Houthis and Prospects of Saudi Arabia–Israel Cooperation

Summary

The sustainability of Israel–Saudi security cooperation on Houthis will depend on whether shared threat perceptions can be translated into practical and enduring arrangements without compromising Saudi Arabia’s political priorities, provoking wider confrontation with Iran or undermining prospects for a negotiated settlement in Yemen.

The Houthis’ attacks on Israel since October 2023 and renewed hostilities with Saudi Arabia since July 2026 have heightened regional security concerns. Amid growing threats to maritime security and critical infrastructure, Israel has indicated its willingness to assist Riyadh in countering the Houthi threat, despite differences over the Palestinian issue and the absence of diplomatic normalisation. The brief examines the prospects, strategic imperatives and constraints shaping potential Israel–Saudi Arabia security cooperation.

Background

The historical roots of the Houthi movement trace back to the Zaydi imamate, which existed in various forms in northern Yemen from 897 AD until the republican military coup in 1962. The subsequent civil war (1962–70) between the royalists and republicans weakened Zaydi religious and political influence, while the community grew increasingly concerned about the spread of Saudi-backed Wahhabi influence to alter tribal identities.[1] After Yemen’s unification on 22 May 1990, the Believing Youth Forum, formed in 1992, emerged as a movement for Zaydi religious revival under Badreddin al-Houthi’s spiritual guidance.

The group evolved into a politico-military movement advocating Zaydi religious revivalism, anti-corruption, regional autonomy, Palestinian solidarity and resistance to Zionism, imperialism and United States (US) and Saudi influence to reinforce regional alignment and domestic legitimacy.[2] The fragile political transition process after the 2011 Arab Spring protests enabled the movement, renamed Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), to consolidate political and territorial control over large parts of northern Yemen.[3]

Between March 2015 and April 2022, Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces were entangled in a protracted conflict with the Houthis to restore the political authority of the Aden-based internationally recognised government, secure the southern border, reverse Houthi’s territorial gains, protect regional shipping lanes and counter Iranian influence, viewing the movement as integral to Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance”.[4] The Houthis maintain close strategic coordination with Tehran while pursuing objectives rooted in Yemeni politics focused on regime survival and strategic autonomy.[5]

Riyadh accepted the 2 April 2022 UN-brokered truce, which largely held until July 2026. Saudi Arabia pursued de-escalation because of the military stalemate, the war’s high financial costs (US$ 100–150 billion), threats to critical infrastructure and investor confidence amid economic transformation plans under Vision 2030, and regional détente with Iran in March 2023.[6] The truce enabled the Houthis to ease blockades, consolidate military capabilities and territorial control, ensure domestic political survival, offset economic and diplomatic weaknesses and strengthen political leverage over Riyadh.[7] During the 2023–2025 Houthi conflict with Israel and the US, the Saudis and their Gulf allies prioritised sustaining the April 2022 truce, pursuing a negotiated solution and avoiding a new round of conflict that has renewed since July 2026.[8]

Houthis’ Renewed Conflict with Saudi Arabia

The Houthis resumed hostilities against Saudi Arabia following Saudi airstrikes on Sanaa airport on 13 July 2026 to block an Iranian Mahan Air aircraft carrying the group’s delegation from landing. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree called the airstrikes an “end to the de-escalation phase”. The group announced a maritime embargo on Saudi vessels conducting attacks on oil tankers, energy facilities, airports, military bases and civilian areas, alongside launching ground offensives against the Aden-based government, seizing strategic islands and striking the Presidential Palace, government installations and Aden airport.[9]

The attacks by Houthis advance Iran’s broader strategy of imposing economic and strategic costs on adversaries by sabotaging alternative Saudi export routes and raising maritime insurance costs and oil prices. With Hamas weakened, Hezbollah constrained and Iranian influence in Syria diminished, Tehran increasingly relies on the Houthis for regional power projection through asymmetric warfare. The group’s territorial consolidation and maritime intimidation, along with Iran’s coercive diplomacy, enable both actors to exploit the structural vulnerabilities, threaten wider conflict escalation and increase the costs of regional conflagration. The territorial expansion also poses significant challenges for the Houthis, particularly their ability to govern a larger population, consolidate control over newly captured territory, and withstand adversaries’ attempts to reclaim these territories.[10]

