international law, which had contributed to peace, stability and development in Asia. The Panchsheel principles had inspired the methodology to handle the problems left over by history and to settle international disputes by peaceful means and provided a theoretical foundation for a more fair and reasonable international order. There was a need for multi-polarisation of the world and greater representation of developing countries in international affairs. The UN, G20, SCO, BRICS and other multinational regimes needed to get full scope for the role they played, with a view to make international governance more than just reasonable.

In today’s scenario, Panchsheel could be instrumental in guiding states in diplomacy. India and China needed to follow their independent foreign policies, uphold the spirit of non-alignment, work for a new international order and support equal sovereignty among all states, insisting that the right of all nations to choose their own social system and path of development should be respected and protected. India and China also needed to promote a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. President Xi Jinping had in the recent Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) spoken about building common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia. While no country should impose its ideology or development model on the other, disputes among countries needed to be resolved through dialogue and consultation and not the use or threat of force. The BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) economic corridor was an example of implementing Panchsheel. China was willing to work on similar lines jointly with other countries for the greater benefit of the people of the region.

The speech of Joint Secretary, East Asia, Ministry of External Affairs, Mr Gautam Bambawale, was read out. Mr. Bambawale said that Panchsheel provided an alternative voice to the newly independent countries in Asia. Nehru and Zhou Enlai elaborated their vision of Panchsheel as the framework not only for India and China but also for relations with all other countries to lay a solid foundation for peace and security in the world. Panchsheel gave substance to the voice of the newly established countries who were seeking space to consolidate their hard-won independence as it provided an alternative ideology dedicated to peace and development of all as the basis for international interaction. India and China were celebrating the year 2014 as a year of friendly exchanges and their bilateral relationship had reached a stage where it could be consolidated and taken to the next level. The two countries maintained a good momentum of high-level contacts and exchanges and the intensity of their defence exchanges had deepened further. Expressing concern over trade imbalance in India-China economic relations, he called for greater Chinese investments in India, particularly in the manufacturing and infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, peace and tranquillity in the border regions was an important guarantor for development and continued growth of the bilateral relations. Both India and China needed to accommodate and be sensitive to each other’s concerns and aspirations and see each other as equal partners for development. They needed to focus on mutual complementarities to realise the untapped potential of this strategic and cooperative partnership.

Shri Tarun Vijay, the Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha delivered the Special Address. He pointed out that there never was a more opportune time to improve India-China relations. He added that Panchsheel in 2014 is viewed in a positive manner because of the tremendous changes in India-China relations. He underscored that ‘togetherness’ as a key in the bilateral relations and both countries explore solutions to our issues through negotiations. He congratulated the Chinese people for being warm and generous and noted that China has always displayed warm regards for India. Due to the established talks and bilateral mechanisms that India and China had peaceful relations despite ‘provocations’. While citing that the two countries have established strategic partnership and series of agreements to increase mutual trust, and increased people-to-people contacts, Shri Vijay argued that Li Keqiang’s visit to India in the year 2013 showed China’s focus on India. He urged to address the trade imbalance issue. He also noted that India and China have cooperated on the international front on G-20, BRICS and climate change. He said that friendly cooperation between India and China is key for regional stability. He argued that the key task for India and China is to develop their economies and eradicate poverty. Therefore, the Honourable MP recommended that confrontation should be replaced with cooperation and more media and youth exchanges should be considered. He said that India and China should increase mutual awareness of each other and India, in particular should understand China more. He raised the slogan ‘Go China, Learn Chinese’ for increasing getting information from China rather than Western media sources.

Session 1: India-China Relations: Historic Perspectives

Chair: Amb. R.S. Kalha
Speakers: Prof. Sujit Dutta, Prof. Madhu Bhalla, Prof. Shen Dingli

Prof. Dutta pointed out that though principles had a place in laying out a roadmap they had to be shaped by the dynamics of politics such as domestic and external factors. Three factors needed to be stressed in this context, namely, the nature of global politics, domestic politics and the role of ideology in bilateral relations, especially in the case of India and China.

