Missile Defence

In view of China’s adverse reaction to India’s missile testing, this year’s Republic Day parade could have been used for strategic signalling to arrogant entities questioning India’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Nuclear deterrence is also about demonstration and display of capabilities. If you have it, then flaunt it!

Expediting India’s membership process would be a win-win situation for both India and the MTCR. The prevailing uncertainty will end for India and the MTCR will get an effective and positive member.

The PAC-3 missile defence deal is a win-win package for both the United States and Saudi Arabia in terms of both their bilateral relations and the enhancement of regional security.

This paper discusses such delivery mechanisms commonly known together as nuclear triad in the Indian context. The paper has four major parts. The first part attempts to set the context for the overall discussion. The second, third and fourth parts deals with the evaluation about missile forces, aerial platforms and submarine based platforms for nuclear weapon delivery on the targets.

The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.

The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

Iran’s investments in space should not be viewed only through the narrow prism of a nuclear threat but as a nascent attempt to challenge the West’s technological domination.

The Patriot deployments signify Turkey’s attempt to secure itself and its allies against touted missile threats from the two countries with which it shares borders to the east – Syria and Iran.

The Chinese efforts towards actualization of the ‘offshore defense’ concept which entails the conduct of campaigns in distant waters, strategic deterrence and counterattacks, has an inherent risk of bringing its naval forces on a confrontational course vis-à-vis other maritime forces, particularly the US. To defend itself against overarching US maritime superiority in such a scenario, China has developed its Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) concept, predicated mainly around the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

To counter the consequences flowing from growing ballistic missile proliferation in its neighbourhood, India must expand its BMD programme to include boost phase and mid-course phase intercept capability.