The escalation occurred against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s increasing reliance on the East–West pipeline, the Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, following the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid the Iran–US conflict. Yanbu port handled all of Saudi Arabia’s seaborne crude exports in April–May, 92 per cent in June and 78 per cent in July 2026.[11] Houthi disruption of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, carrying around 7 per cent of global oil supplies, until June 2026 enables Tehran to exert influence over two critical maritime chokepoints.[12] By restarting the war with Saudi Arabia, threatening the chokepoints and launching a ground offensive, Houthis supported by Tehran seeks to capitalise on the broader regional conflicts, utilise controlled escalation to boost bargaining position, consolidate territorial control, reshape domestic power balance, legitimise political authority, and extract concessions from Riyadh, including ending support for the Aden-based government, lifting maritime and airport restrictions and securing war reparations.[13]

Saudi Arabia is currently avoiding a large-scale offensive against the Houthis, favouring a calibrated response focusing on protecting commercial shipping and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Riyadh’s warning of stronger retaliation against further attacks has focused on limited escalation and boosting support for anti-Houthi forces while reiterating its commitment to a political settlement in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has prioritised intelligence support to assess Houthi deployments and movements, anticipate operational plans, inform future planning, coordinate international efforts to gradually degrade the group’s capabilities and dislodge their control from recently seized areas near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.[14] Riyadh has therefore intensified engagement with global and regional partners to enhance deterrence and coordinate diplomatic responses.

A series of miscalculations has left Saudi Arabia increasingly exposed to renewed conflict in Yemen. Riyadh’s partnership with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collapsed in December 2025 following accusations that Abu Dhabi supplied weapons and combat vehicles to the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), prompting the complete withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen on 30–31 December 2025.[15] The withdrawal left thousands of UAE-aligned fighters without an effective command structure. At the same time, Riyadh struggled to organise fragmented anti-Houthi forces and fill the resulting power vacuum. The lack of coordination and a coherent transition mechanism undermined the Saudi government’s ability to consolidate control and establish a unified military structure.[16]

Riyadh misjudged Washington’s willingness to provide direct military support, particularly coordinated airstrikes against the Houthis. Despite deepening defence ties, Washington prioritised its own strategic interests, particularly securing freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.[17] Washington favoured deterrence and empowering Riyadh to manage the conflict, limiting its assistance to intelligence sharing and targeting support. For Riyadh, this shift towards burden-sharing underscores the limits of US security commitments and the unpredictability of Washington’s support under President Donald Trump.[18]

The renewed Houthi offensive has exposed the limitations of Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities and its reliance on Washington’s security guarantees, prompting Riyadh to diversify its external security partnerships. Saudi Arabia has consequently sought greater support from regional and international partners, including Egypt, the UAE, Türkiye, Pakistan, Britain and France. Most notably, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye was activated in October 2026, entailing a commitment to collective deterrence measures. However, the agreement has yet to translate into direct military intervention, with Türkiye and Pakistan emphasising the defensive nature of their commitments, strengthening deterrence, intelligence sharing, logistical and technical assistance, defence industry cooperation and contributing to diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions.[19]

Houthis and Israel–Hamas War

Amid Israel’s war in Gaza, the Houthis sought to demonstrate solidarity with Palestine and commitment to the “Axis of Resistance” mutual defence by supporting Hamas and constraining Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) operations. Between 19 October 2023 and October 2025 Israel–Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis launched around 130 ballistic missiles and 370 drones towards Israeli territory.[20] By supporting Hamas during the Gaza war, the Houthis expanded recruitment and indoctrination, deflected domestic discontent, strengthened coordination within the “Axis of Resistance”, upgraded missile and drone capabilities and reinforced their regional relevance in the Arab and Islamic world.[21]

