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Title	Date	Author	Time	Event	Body	Research Area	Topics	File attachments	Image
China’s Military Reforms: People’s Liberation Army’s Adaptation to Joint Operations	April 17, 2015	Vijai Singh Rana	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chairperson: Lt. Gen. J.S. Bajwa (Retd.) External Discussants: Commander Lalit Kapur, Gp. Capt. Ravinder Singh Chhatwal Internal Discussant: Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.) China embarked on its ‘four modernizations’ drive in the late 1970s. However, it was only over the past two decades that China carried out a comprehensive military modernization program. China gave special impetus to joint operations and informationization. The paper argues that China’s ability to project combat power depended on coordination across all domains — air, land, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. This paper analyzed the Chinese military transformation with special reference to joint operations. Specifically, it sought to answer questions relating to the Chinese concept of joint operations, evolution of its strategy and thinking on joint operations, initiatives it has undertaken and the degree of success in achieving its goals. The paper concluded that China’s modernization drive has resulted in its growing military prowess, co-terminus with its emergence as a global economic power. As part of their thinking on revolution in military affairs (RMA), the Chinese identified fighting ‘local war under the conditions of informationization’ as its strategy with focus on joint operations. This approach prompted China to undertake reforms to conduct integrated joint operations and to establish joint commands, prioritize technology-intensive capabilities like space, cyber space and the electro-magnetic spectrum. The rapid pace of Chinese military modernization and increasing technological gap evident vis-à-vis India has serious consequences, which needs to be prepared to tackle the emerging threat from China. The author noted that India needs to reduce the gap in technological and strategic capabilities. This would entail building strategic partnerships with neighboring countries and countries with common strategic interests and at the same time focusing on modernization of its armed forces including enhanced integration and capability development. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author It was argued that joint operations are mainly conducted by US, which has global interests and power projection capabilities. China claims that its armed forces are for defensive purposes. However, focus on joint operations and China’s posturing conveys a contrary message that Chinese military build-up is more for power projection than for defensive purposes. The Chinese naval projects and acquisitions specifically are robust in nature and geared up more towards offensive actions. The implication of China’s military modernization for India was discussed at length. It was argued that Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions, which have operational responsibility for the Sino-Indian border, do not have naval component limiting any Chinese joint operations. Similarly, air borne operations cannot succeed in the absence of air superiority. Though China’s enjoys air superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan, vis-à-vis India, such a capability is suspect. China has limitations in operating from Tibet due to high altitude. It was pointed out that undertaking a sustained air campaign required good infrastructure, particularly air fields, which China currently lacked. It was pointed out that in China’s quest for jointness, parochial interests are likely to hamper its efforts. The PLA for instance was the dominant force in the Chinese military set up and this could affect jointness. India’s preparedness to meet any threat depended on its armed forces’ ability to operate jointly. However, deficiencies on this front included lack of integration as regards communication devices used by the three services. It was argued that integration should start at the functional level instead of just focusing at the Service Headquarter level. The paper would be enriched by examining aspects such as limitations of the Chinese Air Force, which highlight gaps in China’s quest for jointness. The strategic environment surrounding China should be analyzed in order to understand what really drove Chinese efforts. Is it the nature of threats that China was facing or was it Chinese ambitions that is the driver behind such efforts? The author could explore the manner in which these efforts were driving China’s overall military modernization programme and the lessons that India could learn in this regard. The author would do well to explore the extent of integration in the Chinese armed forces, specifically whether it was only at the command level or whether it is present also at the combat level. Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA	Military Affairs
Expanding Footprint of Bangladeshi Terror Network in India	February 20, 2015	Anand Kumar		Fellows' Seminar	Chair: General (Retd.) Y.M. Bammi External Discussants: Mr. K. Srinivasan and Mr. Malladi Rama Rao Internal Discussant: Ms. Gulbin Sultana India has often accused Bangladesh of harbouring insurgents and exporting terrorism to India. However, the October 02, 2014 Burdwan blast has challenged this notion. The case has demonstrated that terrorist groups are operating from within Indian territory. Anand Kumar’s paper tries to understand how groups such as the Jama’atul Mujaheedin Bangladesh (JMB) have expanded their reach in the Indian state of West Bengal. The paper also attempts to gain a better understanding of their recruitment pattern. The paper highlights the broader issue of how prolonged neglect of the porous India-Bangladesh border and use of migrants for electoral gains has created a permissive environment for the Bangladeshi terrorist networks to operate in India. This has undermined both Indian and Bangladeshi security interests. India’s sustained pressure on the Bangladeshi Government and the latter’s willingness to stamp out terrorism