There was an improvement in India-China relations after the death of Stalin, with the two countries willing to resolve the issue of Tibet. This led to the enunciation of the five principles and the agreement in 1954 with Tibet, which led India to have a new position on Tibet in order to build new ties with China. India figured that it would stabilise the bilateral relations. Though the five principles gave importance to the political requirements of safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-aggression in a deeply ideologically torn world, the significant part of Panchsheel was peaceful coexistence. But conflict over the definition of peaceful coexistence led to conflict. Countries reacted positively to the post-Stalin definition of peaceful coexistence, followed by the successful visit of Soviet leaders to India. Peaceful coexistence became popular in the security-political context as Pakistan was in talks with the US for a defence agreement and had joined SEATO. The positive environment quickly decayed as the global and domestic political situation worsened. India-China relations were caught up in the worsening Sino-soviet relations.

Currently, the global conditions had changed and this had led to an improvement in India-China relations from being one-dimensional to multi-dimensional. There were many positive aspects in the relationship now because the conditions were different. However, to be relevant the principles of Panchsheel needed to be redefined in the prevailing context. Globalisation had redefined sovereignty, therefore there was a need for new institutions and global cooperation to look at the challenges posed by globalisation. Globalisation had also influenced domestic affairs and mutual gain was shaped by the nature of interdependence though it might not lead to mutual gains.

The principle of mutual non-aggression for peaceful settlement of contending issues and peaceful coexistence had become important in India-China relations. But the relationship was getting affected due to the worsening Japan-China and China-US relations, which was deeply worrying. Interdependence that focused only on economic affairs was not a security guarantee: the dynamics between China and the US were an example.

Prof. Shen Dingli in his turn opined that the five principles were not new but were present in the UN charter. Britain was a coloniser even when international law outlawed non-aggression. The five principles were part of the soft power of India, China and Myanmar. Responding to the points made by Prof. Dutta, Prof. Shen Dingli pointed out that China had indeed changed according to the new situation, by moves such as joining global institutions. In this scenario, even if countries had trade disputes with China, it was possible to resolve the issue at WTO and China was willing to subject its trade and investment sovereignty to a third party. China’s stance on the dispute regarding rare earth minerals was an example. China and other countries were willy-nilly making concessions in the new conditions. Other than this, there was no need to redefine the five principles.

China and India agreed on several international issues such as the wars in Iraq and Syria and the situation in Iran and Libya, underscoring respect for the five principles. This was because both countries were opposed to western-oriented power politics. India had consistently supported the legitimacy of the PRC even after the 1962 war, thus honouring the five principles. China had also applied the principles regarding sovereignty to international scenarios such as Vietnam, Philippines and Japan. In the case of Japan, that country did not have sovereignty over Senkaku, therefore China offered to discuss the dispute and eventually peacefully resolve the issue.

Despite their soft power, India and China were not always successful in resolving conflicts peacefully. The two countries needed to learn a lot from the past not to repeat mistakes. The two countries had made efforts to make the line of actual control tranquil and to sign border agreements, which was a smart policy move in terms of honouring the five principles. This could in turn be applied to the China-Japan dispute regarding the Diaoyu Island. India, China and Japan could also play an important role in Asia.

Prof. Madhu Bhalla, the next speaker, started with a question what was Panchsheel meant to do for India and China. The principles had served China better than India. There were two different readings of Panchsheel, two different senses of its functionality and different ideational values in the two countries’ foreign policies. At the functional level, Panchsheel did not work for India: the Tibet question was solved for China; but the issue of a peaceful border was not solved for India.

Panchsheel was supposed to be an antithesis for the traditional balance-of-power doctrine and competitive security. However, India and China had competitive security issues on the borders and these fell within the balance-of-power politics. Therefore, Panchsheel was an embarrassment and a failure for the Indian state. The claim for Panchsheel became ambitious later as it was considered as a way to have cooperative security and improve economic cooperation at the bilateral, regional and global levels. Panchsheel was actually a code of behaviour, but the rhetoric of value blurred the distinction between interests and values. Therefore, there was criticism that both countries had not defined the areas of cooperation.

Mao Zedong saw Panchsheel as a tool to solve the Tibet issue. Therefore, clarity about Panchsheel was more evident in the Chinese behaviour. The 18th border talks between India and China attested to the fact that the border issue was not resolving. Panchsheel was originally meant as a guide for bilateral relations, not for guiding foreign policy globally. The rhetoric about Panchsheel was devoid of meaning for India. If Panchsheel was to have a future in India-China relations, it had to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny against the demands of Indian foreign policy in the bilateral and global contexts.