The Houthis’ strategic position near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait enabled them to threaten shipping routes connecting Israel. The group’s Red Sea warfare capabilities reflect experience against the Saudi-led coalition and emulation of Iranian coastal defence strategies and operational models. The group employed anti-ship cruise missiles, naval drones, rocket- and missile-armed fast attack craft, mines, unmanned surface vehicle (USV) explosive drone boats, helicopter-borne commando boarding teams, and combat divers to disrupt shipping, including hijacking an Israel-linked cargo ship on 19 November 2023 and holding 25 crew members hostage.[22] Between October 2023 and June 2025, the group launched approximately 520 attacks, targeting at least 176 ships.[23]

The Houthis’ actions reflected calculated risk-taking supported by existing infrastructure and preparedness, alongside the IDF’s limited operational experience in Yemen compared to Lebanon and Syria. Although most missiles and drones were intercepted, the missile strike in Tel Aviv on 19 July 2024, killing one civilian and injuring eight others, was portrayed by Houthis as a military and political victory. It demonstrated the group’s growing capability to penetrate Israeli air defences, gain operational experience and exert political leverage, prompting the IDF to reassess its defensive strategies.[24]

Due to the lack of civilian deaths and low damage, high interception rates, US efforts to curtail the Houthis’ maritime threat, intelligence gaps, and operational priorities in Gaza and Lebanon, the IDF delayed a direct response until the July 2024 Tel Aviv attack. Israel subsequently adopted an overt deterrence strategy, launching Operation Outstretched Arms on 20 July 2024 and responding to each attack with severe retaliation striking Hodeidah port, Sanaa airport, power plants, oil terminals, cement factories, industrial and tunnel infrastructure.[25]

Israel characterised the 22 August 2025 cluster-bomb attack in Tel Aviv that bypassed its air defence network as a qualitative escalation, increasing strike severity, civilian casualty risks, and indicating advanced Iranian technology transfers.[26] The IDF targeted critical installations in Sanaa, including the presidential palace, military bases, power plants, fuel storage depots and assassinated Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and nine cabinet ministers on 28 August 2025. The assassination marked a departure from presumed engagement norms, employing leadership decapitation to destabilise the Houthi administrative structure, erode the distinction between civilian and military targets, remove operational red lines, expand the reach of retaliatory strikes and display the IDF’s enhanced intelligence capabilities in identifying high-value targets.[27]

The IDF’s decapitation strike, however, did not decisively weaken the Houthis, as replacements were appointed swiftly and core military capabilities, including missile and drone units, smuggling networks, ties with Tehran and leadership structures under Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the Jihad Council, remained intact. Israel’s disproportionate retaliation and the Houthis’ reciprocal escalation transformed the conflict from a front supporting Gaza into a sustained war in its own right driven by revenge and political symbolism.[28] The confrontation largely subsided due to de-escalation by the Houthis following Israel’s ceasefire with Hamas on 10 October 2025.

Despite de-escalation, Israel has prioritised reservist mobilisation, urban warfare readiness, protection of strategic sites and swift air and naval deployments. IDF’s preventive, retaliatory and deterrent operations require long-range strike capabilities, aerial refuelling and airlift assets. However, Israel’s distance of over 2,000 km from Bab el-Mandeb imposes significant logistical, intelligence and operational constraints on executing strategic operations.[29]

The Houthis’ decentralised forces, adaptability to military pressure, mountainous territory providing strategic depth, concealment measures, dispersed infrastructure and smuggling networks limit the effectiveness of Israeli airstrikes. Consequently, Israel is likely to pursue sustained strategic strikes and boost security cooperation with Somaliland to provide an additional strategic option for operations near Bab el-Mandeb.[30] However, Israel’s simultaneous regional conflicts have strained its resources, while attacks on critical infrastructure risk worsening Yemen’s humanitarian crisis without dislodging the group from power and decisively weakening its capabilities. The Houthis’ assertive conduct illustrates the challenges of deterring non-state actors driven by zero-sum strategic objectives.[31]

Houthi’s Confrontation with the US

Since October 2023, the Houthis have conducted a two-front conflict against Israel as well as the US in the Red Sea theatre. Washington attempted to balance competing interests, i.e., protecting maritime safe passage, preventing the expansion of the Gaza conflict, preserving diplomatic options to end the Yemen civil war and minimising civilian losses. The US responded with a two-pronged approach: an international maritime defence initiative, Operation Prosperity Guardian (since December 2023) and two air campaigns, Operation Poseidon Archer between January 2024 and January 2025 and Operation Rough Rider between March and early May 2025, to degrade Houthi’s military capabilities, conducting around 774 airstrike events and killing around 550 between 12 January 2024 and 6 May 2025.[32] The US efforts prioritised securing the waterway while preventing uncontrolled escalation that could undermine prospects for negotiations with the group.