under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina has made it increasingly difficult for terror groups to function in Bangladesh. Since 2005, the Bangladeshi Government under Prime Minister Hasina has initiated a serious cracked down on terror and other radical Islamist groups in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh war crime trials were a result of this crackdown. Although this policy saw a subsequent decline in support of terror outfits in Bangladesh, it also simultaneously pressured terror groups such as the JMB to expand their networks into India. The Indian state of West Bengal has since become a sanctuary for such terror groups. The author argues that West Bengal in general is conducive for growing terrorist networks as it shares a porous border with Bangladesh, and its metropolitan character not only makes it well-connected to other regions of India but also makes it difficult for government authorities to locate such terror outfits. The October 2014 Burdwan blast has shown that materials such as ammonium nitrate were sourced from Kolkata. The blast also demonstrated that whilst the JMB has been active in India for quite some time, the Indian Government has not been able to take any effective action against its expanding network. According to the author, a major reason for government inaction could be attributed to the role of the ruling party, the Trinamool Congress (TMC), in the state of West Bengal. The TMC has made it easier for extremist forces to operate within the state. For example, in the case of the accidental Burdwan blast, upon discovery of the bombs, the West Bengal police had exploded the bombs by a river side instead of seeking forensic evidence. The TMC Rajya Sabha member Ahmed Hassan Imran is also allegedly linked to the Jama’at. He was one of the founders of the Islamic Students’ Organisation and president of its West Bengal chapter. Imran is also known for inciting violence, and attending anti-India and anti-Awami League seminars. Moreover, in spite of charges of inciting communal violence in the district of Parganas, Imran was made a Rajya Sabha member in February 2014. The TMC has also been extremely reluctant to hand over the Bardwan Blast investigation to the National Investigation Agency (NIA).The author argues that the primary reason for the TMC to allow such groups to flourish in West Bengal is due to electoral support the party receives from the migrant population originating from Bangladesh. The Burdwan blast also indicated the existence of a regional and pan-India terror network. It has been found that there are 58 terror modules operating from West Bengal alone. The funding for such groups comes from across the border and more than a $1 billion worth of taxable goods have been smuggled into India. The terror networks also rely on smuggling fake Indian currency notes. More specifically, the Saradha scam has revealed that money could be reaching extremist groups through New Delhi to Bangladesh. Whilst such avenues for funding have been known to exist, it has been extremely difficult to trace the flow of funds to such terror networks. Another interesting development is that the Jama’at has been increasingly targeting female recruits. In doing so, the Jama’at also supports women’s rights to study, work and vote. Its strategy is to deepen its terror network by marrying trained women to men who are already working for the terror group. Such couple modelling allows for better indoctrination and greater loyalty to the terror network. The author concludes that whilst there has been seamless cooperation between the Indian and Bangladeshi governments on security issues, such cooperation is lacking between the state and central levels of government within India. The Burdwan blast should act as a wakeup call for security agencies as well as the political establishment in India. It is clear that Jihadi terror networks are now deeply entrenched in the sub-continent and are looking for opportunities for revival. Unfortunately, political forces at the state level seem to be allying with Jihadi forces for electoral benefits, and this is impinging upon the security of the Indian state. The Indian policy on migration and terrorism also needs to be disentangled in order to approach the issue of terrorism in India in a more effective manner. Suggestions/Comments: The paper must thoroughly explore the concept of ‘Greater Bangladesh’ and the notion of pan-Islamism and their ideological underpinnings, which the author has outlined in his paper. The China factor needs to be further explored. A 2004 survey indicates that there has been a 34 per cent increase in the number of madrassas in the border regions of West Bengal. Why is this necessary when public schools are available in these regions? The author can shed further light on the increase of madrassas. The paper must also factor in the possibility of Sheikh Hasina’s exit. Need to explore how it could change the political and, more importantly, the security landscape with respect to terrorism. The paper must examine the kind of support JMB is receiving from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and how Bangladeshi terror outfits are part of their larger game plan. The author need to further substantiate the observations and arguments made in the paper. For example, the alleged relationship between Jama’at and TMC, and how it is weakening the secular forces within Bangladesh. Perhaps, the section on the relationship between JMB and TMC need to be moderated. The demographic factor may also be considered when discussing the recruitment pattern of the JMB. Report prepared by Ms. Charisma M.S Kundan, Research Intern, IDSA	South Asia