The speakers in the first session addressed several questions and comments. Amb. R.S. Kalha pointed out that Panchsheel principles were found in the preamble in a trade agreement and questioned whether India and China had to find alternative principles as the trade agreement expired in eight years. Questions were asked of Prof. Shen regarding Xi Jinping’s reiteration of the five principles and whether it was a nuanced position and China’s policy in joint development in areas of disputed sovereignty. Prof. Shen responded that China adopted the five principles not to solve the Tibet issue only but to make countries stronger against the Western powers. This would lead to moral leadership, leading other states to agree with India and China’s reading of the UN charter leading to both functional and ideational purposes. Panchsheel was primarily used for settling disputes in a peaceful way and avoid using adversarial ways. It would take China some time to offer concessions on the border because it would take a long time to change the mindset.

Amb. Zhou Gang asserted that India and China should have a strategic will on the importance of peaceful principles in international relations because these had built a solid foundation for improving their bilateral relations and for resolving bilateral disputes. These principles had been accepted in the UN by both developed and developing countries. Dr. Arvind Gupta questioned why India could not take advantage of the five principles; whether it was a deliberate policy or India was unable to do so. Prof. Bhalla responded that in India there was disappointment because of the failure in India-China relations. The reason why India did not take Panchsheel more seriously was that India did not perceive it to have a broader role than in India-China relations.

Prof. Dutta pointed out that the use of the term Panchsheel was affected in a negative way because of the 1962 war. However, the general principles of Panchsheel were already relevant in the Indian foreign policy, as was evident in Nehru’s policy regarding the Cold War. Peaceful coexistence was important for India even before the Panchsheel agreement. India and China had similar concerns about sovereignty, with India, even though it was a democracy, being more circumspect about sovereignty than China.

Session II: India-China Cooperation in the Global Context

Chair: Amb. Nalin Surie
Speakers: Amb. (retd) Zhou Gang, Mr. Jayadeva Ranade, Prof. Deng Junbing, Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

Amb. (retd) Zhou Gang said that ever since their first enunciation, the five principles had played a core role in shaping India-China relations. Leadership meetings, close contacts on global issues, exploring new areas of cooperation, people-to-people relations and expansion of military cooperation were some of the aspects of India-China friendship. Earlier, fewer leadership meetings, lack of political understanding and strategic trust had restrained the relationship between the two countries. Lack of resolution of the boundary dispute and the activities of the Dalai Lama and his group created a trust deficit in this relationship.

The primary task for India and China was to vigorously accelerate economic development and improve people’s lives. Economic reforms in both countries had led to great achievements. Both could learn from each other and create a win-win situation. Respecting each other’s core interests and properly handling the disputes would help the relations in the future. The recent consensus between the leadership of the two countries on cooperation was a good sign for the future. China and India shared a common interest in global multi-polarisation and diversification of order, besides climate debate and global commons. Close cooperation also would help increase the influence of emerging countries in the international order.

Mr. Jayadeva Ranade, who spoke next, pointed out that Panchsheel emerged out of the idea that peace and cooperation between India and China was important for their domestic development and as an alternative ideology for newly independent countries. The centrality of India and China for Panchsheel was that after their war in 1962, Panchsheel was ignored in the global order. The 1993, 1996 and 2005 agreements and the recent BDCA (Border Defence Cooperation Agreement) were at the core for the future of India-China relations.

From India’s point of view, the issues that derailed India-China relations were China’s claims on Arunachal and its military and nuclear help to Pakistan. From the Chinese view, the presence of the Dalai Lama in India was an irritant. Strong personalities of the top leaders in India and China could give a momentum to the bilateral relations. The recent Indian election was monitored closely by the Chinese media, which expressed positive expectations about the future. Cooperation on food security, water security and clean energy could deepen India-China relations and help them solve shared and common problems. Damming of the Brahmaputra by China added to India’s challenges vis-à-vis its relations with China.

Prof. Deng Junbing, the third speaker, noted that India was the first non-socialist country to have recognised the People’s Republic of China. The vitality of Panchsheel was in the fact that China and India had overcome the distrust created by the 1962 conflict and the Indian nuclear tests of 1998. The principles of Panchsheel had been important guiding principles of the Chinese foreign policy.

The current international situation was experiencing profound challenges. Efforts for creating peace without war, development without poverty and cooperation without confrontation would help build a shared harmonious world. The five principles could be part of the process of attaining these objectives. Hegemony, power politics and new interventionism were on the rise. The UN Charter could be used to promote new concepts of security. The five principles were useful for this purpose. China and India could work jointly for democratisation of the international order.