Eventually, the Oman-mediated ceasefire agreement on 6 May 2025 halted attacks on US vessels but allowed the group to continue strikes on Israel and Israeli-linked ships. The agreement was broadly viewed as a strategic setback for the US amid weak coordination and limited support from regional and extra-regional partners, poor internal coordination and operational mismanagement.[33] Currently, Washington’s approach is premised on degrading Houthi’s anti-shipping capabilities rather than compelling the group to completely end their attacks, highlighting the limits of a military-centric approach against a resilient non-state actor.[34]

Prospects for Israel–Saudi Arabia Cooperation

Houthi missile and drone attacks have exposed vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia’s intelligence, early warning and critical infrastructure safeguard measures. Amid the US’ reluctance to engage directly in the conflict and shared Iran-linked security threats across the Red Sea, Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz, Israel’s assistance could facilitate security cooperation with Riyadh, embed itself within broader regional security architecture and gradually advance normalisation with Riyadh and other Gulf states.[35]

The IDF, drawing on its operational experience in Yemen and its capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic and cyber warfare, missile detection and air defence, could help Saudi Arabia identify launch sites, weapons depots, command structures and logistical networks. Integrating human intelligence, electronic surveillance, and other intelligence systems could strengthen early warning, weapons-transfer monitoring, threat assessment and response capabilities.[36]

Although Israel is not directly involved in the Saudi–Houthi confrontation, the group’s operations in the Red Sea threaten Israel-linked shipping, disrupt maritime activities at Eilat port and strengthen Iran’s regional influence.[37] IDF’s intelligence and operational expertise could complement Saudi Arabia’s strategic geographic position and existing air defence network, including Patriot batteries and the THAAD system, providing an additional layer of defence against missile and drone threats heading towards Israel. A comprehensive defence arrangement would require integrated radar coverage, missile trajectory assessment, reliable communications and engagement protocols to disrupt the group’s operational capacity and prevent attacks, rather than relying on retaliation through costly defensive measures.[38]

For Riyadh, overt cooperation with Israel remains politically sensitive due to its political commitment to the Palestinian cause, domestic public opinion and reputational costs. Saudi Arabia continues to condition normalisation on meaningful progress towards Palestinian statehood, a position reinforced by the Gaza war and regional opposition to Israel’s actions.[39] Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s fragmented security structure, historically oriented towards regime security, could impede inter-agency coordination, delay decision-making, and constrain the operational flexibility needed to address evolving threats. Additionally, the competing interests of the Aden-based government, STC and tribal factions could complicate cooperation. Therefore, strengthening particular groups without accounting for these rivalries risks deepening internal divisions, undermining Saudi strategy, entangling Israel in Yemen’s domestic conflicts and potentially benefitting the Houthis.[40]

The US’ role is central to any potential Israel–Saudi security cooperation, given its established defence partnerships with both states and institutional capacity to facilitate intelligence-sharing, early warning and integrated air and maritime defence. In mid-September 2026, Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander, US Central Command (CENTCOM), hosted a conference of senior military leaders from eight countries, including IDF chief Eyal Zamir and Saudi military chief Fayyadh Al Ruwaili and representatives from the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, to discuss the broader regional security situation. Israel and Saudi Arabia discussed intelligence cooperation, with Riyadh seeking assistance in mapping Houthi deployments and assessing operational capabilities.[41]

Due to Riyadh’s perception of Israel as a source of regional instability, tactical convergence against Iran and the Houthis does not necessarily translate into strategic trust in the IDF’s role in defending the Kingdom. Moreover, direct Israeli military involvement risks provoking Iranian retaliation, alienating regional actors and undermining Riyadh’s standing as a leading power in the Islamic world.[42] Washington will remain a critical intermediary in managing political sensitivities and advancing Israeli-Saudi security coordination.