Dharma and Artha	January 02, 2015	P. K. Gautam	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chairperson: Prof. Charan Das Wadhva External Discussants: Amb. H. H. S. Viswanathan, Dr. Deepshikha Shahi Internal Discussants: Dr. S. Kalyanaraman, Saurabh Mishra Major Arguments of the Paper: One of the fundamental aims of political science in Indian traditions was to create the cultural conditions necessary for the pursuit of the four great ends of life, the purusharthas – ethical goodness (dharma), wealth and power (artha), pleasure (kama), and spiritual transcendence (moksha). The final or fourth individual aim of moksha or liberation/spiritual transcendence is at a personal level of self-realization and is not being included in this paper. Without moksha the concept is of the three goals of human existence consisting of dharma, artha and kama or trivarga. Each goal is a deep philosophical subject. In statecraft, the most important ones are dharma and artha, and it is on these that the author deliberates upon. The paper argues that in ancient Indian traditions dharma and artha play an important role as they relate to statecraft. It has not changed with time. Simplistically, this is akin to what we may today understand as principle and power. Only artha by itself is insufficient to understand the philosophy of statecraft of the Indian traditions. The author argues that for statecraft and international relations as practised in India, dharma is an important limb. Kautilya, the author cum editor of Arthasastra, never suggested to be selective. He did not ever mention to ignore dharma. It is only later commentators who have given their understanding where the holistic interpretation of dharma with artha is underdeveloped; more so in the domain of statecraft and diplomacy. This paper engages with the concepts in the text and the commentaries and opinions of a number of authors who have dealt with this topic. The paper argues that both dharma and artha are integrated and linked. If artha is like surface water surely dharma is like ground water. Their meaning need to be contextualized in the present milieu and a combination of these two concepts should be judiciously applied in statecraft to herald lasting peace and prosperity. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: Dharma with a capital D signifies the overarching principles of life governing the universe, whereas dharma with a small d is for specific circumstances. Indian scholars of politics have mostly deliberated upon the latter. Kautilya’s Arthasastra also falls into the second category. Kautilya was secular in his outlook. His personal religious belief did not affect the conduct of statecraft. It was evident when Chandragupta, his disciple, leaned towards Jainism and Kautilya did not get perturbed by this or come in his way. The general western perception of India is that of a land and people who are concerned with other-worldly affairs. However, it is a fallacy as we know that in the Indian philosophical tradition all four aspects of life, that is, Dharma, Artha, Kama, Moksha, have been given adequate attention. Kautilya is considered to be immoral and lacking in ethics because of its prescriptions for statecraft. However, a proper understanding of the Arthasastra suggests that he was very mindful of ethics and morality even in the conduct of state affairs. For instance, he gives precedence to Dharma Vijaya over Asura Vijaya. The study of Arthasastra and other ancient Indian political texts have assumed significance in the backdrop of the possibility of India emerging as a world Power. Existing ‘Western’ IR theories are inadequate to explain India’s rise. Kautilya’s Arthasastra is a more holistic work than Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. Kautilya was the first scholar to establish a link between domestic and foreign policy. He argued that although the policy options before the king for the conduct of the two are different, there is a direct correlation between the domestic and foreign policies of a state. For Kautilya dharma was limited to the end and did not apply to the means. The king must set his goals in consonance with dharma. Adoption of unethical means to achieve a pious end has not been ruled out. In this he differs from Gandhi who advocated the purity of means as well as end. It was argued that Indian scholars should avoid the tendency of exalting Kautilya and denigrating Western scholarship. A synthesis of the best scholarly tradition of east and west will lead to the furtherance of true knowledge. The author was advised to give current examples to argue his case as to how the Indian state has sought to practice dharma and artha in the conduct of statecraft. That will generate more interest in Arthasastra. Since the morality of individual may not be in sync with the state’s morality, the author needs to deliberate upon different aspects of morality and resolve the dilemma.	Military Affairs
India-China Riparian Relations: Towards Rationality	January 16, 2015	Uttam Kumar Sinha	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Prof. Brahma Chellaney External Discussants: Mr. Sanjay Gupta and Mr. Joydeep Gupta Internal Discussants: Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal and Dr. Jagannath Prasad Panda Key points of presentation: India and China have long been associated as rising powers in Asia. In order to boost their economy and growth rates, they need uninterrupted sources of water supply. Water has emerged as a contentious issue between India and China with complex inter-linkages. The leadership in both the countries acknowledge the water problem as an existential threat. Given the fact that China has 14 land neighbours out of which 13 are riparian neighbours, it is important to note that it has no water- sharing agreement with any of them. It is in this context the paper argues that it is the principle concern of India to bring water issues into the core of the bilateral discussions with China. The paper also identifies three major elements in India’s concerns over China being an upstream riparian : Dams and diversions; The resultant hydro-politics and power asymmetry; and The impact of climate change The paper further suggests, as a counter approach , strengthening of diplomatic tools for a structured dialogue that allows apprehensions of the lower riparian regions and states to be recognised and addressed. As many of the regions in the world are lower riparian, including India, Dr. Sinha argued that a stable supply of water is critical to India’s growth and development. Since China is an upper riparian region when compared to India, hence, the “water rationali ty” or “water as a unifier” perspective becomes an important issue for discussion between the two