US Motivations to Attack Iran, Pressures for De-Escalation, and Potential Outcomes

Summary

One of the defining features of the current crisis in West Asia has been a degree of confusion within the US administration regarding its ultimate objectives. President Donald Trump’s messaging has been particularly inconsistent. Safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz represents the most immediate shared interest among all actors and, therefore, the most viable entry point for de-escalation.

The United States has articulated several justifications for its military action against Iran. At the strategic level, Washington has framed the campaign around four primary objectives: preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability; degrading Iran’s missile and military infrastructure; weakening the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and elements of the Iranian regime leadership; and protecting international shipping and regional allies, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz.[1]

In official statements, the campaign has been described as a limited coercive operation intended to deter Iran and degrade its capabilities. Washington framed the strikes as retaliatory and defensive, following attacks on US assets and regional partners carried out either directly by Iran or by Iranian-aligned groups. Operationally, the United States has focused on targeting missile sites, IRGC facilities, and key elements of Iran’s military infrastructure to disrupt Iran’s ability to strike US forces and regional allies.[2]

However, right from the beginning, the strategic end-state of the campaign, whether it is deterrence, coercive diplomacy, or regime change, has been unclear.[3] Over the past several weeks, the conflict has escalated further. Limited strikes and counterstrikes have given way to a broader regional confrontation, including attacks affecting Gulf States and a US action against an Iranian naval vessel off the coast of Sri Lanka. These developments have also had global economic consequences. Disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered an oil price shock, with prices briefly touching US$ 120 per barrel, underscoring the conflict’s broader economic implications.[4]

Confusion within the US on End Goals

One of the defining features of the current crisis has been a degree of confusion within the US administration regarding its ultimate objectives.

President Donald Trump’s messaging has been particularly inconsistent. One early indication of his shift from positioning himself as a “no-war” president towards a more confrontational posture came in a message directed to the Nobel Committee in the context of the Greenland issue, in which he stated “Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace, although it will always be predominant, but can now think about what is good and proper for the United States of America.”[5] Trump has also suggested that the conflict carries a personal dimension, referring to alleged Iranian attempts to assassinate him while he was on the campaign trail. In quotes attributed to him, he stated, “I got him before he got me. They tried twice. Well, I got him first.”[6]

In the early phase of the conflict, Trump’s messaging implied that regime change or regime collapse in Iran could be a potential outcome of the war. His narrative subsequently oscillated between emphasising regime change and highlighting US military success. Both frames suggested the possibility of political transformation in Iran following military pressure. As oil prices began to rise and domestic economic concerns grew, Trump, however, pivoted towards reassuring US audiences about economic stability. More recently, his messaging has become contradictory, simultaneously suggesting that the war is nearing completion while also stating that it will end only with “total victory”.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has adopted a more consistent diplomatic framing, seeking to anchor the campaign in the language of non-proliferation and pre-emptive defence while avoiding references to regime change. In his statements, he has emphasised Iran’s responsibility for escalation, arguing that Iranian retaliation and threats to global shipping demonstrate an attempt to coerce the international community through instability.

The conflicting messaging and justification from the Administration is reflected in the following exchange that played out with Rubio saying, “We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces. We knew that if we didn’t pre-emptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties”, which explained US entry into the war in the expectation that Israel was going to act anyway and that this would draw fire onto US assets.[7] In subsequent remarks at the Oval Office, the President said the opposite: “[I]t was my opinion that they [Iran] were going to attack first and I didn’t want that to happen. So if anything, I might have forced Israel’s hand.”[8]

By contrast, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has framed the campaign primarily in military terms and used more forceful rhetoric to describe the operation. He has repeatedly insisted that the United States was responding to Iranian aggression, stating, “We didn’t start this war, but we’re finishing it.” Hegseth has also highlighted the scale of the US air campaign, claiming that it has employed “twice the air power of the Iraq invasion’s ‘shock and awe’”, and suggesting that Iran’s military capabilities have been severely degraded. At one point, he declared that Iran’s military was effectively “toast”. At the same time, his statements have signalled the possibility of a prolonged campaign, emphasising that the operation has no fixed timeline and warning of further casualties. His signalling has also included regime change, saying, “This is not a so-called regime change war, but the regime sure did change, and the world is better off for it.”[9]

Taken together, these differing narratives have produced one of the central criticisms of the US approach to the conflict: the administration appears to lack a single coherent strategic narrative. While the military campaign has clear operational objectives, the political end-state—whether deterrence, regime change, or negotiated settlement—remains ambiguous.

