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13th IDSA-BESA Bilateral Dialogue on “Evolving Political and Security Dynamics in the Region: Implications for India and Israel” January 22, 2014 1000 hrs Bilateral

0930-1000h: Registration

1000-11045h: Inaugural Session
Welcome Address by DG IDSA
Opening Remarks by Director BESA
Keynote Address by JS (WANA), MEA, Government of India (tbc)
Special address by Mr. Yahel Vilan; Deputy Chief of Mission/Charge de’ Affairs to India.

1045-1115h: Tea Break

1115-1300h: Session 1: Round Table on Evolving Global Strategic Environment in South and West Asia
Dr Arvind Gupta, IDSA (China and Central Asia)
Dr. Ashok Behuria, IDSA (Af-Pak Region)
Ms Shebonti Ray Dadwal, IDSA (Energy Issues)
Prof Eytan Gilboa, BESA
Prof Efraim Inbar, BESA

1300-1400h: Lunch

1400-1600h: Session 2: Evolving Political and Security Dynamics in the West Asian Region - Evolving Political and Security Dynamics in the West Asian Region
Chair: Prof Efraim Inbar, BESA
Indian Perspective by Rajeev Agarwal, IDSA
Israeli Perspective by Prof Joshua Teitelbaum, BESA
Iran’s Nuclear Issue and its Impact on the Region
Dr Rajiv Nayan, IDSA
Dr Uzi Rubin, BESA

1600-1615h: Tea Break

1615-1730h: Session 3: India-Israel Bilateral Relations: Challenges and Opportunities
Chair: Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retired), DDG IDSA, (tbc)
S Samuel C Rajiv, IDSA
Prof Efraim Inbar, BESA
Discussion
Closing Remarks

Eurasia & West Asia
Culture as a factor in India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Can the States Play Role February 28, 2014 Smruti S. Pattanaik 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar South Asia
India's Neighbouring Borderlands: An Anthropological Approach January 13, 2014 1430 hours Round Table

Venue: Room no. 005, IDSA

Introductory address by H.E. Shekhar Dutt, Hon'ble Governor of Chhattisgarh

Terrorism & Internal Security
The US Pivot/Rebalance to Asia and the Japanese Response: Implications for India’s ‘Look East’ Policy January 24, 2014 Mahua Bhattacharya 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair person: Professor Sreemati Chakrabarti
External Discussion: Professor K P Vijaylakshmi and Professor Lalima Varma
Internal Discussion: Dr R N Das and Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav

East Asia
Military Change in India: An Appraisal of the Evolving Strategy Towards Pakistan January 17, 2014 S. Kalyanaraman Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Lt Gen HS Lidder (Retd)
External Discussants: Vice Adm Anup Singh (Retd), Lt Gen Prakash Menon (Retd) and Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan
Internal Discussant: Col PK Gautam (Retd)

This paper primarily made an attempt to understand India’s evolving military strategy towards Pakistan. It analyzes this evolution using the theoretical framework of mlitary change, which can be conceived of as occurring at three levels: the goals of a military organisation, its organisational structure, and the strategy it adopts. The cause of military change can be traced to three sources: a voluntary or externally induced change in the cultural norms of a military organisation; changes in a state’s domestic political orientation or in its national security scenario; and the introduction of new technology.

The paper seeks to examine whether military change has occurred in India at any of the three levels identified above and, if yes, then what has been the source of that change. With these objectives, the paper focuses upon the third level of change, namely strategy. Specifically, it examines the strategies adopted by the Indian armed forces for the Pakistan front and the changes effected therein over the course of the last six decades. This examination highlights two principal trends. At the operational level of war, India’s military strategy towards Pakistan changed from attrition to manoeuvre and back to attrition. And the objective of India’s strategy has changed from victory until the 1980s to punishing Pakistan since the 1990s. The paper argues that these changes were caused by India’s evolving security scenario vis-à-vis Pakistan and in particular by the introduction of nuclear weapons, which have inhibited India’s response to the challenge posed by Pakistan.

