At a time when the battlefield has been progressively transforming from the conventional to unconventional, the role of Special Forces will become critical in shaping its outcome. Conflicts in the past decade have established the primacy of such forces. Their role has evolved and today special operations are meant to be decisive and achieve strategic objectives. The Indian security establishment has also been taking notice of these changes and by and large making right moves.
Three months after the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was swept to power at the centre in the general elections held in April–May 2014 to the 16th Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament), the Standing Committee on Defence was constituted under the chairmanship of Major General B.C. Khanduri (Retd.), former Chief Minister of the northern state of Uttarakhand and a prominent member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is the main constituent of the NDA.
MoD will do well to set up a crack team of experts from all fields to work out the terms of the proposed IGA keeping in view the larger picture of what happens after these 36 aircraft are inducted.
A loosely articulated idea of making India a defence manufacturing hub cannot work unless it is backed by a comprehensive blueprint, efficient procedures, meticulous implementation, trained and responsive manpower, continuous monitoring and quick decision-making.
The bad news in this year’s defence budget is that it does not recognise that things are not going in the right direction but only the beaten track. And the poor track record in fully utilising the resources allocated for ‘Modernisation’ is the worse news.
It is a fairly simple exercise to estimate what the defence budget will be given available indicators. My assessment is that the Budget Estimate for defence is likely to be around Rs. 250,000 crore, with 105,000 crore for Capital Expenditure and 145,000 Crore for Revenue Expenditure.
There is a general feeling among analysts that while US government lawyers may have been satisfied that the CLNDA is compatible with CSC in light of explanations offered by the Indian government, this view is being reportedly challenged by nuclear industry lawyers.
There is an urgent need to conceptualise a policy framework as to what Make-in-India implies so far as defence production is concerned and how it is different from the existing policy framework.
If reports about the diversion of INR 13,000 crore from the capital segment of the defence budget to the revenue heads are true, it is an indication of the growing strain on the revenue budget.