countries for better riparian relations . Dr. Sinha also outlined the “power asymmetry” that exists in river basins. Given the political equation between India and China, the latter will use its upper riparian advantage to circumvent any decision made on India’s behalf. It is also important to consider the food, energy and water nexus which is highly dependent on the rapidly changing ecosystem. This will prompt nations to take several actions, many of them unilateral, to secure resources and territorial sovereignty. It is thus essential that water resource utilisation policy takes into account the impact of climate change in terms of seasonal flow and extreme events. Dr. Sinha also emphasised the middle riparian position of India and its dependence on the waters of the rivers such as Brahmaputra, and Indus and Sutlej which originates from the Tibetan plateau (which is under Chinese territorial jurisdictions) and then flows into Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. However, unlike China, India being an upper riparian state has had longstanding commitments to bilateral river treaties with the lower riparian states. The paper concluded with the following recommendations: Any formal water cooperation can be achieved only through a holistic, bold, and imaginative diplomacy. Water issues should be structured on the principles of international water law, particularly ‘limited sovereignty’, ‘no significant harm’ and ‘information sharing’. In addition to what has already been stated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between India and China in 2002, further accuracy and regular availability of credible hydrological data are vital to the effectiveness of any trans-boundary water arrangement. One of the ways forward is to create a lower riparian coalition. This coalition is not to be militaristic in nature or seen as versus China. It should be about acknowledging and addressing the concerns of lower riparian nations . Key points from discussion: India needs to build its own understanding of water. The scientific knowledge on water management in India is minimal when compared to China. The Central Water Commission is not in a state to perform any kind of extensive research and development as there is no investment in this area. Need to shift from supply-side to demand-side management. Most of the treaties are focused on supply side and not on demand side principles. Resultantly, the agricultural productivity in India is lowest. Cross linkage of issues should be built in order to bring China to the negotiation table. For example, Tibet c ould be used as a leverage to negotiate water issues with China. Turning Tibet from a territorial/political issue to one of ecological/environmental concern can prompt China to discuss and cooperate on socio-economic and ecological issues. Are states and nations the best actor/agent to deal with a holistic issue like water? People’s participation is equally important and their ground knowledge and understanding can be of great value . China is making long-term investments in the hydro- power sector in order to phase out thermal power plants by 2030 and meet their demands for clean energy. Apart from Brahmaputra, China is also considering water projects on Indus and Sutlej rivers. India needs to move from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy with lower riparian nations in the region. Realistic approach should be adopted when it comes to formation of a lower riparian coalition. Report prepared by Mr. Satyam Malaviya, Research Intern, IDSA.	Non-Traditional Security
Enhancing Energy Security in Rural Tanzania: Examples of Successful Community Engagement in Rural Electrification from South Asian Countries	December 12, 2014	Ian Sanghavi		Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Prof. Rajen Harshe External Discussants: Ms. Lidya Powell and Mr. Nitya Nanda Internal Discussants: Ms. Ruchita Beri and Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik Presentation: Tanzania is one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and as a result of this the demand for electricity is increasing considerably. However, the access to electricity and electricity penetration in Tanzania is significantly low, especially in the rural areas where 90 per cent of the Tanzanian population resides. Biomass (mainly firewood and charcoal) is the dominant source of energy in Tanzania and a major source of domestic energy in rural areas as it is readily available and cheap. But the Government of Tanzania has recognized that the regular consumption of biomass causes substantial damage to the environment and health of its population. As a result of this the government has considered using alternative sources of energy to generate electricity. The paper highlighted the Government of Tanzania's new initiative the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP) Project which is working to promote clean energy for domestic uses. The government through the SREP wants to transform the country's energy sector from one that is increasingly fossil-fuel dependent, to one that uses a more balanced supply of diverse energy resources. This will allow Tanzania to move along a low-carbon development pathway, increase energy security, generate new economic opportunities and widen access to energy service. The SREP-Tanzania Investment Programme also constitutes the generation of low-cost and reliable geothermal power. However, its most important feature is the scaling-up Renewable Energy for Rural Electrification (RERE) Project. RERE Project aims to build an efficient and responsive development infrastructure for renewable energy based on rural electrification that will supply power to 2 million off-grid rural customers. However, there are certain obstacles i.e lack of enough resources to implement national energy policy, low participation of private sector, energy illiteracy resulting in underappreciation of the benefits of renewable energy and limited expertise in undertaking construction of the projects. But through the SREP Project the government hopes to overcome these economic and policy barriers to ensure the fruitful operation of the renewable energy projects. While Tanzania gets support from