The paper concludes that civil-military coordination is essential for bringing in sync the military and political objectives within a larger strategic narrative. While such coordination was indeed a consistent feature between independence and the 1999 Kargil conflict, a divergence has emerged between the political and military leaderships during the last 10 years. This fraying of politico-military coordination is clearly evident in the army’s failure to win political approval for the Cold Start strategy and indeed in its attempt through such a strategy to compel the political leadership into following its timetable for military action. For its part, the political leadership has also failed to engage with the services to ensure the crafting of a strategy that is both appropriate for a nuclear environment and is dovetailed with broader policy objectives.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:

  • It was pointed out that more than lack of trust or anything else, the civil-military disconnect in India is the result of lack of expertise on military matters among the civilian leadership. This state of affairs can be attributed to the near absence of public discourse on hardcore military subjects. This scenario is, however, fast changing with an increasing number of retired military professionals beginning to write and generating a public debate on military issues.
  • Military strategy in war is different from pre-war planning. The paper needs to spell out clearly which level of strategy is its focus.
  • There is a need to unbundle and elaborate upon the argument about the change in Indian strategy from victory to punishment. It was argued that India’s objective has been to deter Pakistan and the method adopted for that purpose has been punishment and not victory per se. Further, for India, victory has not always entailed the defeat of Pakistan or the occupation of its territory. Victory has to be judged in terms of the goals set with punishment also having been a part of victory.
  • With respect to the nuclear factor, it was pointed out that India has been repeatedly subjected to nuclear blackmail. At the same time, India’s propensity to up the ante against Pakistan has been severely constrained. The Cold Start has been seen as a viable option in the nuclear backdrop but the ambiguity that surrounds it has outweighed its utility as a strategy.
  • While formulating any strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, India cannot ignore China. It implies that a two front war scenario is a very distinct possibility and India must retool its strategy to meet such challenge.
  • The paper needs to incorporate the role played by the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war, a role that was crucial in terms of providing valuable intelligence and reconnaissance support.
  • It was argued that Pakistan’s strategy toward India is one of offensive-defensive, whereas India’s has been defensive-offensive. This has been reflected time and again in Pakistan’s misadventures against India in the past.
  • Regarding Cold Start, it was pointed out that lessons are learnt from war and that goes into doctrines. Therefore, the Cold Start, which is primarily a mobilizational effort, does not hold much doctrinal value.
  • It was argued that attrition is a safe option. Contrary to attrition, manoeuvre involves high risk and high gain. Any strategy, therefore, should be a combination of both attrition and manoeuvre and it cannot be a case of either or.
  • It was suggested that the paper should focus on political strategy rather than military strategy as everything else flows from the former. It is the political leadership that decides on war and peace after taking into account several factors ranging from domestic to external.
  • The paper would be enriched if it includes Pakistan’s military strategy and objectives vis-à-vis India.

Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA

Military Affairs
Talk by Mr. Falih Al-Fayyadh, National Security Adviser, Republic of Iraq December 20, 2013 Other


IDSA organized an interaction on Current Developments in Iraq and the West Asian Region on 20 December, 2013. A five member delegation from Iraq led by His Excellency Minister Falih Al-Fayyadh, National Security Adviser; Republic of Iraq gave insights into situation prevailing in Iraq and commented on the scope for India-Iraq ties. Dr. Arvind Gupta, DG IDSA chaired the talk.

A bilateral agreement was also signed between Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Delhi) and Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies (Baghdad).

Following points were highlighted by Mr. Al-Fayyadh during his address:

Mr. Fayyadh stated that Iraq has successfully traversed from dictatorship to democracy after fall of Saddam Hussein. However, Iraq has transitioned from authoritarian to democracy under difficult conditions, and now faces the brunt of international terrorism, which is attacking the democratic process. In the last seven years, terrorism is the biggest challenge facing Iraq. He labeled the terrorism as an “unrealistic ideology” and emphasized that all the terrorist groups within Iraq operate under the umbrella of al-Qaeda. Terrorism in Iraq was “international” in nature, according to Mr. Fayyadh, who believed that this ideology was being protected and nurtured by rich countries in the region. The Minister however expressed satisfaction that the International community is now beginning to understand this and is willing to cooperate and assist Iraq in dealing with terrorism.

