India-Pakistan Relations

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • India-Pakistan Game-Theoretic Interplay

    To make the transition from the prevalent Nash Equilibrium with its lower payoffs to Pareto-optimal which will yield higher pay offs, India and Pakistan must break away from their traditional thinking of making no concessions.

    April 20, 2011

    Why India should retain its No-First-Use policy?

    Since there is no evidence to suggest that the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile has degraded India’s retaliatory capability, India should retain its no-first-use doctrine.

    April 11, 2011

    India and the Pakistan-China Nexus in Gilgit-Baltistan

    China’s intensified engagement in the region, encompassing reconstruction and development, suggests a subtle move to alter the security situation.

    March 16, 2011

    India-Pakistan Relations: Military Diplomacy vs Strategic Engagement

    Military diplomacy has not figured significantly in India-Pakistan relations with ample reasons. Military to military engagement between the two states is confined to CBMs of varying significance. Even as both militaries have several regional and extra-regional engagements falling under the rubric of military diplomacy, the ones between the two are restricted to the routine exchanges of military advisors in respective missions in national capitals. However, there is a case for expansion in military diplomacy between the two.

    India-Pakistan Relations: Military Diplomacy vs Strategic Engagement

    Military diplomacy has not figured significantly in India-Pakistan relations with ample reasons. Military to military engagement between the two states is confined to CBMs of varying significance. Even as both militaries have several regional and extra-regional engagements falling under the rubric of military diplomacy, the ones between the two are restricted to the routine exchanges of military advisors in respective missions in national capitals. However, there is a case for expansion in military diplomacy between the two.

    January 2011

    Need for a composite back channel with Pakistan army

    The absence of a credible interlocutor in Pakistan who can exercise effective control over the Pakistan army leaves India with little choice except to open a parallel dialogue with the military establishment in Pakistan.

    January 07, 2011

    Cold Start as Deterrence against Proxy War

    As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region.

    November 22, 2010

    Ganesh asked: Why India is not taking stringent actions against Pakistan in 26/11 case as it already proved Pakistan the culprit before international community?

    Ali Ahmed replies: The assumption in this reply is that 'stringent action' referred to in the question implies 'military action'. Other action available being diplomatic contact with the Pakistani authorities to facilitate the judicial process. In this context, periodic news on the exchange of folders, enquiries from the Pakistani side etc is released. A couple of serving ISI military officials have been identified as part of the conspiracy. The issue has been raised with the Pakistanis on several occasions of direct contact with the at all levels including during the meetings of the PMs, the foreign ministers, foreign secretaries and the home minister. The US has also expressed its concerns to Pakistan, testifying to the fact that our diplomacy is multipronged. In so far as more 'stringent action' is concerned, it is not being contemplated upon now and for good reasons. The judicial system in Pakistan is siezed of the case against those handlers arrested and would proceed at its own pace. Additional action that the Pakistani state can and should take such as against the infrastructure of terror and those inspiring and sustaining terror networks of LeT and the JM is being impressed on Pakistan. It would require to be prevailed upon through persuasion and argument of not only India, but also its friends such as the US. The Pakistani state may take such action in case the nexus identified between the anti India groups and the TTP and Al Qaeda deepens to threaten the Pakistani state itself. The argument the international community has been making is that it is in Pakistani interest to roll back the infrastructure of terror before it threatens the Pakistani state. Therefore, other alternatives require to be tried out more exhaustively, before 'stringent action' in terms of military action is contemplated or executed. In any case, military action cannot now be proceeded with in respect of 26/11. In case military action were to be taken, it would set off an unpredictable series of events within Pakistan that could jeopardise not only that state but also the international community's efforts in Afghanistan. However, in case another 26/11 were to occur, then that option is a serious possibility.

    The ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy

    The strategy helps sensitise Pakistan to India’s tolerance threshold and reinforces deterrence by bringing home unambiguously to Pakistan that things could get out of hand.

    September 28, 2010

    Water Security for India: The External Dynamics

    Water Security for India: The External Dynamics
    • Publisher: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
      2010

    India is facing a serious water resource problem and as trends suggest, it is expected to become 'water stressed' by 2025 and 'water scarce' by 2050. Premised on this, this IDSA Report raises fundamental questions about the forces driving water demand and the political dynamics of riparian relations, both in terms of hindrances and opportunities, amongst states in the subcontinent.

    • ISBN 81-86019-83-9 ,
    • Price: ₹. 350/-
    • E-copy available
    2010

    Pages

    Top