key players like the government, private sector and international organizations like the World Bank, the Tanzanian government fails to incorporate the local rural community as a part of the SREP Project. The paper argues that it is very crucial to ensure that these renewable energy projects factor in a community (decentralized) engagement approach to supplying energy to the rural areas. The government has to recognize the power and ability of the rural communities to come together and conceptualize localized solutions to their problem. In this context, the paper provided evidence-based recommendations to the Tanzanian government on the benefits of community participation (or decentralized) power generation in rural Tanzania. Examples of decentralized rural energy generation from India from India provide the structures through which local community can participate in energy generation: Local communities independent initiative – hydro power generation project in Putsil located in the Koraput district of Orissa state. Local communities collaborating with the government – biomass gasification in Hosahalli village in Karnataka. Local communities’ collaborating with government and private sector – Mlinda solar electrification project in the Sundarbans in West Bengal. Local communities’ collaborating with government and international donors – The Biomass Energy for Rural India (BERI) Project in Tumkur district in Karnataka. The commonality of these four examples is that these projects are small scale, inexpensive and vested in the communities’ best interest which makes them more sustainable in the long run. In the light of these examples the author has made some recommendations: Tanzania has a strong sense of national community which the government can exploit. A holistic approach to renewable energy generation is needed in Tanzania's rural areas. Government has to make an effort to build the capacity of the rural population in order to keep the communities actively engaged in the projects. Social marketing campaigns are important to create awareness amongst the rural population on the benefits of electricity in their lives and how they can participate in the local projects. Community engagement approach is crucial to the success of renewable energy generation projects in Tanzania and to exploit and efficiently utilize existing potential for renewable energy. Major points of discussion: One can look into the policy dilemma in India regarding whether one should find localized solutions to rural electrification problems or have rural electrification through the national grid. Does such a policy debate exist in Tanzania? Grid connectivity is in high demand by rural population in India. Therefore, through these projects it will be beneficial to find out about the needs of the rural population in Tanzania and not make the mistake of predetermining their energy needs. In rural India the local panchayats are important for implementing and supervising projects, hence, examples of local government bodies in rural Tanzania performing similar should be mentioned in the paper. Decentralized solutions can be idealistic when one lives is competitive globalized world, this can put the country at a disadvantage at the global stage. Law of science requires you to use energy to be competitive. Therefore, one has to think whether decentralised solutions will be cost effective and allow Tanzania to compete at a global level. Examples of decentralized rural energy approaches from other African countries can also be considered for policy recommendation. Report prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena, Research Intern, IDSA	Non-Traditional Security
Fifth Y B Chavan Memorial Lecture: Securing India’s Borders: The Way Ahead	December 03, 2014		1030 to 1300 hrs	Speeches and Lectures	Dr Madhav Godbole, Former Home Secretary, Government of India would deliver a lecture on ‘Securing India’s Borders: The Way Ahead', on Wednesday, December 3, 2014 at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, under the series of Y B Chavan Memorial Lecture. The Lecture would be chaired by Shri P C Haldar Press Release [+] Complete Text Speech [+] Programme 1500-1505: Welcome Address by Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd), DDG, IDSA 1505-1510: Address by Representative of YashwantraoChavanPratishthan, Mumbai 1510-1540: Lecture by Dr Madhav Godbole, Former Home Secretary, Government of India 1540-1545: Remarks by Chair Shri P C Haldar 1545-1615: Question and Answer Session 1615: Vote of Thanks by Col Vivek Chadha (Retd), Research Fellow, IDSA 1620: Refreshments
Talk by David Brewster on "Bay of Bengal as a Coherent Strategic Space"	November 15, 2014			Other	A talk by Dr David Brewster on ‘Bay of Bengal as a Coherent Strategic Space’, was organized by the Centre for SoutheastAsia & Oceania at IDSA on October 15. The speaker is distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University, a Distinguished Research Fellow with the Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow with the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre. Dr. Brewster traced the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal to the period of Second World War in 1942 when the Japanese invasion stopped at the boundary of the then Burma because of the popular perception of India not being a part of Asia by the Japanese. Later too, a ‘mental’ dividing line has been drawn on the Bay of Bengal to set the Indian Subcontinent apart from Myanmar vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. Formation of a separate Southeast Asia Command furthered the process of differentiating the Indian Subcontinent from Southeast Asia during the Second World War. Dr. Brewster emphasized that there is a need to move forward from these traditional regionalization concepts in the context of evolving strategic dynamics to perceive the Bay of Bengal as a single strategic and coherent space. He spoke on India’s role in regional peace and stability as because the security issues in the Bay of Bengal region have become trans-regional and the World War II, the Indian independence, India’s economic policy, absence of security cooperation in the region during Cold War have