The Gulf Regional Stability under Strain

February 18, 2026 |
Issue Brief

Summary

Intensifying American pressure and sustained Iranian defiance have created a tense situation in the Gulf region. The possibility of a military confrontation between the US and Iran has raised concern among the regional countries, given the far-reaching security, economic and political repercussions such a conflict would entail.

Stability and security in the Gulf region have once again come under strain. The protests that erupted in Iran in December 2025, triggered by the sharp depreciation of the national currency, can have significant consequences not only for domestic politics but also for the broader geopolitical landscape of the Gulf. Iranian authorities have alleged that the unrest was backed and instigated by external actors, particularly Israel and the United States, accusing them of attempting to foment internal instability in the country.[1]

The United States has criticised the Iranian government for its severe crackdown on the protesters. At a time when Iran was going through internal turbulence, the US applied its ‘maximum pressure’ strategy by threatening a military strike on the country. This renewed American military and strategic posturing towards Iran has further intensified tensions in the region. These developments are occurring at a time when several other regional realignments are unfolding more rapidly. Concerns among the regional Arab countries have grown over the threat of the use of force against Iran.

American ‘Maximum Pressure’ and Iranian Defiance

US President Donald Trump has intensified pressure on Iran to conclude a nuclear agreement that would result in the complete dismantlement of its nuclear programme. As part of this coercive strategy, the United States has re-deployed the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier group from the Indo-Pacific to the Persian Gulf. Following Iran’s agreement to enter negotiations, Washington placed four principal issues for discussion: Iran’s nuclear programme, the range and development of its ballistic missile capabilities, Tehran’s support for regional proxy groups and the government’s treatment of the protesters.[2] While Iran has agreed to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue, it has expressed clear reservations about broadening the agenda to include other matters, particularly its ballistic missile programme.

In the absence of a technologically advanced and modern air force, Iran’s missile capabilities constitute its principal and most credible deterrent instrument. This deterrent posture was notably demonstrated during the 12-Day War with Israel in June 2025. From Tehran’s perspective, any externally imposed limitations on its missile programme would significantly weaken its defensive capacity and potentially leave the country vulnerable to external military threats. Meanwhile, a second carrier strike group—the USS Gerald R. Ford—is being deployed to West Asia, further reinforcing the United States’ heightened military posture in the region amid ongoing talks with Iran.

Iran has maintained a defiant posture in the face of the mounting American pressure. It has insisted that negotiations must be conducted only on an equal footing and with mutual respect.[3] Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has warned that “if Americans start a new war against Iran this time, it will be a comprehensive regional war”.[4] In a similar vein, the Iranian Foreign Minister has stated that any attack on Iran will be disastrous for the region and reiterated that Iran will target the American assets in the Gulf region in the case of a war.

The Houthis of Yemen and Kataeb Hezbollah in Iraq have also expressed their support for Iran in the case of an American attack.[5] The Houthis have announced that they would resume attacks on shipping lines in the Red Sea in the case of a war.[6] These statements highlight the risk that a US–Iran military confrontation can quickly spread to the wider West Asian region. Furthermore, these statements have come on the backdrop of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) being designated as a terrorist organisation by the European Union. In a retaliatory move, Iran designated the militaries of the EU countries as terrorist organisations.[7] European countries may also be drawn into the conflict.

Israel has put more pressure on the Trump administration to adopt a tougher position on Iran, as it believes it is an opportune moment, as Iran is going through a severe internal crisis and spiralling economic problems in the face of the devaluation of its currency. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has emphasised that any prospective agreement between Washington and Tehran must include the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.[8] Israel believes that the US should not accept a deal limited to temporary restrictions that merely slow or delay uranium enrichment without eliminating the core capabilities of the programme.

