Pakistan

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  • A Passage Through India?

    Given the fragility of ISAF’s southern lines of communication passing through Pakistan, India could consider offering a passage through its territory as a meaningful alternative.

    October 21, 2010

    Ganesh asked: Why India is not taking stringent actions against Pakistan in 26/11 case as it already proved Pakistan the culprit before international community?

    Ali Ahmed replies: The assumption in this reply is that 'stringent action' referred to in the question implies 'military action'. Other action available being diplomatic contact with the Pakistani authorities to facilitate the judicial process. In this context, periodic news on the exchange of folders, enquiries from the Pakistani side etc is released. A couple of serving ISI military officials have been identified as part of the conspiracy. The issue has been raised with the Pakistanis on several occasions of direct contact with the at all levels including during the meetings of the PMs, the foreign ministers, foreign secretaries and the home minister. The US has also expressed its concerns to Pakistan, testifying to the fact that our diplomacy is multipronged. In so far as more 'stringent action' is concerned, it is not being contemplated upon now and for good reasons. The judicial system in Pakistan is siezed of the case against those handlers arrested and would proceed at its own pace. Additional action that the Pakistani state can and should take such as against the infrastructure of terror and those inspiring and sustaining terror networks of LeT and the JM is being impressed on Pakistan. It would require to be prevailed upon through persuasion and argument of not only India, but also its friends such as the US. The Pakistani state may take such action in case the nexus identified between the anti India groups and the TTP and Al Qaeda deepens to threaten the Pakistani state itself. The argument the international community has been making is that it is in Pakistani interest to roll back the infrastructure of terror before it threatens the Pakistani state. Therefore, other alternatives require to be tried out more exhaustively, before 'stringent action' in terms of military action is contemplated or executed. In any case, military action cannot now be proceeded with in respect of 26/11. In case military action were to be taken, it would set off an unpredictable series of events within Pakistan that could jeopardise not only that state but also the international community's efforts in Afghanistan. However, in case another 26/11 were to occur, then that option is a serious possibility.

    How ISI terrorises Pakistani Journalists

    Umar Cheema’s abduction and torture by ISI officials recently is part of the strong arm tactics employed by the Pakistan Army and its intelligence wing to force journalists to fall in line.

    October 19, 2010

    Afghanistan: India should keep a low profile for the present

    India must stay engaged, keep a low profile, earn the goodwill of the Afghan people through its multifaceted assistance programme, and stay away from any costly misadventure in the security sector.

    October 18, 2010

    Afghanistan: A Firewall is Better than Partition

    India has been fairly successful in firewalling the radical blowback emanating from Pakistan in the past and need not be overly worried about the impending US withdrawal.

    October 07, 2010

    Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War

    Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War

    This essay seeks to collate, sort through, and organise the reams of publicly available information and speculation to provide a systematic assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear security.

    Chinese Activities in PoK: High Time for India to Put its Act Together

    A recent New York Times report that 11,000 soldiers of the Peoples’ Liberation Army have been stationed in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of the PoK, carries important implications for India. For India to put forth its legitimate claim to the whole of Kashmir, the time is now or else, never.

    September 09, 2010

    India's Response Options to Pakistani Nuclear First Use

    The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.

    April 2010

    Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia

    Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia

    This paper suggests an approach towards building conditions necessary for peace between India and Pakistan. Identifying the Pakistani army as a power centre in Pakistan, the hypothesis is that a strategic dialogue with it would achieve doctrinal balancing and help mitigate its threat perception.

    2010

    The Sochi Summit: Fresh Moves on The Grand Eurasian Chessboard

    At their second Summit in Sochi on August 18, 2010, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed to reinforce their cooperation. The United States has supported the Russian initiative due to its own compulsions and the China factor. India needs to pursue a well considered “Eurasian Heartland” policy in the context of these developments.

    August 27, 2010

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