Has the Time Come to Replace Manned Combat Aircraft With Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles?
Kishore Kumar Khera
August 16, 2017
A quantum jump in the operational role of UAVs can be expected only with a breakthrough in Artificial Intelligence. Until that happens, their will increase gradually to reach about 50 per cent of combat operations over the next three decades.
The F-35 should be, and almost certainly will be, the last manned strike fighter aircraft the Department of the Navy will ever buy or fly.
– Ray Mabus, US Secretary of the Navy
Aviation, which started with the Wright Brothers’ first controlled flight of a heavier than air machine on 17 December 1903, has come a long way in the last 114 years. As is true for many technological developments, aviation too quickly acquired a niche for itself in the military matrix. Manned aircraft were first inducted in warfare as high ground observatories to monitor enemy troop movement. Aerial reconnaissance with an observation by the pilot and later with a still camera was the first operational role of aircraft. The next step involved aircrew carrying small bombs and dropping them manually from the cockpit. Thus was born the role of ground attack. In the next phase, aircraft were equipped with guns to engage enemy aircraft in the air and this commenced the aerial combat role. Besides these, the development of bigger airframes and powerful engines enabled the development of transport aircraft, which were subsequently modified with the fitment of radars, jammers and fuel tanks for surveillance, electronic warfare and inflight refuelling, respectively. These roles are being performed by manned aircraft albeit with much better technology and accuracy than was possible during the 20th century.
Technological advancement in computing and communication facilitated the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Controlled from a ground station, the UAV either flies a pre-planned path or can be dynamically controlled. As was the case with manned aircraft about a century ago, the operational roles of UAVs are following a similar trajectory. Besides being used as a weapon, the first operational role for UAVs was of aerial reconnaissance wherein the UAV was fitted with optical cameras. The development of sensor technology and its miniaturisation along with better computation and communication allowed transmission of real time data in various electromagnetic bands, a boon for a military commander. UAVs scored substantially over manned aircraft in this role owing to their longer endurance. Coupled with satellite imagery capabilities, UAVs have practically driven out manned aircraft from the reconnaissance role except in a very few critical cases where their low speed remains an operational impediment. However, UAVs have been able to overcome their speed limitation to a certain extent by their low Radar Cross Section (RCS), making it difficult to detect and engage them.
Going by the precedent of manned aircraft, the next role UAVs were assigned was of ground attack. This required more powerful engines and larger airframes for enabling the UAV to carry weapons. Here too, technology played a pivotal role in enhancing weapons delivery accuracy thus reducing the weapon size required for the same extent of impact on the target. This role by UAVs is being carried out successfully in Afghanistan with Hellfire missiles from USAF MQ9. The UAV’s long endurance allows a high success rate for search and strike missions as compared to a manned fighter aircraft with comparatively limited endurance. The success rate of UAV ground attack missions is to a large extent dependent on their operation in a benign air defence environment.
The full development and employment of UAVs in an air defence role is still some distance away owing to prevailing technological challenges. In the same vein, switching to unmanned transport aircraft may also take a few decades. While the roles of UAVs are gradually increasing in the civil sector, ranging from the delivery of packages to the shooting of high-quality aerial films, a debate is on about the end of an era for manned aircraft for operational missions. There are three critical components involved in the employment of UAVs instead of manned aircraft in combat, viz, basic flying (take off, landing and planned navigation), tactical flying (situation appreciation and changing the plan midway) and weapon delivery (correct and timely targeting). While progress has been made in all three verticals, it is yet to reach a level that would enable the complete replacement of manned aircraft. Factors that need to be considered in this debate are:-
Sensors and Dynamic Situation Processing. In a benign air defence environment and uncontested air space, UAVs are efficient in mission accomplishment. When decision-making autonomy is required or there are rules of engagement or a developing air situation that cannot be explicitly expressed mathematically, a human is essential. The current generation of sensors do not have the capacity to replicate the appreciation by a human eye and pose a limitation in operations because the UAV operator is not situationally aware. The major drawback of the current generation systems is their inability to capture high fidelity data, process, encrypt and transmit it and, based on directions from the ground station, receive, decrypt and process it to execute a command. Based on the type of processor and communication systems, this process may take anywhere from 600 milliseconds to three seconds – a very long duration in combat operations. The development of Artificial Intelligence will overcome this deficiency and provide the requisite autonomy to the UAV.
Speed and Manoeuvrability. UAVs are generally characterised by their low speed and consequent low manoeuvrability as compared to manned fighter aircraft and this makes them vulnerable. At the same time, however, a low RCS and greater endurance are design features that assist UAVs in mission accomplishment.