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, the fourth speaker, saw India-China global cooperation in terms of a mix of competition and cooperation. The two countries coordinated on UN discussions on security and interference although there was a slight difference of opinion between them. They also cooperated on terrorism as their definitions of this phenomenon were similar, even though there was some dichotomy. There was no substantial counterterrorism cooperation as yet. China tended to take a lenient view of some of the Jamat groups. The recent terrorist attacks in China could alter this position.

UNSC reforms were another important area. China welcomed a greater role for India in international affairs but did not support its UNSC permanent seat candidature directly. There was also cooperation in multilateral organisations. However, India had not been able to expand its role in the SCO as yet and China was only an observer in SAARC. There was some form of cooperation in WTO and in BASIC. On energy issues, there was a mixed picture of competition and cooperation. Third-country cooperation on investments had not materialised as yet. There was also serious disagreement on maritime, space and cyber issue areas.

In the ensuing discussion, it was pointed out that UNSC reforms were important because UNSC was the most universal body in world politics. Chinese support for India’s UNSC seat should not be seen as a benchmark for India-China cooperation. It was very difficult for China to support India’s UNSC candidature publicly. But there were ways in which the two countries could cooperate to strengthen the global system in coordination with likeminded countries. India-China relations did not have to be looked at in terms of media hype. Common interests needed to guide their cooperation.

On energy security, the two sides needed to take a broader view. They could take a shared look at the global energy order. UNCLOS also could be discussed. The two countries could coordinate against energy cartels that had a grip on pricing, but competition overtook cooperative tendencies.

On maritime issues, India supported freedom of navigation, demilitarisation and dispute settlement using multilateral frameworks. Indian scholars pointed out that China had taken inconsistent positions based on UNCLOS in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. The Chinese participants noted on the other hand that the Chinese position was based on the narrowness of the Yellow Sea. The differential interpretation was not deliberate. China would not militarise its EEZ in the South China Sea: it was not entitled to such privileges. The Indian participants in their turn pointed out that if ADIZ were to be extended to the South China Sea then even commercial ships might be subjected to scrutiny.

Session III: India- China relations in regional peace and stability

Chair: Prof. Shen Dingli
Speakers: Prof. Chen Jidong, Prof Ye Hailin, Dr. Jagannath Panda

Prof. Chen Jidong elaborated on how discourses on Sino-Indian relations are viewed from the prism of competition rather than cooperation. The world was big enough for both China and India and they did not need to always clash. In recent years, India-China cooperation had increased in the realm of economics. The BCIM corridor held great significance, not only bilaterally, but also regionally and globally as it would lead to economic prosperity in all four countries. India having a developed service sector and China having a developed manufacturing sector was like killing two birds with one stone. Both countries needed to deepen cooperation as BCIM would not only lead to regional integration and connectivity but also regional prosperity. The Kunming Initiative had been 14 years in the making and had passed through many hurdles. From being a Track II initiative, it had slowly graduated to a Track I initiative in 2011. BCIM was located at the periphery of these countries and it would lead to the development of the border regions, which had hitherto been neglected. The five principles of the Panchsheel Agreement were a precondition to the construction of BCIM and the participant countries needed to cooperate to further this project.

Prof. Ye Hailin echoed the sentiments of Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister who had recently visited India and had called India a “strategic and cooperative partner of China”. Asia was becoming increasingly nuclearized and countries needed to be extremely careful not to escalate tensions. Both India and China had a moral responsibility to secure the Asian community. Both were part of CICA, which sought to enhance cooperation between countries to build a stable and peaceful environment. Three main regional issues would shape India-China relations in the future, namely, regional integrity, cross-border regional development and maritime security.

Both India and China believed in regional institutions being sacrosanct. The fact that China was an observer state at SAARC and India was a part of ASEAN+6 would allow both states to share ideas and forge a common security concept. Regional linkages such as BCIM and the Silk Road economic belt were also important for fostering cooperation.

There was a lot of noise about China being a threat because of the Nine-dash line. However, it was important to note that Vietnam and Philippians too had demarcated huge territories claiming ownership on them. Confidence-building measures were important in managing the problem. For China, its Maritime Silk Road project was important for boosting maritime connectivity.

India and China were facing similar challenges and needed to cooperate to tackle them. China needed India’s help in tackling security challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan as growing extremism in both countries was a major challenge. Myanmar was another example where India and China could work together. There was a lot of room for trilateral dialogue to find answers to key security challenges both countries faced. Prof. Ye Hailin also tried to clear the air on various issues such as String of Pearls, Chinese funding of Gwadar Port and the China threat theory.

