Pakistan

Pakistan has at present a great many internal and external troubles to cater for. Islamabad is still feeling the after-effects of the Lal Masjid operation, while simultaneously fighting a seemingly uphill battle to rein in support for militancy within the political, defence, and intelligence establishments. In addition, Islamabad is struggling to keep a lid on the instability that plagues its western border regions.

The rise of a militant Islamist group calling itself Pakistani Taliban has drawn wider international attention in recent years. It has appeared as a serious internal security threat for the Pakistani state and as an external challenge for the Afghan government facing a resurgent Taliban in southern Afghanistan. This article seeks to trace the evolution of 'Pakistani Taliban' and to isolate and analyse its ideological moorings and its political aspirations.

The traditional Sino-Pakistan friendship of 55 years now has a new objective—to improve the economic content of their relationship, which comprises trade, investment and energy co-operation within a bilateral framework. The result of this determination to implement the new economic agenda is visible in the quantum of Chinese investment in Pakistan.

For decades, the dominant sense in the foreign policy establishment of India was that neither the Kashmir question nor the boundary dispute with China was ripe for resolution. Yet, in defiance of this received wisdom, two very different political coalitions have opened and sustained substantive negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir and the boundary dispute with China. Forward movement in both negotiations has also been premised on opening the closed frontiers with China and Pakistan.

The Prime Minister of UK, Tony Blair, visited Pakistan in the third week of November to participate in the third UK-Pakistan bilateral summit. The UK-Pak joint statement of December 6, 2004 institutionalised such bilateral meets at the highest level, to 're-energise' the 'partnership for peace and prosperity in the 21st century'. As these bilateral summits are of a strategic nature and are being pursued without interruption since 2004, it is useful to analyse the scope and extent of such bilateral engagement.

Despite the categorical denial by the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson about a report published by a British newspaper in January 2006, that Islamabad was engaged in talks with China to purchase eight nuclear reactors worth US $7 billion, the Chinese media later disclosed Beijing's plan of signing an agreement to supply six reactors. Speculation in this regard has gained currency now that the two countries are to enter into a nuclear deal during the ongoing visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Pakistan.

As the India-China relationship continues to grow in the new Asian dynamics, Mr. Hu Jintao's maiden visit will indeed help to keep the momentum of improving ties going. The main thrust of both governments will be to establish greater political trust for future co-operation. Two-way trade between India and China is likely to touch US $24 billion this year. There are high expectations on both sides. Manmohan Singh and Hu know each other well. They have met and held talks five times during the last two years.

“Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia … We offer the critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra- regionally and interregionally”
-- President Gen. Pervez Musharraf
June 15, 2006

The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the "Tiger of Balochistan" in the early hours of August 27 in an army operation has ominous implications for the restive province. The tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, was a strong proponent of Baloch autonomy, and had said that he had been a Baloch for several centuries, a Muslim for 1400 years but a Pakistani for just over fifty.