Why Mumbai? Why Now?
The desire for visibility incentivises groups like the Indian Mujahideen to engage in ‘costly-signalling’ through terror strikes.
- Namrata Goswami
- July 27, 2011
The desire for visibility incentivises groups like the Indian Mujahideen to engage in ‘costly-signalling’ through terror strikes.
With India’s security apparatus once again standing exposed and the security overhaul envisaged after 26/11 being still a work in progress, it is time for some harsh introspection.
The recent activities of SIMI as well as its suspected links with groups like the Popular Front of India and the Karnataka Forum for Dignity and even the Indian Mujahideen suggest that it is regrouping to undertake terrorist attacks in different parts of India.
Although on the ground the areas of conflict are specific and do not cover the entire landmass as a map would indicate, the incoherence of the state’s response makes it appear that India is at war with itself.
Much has been written about terrorism and counterterrorism as forms of communication, but such analyses are usually jettisoned in the arena of “breaking news alerts” and real-time reporting.
Civil society in general and the strategic community in particular must demand the release of documents pertaining to India’s security.
Non-proliferation is now an accepted norm in international security and international relations. Most countries perceive global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as being inseparable in principle, although there is disagreement among countries on the ultimate objective of non-proliferation. Most countries generally want non-proliferation to be a transitional arrangement before total nuclear disarmament, which at present is a desirable though distant goal. The classical bargain for balancing the two has tilted in favour of non-proliferation.
Though Pakistan and Afghanistan still continue to be embroiled in religious and ethnic conflict, the rest of South Asia appears keen to check and go beyond such tendencies.
Under the November 2010 statement issued by India and the United States, India is committed to take only one step: harmonizing its export controls with those of all the four multilateral export controls regimes.
This Brief elaborates the principles that need to be followed to evolve a criteria-based approach to enable India to join the NSG as a full member and contribute materially and substantially to a future non-proliferation regime that will be acceptable to the international community as a whole.