Regarding India-Iraq cooperation, he said that with around 7 million Indians working in Gulf, India has strong interests in the region. Significantly, India like Iraq faces same challenges from externally supported extremist groups. Therefore, with vital interest in the region and itself a victim of terrorism, it is logical that both India and Iraq cooperate over the issue of terrorism.

Mr. Fayyadh identified two ways of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two nations:

Direct cooperation: By transparency in exchange of information, experience-sharing and capacity building/investments in Iraq to enhance anti-terrorism infrastructure.

Indirect cooperation: To adopt anti-terrorism policy and voice the concerns at an international platform. He further added that there was a need to encourage diplomatic visits and exchange.

In conclusion, he reiterated the need and scope for strengthening India-Iraq relations.

Open Discussion:

Following issues were raised in the subsequent session:

Foreign involvement and terrorism in Iraq:
Mr. Al-Fayyadh acknowledged involvement of foreign hand in funding and supporting terrorist groups. He stated that while most of the infiltration was happening from Syria, the funding was coming from some Gulf countries and the fighters on the ground belonged to different nations.

Sectarian divide in Iraq:
He dismissed the claims of sectarian strife in Iraq and emphatically stated that the ultimate victims of such attacks were innocent masses. He added that Iraq was a multi-cultural society represented by ethnic diversity and Shia-Sunni differences were labeled as unrealistic and exaggerated. “The war in Iraq was a war of extremism”, Mr. Fayyadh stated.

Iraq’s perception of Arab Spring:
Mr. Fayyadh said that the rebels had tarnished the image of Arab Spring by mis-using terrorism as a tool against existing regimes. According to him, the uprising was at best an “extremists’ spring”

Separatism and Kurdish Issue in Iraq with reference to recent oil deal between Kurdistan and Turkey:
He asserted that oil and gas resources belong to all the people of Iraq and admitted that there were disputes between Federal Government and KRG regarding use of oil and gas resources. While addressing the issue of distribution of revenue from Oil-Gas trade, he stated that legislation on Oil-Gas resources was in the pipeline but political disputes were a major hindrance.

Iraq-Turkey relations:
Mr. Fayyadh stated that both the nations enjoyed very cordial relations till the rise of Arab Spring. However, shift in Turkey’s foreign policy from “non-interference in internal affairs to harsh interference” has altered the equation. Turkey’s interference in Syria was tagged “unreasonable and unwise”

Iraq’s take on situation in Afghanistan post-2014:
Mr. Fayyadh stated that unlike Iraq which has significant oil wealth, Afghanistan is relatively poor (Fakir) and will have to bank upon foreign aid to ensure political stability after withdrawal of US and NATO troops. He pointed that Iraq has been making huge investments in anti-terrorism activities. For Afghanistan to deal with the threat of terrorism, financial help from international community remains indispensible. Referring to US troops in Afghanistan post 2014, he gave example of US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and stated that even in presence of US troops Iraq witnessed high levels of violence. In 2006 alone, 50 cars had exploded in the Baghdad. He added that there is critical need for sincere support and economic help from Afghanistan’s neighbours.

Iraq’s outlook towards Iran-US nuclear deal:
Mr. Fayyadh affirmed that Iraq was in favour of any deal or policy which ensures peace in the region. According to him, “Iraq was perhaps a unique state which has been able to maintain cordial ties with both US and Iran”. He added that both US and Iran have accepted Iraq’s foreign policy stance and have not pressurized Iraq to deviate from its stated position.

Prepared by Ms Divya Malhotra, Intern, West Asia Centre, IDSA

Amended

Under “Foreign involvement and terrorism in Iraq”, ‘Saudi Arabia’ was erroneously & inadvertently mentioned. The speaker had used the phrase “the Gulf Region”. The error is deeply regretted and has since been rectified.

The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, in a rejoinder objecting to the mention of the name of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has also pointed out that “The Kingdom has been in the forefront of the international efforts of countering terrorism, eradicating terrorists and combating terror financing. It has taken many initiatives and measures in this regard, including signing in 2011 an agreement with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and donating $10 million towards its creation. In 2013, the Kingdom pledged another donation of $ 100.millions for the Centre.