Speculation on Motives

Alongside mainstream strategic explanations, a range of alternative or speculative strategic interpretations have circulated in commentary and public debate with various vested interests in the background.[10]

One such line of argument suggests a broader geopolitical strategy in which sustained instability around Iran helps maintain volatility in global oil markets, reinforces US leverage over the economic trajectories of major energy importers such as China and India, and keeps Gulf monarchies strategically dependent on US security guarantees while limiting their ability to pursue independent diplomatic arrangements.[11]

Energy analyst Anas Ahlaji noted in an X post that the conflict could be viewed through the lens of President Donald Trump’s broader economic and technological strategy. According to his perspective, the administration’s actions were partly linked to efforts to strengthen US industrial and technological dominance, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence and energy production. In this reading, ensuring abundant and relatively cheap energy for the United States—while competitors face higher costs—becomes a strategic objective, given the energy-intensive nature of emerging technologies.

Control or influence over major energy supply routes and maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, is therefore seen as a way of shaping global energy flows and costs. Disruptions to Gulf energy exports could push Asian economies to diversify towards US oil and liquefied natural gas while increasing production costs for key industrial competitors.[12] Within this framework, the confrontation with Iran could be viewed less as an attempt at regime change and more as a means of reshaping global energy and supply-chain dynamics in ways that reinforce US economic and technological advantage.

Another long-running theory—revived in the current crisis—argues that a network of pro-Israel lobbying groups and neoconservative policy actors has steered US policy towards confrontation with Iran to serve Israeli security interests and regional dominance. In some versions of this argument, the conflict is interpreted as the culmination of efforts by what commentators describe as a broader global neoconservative alliance. This coalition is sometimes described as including segments of the US national security establishment, Israeli military and political leadership, European Atlanticist policy circles, and conservative Arab Gulf regimes aligned against Iran. According to this interpretation, these actors share an interest in preserving American primacy in the Persian Gulf, which is seen as essential for maintaining Western influence over global energy markets. Proponents of this theory argue that weakening Iran would dismantle what Tehran describes as the “axis of resistance”, thereby reshaping the regional balance of power in favour of Western interests.[13]

A related perspective, more common in left-wing commentary, portrays the conflict as the culmination of a long alignment between the energy sector and the defence industry. According to this view, heightened regional tensions generate sustained demand for weapons systems and military deployments, and fuel energy market volatility, benefitting large defence contractors and energy companies.[14]

Another interpretation situates the conflict within great-power competition. In this reading, Iran is seen as a potential strategic partner or foothold for China in the Middle East. Weakening Iran would therefore prevent the emergence of a Beijing-anchored Eurasian geopolitical order and limit China’s access to strategic energy and infrastructure networks.[15] More sensational speculation circulating in media commentary suggests that the two political leaders may also have domestic political incentives for escalation (Epstein files, corruption cases, political weakness), using war to change the media narrative and rally their bases.[16] While these interpretations remain contested and often speculative, their circulation reflects the broader uncertainty surrounding the conflict’s strategic logic and end-state.

Internal and External Pressures for De-escalation

At the same time, several internal and external pressures could push the United States towards de-escalation. Domestically, public opinion may shift if the conflict becomes prolonged or if American casualties rise. Congressional pressure, including potential war-powers resolutions or funding constraints, could also limit the scope or duration of the conflict. Economic pressures may prove particularly significant. Sustained disruption around the Strait of Hormuz risks higher oil prices, inflationary pressures, and broader instability in global financial markets. Rising energy costs would quickly translate into domestic political pressure on the administration.

International pressure could further reinforce incentives for de-escalation. European allies are likely to push for diplomatic solutions if the conflict threatens economic stability or non-proliferation efforts. Gulf states may initially support pressure on Iran, but could advocate restraint if their own security or energy exports are threatened. Taken together, these domestic, economic, military and diplomatic pressures could eventually encourage the United States to pursue a negotiated settlement or a controlled de-escalation once initial military objectives are achieved.

Priority for the International Community: Safeguarding the Straits of Hormuz

Safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz represents the most immediate shared interest among all actors and, therefore, the most viable entry point for de-escalation. The possibility of its closure has been analysed over the years, and several proposals—historical, legal, regional and operational—have been discussed to protect the Strait of Hormuz and ensure uninterrupted global energy transit.[17] After attacks on shipping during the Tanker War (1984–88), some policymakers and legal scholars proposed effectively internationalising the strait by reinforcing the transit passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, so that commercial shipping could not be impeded even during conflict.[18]

Maritime-law experts have since suggested strengthening this framework through internationally supervised shipping lanes, clearer navigation rules, and multilateral monitoring of maritime traffic.[19] Iran’s stillborn Hormuz Peace Initiative called for Gulf states—including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman and the UAE—to guarantee maritime security and reduce external military involvement jointly.[20] However, the Gulf countries have preferred to be under the US security umbrella.[21]

Other proposals include a broader Persian Gulf security dialogue with confidence-building measures such as incident-prevention mechanisms, maritime communication channels and joint patrols.[22] Operational options discussed by naval and shipping experts include multinational naval escort missions, coordinated surveillance and mine countermeasures operations, designated tanker transit corridors, and expanded political risk insurance guarantees to keep commercial shipping flowing during crises.[23] Together, these ideas point towards a possible post-conflict outcome in which Hormuz is insulated from military confrontation through a combination of legal guarantees, regional security arrangements, and practical maritime protection mechanisms.