Despite the absence of diplomatic normalisation, Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the Gaza war, shared concerns over Iran and Houthis could sustain discreet intelligence cooperation, albeit within existing political and diplomatic constraints. Riyadh, through targeted US support and CENTCOM-mediated engagement, could benefit from Israeli support to facilitate security normalisation while preserving its political cover, existing diplomatic positions, sovereignty and national security priorities. Israel’s key challenge will be to convert temporary security convergence into sustainable regional cooperation while navigating persistent political constraints about the Palestinian issue.[43]

Besides the US, the UAE could serve as a conduit for Israel–Saudi security coordination. Following the 2020 Abraham Accords and subsequent Houthi attacks on Emirati territory, Abu Dhabi reportedly expanded intelligence and surveillance cooperation with Israel in Socotra and strategic sites near the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait.[44] The Emirati influence in southern Yemen, established security networks and potential use of private military contractors could provide indirect channels for Israeli participation in monitoring Houthi activities and facilitating broader regional intelligence arrangements involving Israel and Saudi Arabia.[45]

Conclusion

For Israel, the renewed Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia since July 2026 provides an opportunity to strengthen its strategic relevance to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. However, shared opposition to the Houthis and Iran and operational cooperation does not necessarily translate into strategic trust and political normalisation, particularly given the Gaza War and Israeli opposition to Palestinian statehood. Nevertheless, Israel’s capabilities could complement Saudi Arabia’s defensive infrastructure through discreet, issue-specific security normalisation, with military and intelligence imperatives preceding political engagement. As security-driven collaboration becomes institutionalised, publicly acknowledging bilateral military and intelligence contacts between Saudi Arabia and Israel may gradually become less sensitive.

The US would remain the principal facilitator through CENTCOM and established defence partnerships, while the UAE could serve as an additional regional conduit. Currently, Riyadh is facing multiple challenges in terms of addressing the Houthi threat; pursuing de-escalation, economic diversification plans and reinforcing strategic autonomy; and managing the political sensitivities of security cooperation with Israel. The sustainability of Israel–Saudi security cooperation will depend on whether shared threat perceptions can be translated into practical and enduring arrangements without compromising Saudi Arabia’s political priorities, provoking wider confrontation with Iran or undermining prospects for a negotiated settlement in Yemen.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

[1] Charles Schmitz, “The Huthi Ascent To Power”, Middle East Institute, 15 September 2014; Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War To State Capture”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, No. 8, September 2018.

[2] Bruce Riedel, “Who Are The Houthis, And Why Are We At War With Them?”, Brookings, 18 December 2017.

[3] Ahmed Nagi, “Yemen’s Houthis Used Multiple Identities To Advance”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 19 March 2019.

[4] Marcus Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, From the 1990s to the Present”, Arab Centre Washington DC, 19 February 2021; Summer Said, Saleh al-Balati and Benoit Faucon, “Iran is Giving Houthis Targeting and Intelligence for Attacks on Saudi Arabia”, The Wall Street Journal, 16 October 2026.

[5] The October 2024 UN Panel of Experts reported that Iran, Iraqi groups and Hezbollah provided the Houthis with technical assistance, training, weapons and funding. The joint operational centres in Iraq and Lebanon include Houthi representation to coordinate joint military actions within the “Axis of Resistance”. The Houthis’ diverse arsenal, including ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, surface-to-air missiles, electro-optical surveillance systems and naval mines indicates substantial external assistance. See “Letter Dated 11 October 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council”, United Nations Security Council, 11 October 2024.

[6] The Saudi-led coalition following de-escalation in April 2022, suspended military operations, eased the blockade on Hodeidah port and Sanaa airport and initiated direct talks with Houthis on foreign troop withdrawal and reconstruction. See “The Costly Price of Saudi Arabia’s Intervention in Yemen: A War With No End in Sight”, Daily Trend, 30 April 2025; Ari Heistein, “Saudi-Houthi Agreement: Four Scenarios and Their Potential Impact”, Middle East Institute, 10 April 2024; “Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 May 2023.