Dr. Jagannath Panda in his turn noted that the contributions of Panchsheel were universal, as its values were replicated in the charter of UN, SCO, ASEAN and SAARC. There were two sides to Panchsheel: one was the emotional and ideological aspect and the other was the practical aspect. The realities of today were very different from the ones faced by leaders such as Nehru and Zhou Enlai. Both Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, towering leaders in their own right, faced a completely different set of challenges. The 1962 war was not about the question of sovereignty but about lack of respect for each other’s territorial integrity. The lingering boundary issue was not about technicalities but was about highly politicised sentiments of nationalism. As regards non-aggression, the real aggression took place not in actions but in perceptions. There was a great deal of hostility, distrust and suspicion on both sides, which had been played up by the media. This issue needed to be tackled at the highest levels. As regards the third principle, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, both China and India had interfered in the other’s internal issues at some point in history.

China was undergoing a slow democratisation process and the reforms that were underway were a result of this process. Both nations defined democracy very differently and this issue needed to be brought to the table in solving the issues of the boundary and Tibet.

As regards the fourth principle of Panchsheel, which is that of equality and mutual benefit, both India and China, other than being the third- and second-largest economies of the world, were vast territorially. They could not mutually benefit and integrate regionally if they did not give space to each other. India needed to give space to China in the Indian Ocean and China to India in the South China Sea.

Regarding the principle of peaceful coexistence, there was a duality in the Chinese position. On the one hand, it talked about creating a new type of major power relation and saw itself as equal to the US, while also talking about being a developing country and still having a lot of catching up to do. India needed to ask China to clarify whether it viewed this world as multipolar or bipolar.

With the session ending, S.D. Muni questioned the panel as to the reasons for the slow pace of BCIM and why China fished in troubled waters whenever India faced bilateral tensions with its neighbours. R.N. Das questioned the panel on stapled visas being issued in Arunachal. On the whole, the session was fruitful and yielded many important insights about the future scope of India-China relations.

For More Details [+]

Chair: Dr Arvind Gupta

Lt Gen (Retd.)V K Ahluwalia gave a presentation on “Future of the Naxalite Movement”, at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), on June 5, 2014. Lt Gen Ahluwalia is the author of the book “Red Revolution 2020 and Beyond: Strategic Challenges to Resolve Naxalism”.
He is presently, Member, Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Jaipur Bench, and has earlier served as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command, from 2010 to 2012.

Historical Perspective

Tracing the origins of the Naxalite movement, Lt Gen Ahluwalia said the Naxalite movement is a grass-root movement that traces its origin in the tribal uprisings against social discrimination, economic exploitation and injustices in pre-independence period. The General mentioned that such socio-economic unrest and discrimination manifested themselves in the form of the Indigo Revolt (1859-1861), Munda Rebellion (1899) in Chaibasa and Chota Nagpur region, Bhumkal Rebellion (1910), the Tebhaga Movement (1946) in undivided Bengal and Telangana Armed Struggle (1946-1951), etc. However, such revolts and rebellions remained sporadic and were primarily directed against feudal land lords and colonial masters of India.

Mapping the evolution of the movement since it gained momentum in 1967

Lt Gen. Ahluwalia said that the Naxal movement has passed through various stages of operation. There was a sharp rise in Naxalite violence from 1967 to 1971, followed by a sharp decline from 1971-1980 due to stepped-up government operations against various Naxals groups, which was followed by a phase of negotiation and dialogue between the splintered groups. Learning from past experiences, various Naxalite groups sought to gain critical mass and strength, and this led to the merger of a large number of Naxalite groups as witnessed from 1980 to 2004. Eventually in 2004, the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist (Peoples War) and Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) amalgamated to form the unified and more lethal Communist Party of India (Maoist). With this started the Maoist phase in the history of Naxalite Movement in India which continues till date.

Ground Realities

While discussing the ground realities prevailing in most of the Naxal-affected areas, Lt Gen Ahluwalia asserted that these areas are among the poorest, the remotest and the most backward areas in the country.