affected the strategic importance of Bay of Bengal. He also spoke about the regional groupings that existed and expressed his concern at India not being considered for membership in these regional alliances, such as APEC. He spoke on the certain concrete achievements of BIMSTEC as well as its limitations of being an exclusive regional grouping not involving countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. He expressed his view that India’s role as a regional security provider would do broader significant rebalancing of the strategic space. India’s defence structure, its ability to protect the SLOCs, internal political stability all will have some or the other consequences on its capacity to play the role of a security provider, nonetheless as a benign security provider. He presented his new mental map of Bay of Bengal where the peripheries would be redrawn. In that mental map, Bay of Bengal would be considered as a strategic twin of South China Sea. He said, both are identical and linked by the Malacca Straits. He explained that both Bay of Bengal and South China Sea have immense significance in today’s context of international affairs and therefore, an enhanced security role of India is necessary in both the regions. He also spoke on the concept of Indo-Pacific where both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean merge and new vistas of cooperation emerge within countries located in different continents. He concluded by maintaining the point that though strategic spaces in geography were subjective and transient, but India’s increasing role in the region necessitate such a conception. Following the talk, the floor was opened for Q&A session. Some of the important questions that were asked were: Whether Bay of Bengal and South China Sea can be seen under the same lens?; Whether India should be interested in playing the role of an extra-regional security provider in the Indo-Pacific region?; What should be India’s security priorities?; Which theory is more suitable for explaining the strategic significance of Bay of Bengal: Mental Mapping theory or the Cognitive Theory? Can Arabian Sea be compared with Bay of Bengal as a similar type of strategic and coherent space?; Whether India should concentrate on its troublesome western neighbours or relatively peaceful eastern neighbours?; Does the US presence in Diego Garcia influence the strategic interests of India and China?; What should be the role of small states in Indo-Pacific security architecture?
Talk by Amb. Virendra Gupta on "India-Africa Relations"	October 16, 2014			Other	A talk by Shri Virendra Gupta, former High Commissioner of India to South Africa, on “India- Africa relations” was organized by the Africa, LAC and UN Centre on October 16, 2014. During the talk and the ensuing discussion several issues related to India engagement with the continent were raised. Many regions within Africa have fast growing economies, for example, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria. As a result of this there is an increase in the confidence of the African nations to be more assertive and wanting to take decisions on their own issues. But the increase in economic growth and the abundance of natural resources that are needed to be tapped continues to attract developing economies like China and India. But the new assertiveness that the African nations are demonstrating has forced many countries like India to change its strategy of engagement in the continent. It is also important to understand the changing nature of the political environment. Democracy in Africa has taken stronger root and there is a huge intolerance towards any form of autocracy or military coup. This has shown that Africa is slowly maturing in dealing with its own affairs. Rwanda is a good example of how good governance can revive a nation which was once engulfed with a brutal civil war. At present, growth in Africa is based on its mineral wealth and India is becoming increasingly dependent on Africa for its requirement for resources to fuel its own economic growth. The economic footing of India in Africa has increased considerably since 2001. India has made substantial investment in Africa and about 150 Indian companies have interacted with the region. The Indian companies’ main offices are in South Africa which will eventually branch out to different regions. Gradually, African nations are resenting the way China is conducting itself. China is following a more Western mercantilist (predatory) approach where they are solely engaging in Africa for extracting its valuable resources to fuel its own economic development. Also the relationship between China and African regions is of donor and recipient.. China only gives material aid to the African regions and does not participate in skill development and job creation for the local African population. The Chinese model has therefore been exposed and is something that India should not replicate. Historically, India has been part of the freedom struggle and decolonization movement in Africa. As a result of which India has attained a certain level of good will and respect from the African people. Keeping this similar history of colonization in mind, India has always been involved in Africa not as an exploiter but as a contributor. It is wrong to perceive the continent as a homogenous entity. This is because Africa is very diverse. Also, African Union as an institution is not roboust. Many strong players in AU for example South Africa and Nigeria often not represent the affairs of the other less significant regions in the continent. Also, since the AU is not a cohesive organization, channeling foreign aid collectively is difficult. Hence, a Pan-African engagement is not advisable for India until there is a certain level of cooperation among the African nations themselves. However, India-Africa Forum (IAF) Summit is a platform through which India engages with African nations. Though the last two summits have been relatively successful, it is still a challenge to deal with many diverse African nations collectively in one forum. Unfortunately, the current IAF Summit which was scheduled for 2014 had to be postponed till 2015 due to the Ebola crisis in West