Weapon Carrying Capacity. Owing to their power, UAVs are capable of carrying low calibre/low weight weapons in limited numbers as compared to manned aircraft. But this limitation can be overcome by converting fighter aircraft into UAVs or through the use of special weapons with high accuracy to reduce Over Target Requirement (OTR)1 in terms of number and size of weapons.
Quantity and Costs. UAVs do not need some of the safety and operating systems that manned aircraft need and thus enjoy better cost efficiency. This normally translates into greater numbers of UAVs for the same cost as compared to a combat aircraft. However, autonomous aviation technology is yet to mature, which can be assessed from the fact that UAV accident rates are four to five times higher than that of manned aircraft. This negates the cost effectiveness partially as of now, but is likely to improve with better technology.
Endurance and Risks. UAVs practically eliminate human endurance as a factor for mission duration. Autonomous inflight refuelling could keep the UAV in the air for days. Risk to life and risk of capture of operators is fully eliminated. However, the control of UAV is heavily dependent on electromagnetic waves, which are susceptible to interference/jamming/technical malfunctions. Any delay in the transmission of critical commands could be lethal. Another aspect of the absence of an aircrew in UAVs is the limited ability of on board systems to diagnose any system malfunction especially owing to an external factor. An aircrew can diagnose an instrument failure and react to save the aircraft, but an UAV with instrument failure will most probably be lost.
Trends. With effect from 2010, the induction of UAVs has outnumbered induction of manned aircraft in the US armed forces. And since 2011, the US Air Force has trained more UAV pilots than fighter/bomber pilots. But most of the financial allocations the world over including in the US are still being made for manned aircraft development and procurement. This will change once better processing power, artificial intelligence and communication equipment are developed and incorporated in UAVs. Technology involving a swarm of UAVs operating in a group and being mutually supportive is at an advanced stage of development and will assist UAVs in garnering a greater share of operational missions.
Efficacy. The conversion of fighter aircraft to UAVs for undertaking training missions has been tried and tested in the cases of the F4 and F16 in the US Air Force and the F6 in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. The same could be developed further for undertaking operational missions with high risk.
Suitable Missions. In the foreseeable future, an optimal solution is a mix of manned aircraft and UAVs till technology can support a better appreciation of situational awareness and command and control aspects. Currently, the most suitable missions for UAVs are the five Ds – Detect, Designate, Dirty, Destructive and Dangerous. Detect missions require long endurance and are pre-planned and repetitive in nature like surveillance over a large area for a prolonged duration to detect a possible development. Designate either in conjunction with Detect or stand-alone missions designate a target system/sub system using laser designators for an attack by an armed aircraft/UAV. Dirty missions are undertaken in an NBC environment in order to negate the risk to human life. Destructive missions are when the UAV is equipped with explosives and is used as a weapon And Dangerous missions involve those against a heavily defended target to either attack the defences or force the adversary to expend missiles on UAVs.
Indian Scenario
While Israel and USA are leaders in UAV technology and operations, the Indian UAV programme is in its infancy. Going by the example of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the production of an Indian combat mission capable UAV is at least a couple of decades away. India will have to depend on imports or joint ventures for Make in India in the interim, as UAVs are essential in any operational matrix. Till a requisite number of mission capable UAVs are inducted in India, some of the operational missions will have to be carried out by manned aircraft, albeit in a suboptimal way. The induction of Su30MKI, LCA and Rafale will continue till 2022 and these aircraft with an average calendar life of 25 years or more will be in service well beyond 2050. By that time, for operational effectiveness, at least 50 per cent of combat missions would be designated to UAVs and that would require a large fleet of various types of UAVs. To meet that challenge, it would be prudent to establish a joint venture for the production of UAVs in India under the Strategic Partnership programme.
Sum Up
With the current state of technology, UAVs are the best bet for operations in an uncontested air space for surveillance and search and strike missions with low calibre high accuracy guided weapons. However, operations in a moderate to dense air defence environment will need manned aircraft to react appropriately, although UAVs can be of great value in reducing the risk to manned aircraft by saturating the air space and attacking air defence systems thus compelling an adversary to expend his missiles. UAVs are essential ingredients of a combat force and their role will continue to increase along with their capability. A quantum jump in the operational role of UAVs can be expected only with a breakthrough in AI. Until that happens, the role of UAVs will increase gradually to reach about 50 per cent of combat operations over the course of the next three decades.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Over Target Requirement (OTR) is the number of weapons required over a target to achieve the requisite level of damage and is calculated based on target system, its functional and vulnerability analysis along with weapon characteristics and parameters of its damage mechanism like Blast Over Pressure, Dynamic Pressure, Pressure Pulse, Penetrative Index, Fragmentation Pattern, Shock and Fire Indices in the given attack profile.