Displacement due to large-scale mining and other projects is yet another reality being largely faced by the tribal communities in Naxalite-affected regions. It is important to note that the tribal populace accounts for 8.2 % (100 million) of India’s overall population and is the worst-hit by displacement, particularly in the Naxal- affected areas. The speaker argued that while the acquisition of land is important to undertake development projects there is an urgent need for social audit to ensure that those who are displaced are fully compensated, resettled and rehabilitated. The speaker agreed that while there are various governmental schemes to accommodate the displaced populace, the lack of political and administrative will has led to an aggravation of the socio-economic conflict that afflicts such regions.

The Naxal-affected states account for 40 to 45% of the total forest cover of India. The livelihood of tribals inhabiting these areas is mainly dependent on land and forest products, but is largely threatened by mining and other projects. Also, the same regions account for the largest reserves of mineral wealth like coal, bauxite and iron ore. It is worth-mentioning here that about 85 to 90 % of India’s coal and iron ore reserves are found in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Odisha.

The Naxal-affected areas also do not have any meaningful cash crops as compared to other parts of the country. Resultantly, as they are also not getting adequate amount of compensation for the same, they have turned to cultivation and trade in opium and cannabis. Moreover, these states also account for the Human Development Index (HDI) running much below the national average with high levels of poverty, high mortality rate and low literacy rate (literacy rate among the tribals is 47 %, which is well below the national average of 65 %). Medical facilities require tremendous –– these are almost non-existent in the critically-affected areas. Most of the Naxal-affected regions lack electrification and road connectivity which, according to Lt Gen Ahluwalia, can actually act as a major socio-economic multiplier. He gave specific statistics of electrification and road connectivity in the critically-affected areas.

Strategic Areas of CPI (Maoist)

Highlighting some of the major Naxal attacks that took place since 2001, Lt. Gen Ahluwalia termed the period from 2009 and 2010 as the “bloodiest years” of the Naxalite movement so far. According to the speaker, the CPI (Maoist) has identified a few strategic areas of interest to carry forward the movemen:

• Huge plans to target the industrial and urban belts of India. Specific targeted areas were shown on a map;
• Making inroads in the North-East India;
• Venture into NCR and northern India; and
• An endeavor to bridge the strategic gap that lies in between the northern (erstwhile MCCI) and the southern group (erstwhile CPI M-L People War).

External Linkages

The Naxalites have established linkages with many other groups within and outside India to sustain their movement. The CPI (Maoist) has established links with militant groups of the northeast like PLA of Manipur, ULFA, and NSCN (IM) and anti-India terror groups based in Pakistan. It also has some links with umbrella organisations like Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) formed in July 2001 and Friends of Indian Revolution (FOIR), etc. The major drivers for establishing such linkages are funding, arms and ammunition, training facilities, safe sanctuaries, drugs, propaganda and ideology etc. The speaker brought out the main sources of arms supply in the earlier and current phase of Maoists' operations. The NE arms supply route was also illustrated with a Map.

In the wake of growing linkages, Lt Gen Ahluwalia affirmed that there is an urgent need to cut off the tangible support to restrict the Maoist insurgency from flourishing. He gave examples of successful counter-insurgency campaigns (different countries) and their main strategy to resolve the conflict. Each country had a different centre of gravity and hence required a separate strategy to succeed, which was evident from the successful campaigns he quoted.

The Way Forward

According to the speaker, a ‘one size fits all’ solution cannot be applied to all the Naxal-affected areas. There is an urgent need to divide the affected areas into critically-affected, moderately-affected, and potential/vulnerable areas; and devise different solutions as per sub-regional requirements. In critically-affected areas, security holds the key to success, while in the latter categories, region-based customized solution should be undertaken by the government.

When does an insurgency tend to end?

Lt Gen. Ahluwalia claims that Naxalite movement is likely to end under the following two conditions:

• When the rebels feel that no matter how long they prolong, they cannot succeed. Or when they realise that the cost - in terms of casualties, arms, ammunition, training facilities, maintenance and funds - of continuing the campaign will be much more than ending it.
• Belief of the people that Governments - both at the centre and states- are becoming reasonably effective to address their grievances (human security, socio-economic, political aspirations etc.) in a suitable time frame.
• In a country like India, the Speaker emphasised that it is almost impossible for any insurgency to succeed. But, the moot point is how long will it take to manage / resolve the conflict? This has prolonged for too long due to a number of reasons. He gave examples of time taken to manage / resolve the conflict by a "Good, Moderately Effective and a Weak Government." (This aspect generated a good discussion among the participants).

What needs to be addressed?