Africa. India should consider building stronger ties with African nations through regional engagement. Like China, India is also an emerging donor country from the South. However, unlike China, India treats the African nations as an equal partner. It would be easier for India to deliver on its commitments on technology transfer, skill development and job creation with African regions separately. India can also enhance this connection culturally with the help of the Indian diaspora, especially with those who relate more to their Indian roots, and create an awareness regarding India's contribution and investments in the different regions. There has been some muted criticism of India’s Africa policy. It has been noted that the Indian missions in Africa are not sufficient in number and this may be a hurdle in enhancing relations with the continent. At the same time there are problems from the African side too. In terms of India’s development assistance to the region, the mechanism of identifying projects is very bureaucratic which results in delay. Hence, a mechanism has to be discovered so that aid reaches efficiently. There is also a lack of academic collaboration between India and Africa. Indian tertiary level of education is well established and should offer more opportunities to African students to come and study and contribute in generating knowledge about the African subcontinent and also equally learn about India. This knowledge generation will help strengthen the ties between India and Africa. The meeting ended with following recommendations: India should only offer help to the African nations which it can fulfill. Raising the expectations of the African communities and then not delivering on it would send the wrong message. As the Africans are now becoming more independent and are capable of solving their own affairs, they will value India's aid and contributions if it seems beneficial to them. Engagement at a bilateral level is more effective for enhancing India-African relations. India should not follow the predatory policies of China and treat the African nations as equal partners. (This report was prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena, Research Intern, IDSA)
Visit of National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia (NRI-RI) Members to IDSA	October 14, 2014			Other	A 29-member delegation from National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia (NRI-RI) visited IDSA and interacted with scholars on ‘India’s Strategic Neighbourhood’. The delegation led by Dr. H.M Said Saile (IG Police) included Prof. H. Didin S. Damanhiri, Joko Prostowo, Budi Setiyadi and Wahiu Djatmiko. Members of armed forces, judiciary, police, business chambers as well as academicians accompanied them. The Deputy Director General, IDSA provided an introduction to IDSA. The interaction had presentations by Ashok Behuria, Cdr. Abhijeet Singh, Jagannath Panda and Udai Bhanu Singh. Dr Behuria spoke on terrorism, Islamic radicalisation in South Asia, transition towards democracy in Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives and on India’s current neighbourhood policy. Cdr. Abhijit Singh spoke on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region and underlined the potential areas of cooperation between India and Indonesia. Dr Panda spoke on India’s Look East Policy in the context of current East Asian geostrategic and security dynamics. Dr Udai Bhanu Singh spoke on India-Indonesia and also hinted on the importance of creating value chains in the region. During the discussion various issues were raised including India’s taxation system; natural resource management and common threats to IORA countries. Questions concerning how India will tackle the emerging ISIS threats; what will be India’s position if the ASEAN Economic Community is formed within 2015 were raised. Also what are India’s priorities within LEP; where does ASEAN stand in India’s enhanced Look East Policy and whether or not there will be a continuation of nuclear race between India and Pakistan? Report Prepared by Sampa Kundu and Munshi Zubaer Haque, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre
Talk by Rakhee Kalita Moral on "The Woman Rebel and the State: From Combat to Community"	September 15, 2014			Other	The Internal Security Centre at IDSA organized a talk by Dr. Rakhee Kalita Moral on “The Woman Rebel and the State: From Combat to Community” on September 15, 2014. Brig. Rumel Dahiya (Retd), Deputy Director General, IDSA, chaired the talk. The talk aimed to look into the suppressed history of the women rebels in the struggle between the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the State, and also their encounter with the state and community while transitioning from war to peace. Three important signposts of transition from conflict to post conflict were highlighted during the talk. These include, a) the 2003 Bhutan crackdown, which led to a wrapping up of the camps of the outfit, followed by b) the ceasefire that happened a few years later, and c) the negotiations/peace talks. Dr. Rakhee began by describing how ULFA’s initial popular mass base steadily declined in its later phases due to the increasing unethical use of violence and coercion that led to a physical disconnect with the Assamese society. In its rise and decline, the outfit flung from its role as “romantic revolutionaries” to “enemies of the state”. The role of the women cadre in the ULFA throughout is seen as miniscule; women formed about 10-12% of the cadres at most (figures disputed). It is commonly agreed that women entered the organization due to a variety of reasons. What drove these women were not merely feelings of belongingness to a region that was ULFA’s homeland, but also certain ethnic factors that constitute categories of people who have been radical in terms of the idea of the Assamese, articulating aspirations of the Assamese, sovereignty of the Assamese, etc. The tacit support of the village elders, safe homes, were also some reasons that inducted them into the ULFA fold. It is important to note that a huge chunk of the women cadres in the ULFA were taken from certain districts of upper Assam. In choosing these women, the leadership had often