Pakistan’s Afghanistan Problem
The Taliban 2.0 have refused to bow to Pakistan’s dictates on multiple issues, including on cracking down on the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and their relationship with India.
The Taliban 2.0 have refused to bow to Pakistan’s dictates on multiple issues, including on cracking down on the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and their relationship with India.
Unless the Taliban regime adopts relatively non-intrusive social policies and embraces people-centric approaches to governance, it will remain somewhat a mirror image of its old regressive self from the 1990s.
The Pakistan–Afghanistan border standoff threatens livelihoods as well as regional stability.
Given the ideological convergence the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has with the Taliban, the latter may not be able or willing to fulfil Pakistan’s demand that its activities be curbed.
The relationship between TTP, or Pakistani Taliban, and Afghan Taliban will continue to be dictated by religious-ideological convergence, ethnic-fraternal linkages and the close camaraderie that emerged while they were fighting together against the foreign ‘occupying’ forces in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s historical insecurity towards India and the Islamisation of its military raises a curious question of strategy and identity rooted in Pakistan’s political genesis. This article examines the social and geostrategic factors underpinning Pakistan’s Afghanistan approach between its inheritance of security principles from colonial administration after Partition, and the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 1996 and beyond. This article also critically analyses the existing link between the Taliban and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).
Unless the Central Asian states, China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia jointly contribute towards ensuring stability, Afghanistan is likely to fall to the Taliban again or even break up.
Where does Pakistan figure in ‘Afghan good enough’ if Pakistan’s centrality in the Western approach is taken into account? Not working towards a ‘Pakistan good enough’ would simply mean that ‘Afghan good enough’ is not ‘good enough’.
India will remain a card in the hand of any future Afghan dispensation (whether Taliban or anti-Taliban) to strengthen its negotiating position with Pakistan.
The protection and shelter of millions of Afghans on Pakistan soil for over three decades has amplified the image of UNHCR as a humanitarian institution, which has worked along with the government of Pakistan to manage the burden of the largest caseload of refugees in the world. The office is credited with having carried out the largest repatriation of Afghans (approximately 3.6 million) to their home country since 2002. This operation has greatly enhanced the credibility and esteem of the UNHCR both within Pakistan and Afghanistan.