[7] The Houthi forces’ frontline expanded from 700 km in early 2014 to over 1,700 kms in October 2023. The size of Houthi-controlled areas increased from 30,000 sq km in 2014 to 120,000 sq km in 2015, stabilising at 110,000 sq km after frontlines froze during 2018–2023. The population in Houthi-controlled areas rose from 2–3 million in 2014 to 20–24 million in 2023, alongside claimed mobilisation capacity of 708,000 personnel prior to the 2023 conflict with Israel. See Michael Knights, “Assessing the Houthi War Effort Since October 2023”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 17, No. 4, April 2024.

[8] Gerald M. Feierstein and Fatima Abo Alasrar, “The Geopolitical Implications of Houthi Attacks and Israeli Retaliation”, Middle East Institute, 23 July 2024.

[9] “Saudi Airstrikes Hit Sanaa International Airport, Iran-Backed Houthi Rebels in Yemen Say”, NBC News, 13 July 2026.

[10] April Longley Alley, “The Latest Cycle of Saudi-Houthi Escalation is Different-and More Dangerous”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14 October 2026.

[11] “Yemeni Missiles Ignite Saudi Aramco’s $12bn Jazan Complex”, The Cradle, 25 July 2026.

[12] Vincent Durac, “Why Yemen Has Returned to Conflict”, The Conversation, 16 September 2026.

[13] April Longley Alley, “The Latest Cycle of Saudi-Houthi Escalation is Different-and More Dangerous”, no. 10; “The Causes and Impacts of the Recent Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia”, Rasanah, 2 August 2026.

[14] “‘Israeli Aid Against the Houthis Will Not Advance Normalization,’ Saudi Official Says – Report”, i24 News, 17 September 2026; Laure Foucher and Camille Lons, “Towards an Israeli-Saudi Standoff? The Middle East and the Brutalization of the New World Order”, Foundation pour la Strategique, 15 April 2026.

[15] Mostafa Salem, “UAE Says It Will Withdraw Its Remaining Forces in Yemen After Saudi Arabia Struck Port City”, CNN, 31 December 2025.

[16] April Longley Alley, “The Latest Cycle of Saudi-Houthi Escalation is Different-and More Dangerous”, no. 10.

[17] US officials met Houthi representatives in Oman in mid-September 2026, with the group reaffirming their commitment to the 2025 ceasefire and pledging not to target commercial ships except for Saudi vessels. See “Houthis Met US Officials in Oman, Promised Not to Hit American, Israeli Ships – Sources”, The Times of Israel, 16 September 2026.

[18] Samia Nakhoul, Humeyra Pamuk and Steve Holland, “Saudi Crown Prince Sought US Military Help From Trump With Houthis, Sources Say”, Reuters, 11 September 2026.

[19] Suzan Fraser, “Turkish Lawmakers Approve a 3-Nation Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan”, Associated Press News, 6 November 2026; M Waqas Haider, “Mecca Pact: Pakistan and Turkey Have Answered Saudi Arabia’s Call For Help – But Don’t Expect Them to Fight the Houthis”, The Conversation, 9 October 2026.

[20] Emad Almarshahi, “Sayyid Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi Lauds Palestinian Resistance Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”, Hodhod Yemen News, 10 October 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “IDF Says Houthis Have Launched 40 Missiles, 320 Drones at Israel Since Start of War”, The Times of Israel, 9 January 2025; Emanuel Fabian, “IDF Downs Four Houthi Drones Over Eilat Within An Hour”, The Times of Israel, 7 October 2025.

[21] Osamah Al Rawhani, “After the Gaza Ceasefire, What’s Next for the Houthis?”, Atlantic Council, 16 October 2025.

[22] Marc Martorell Junyent, “Why are the Houthis Getting Involved in a War Between Israel and Hamas?”, Stimson Center, 4 December 2023.

[23] Luca Nevola, “A Red Sea Hall of Mirrors: US and Houthi Statements vs. Actions”, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Organization (ACLED), 26 June 2025.

[24] Raz Zimmt, “Escalation of the Confrontation Between Israel and the Houthis: Background and Significance”, The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, 4 July 2024.

[25] “Houthis & Israel”, Wilson Center, 26 July 2024; John Pollock and Damien Symon, “Despite the Gaza Ceasefire, the Israel-Houthi Conflict May Resume”, Chatham House, 16 December 2025.