The two important factors that should be addressed on priority are:

• Security forces need to create a secure environment to facilitate development of the region.
• The root causes of the insurgency should be addressed in a holistic manner. To do so, the government needs to be on the ground to know the ground realities.
• These two actions will automatically start building the trust among the local population.

Lt Gen Ahluwalia argued that Governance is the basic wheel around which all the aspects revolve. In order to counter the Naxal challenge, there needs to be:

• A Strong Political Will - India needs to have a grand strategy at the national level to counter the Naxal challenge. The strategy must take into consideration the various aspects like political, social, economic, psychological, environment, cultural, civil actions, law enforcement etc. There should be an apex body dealing with Naxal problem. He also broadly spelt out the role of each element of national power, something that remains largely unaddressed in a comprehensive manner. The illustrations were interesting as the aim was to achieve short-term to long-term objectives.
• Good Centre-State Synergy among the Naxal-affected states is a must to deal with the Naxal problem holistically. Because the implementation on the ground would primarily be achieved by the states.
• In addition, the General spelt out the main hurdles to resolve the conflict, due to which the progress on the ground has been sluggish.

Difficulties experienced by the Maoists

Lt. Gen Ahluwalia believes that there has surely been a decline in violence by the Naxalites since 2010. The credit for the same must also go to the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). He showed the statistics on a graph, and highlighted the main areas that merit focus in the future. He briefly explained, with statistics, the following difficulties being faced by the Maoists to further spread and strengthen their movement : leadership crisis, splintering of party into sub - groups, loss of support in traditional strongholds, lack of volunteers for fresh recruitment, lack of adequate support in urban areas, progressive dilution of ideology and improved counter - operation techniques of the counter - insurgents.

Game Changers

Lt Gen Ahluwalia discussed some of the game changers to achieve short term tangible results on the ground, both from the security and governance point of view. He was unequivocal to suggest that we have to critically analyse each region and sub- region separately to formulate a workable plan. While the national strategy could cover broad contours, regional strategies are far more important to win the campaign at the national level. The General gave a few examples that would require an early attention of the stake holders. Considering the current stage of the insurgency, the government has not paid much attention to perception management. To combat an insurgency, action plan has to be dynamic - he supported his argument with examples of the states where the incidents, violence and killings have increased / decreased over the last few years.

Concluding his presentation, Lt. Gen. Ahluwalia, while visualising the future of the Naxalite movement in India, said that we have to analyse this aspect by dividing this period into two distinct parts:

• Period 2014 to 2020,
• Period 2020 and beyond

While crystal gazing into the future, he discussed at length various factors such as the enabling environment, success of delivery mechanism on the ground and their impact on the Maoists' movement. These would have a direct impact on the future of the Maoists movement. He listed out various options that would be available to the Maoists between the two distinct phases, based on the results achieved / not achieved by the present government. Given our past record of implementation, he felt that results ( good governance and delivery mechanism ) could range from 'moderate plus to moderate minus'. He discussed in detail the likely course of action of the Maoists, with specific examples of regions / sub- regions of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha that may remain affected much beyond 2020. The worst case scenario would be if we allow them to broaden their mass base, bridge the strategic gap, establish linkages and support from different militant organizations, and to emerge stronger in the future. He said that a study of these options should help us to prepare ourselves better for the future. He, however, briefly spelt out certain methodologies to improve the security environment and to achieve better delivery on the ground. Besides the Naxals strength, their activities and local support, physiographic of the region and human terrain map cannot be ignored while planning security operations.

Significant points which emerged during the discussion

• The already existing tribal legislations and socio- economic projects must be implemented on the ground at the earliest.
• Opportunities for employment especially in Naxal - affected areas must be created as these will wean the youth from getting involved in Maoist’ activities.
• CAPF have produced fairly good results in the last four years. Better synergy among the CAPF and the state police, unity of command, human intelligence and coordination among various agencies would help to produce better results.
• Economic integration of Naxal - affected regions with the rest of India must be the priority of the Government.
• Basic infrastructure projects that need to be undertaken on war footing in Naxalite - affected areas.
• States have to play a major role because they are the one who have to deliver on the ground.
• Sympathy/support from the intellectuals for the Maoist’ cause is likely to continue in the immediate future. The large number of Maoist’ front - organisations which are propagating the Naxal / Maoist ideology and the cause, need to be monitored. Some of the issues raised by them are justified. The government should take a note of them.

Report prepared by Ms. Rajbala Rana