Plausible End-States

Looking ahead, analysts have identified four plausible end-states for the conflict.[24]

The first scenario is a negotiated settlement following limited military escalation. Under this outcome, both sides would claim partial victory while returning to indirect negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme and regional activities. Also termed the Venezuela model, this train seems to have left the station following Trump’s successful regime change in Venezuela.[25]

A second scenario involves a prolonged but contained conflict characterised by periodic strikes, proxy attacks and maritime disruptions without a decisive outcome for either side, while producing sustained disruptions to global energy markets.

The third scenario is a broader regional escalation that draws in multiple regional actors and creates a multi‑front conflict with severe global economic consequences, especially for energy and shipping.

The final scenario is a decisive military outcome in which sustained US and allied strikes significantly weaken Iran’s military capabilities and political leadership, forcing a strategic retreat or internal political transformation.

Which of these outcomes ultimately emerges will depend on the interaction between military developments, diplomatic initiatives, domestic political pressures, and the broader geopolitical environment in which the conflict is unfolding.

[1] “Why is the US Attacking Iran?”, Reuters, 1 March 2026.

[2] “Press Briefings and Transcripts”, U.S. Department of Defense, 2026.

[3] “Experts React: US and Israel Strike Iran—What Next?”, Atlantic Council, 28 February 2026.

[4] “Iran Unleashes Oil Shock to Blunt US Firepower”, Reuters, 13 March 2026.

[5] Alexa Lisitza, “‘REMOVAL FROM OFFICE’ — Americans Are Mocking Trump After He Admitted He’s Done With ‘Peace’ After the Nobel Peace Prize Snub”, Yahoo News UK, 21 January 2026.

[6]  “‘Got Him Before He Got Me’: Trump Says Khamenei Plotted His Killing in 2024”, NDTV, 2 March 2026.

[7] Callum Sutherland, “Trump Says Iran Has Been ‘Knocked Out,’ Denies Israel Forced U.S.’ Hand on Strikes”, TIME, 4 March 2026.

[8] Yair Rosenberg, “The Real Reason Trump Went to War”, The Atlantic, 2026.

[9] Aveek Banerjee, “We Didn’t Start War, We’re Finishing It’: US Defence Chief’s Warning to Iran”, News18, 2 March 2026.

[10] “The Iran War Cheerleaders and the Weapons Industry That Funds Them”, Responsible Statecraft, 2026.

[11] “Why are the US and Israel Attacking Iran? What We Know So Far”, Al Jazeera, 2026.

[12] Anas Alhajji, “🛑 ماذا يريد الرئيس ترمب؟ …”, X (formerly Twitter), 7 March 2026.

[13] Nimrod Flaschenberg, “Netanyahu’s Iran War Is Also the War of Global Neocon Elites”, Jacobin, 6 March 2026.

[14] “Economy”, Interview with Prof. C.P. Chandrashekhar, Truthout, 3 March 2026.

[15] “Asia and the Iran Conflict: Energy Vulnerability and the Imperative for Action”, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 12 March 2026.

[16] Andrea Rizzi, “The Motives Behind the Attack on Iran: An Offensive Tinged with Trump and Netanyahu’s Personal Political Interests”, EL PAÍS English, 28 February 2026.

[17] Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz“, International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 82–117.

[18] Nilufer Oral, “Transit Passage Rights in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the Passage of Oil Tankers”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 16, No. 16, 3 May 2012.

[19] For a detailed study, see Abdulmalik Mohammed A. Aldawish, “The Application of the Transit Passage Regime in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Strait of Hormuz”, PhD thesis, School of Law, University of Essex, 2024.

[20] “Letter dated 9 December 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary‑General (A/74/581–S/2019/933)”, United Nations, 10 December 2019.

[21] Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “Gulf Maritime Security: Seeking Stability in the Era of Precarious Détente”, TRENDS Research & Advisory, 4 October 2022.

[22] “Russia’s Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf”, Unofficial Translation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 24 August 2021.

[23] Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz“, no. 17.

[24] “Four Scenarios: What Are the Possible Outcomes of the US–Israel War on Iran?”, The Guardian, 3 March 2026.

[25] Ramzi Bendebka,  “Echoes of Empire: The Hidden Geopolitics, Strategic Drivers, and Endgame Scenarios of the 2026 US–Israel–Iran War”, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 16 March 2026.