Eurasia & West Asia
The Importance of Nuclear Security: An Asian Perspectives January 31, 2014 Reshmi Kazi 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Professor R Rajaraman
External Discussants: Shri Amandeep Singh Gill and Dr Sitakanta Mishra
Internal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Shri Kapil Patil

Nuclear and Arms Control
Prospects of Cross Line of Control (LoC) Travel and Trade January 31, 2014 Priyanka Singh Fellows' Seminar

Chair: Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Kapil Kak
External Discussants: Professor Riyaz Punjabi and Professor K Warikoo
Internal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Col (Retd)Vivek Chadha

Dr Priyanka Singh, in her presentation, analysed the prospects of travel and trade across the LoC, which according to her, were of strategic significance for India. She applauded the efforts made by the respective governments to soften their stand on LoC and discussed the way in which the LoC links were activated by the two governments in the aftermath of the ceasefire of 2003 transcending constitutional barriers in both the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir and the so called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK) under Pakistani occupation.

She argued that people-to-people contact, promoting economic interdependence and making borders irrelevant were imperative for the success of cross-LoC linkage. The presentation also contained informed about the operation of bus service on two routes, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalkote, which were loosely modelled after Delhi-Lahore bus service. It was observed that sustaining lines of trade across the LoC was a significant step forward to soften the LoC, an important CBM between India and Pakistan.

She highlighted the key recommendations of the Working Groups, which were constituted to recommend measures for softening the LoC for transit and dwelt on the composition of cross LoC trade—comprising mainly of handicraft, handloom and food items (agricultural and horticultural). Providing further details about cross-LoC trade Dr Singh said that it was not trade in the conventional sense of the term, and it was duty-free and barter based trade and operates on a limited basis through 1-1.5 ton capacity trucks.

The scholar isolated events which catalysed the process of change which included the stakeholder’s meeting at Istanbul in November 2011, where Jammu & Kashmir Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed. This was a milestone in institutionalizing trade between the two sides. She also discussed several bottlenecks which are inhibiting process of trade and travel, which included the never-ending security concerns, limited scope of trade, financial constraints, communication gap, logistical hurdles, and vulnerability to misuse.

In spite of such hurdles, she argued that there was a growing demand for additional routes in the region which shows that such linkages are valued by people on both sides of the LoC. She also brought it to the notice of the audience that there was a feeling of being left-out in those regions of Jammu, Ladakh and Gilgit-Balitstan, where there are additional demands for cross-LoC linkages. People in these areas believe that too much focus is being laid on the Kashmir valley. The author quoted PM Manmohan Singh to prove this. The PM had in fact acknowledged recently that he was aware of the growing demand from the people in Kargil to have links restored with Gilgit and Baltistan, as a result of which the opening up of Kargil-Skardu is under consideration. Such links would not merely yield economic dividends, they would also address the issue of divided families in the state.

The author noted that the record of cross-LoC travel so far was impressive and there was surprisingly no major incident of violence, apart from the one on the tourist facility center in Srinagar, a day before the bus service between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad started. She mentioned various incidences which affected cross-LoC trade between, including the 26/11, which occurred only a month after cross-LoC trade was inaugurated, the land controversy in Amarnath which flared communal tensions in the valley, beheading of an Indian soldier by Pakistani border guards and the allegations of drug-smuggling by Pakistani operators resulting in stalling of the process following 47 trucks carrying goods from PoK being withheld by Indian authorities.

Dr Singh raised a pertinent point in her paper that the initiative has remained largely insulated from the larger complexities involving India-Pakistan relations. She held that it was natural to expect India-Pakistan relations would influence the Cross-LoC trade and travel. She mentioned various such instances when, the bus service was suspended, like suspension of the Delhi-Lahore bus for about two years in the aftermath of the militant attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001.

However, she found through her research that there was a tremendous enthusiasm amongst people on both sides about such linkage mainly because it gives them an opportunity to unite with the divided families across the LoC on either side, and partially due to the economic prospects it offers. The desire in the people of the region to see trade and travel flourish for a secure and better future for themselves was also highlighted.

