Pakistan

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  • The Pakistan Navy: A Transformation from ‘Fledgling Force’ to ‘Fighting Machine’

    The Pakistan navy (PN) is poised on the brink of a transformation. Neglected for long by Pakistan’s political masters and a dominant Pakistan army, the PN was unable to assert its salience and witnessed slow growth. But in the one decade since the September 2001 attacks and the US led ‘war on terror’, it has undergone a striking metamorphosis. As Pakistan realises the importance of having a robust maritime force and commits greater resources for its development, the tactics of the PN and its broader strategy in the northern Arabian Sea too have undergone a shift.

    October 2011

    Understanding the Motivation of Pakistan’s Security and Defence Policies: Roots of Pakistan’s Emergence as the Epicentre of Terrorism

    The idea of Pakistan survives on the premise of enmity towards India. This premise came into existence well before Pakistan became a reality. Some in Pakistan believe that the country started incubating the moment the first Muslim stepped on the soil of the subcontinent. That belief originates from the conviction that the Islamic civilisation cannot intermingle with another civilisation because it always seeks to conquer and subjugate.

    October 2011

    Radicalization of the Pakistan Army

    A division of forces between the proposed Indian and Pakistani dominions and creation of a separate military establishment for the latter was necessitated by the partitioning of British India. An explosion of communal violence, triggered and later fuelled by the impending partition and the ethnic cleansing of the Hindus and Sikhs that preceded it in West Punjab, the mass migration of a very large number of population from and to Pakistan, the outbreak of war with India over Kashmir and the subsequent ‘Crush-India’ campaigns gave impetus to this requirement

    October 2011

    Pakistan: Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) - An Analytical Overview

    The ISI was set up in 1948, shortly after the first war with India, to strengthen sharing of intelligence between the army, navy and air force. It was headed first by Maj Gen R. Cawthorne, one of the last British officers to leave Pakistan. He continued at the helm of ISI till 1956. Thereafter, for almost three years, it remained headless as Pakistan faced constitutional turmoil leading finally to Ayub Khan’s first martial law take-over. Ayub appointed Brig Riaz Hussain as ISI chief and he continued up to 1966.

    October 2011

    The Terror Challenge In South Asia and Prospect of Regional Cooperation

    The Terror Challenge In South Asia and Prospect of Regional Cooperation
    • Publisher: Pentagon Security International
      2012

    This book is an attempt to study the problem of terrorism in South Asia, which has often been perceived as its hub. The contributors to the volume belonging to South Asian region have provided valuable insights on the issue of terrorism and have also suggested measures to deal with the problem. They consider terrorism as a phenomenon that has been harmful to society, economy and polity of the South Asian nations. At the same time, they also point out that there should not be over-emphasis on the use of force. In fact, a calibrated use of force is likely to be more effective.

    • ISBN 978-81-8274-599-5 ,
    • Price: ₹. 695/-
    • E-copy available
    2012

    Queering the ‘Pitch’ of Pakistan Politics

    At a time of such monumental, even existential, challenges, if all that Pakistan can come up with is a vacuous demagogue like Imran Khan, then its future is pretty bleak.

    November 08, 2011

    Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative

    Since the infliction of unacceptable damage may not deter Pakistan from breaking the nuclear taboo, a ‘tit for tat’ strategy in case of lower order nuclear use is worth considering.

    October 03, 2011

    Flailing America Vs Failing Pakistan

    Until the US figures out an answer to the larger Pakistan problem, like India it too will have to resist the temptation of responding to Pakistani provocation with force.

    October 03, 2011

    NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan

    It makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon is used by Pakistan, since India’s general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

    August 19, 2011

    What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr?

    The commentary addresses the pros and cons of Pakistan’s development of Nasr and concludes that it can be neutralised by India through innovative measures.

    August 17, 2011

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