Smruti Pattanaik replies: I do not agree that India is selective in choosing its partners in neighborhood. India has always liked to see democratic and secular governments in the neighbouring countries that represent people’s aspiration. The military regimes in the neighbouring countries are antithesis of these values. In the past, India has however has done business with the military regimes. But that does not detract it from these core values.

India was closely associated with Awami League during the liberation struggle. Awami league represents some of the core principles that India represents and values democracy, pluralism and secularism. Moreover AL’s feels cooperation with India would help Bangladesh. If one looks at the BNP and the political values it represents its hesitancy to develop good relations with India is clearly apparent. Therefore, it is just not India’s preference of one over the other it depends on the domestic constituencies of the political parties and their ideological underpinnings that define the response in the neighbourhood.

In case of Pakistan, democratic regimes there believe that confrontation with India will strengthen the Army and would be detrimental to growth of democracy. India also feels that military regimes would not help the interest of peace. Therefore, response to India’s hand of friendship is determined by regime interest in the neighbouring countries.

A. Vinod Kumar replies: Nuclear or conventional arms control could figure as a key element in a dialogue only when it amounts to be the most potent point of contention between the two states or when it makes a drastic transformation in the equation. In the case of India and Pakistan where the core political issues are terrorism and Kashmir, quasi-political matters like water-sharing, arms control or nuclear confidence-building measures could only follow a larger political understanding. It could be noted that this point has not been achieved in the Indo-Pak talks. Another factor is the element of stability that is perceivably existent in the nuclear equation of these two countries.

Though Pakistan had fought a limited war in Kargil and has undertaken a prolonged low-intensity conflict, both under nuclear conditions, and notwithstanding the Western notion of South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint, there were very few opportunities when both countries went the extra mile on nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) – the two instances being the agreement to abstain from attacking nuclear facilities and giving prior notice of missile tests. While the potential for nuclear or conventional CBMs to dramatically impact this relationship is minimal when the core political issues remain unresolved, such measures could be significant when there is threat of conflict escalation, leading to nuclear brinkmanship. Besides, there are conditions like an Indian push for ballistic missile defences, which could prompt Pakistan to seek countermeasures or push for arms reductions in the region.