looked into the capacities of the women. For instance, women who were more educated, came from bigger cities, were inducted into important groups. Within the ULFA hierarchy itself, very few women cadres were inducted into the military wing – the relatively significant arm of the ULFA. In 1996, ULFA’s reorganization led to the restructuring of the organization – the structural severing of the military from the political. Many of the cohesive factors of ULFA’s organizational capacities were actually played down with this separation when there were moments of rifts inside the camps. It was during this period of stress and strife that the guerilla romance started diminishing and the dynamic of gender discrimination started becoming evident. While women slept in different barracks, wore the same uniform, carried the same cartels on their backs, they were often not privy to the more important political meetings. When ULFA was going through the splits that led to triggering of defections from within the camps, the female rebels wanted to move out. There was clearly a sense of bewilderment and frustration amongst women, who saw how their male colleagues often did not reveal strategic information to them. In the summer of 2008, when ULFA pro-talk faction declared ceasefire and decided to negotiate, many of the women suddenly seemed to lose grip with the organization. At that time, while male cadres were typically viewed as salient to the outfit’s cause and post conflict welfare, women were perceived as inimical to the organization and as a liability. Men were to politically chart out strategies for peacemaking, while women were left to accommodate to social roles such as tending to infants, nursing, sweeping, washing, etc. They were subjected to the whims of their leaders who were invariably men. Therefore, there were significant numbers of women rebels who had disbanded. However, her moment of release from the underground would also be her entry, unwittingly, into a deeper maze of surveillance and state control, also social economic uncertainties. In what is understood as a routine and standard procedure of surrender, her activities were often tracked down every single day. These women were transformed into a special category of state subjects who were seen to be struggling in a shrinking democratic space. As these women encounter a certain sense of uncertainty when they fling back to civilian life, they soon realize that the liberal state that the insurgent looks to is apparently not present. Between war and no war, therefore, the combatant saw that the end of troubles were not in sight. One of the interesting encounters that the women rebels had with the state was triggered by the Bhutan crackdown in December 2003. During this, several rebels went missing because they were either taken by the Royal Bhutanese Army or handed over to the Indian Army. Many former women combatants and civil society activists even launched an offensive proclaiming that the state wasn’t taking a proactive role in trying to see what happened across borders. This led to a legal, judicial impasse and, after a lot of legal battle and several court hearings, the matter was dropped for want of evidence in 2010. It is clear that despite numerous attempts by the state, there is a gap in some juridical position to solve this issue. Even the Geneva Convention, which articulates the historic protocol on rebels of armed conflict more than three decades ago, is constrained by its own mandate for not providing any machinery for its supervision or enforcement. Dr. Rakhee also highlighted the problem of A) lack of proper disbursement of cash to these former women combatants. The compensation allotted to them by the state fails to reach them thereby making it difficult for them to reintegrate. B) Further, gender concerns are markedly absent in the structural paradigms of peace building. Transitions from conflict to peace are critical reconstructive moments and therefore should be a priority to the state. There are multiple sites where representation of women can be advanced. These include 1) Government, 2) Security sector, 3) Local stakeholders, and 4) External partners like international institutions, regional and multilateral organizations. All this is only possible if the processes of justice are advanced, for which there must be cognition of offences particularly to women. There is a need to erase silences and there ought to be measures by which narrative can be made available. There must also be measures where women’s role in these long drawn conflicts must be recorded and acknowledged and their participation in the peace processes and in reconstruction during the conflict must be made available. Key points that were raised during the discussion: It is significant to look at the way we define surrendered insurgents. One of the reasons why a lot of women had difficulties in procuring the benefits after surrender could be due to the fact that they might not have been qualified for it. The internal patriarchal paradigm that pervades every sphere of our lives could be one reason why there is lack of a prominent name of a female rebel in the ULFA ranks. While looking at the lives of the women rebels after surrender, it is important to look at the level of societal acceptance of these women, i.e., for instance, how do civilian Assamese women look at these former combatants. A comparison of surrendered militants from Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland or Mizoram would prove helpful in providing a clearer pan-India picture. Understanding of the women cadre in the ULFA will also help us to have a strong case study to understand how to deal with the women in other insurgencies, for instance, the Maoists. About the Speaker Dr. Kalita is Currently Fellow, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Teen Murti House, and Associate Professor of English Cotton College(State University), Assam. Her work on women combatants is based on field work she has conducted with women combatants of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Prepared by Husanjot Chahal, Research Intern, IDSA	Terrorism & Internal Security

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