However, it was noted that while on the Indian side both the mainstream regional parties in J&K— National Conference (NC) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)—expressed their faith in cross-LoC linkage the opinion was divided among the political elites of ‘AJK’ on how to approach the issue. Some of them feel emphasis on cross-LoC linkage would dilute the main issue of Kashmir. However, the business class in AJK is keen to expand trade-ties and has been demanding that cross LoC trade must be put on the agenda at the highest level of talks between India and Pakistan. The pressure from Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) to open Kargil-Skardu route was also discussed.

The popular demands were listed by the scholar well which were:— enhance transit capacity by increasing the number of vehicles, increase the trade basket, promote tourism to allow greater communication amongst people from both the sides, establish better lines of communication amongst the traders’ community, overall easing up access to the LoC, encourage greater participation of the people in the process, introduce integrated banking system and efficient sales policy, and above all carve out a well-conceived policy on security. At the same time due care must be taken, it was argued, to retain and preserve the quintessential Kashmiri character of the initiative.

It was argued that cross LoC interactions could go a long way in managing perceptions not only within Kashmir, but possibly beyond it in both the countries. However, such initiatives are likely to stimulate bigger expectations, and the challenge lies in managing such expectations, which, if remain unaddressed for long, could potentially translate into cynicism, pessimism and anger, which is usually the case in conflict ridden areas.

It was observed that at the India-Pakistan bilateral level, establishing cross-LoC linkage is probably one of the most tangible CBMs between the two. Thus, the fundamental question arises whether cross LoC exchange is a driver of peace? The scholar was of the opinion that in terms of larger long-term gains in pursuit of peace, both countries need to reflect upon these questions and think whether they are willing to make concessions on the larger political problems, most importantly on territorial issues. Ultimately the success of cross-Loc exchange during the last few years depended on whether the travel and trade has created an enabling environment, bridged the gap amongst Kashmiri people, encouraged collective economic consciousness, and more importantly reduced the level of frustrations and angst amongst Kashmiris during these years.

The author closed by offering some suggestions to boost this initiative which included enhancing the scope of trans LoC interaction, maximising economic gains and incentives, opening the line for people other than those belonging to divided families, exploring additional diversified channels of exchange other than educational and medical needs, minimize technical problems, move on from the barter system as it is unsustainable in the long run and explore the option of transit trade by linking the route up to the Central Asian Republics.

External Discussants:

One of the external discussants, Prof Riyaz Punjabi applauded the author and stated that the paper did well to link cross-LoC trade and intra-J&K trade with Indo-Pak Relations. He apprised the gathering that the partition of 1947 did not take into account linguistic affinity, compulsions of geography and other cross-regional trade interests. He noted that before partition, Baramulla-Rawalpindi used to be an all-weather route open throughout the year and pointed out that cross-LoC trade would hold enormous potential if we connect the regions of Jammu and Ladakh to Kashmir.

He stated that the Gilgit-Baltistan region had far been neglected by the Pakistani government and it was even referred to as ‘Northern Areas’ till 2005. He also recalled an incident when a group of journalists from across the LoC came to Jammu and had a gala time with the people out there, for which they had to face a very hostile time in Srinagar because the separatist Hurriyat Conference people were extremely displeased with their affinity with the people of Jammu.

He also stated that the trade between the two parts of the region has enormous potential which has been hampered due the vested business interests of the political class who find it convenient and profitable to transfer the goods from a third destination, preferably Dubai. He accepted that there are several challenges one of which was the illegal drugs trade starting from Afghanistan through Pakistan and India to other markets beyond in South-east Asia. Radical elements will continue to push for this through India and Pakistan, taking advantage of the Cross-LoC and Wagah-Attari trade links. He urged that some mechanism must be found out to deal with such crucial issues in order to keep the cross LoC trade flourishing. In the end he emphasized that barter must be replaced by broader kind transaction system, may be through banks, to boost the process further.