Iran’s defiant posturing reflects its firm rejection of any negotiations with the United States conducted under pressure, even though Tehran has repeatedly stated its willingness to engage in dialogue in a mutually respectable manner. Iran states that “diplomacy is incompatible with pressure, threats, and intimidation”.[9] By adopting a strong stance, Iran seeks to push back against Washington’s coercive approach, to compel the Trump administration to moderate its maximalist demands and make them more rational and acceptable from Iran’s perspective.

Uncertainty over US–Iran Talks

The first round of talks between the US and Iran was held in Muscat with Omani Mediation on 6 February 2026. Both sides have expressed satisfaction over the talks. Iran has described the talks as a ‘good start’,[10] whereas Trump said both sides had ‘very good talks’ in Oman.[11] Iran has stated that only the nuclear issue will be discussed in the talks. The second round of talks was held in Geneva on 17 February 2026. Omani Foreign Minister has stated that ‘good progress’ was made during the second round, while Iranian Foreign Minister stated that ‘guiding principles’ of the nuclear deal were reached between the US and Iran.[12]

Trump has reiterated his objective of a complete end to the Iranian nuclear programme. Meanwhile, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi has stated that Iran would consider compromising its nuclear programme in return for the US lifting its sanctions.[13] Despite these stated positions, significant uncertainty surrounds the prospects for successful negotiations. While both sides have clarified their broad objectives, they continue to guard their strategic intentions carefully. Failure of talks could heighten the risk of an American military strike against Iran. In contrast, a successful negotiation might culminate in a mutually beneficial agreement that addresses core concerns on both sides.

Concerns Among the Gulf Arabs

The Gulf Arab countries have expressed their concern over the US military posturing towards Iran. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have stated that they will not allow their military bases to be used against Iran.[14] Qatar and Oman have been involved in facilitating talks between the two sides.

An escalation in the region would make them vulnerable and legitimate targets of an Iranian attack in the event of war. Since the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in March 2023, Iran’s engagement with the GCC countries has significantly strengthened in several sectors, including the economy, security and political ties. The GCC states believe that an American-Israeli attack on Iran at this point, having recently achieved a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, would further destabilise the region.[15] They are also concerned about the possible impact of the war on their economy, as the Strait of Hormuz would most likely be closed in case of an American attack on Iran, which would impact the transport of oil through this crucial chokepoint. Moreover, any attempt by the US to impose regime change in Tehran would have unprecedented and unforeseen consequences for the region.

Emerging Regional Alignments

A major change in the regional security architecture in West Asia is underway, as Türkiye has expressed interest in joining the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) signed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025. The agreement stated that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”.[16] The agreement is beneficial to both countries: Saudi Arabia expects Pakistani military support, while Pakistan seeks financial benefits to support its weakening economy.

Türkiye and Pakistan enjoy a strong political and defence partnership. Türkiye is one of Pakistan’s major military suppliers. They also invoke Islamic solidarity as a foundation of their bilateral relationship. The relationship between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has strengthened in recent years, although both perceive each other as competitors for regional hegemony. Thus, there is a growing convergence of interests among these three countries to pursue military cooperation. This has been termed as an ‘Islamic NATO’[17] in West Asia, which is dominated by three Sunni-majority Islamic countries. This has the potential to significantly alter the regional balance of power by emphasising collective security.

The Saudi Arabia–Pakistan–Türkiye talks are taking place at a time when the Saudi Arabia–UAE relationship is going through friction. There are growing differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in West Asia and the Horn of Africa. In a major decision, Israel recognised Somaliland in January 2026. The UAE supports Somaliland and has several key investment projects in the territory.[18] Thus, there is a visible convergence of interests between the UAE and Israel in Somaliland. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has rejected the Israeli recognition of Somaliland. Meanwhile, Somalia has cancelled all the agreements it had signed with the UAE.

Similarly, the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has launched military aggression against the government of Sudan.[19] Saudi Arabia has rejected any intervention in the internal affairs of Sudan and support for secessionist or breakaway factions in the country.