[26] Andreas Noll, “Yemen: Hostilities Escalate Between Israel and the Houthis”, Deutsche Welle (DW), 27 August 2025.

[27] Faozi al Goidi, “Israel’s Targeting of Houthi Ministers Opens a New Phase of Conflict”, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 22 September 2025; Yossi Melman, “Israel Ramps Up Intelligence Gathering in Yemen. But Is It Too Late?”, Haaretz, 2 January 2025.

[28] “Israel and the Houthis Escalate”, The Soufan Center, 17 September 2025.

[29] Yossi Melman, “Israel Ramps Up Intelligence Gathering in Yemen. But Is It Too Late?”, no. 27; April Longley Alley, “Israel and the Houthis are Entering a Dangerous Escalation Cycle”, no. 10.

[30] Ehud Eilam, “The Houthis Could Reopen the Southern Front. Is Israel Ready?”, Israel Defense, 14 October 2026.

[31] John Pollock and Damien Symon, “Despite the Gaza Ceasefire, the Israel-Houthi Conflict May Resume”, no. 25.

[32] Luca Nevola, “A Red Sea Hall of Mirrors: US and Houthi Statements vs. Actions”, no. 23.

[33] On 15 March 2025, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth shared sensitive and classified operational details of planned US military strikes against Houthi targets in a group chat on the Signal app. See Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans”, The Atlantic, 24 March 2025; Peter Rodgers, “A Story of Retreat: America’s Military Failure in the Red Sea”, Middle East Monitor, 18 May 2025.

[34] Mohammed Ghobari, “US-Houthi Ceasefire Deal Does Not Include Israel, Says Houthi Spokesperson”, Reuters, 7 May 2025.

[35] Lazar Berman, “As Iran and Houthis Tighten the Screws on Saudi Arabia, a Potential Role Emerges for Israel”, The Times of Israel, 20 September 2026; Burcu Ozcelik, “The Battle for Bab Al-Mandeb is Becoming a Contest for Regional Power”, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 21 September 2026.

[36] Seth Frantzman, “‘How Could Israel Help Saudi Arabia Defend Against The Houthis – And At What Cost? – Analysis”, The Jerusalem Post, 18 October 2026; “Saudi Arabia, Israel Have Shared Interests At Stake, Houthi Escalation Highlights – Editorial”, The Jerusalem Post, 12 October 2026.

[37] Sam Hamad, “Israel Eyes Yemen Role As US Holds Back From Saudi-Houthi War”, The New Arab, 14 September 2026; Amichai Stein and Amir Bohbot, “Israel Provided Saudi Arabia With Intel. Assistance as Houthi Attacks on Riyadh’s Assets Continue”, The Jerusalem Post, 15 September 2026.

[38] Jonathan Pollard, “The Saudi Shield: An Unlikely But Effective Answer to Israel’s Houthi Threat”, World Israel News, 15 October 2026.

[39] “Israel Shares Houthi Intelligence With Saudi Arabia: Report”, Daily Sabah, 15 September 2026.

[40] Jonathan Pollard, “The Saudi Shield: An Unlikely But Effective Answer to Israel’s Houthi Threat”, no. 38.

[41] Neville Teller, “Saudi Arabia Turns to Israel as Houthi Attacks Expose Limits of the Mecca Pact – Opinion”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 September 2026.

[42] Giorgia Valente and the Media Line, “Trump’ Push for Israel-Saudi Relations Faces Obstacles amid Elections, Houthi Attacks – Analysis”, The Jerusalem Post, 21 October 2026.

[43] Michael Milshtein, “Houthi Threat Opens New Regional Doors for Israel, But Old Limits Remain”, Ynet News, 26 September 2026; Ehud Eilam, “The Houthis Could Reopen the Southern Front. Is Israel Ready?”, no. 30.

[44] Yaakov Lappin, “Is the UAE Deepening Its Strategic Involvement Against the Houthis?”, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), 11 December 2025.

[45] “US Mediation and UAE Connections: Will Saudi Arabia Turn to Israeli Support Against the Houthis?”, Noon Post, 12 October 2026.

Keywords : Israel, Saudi Arabia