New Hambantota Port Deal: China Consolidates its Stakes in Sri Lanka
Smruti S. Pattanaik
August 14, 2017
While the agreement remains controversial, China is likely to consolidate its presence and Sri Lanka likely to get deeper into the Chinese debt trap even though it has gained temporary relief through the equity for debt swap.
Some Sri Lankan economists had privately told me in 2011 that their country will find it difficult to repay the massive loan of USD 8 billion at an interest rate of more than six per cent taken from China for modernising the Hambantota port and that it may ultimately have to convert these loans into equity. That warning came true on July 29, 2017 when Sri Lanka and China signed the Hambantota Port Concession Agreement. Soon after the Agreement was signed, China declared that the Hambantota port is a part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
According to the agreement1, China will pay USD 1.12 billion upfront in a debt-equity swap in the ratio of 70:30 approximately, with the China Merchant Port Holdings Company (CMPort) getting 69.55 per cent of the shares and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), a public sector organization, holding the remainder 30.45 per cent. After 10 years, SLPA can buy another 20 per cent of the shares, making the two companies equal partners.
The agreement envisages the formation of two special vehicle companies — the Hambantota International Port Services Company (HIPS) to provide port services and security, and the Hambantota International Port Group Company (HIPG) to look after the commercial aspects. In HIPS, the SLPA will hold 50.7 per cent of the shares, and CMPort 49.3 per cent. And in HIPG, the CMPort will own 85 per cent of the shares and SLPA 15 per cent. The agreement leases out the port to CMPort for 99 years, but contains a provision for the SLPA to acquire majority stake gradually after ten years. The commercial company HIPG will pay SLPA dividends and royalty.
A financial expert has, however, opined that CMPort’s stake in HIPS is not 49.3 per cent but actually 58 percent because 8.7 per cent of the SLPA’s stake of 50.7 per cent comes from the coffers of the HIPG in which CMPort has 85 percent stake2. Therefore, in effect, CMPort is a majority shareholder in both HIPG and HIPS and is the de facto owner of the port. The share distribution in the HIPS and HIPG raises the question as to whether HIPS, which handles security, can effectively implement the following clause – the Government of Sri Lanka ‘will have the right and authority to grant permission, clearance and approval to berth naval vessels in the port, on mutually agreed payment terms3’ – when China owns the majority stake in that company.
The agreement was submitted to the Sri Lankan parliament on July 27, and a debate was fixed for July 28. But the debate could not take place as commotion broke out in the House over another issue and parliament was adjourned. Yet, the agreement was signed on the very next day (July 29), drawing criticism from the opposition. In order to assure the Opposition, President Maithripala Sirisena undertook to let Parliament debate the Agreement. And he promised that after the debate, if found necessary, the Agreement will be amended. Accordingly, the Minister of Ports, Mahinda Samarasinghe, had to make an announcement in the presence of the Chinese Ambassador and the CMPort’s top brass that the agreement will be debated on August 8. But the debate has been further postponed due to corruption allegations surrounding the Finance Minister. Fearing an Opposition backlash, Sirisena had allowed for the inclusion of a clause stipulating that the agreement could be amended at any time with the consent of the two countries.
The fear that China would eventually take control of the country’s infrastructure was palpable when the Mahinda Rajapaksa government first went ahead with massive infrastructure projects in his electoral constituency of Hambantota district with Chinese funding without assessing their economic viability and long term implications. But the successor Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government, which had accused Rajapaksa of converting the country into a Chinese colony and promised to reverse these decisions, had very little choice other than opting for equity and public private partnership with China. Sri Lanka’s GDP growth had dipped to 3.5 per cent last year. The International Monetary Fund projected a growth rate of five per cent for 2017 only after it became known that the government would opt for a debt-equity swap with China on Hambantota port. On December 8, 2016, a Framework Agreement for the port was signed between Sri Lanka’s Ministries of Ports & Shipping and Development Strategies & International Trade, on one side, and China Merchants Holdings Ltd (now called CMPorts), on the other, for the ‘revitalisation’ of the Hambantota port on a Private–Public Partnership (PPP) model.
The conclusion of an agreement with China to manage the Hambantota port was seen as inevitable after the government buckled under Chinese pressure when the China Communication and Construction Co Ltd, which was building the port city, demanded USD 143 million as compensation for the stalling of the work. The Sri Lankan government was also compelled to renegotiate the Colombo Port city project last year, which had been suspended due to criticism about the Chinese ownership of 20 hectares of freehold land as well as controversy over the project’s possible negative environmental impact.