The other discussant, Prof K Warikoo, compared the cross-LoC situation with the situation in the Central Asian Republics. He cautioned the Indian authorities that it was very essential for them to first safeguard the borders before opening it up for trade. He stated that China has settled huge population of Han families, traders and officers in Kashgar area in order to fully sanitize the border before going for trade. The other border he quoted was the Tajik-Afghan border, where Taliban had changed the proportion of tribes in furtherance of its interests as it was a very porous border. Coming to the Indian context, he stated that till 2006, only 17,000 people crossed LoC, while over 10 million people go to Vaishno Devi and over 20 lakh to Amarnath shrine every year. While the Kashmiris are quite vocal about the need for cross-LoC linkage, they have not utilized this bus service to the extent they were expected to. He stated that it is only the Pahari speaking people from Poonch who have utilized the bus service as they have been the worst sufferers of the partition. He recalled his experience where people of Poonch showed their lands adjoining the border, on the other side, while they were confined to our side of the border. Their issues have never been addressed, not even in the Shimla Agreement. He also urged the international community to change its perception of looking at Kashmir as an underbelly of Central Asia and give it its due importance.

Internal Discussants

Dr. Smrutti Pattanaik stated that many people in the valley do not want to take the LoC route as the passport/identification verification process itself takes about 6 months to complete. She also stated that despite lot of clamour about the Kargil-Skardu route, the reservations are more with India than Pakistan, as majority of people in Kargil are Shia, whose pain and agony are often overlooked by the Sunni majority dominating the politics in Kashmir. She asked the author to put the present topic in a larger context and clarify whether she is looking at the cross-LoC trade only from the Kashmiri perspective or larger Indo-Pak perspective. She also asked the author to mention whether cross-LoC trade is crucial enough to feature in India’s larger foreign policy domain. The Chairperson, Kapil Kak noted that we all must have a grand vision for trade and commerce between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China.

Col Vivek Chaddha asked the author to be clear about the questions raised in the paper, as to whether she was looking at the subject from Indian or Pakistani perspective, as the security concerns of the two countries were very different. He also urged the author to visit the place and interact with people to take their views into consideration which would be of great importance for this paper. He also asked the author to clarify few topics in the paper which might not be understood by a layman, like the term “Trade Facilitation Centres”. He also asked the author to include the suggestion of J&K CM Omar Abdullah’s in the paper, that simple telephonic conversations should be started along with trade and commerce.

Prof Riyaz Punjabi noted additionally that whatever is produced in Kashmir has a huge market within the country, so we do not need to explore foreign markets for the products of Kashmir. He further stated that it is a cause of concern that very few people from across the LoC visit the shrines in J&K, particularly Hazratbal, and Indian government must look into this issue.

Report prepared by Abhimanyu Singh, Research Intern, IDSA.

South Asia
The Tamil Nadu Factor: Perspectives of Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka January 10, 2014 Smruti S. Pattanaik 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar South Asia
Talk by Lt Gen SA Hasnain (Retd), on "Kashmir 2014: A Review and Prognosis" January 06, 2014 Other

The Internal Security Centre at IDSA conducted a talk by Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) on 06 January 2014 on the topic “Kashmir 2014: A Review and a Prognosis”. Gen Hasnain provided a strategic review of the Kashmir situation through the 1990s and 2000-2013 followed by a prognosis for the period 2014-18. This involved analyzing key concerns like the effect of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdrawal on Kashmir, issues pertaining to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in J&K and the need to take Operation Sadbhavna to the next level.

Followings are the key points brought out by the speaker in his talk:

Highlighting the strategic importance of Kashmir, Gen Hasnain argued that it is important to keep in mind the October 1947 ‘Instrument of Accession’ and the 1994 joint resolution of the two houses of the Parliament, asserting the idea that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) is an integral part of India. Having said that, he laid emphasis on changing the narrative for Kashmir against established narratives and then went on to analyze Kashmir’s current status and where is the situation heading.