Saudi Arabia has called for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Syria. At the same time, the relations between Israel and the UAE have continued to grow despite the ongoing regional tensions. The deepening Israel–UAE relationship is increasingly perceived in Riyadh as a strategic challenge to Saudi Arabia’s regional influence. Its differences with the UAE have continued to widen. Saudi Arabia has become more stringent over its recognition of Israel, on which there were discussions between the two countries before the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.

The Saudi-Emirati relations reached a nadir when Saudi Arabia carried out a strike on a UAE-linked shipment at the Port of Mukalla.[20] It is suspected that the consignment contained weapons intended for the Southern Transitional Council (STC). While Riyadh continues to back the internationally recognised government in Yemen, Abu Dhabi has supported the STC, a southern separatist movement. The Saudi attack ultimately led to the UAE’s withdrawal from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Additionally, Saudi Arabia harbours strong apprehensions that the expanding UAE presence in southern Yemen, coupled with Israel’s growing engagement in the Horn of Africa and the recognition of Somaliland, could significantly alter the maritime geopolitics of the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, thereby re-shaping regional power dynamics.

At present, the Israel–UAE convergence of interest emerges as a challenge to the long-term Saudi interests in West Asia and the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia increasingly views the UAE’s expanding engagement in West Asia and the Horn of Africa as an assertive intervention that risks aggravating regional instability. While Riyadh has generally adopted a cautious approach aimed at preserving the existing balance of power, Abu Dhabi has pursued a far more proactive foreign policy. This divergence in their regional outlook has created significant friction between the two countries. Notably, there is a growing convergence between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on the evolving situation in Sudan, Syria and Yemen, suggesting a subtle recalibration of regional alignments.

Conclusion

The rapidly evolving political and security dynamics in the Gulf are likely to have significant repercussions for regional geopolitics and broader strategic stability. In this context, the outcome of the ongoing US–Iran talks remains uncertain. The Arab Gulf states are observing these developments with serious concern, as any military confrontation between Washington and Tehran would directly affect their security, economic interests and regional stability.

Simultaneously, pronounced differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—two major regional powers—over key regional theatres, including in West Asia and the Horn of Africa, have further complicated the strategic environment. While Israel and the UAE have consolidated stronger ties in the post-Abraham Accords phase, Saudi Arabia, alongside Türkiye and Pakistan, has been engaged in discussions on the potential formation of an ‘Islamic NATO’. These overlapping and, at times, competing alignments have added further layers of uncertainty to the evolving US–Iran entanglement. In such a fragile environment, any strategic miscalculation by the principal actors could have severe consequences for regional security and stability in the days ahead.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

[1] “Iran’s Top Security Body: US, Israel Orchestrating Riots to Drag Country into Insecurity”, Press TV, 9 January 2026.

[2] “Rubio Says US Ready to Meet Iran But Must Discuss Missiles”, Asharq Al Awsat, 4 February 2026.

[3] “Iran Ready for Diplomacy, But Not Under Pressure: Foreign Minister Araghchi”, Press TV, 2 February 2026.

[4] “Ayatollah Khamenei: Any US-initiated War Against Iran Would Become Regional”, Press TV, 1 February 2026.

[5] “Iran-backed Militias in Iraq and Yemen Threaten New Attacks as US Aircraft Carrier Arrives”, The Indian Express, 27 January 2026.

[6] Ibid.

[7] “Iran Designates EU Armies ‘Terrorist Groups’ in Retaliatory Move”, Al Jazeera, 1 February 2026.

[8] “Netanyahu Calls for Dismantling Iran’s Nuclear Programme in Any US Deal”, Al Jazeera, 16 February 2026.

[9] “Iran Ready for Diplomacy, But Not Under Pressure: Foreign Minister Araghchi”, no. 3.

[10] “Iran FM Declares ‘Good Start’ as US–Iran Talks Conclude in Muscat”, Press TV, 6 February 2026.

[11] “Trump Says U.S. Talks with Iran ‘Very Good’, More Negotiations Expected”, The Hindu, 7 February 2026.