Compared to the 2016 agreement, the July 29, 2017 Concession Agreement on Hambantota appears to be better with the shareholding of the Chinese company brought down by ten percentage points (from 80 to 70 per cent). And the clause relating to 15,000 hectares of land has been deleted under the new agreement4. Keeping in mind popular protests, the government has decided that only 1,115 hectares of gazetted land will be leased.
Many in Sri Lanka argue that the Hambantota port could make an economic turnaround within a few years5. Their argument is that the SLPA, which has been making loan repayments since 2011, is in a position to fully repay the entire debt by 2032, as was initially envisaged by the previous government6. Some economists in Sri Lanka also feel that the bunkering facility in Hambantota can be utilised for earning foreign exchange to repay the Chinese loan. Port Minister Samarasinghe has, however, said that since 2011, the SLPA has paid China Sri Lanka Rupees (LKR) 47 billion as loan repayment for the Hambantota port, at the rate of LKR 9.1 billion annually, which was not sustainable in the long run. Further, the SLPA announced that it had paid more than LKR 7.1 billion as loan repayment for the loss making Hambantota Port, with LKR 16.7 million as capital and interest in 2016 alone.
Others question whether leasing the port for 99 years is worth the debt to equity swap. But the government argues that the sale of majority share in Hambantota port would help pay the burgeoning interest of 6.3 per cent on the USD 8 billion loan taken from China as well as convert the loss making port and airport into profit-making entities through Chinese investments in the special economic zone.
The deal had been criticised by the Opposition including the Rajapakse faction of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) popularly known as ‘Joint Opposition’. At the heart of the Opposition’s grievance is the government’s decision to lease 15,000 acres of land to CMPort for 99 years without a competitive tender process. Vasudeva Nanayakkara, an ally of Rajapakse, has even filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging this decision.
Ironically, Rajapakse, the main architect behind Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, has effected a complete U-turn. He has stated that he will scrap the Industrial Park proposed to be built on the land forcibly taken over by the government. Protests against the proposal started in December 2016. And when Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe came to inaugurate the industrial park in January 2017, public protests turned violent in which 21 people were injured. Buddhist monks also joined the protesters against the lease of land which was described by Rajapakse as impinging on “Sri Lanka's sovereign rights.7” Media reports note that Arjuna Ranatunga was removed from his post as Minister for Ports because of his opposition to the deal. Parties like the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) are also strongly opposed to this agreement.
India's Concerns
India had expressed concerns regarding Chinese-built projects especially the Colombo Port City and the Hambantota port in the past. In both these cases, the agreements were revised ostensibly to address the concerns of India as well as of some other countries.
India’s main concern has been the long term impact of Chinese state-owned companies acquiring equity in the Sri Lankan economy and the extent to which Chinese influence on Sri Lanka’s economy would affect Colombo’s ability to practice an independent foreign policy. Chinese influence in Sri Lanka will have serious implications for the latter’s relationship with India. This was highlighted by the Sri Lankan decision in November 2014 to permit Chinese submarines to dock in Colombo port in spite of India’s strong protests. India’s fear regarding China’s intentions in its neighbourhood are not unfounded given the latter’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, decision to acquire its first overseas base in Djibouti and its presence in Gwadar as part of the intensifying Sino-Pakistan axis.
To assure India that past policies regarding Chinese submarines would not be repeated, the July 29 agreement has two exclusive clauses that relate to the issue of management of the port. Quoting from the agreement, Nirupama Subramanian writes,
‘It is expressly understood and agreed… [by the parties] that the use of the port property and the common user facilities shall be strictly dedicated for the purposes of port- and marine-related commercial and development activities… and is specifically prohibited from using or carrying out any non-port or non-marine related… activities involving military personnel and/or any kind/type of activities of military nature whatsoever… the sole authority for granting all requisite permissions, clearances, and approvals for bringing in or berthing warships, submarines or storing, warehousing of any military equipment and machinery, installation of communication networks, facilities, shall only be with GoSL’ 8.