After years of antipathy and anguish, many people claim victory in Kashmir today. But the question is, can a victory be declared when there isn’t even an articulated political and military aim? Gen Hasnain felt that while a military aim existed in vague terms, a political aim in Kashmir has been eluding for long possibly because of the unclear external and internal dynamics. . Militarily, infiltration has been taken care of and every year the numbers of successful infiltrators in the valley are dwindling – all thanks to the Line of Control (LoC) fence which was constructed in 2003-4 that changed the mathematics of terror; more terrorists being eliminated than the numbers that could successfully infiltrate. Politically, however, he stated that there is a long way to go and the Army would have to continue to be the lead agency in supporting and rebuilding efforts; this is because of the outreach that it has and the organizing will and zeal to bring normalcy in Kashmir. No other agency has the strength and capacity to pursue the agenda of simultaneously preventing terrorist revival and stabilization. However, the Army’s presence and lead status will always be exploited by inimical elements to question the Government’s intent and resolve to integrate Kashmir. Continuing antipathy towards the Indian establishment, disappointment in governance, unresolved issues of thousands of surrendered terrorists, failure to take stock of the youth, and most importantly the growth of radicalization in Jammu and Kashmir, will continue to add to the negativity surrounding the transition.

Therefore, it may be wrong to assume that the role of the Army is over. While the Army’s place at the remote LoC is well accepted its continuing presence in the urban hinterland is hotly contested by local political parties, ideologues, separatists, intellectuals and human rights activists. In this context, Gen Hasnain conveyed his perception that the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) (which largely manages the hinterland) was raised not only for a militaristic purpose but also for a larger national aim of integrating the Kashmiris with India politically, socially, economically and most importantly, psychologically. The demand for a drawdown of the RR is likely to gather strength in the near future but must not be accepted until completion of the full integration process is completed. He stated that thus far the Army has done its work well; however, it has been successful in eliminating the terrorists but not terrorism in J&K.

Further, while talking about Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), Hasnain prompted at certain conditions that had first demanded its creation – Pakistan sponsored terrorism, protection of all communities (for instance the Kashmiri Pandits) and symbols of national pride. Highlighting the fact that most of these conditions have still not been met he did not see the logic of getting rid of AFSPA. Moreover, even the army can only expect its soldiers to function best once it guarantees legal protection in case of inadvertent mistakes and empowerment to co-conduct operations without reference. As far as the human rights issues are concerned, it would be important to keep in mind that in an active Counter Insurgency environment, a good number of cases can fall prey to manipulation, which only puts immense pressure on the Army, diverting its attention.

What should be done necessarily to avoid falling for these manipulative triggers? To begin with, the answer most importantly lies in perception management. The army needs to get its perceptions correct. It has to change its narrative and show every Kashmiri that the army is not the enemy of the people. Operation Sadbhavana has to move forward to build a more people-oriented approach where dignity and self-esteem of the average Kashmiri is accentuated. And this can be done, for instance, by managing the force ethos and keeping in mind the cultural sensitivities of the people. The Army therefore needs to pay much more attention towards cultural training of its rank and file so as to respect the sensitivities of the local population.

Overall, for Gen Hasnain, militarily the situation is under control. It is unlikely that 2014 will be a template similar to 1989 (when the Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan), and ISAF withdrawal is unlikely to lead to a major influx of foreign terrorists; the security forces just need to ensure that the overall terrorist counts do not rise. What is perhaps more dangerous is that there still is a potential for violence, which is constantly being fuelled by anti-India sentiments and cries of separatist radicalism amongst the people. However, the state can take stock of this situation, mainly by outreach and a greater connectivity between Delhi and Srinagar. True victory will only be achieved when every Kashmiri will start considering himself as an Indian.

Key points that were raised during the discussions:

  • One of the major factors furthering conflict in Kashmir is the huge amount of financial assistance from outside India for various radical and fundamentalist purposes.
  • More often major focus from the security, political and development discourses have always been concentrated on Kashmir valley whereas the areas like Jammu and Ladakh are hardly attended. There is a need to address the issues in these areas as well.
  • Points were raised regarding the status of Kashmir Pandits and their return to the valley. This aspect necessarily puts a question mark on the inclusiveness of the Kashmiri society these days.
  • It has been felt that there rules a sense of victimization among the Kashmiris by the state of India in general and by the Army in particular. This perception, most of the time, over rules all the good intentions of the state establishment.
  • Many outside Kashmir have a feeling that the problem in Kashmir is a self-created one. There are vested interests of the power elite in the state, which as believed by many, tries to keep the conflict in continuity.

Report Prepared by Husanjot Chahal

Terrorism & Internal Security

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