On April 11, 2017, speaking to the press in Colombo on his return from a visit to Beijing, Wickremesinghe had said that Chinese investments in Sri Lanka were ‘an opportunity for everyone to make money. That’s what we do in Asia’. But Sri Lankans are wondering who has made money in the deal this time around. While the agreement remains controversial, China is likely to consolidate its presence and Sri Lanka is likely to get deeper into the Chinese debt trap even though it has gained temporary relief through the equity for debt swap.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
5. When the Hambantota port agreement was signed in 2006, the global economy was witnessing high growth and the Colombo port was facing congestion due to heavy traffic out of which nearly 70 per cent was destined for India. But since the signing of the agreement and building of the Hambantota port, the traffic in Colombo port has decreased significantly due to the global slowdown in general and India’s growth in particular. India also has invested in further developing its own port infrastructure. Given the reduction in the volume of traffic, Hambantota port has become economically unviable. In 2011, the government shifted the import of vehicles to Hambantota without much success as the cost of imported cars increased. In 2012, SLPA introduced a rebate scheme for vehicle transhipment at Hambantota. In 2012, the rate of tax concessionary was 30 per cent and it has been gradually reduced to 20 per cent in 2013, 10 per cent in 2014 and 0 per cent in 2015. However, in 2015, an additional tax was levied on vehicle imports. The significant point to note is that Hambantota has taken away some business of Colombo port but is not able to create new business. See, Pothupitiyage Dona Kalani Dilka et al., “Development of vehicle transhipment in Sri Lanka: Case study of Hambantota Port,” 12th International Conference on Business Management (ICBM) 2015, p. 12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2706996.
Unfortunately, the incoherence in US policy under Trump makes one fear that the probability of a disastrous miscalculation is truly worrisome.
The belligerent rhetoric from Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un is causing serious concern. While a war appears rather unlikely as neither side can afford it, it cannot be completely ruled out. A miscalculation by either side might lead to a war that is certain to cause loss of human lives and destruction of frightful proportions. Policy driven by belligerent rhetoric can indeed engender such miscalculations as both sides paint themselves into a corner. Unfortunately, the incoherence in US policy under Trump makes one fear that the probability of a disastrous miscalculation is truly worrisome.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
It is important to bear in mind that we are in the month of August and should recall with horror the holocaust carried out by President Truman in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two bombs immediately killed more than 120,000 human beings and many thousands more later. Historians have not ceased to debate on the need and justification for such a holocaust. One doubts whether Truman’s predecessor Roosevelt would have done it. It has been argued by the apologists for Truman that it was necessary to use the horrendous atom bomb for compelling Japan to surrender as otherwise US casualties would have been heavy if an invasion of the Japanese islands had been carried out. There may or may not be merit in that argument. But granting that there is merit, the question remains as to why Nagasaki was flattened within three days. Surely, Truman could have waited for a reasonable period for Japan’s response to the destruction of Hiroshima.
We know now that the US was testing out two types of bombs. The ‘Little Boy’, with uranium 235 on Hiroshima and the ‘Fat Man’ with plutonium 239 on Nagasaki. The bombs could have been tested in an unpopulated area, but the US wanted to know the extent of the destruction in terms of lives and property.
Why we are where we are?
It is not the case that only Pyongyang has been repeatedly provoking the US by carrying out nuclear and missile tests. The provocation has come from both sides. In May 2016, candidate Trump had clearly stated that, if elected, he would be willing to talk to Kim Jong-un over a hamburger. But after becoming President, he did not send any signal about talking. The first signal came in early February 2017 when the US and South Korea agreed to install THAAD (Terminal High Area Air Defense) in South Korea. On 5 February, the US and Japan successfully downed a test medium-range ballistic missile with a new interceptor launched from a guided-missile destroyer. That was a message to North Korea that its missiles can be intercepted.
Six days later, North Korea carried out the first of its 18 missile tests since Trump became President. In April 2017, Trump requested China’s Xi Jinping to restrain North Korea from further tests. Xi indicated that there were limits to his ability to persuade Kim, but that he would try. Trump made a triumphant declaration that he expected China to stop further tests by North Korea. Given Kim’s psychology, such an openly announced agreement between Xi and Trump would have made it impossible for him to stop testing. Is there anyone in the US to whom Trump would have listened if he was told of this likely reaction from Kim?
On 30 June 2017, it was announced that Trump was being briefed on military options if North Korea were to carry out a new missile test. On 4 July 2017, obviously to coincide with the US Independence Day, North Korea carried out what it claimed as an ICBM test. The US and South Korea responded by holding a joint missile drill to counteract North Korea's "destabilizing and unlawful actions," as a US Army statement noted. Kim’s response was the test of 28 July, claimed to be ICBM once again.
North Korea’s Capabilities
It is not known how good and accurate US intelligence on North Korea is. Presumably, the US lacks human intelligence. Pundits are divided on the number of warheads Kim has, with the estimate varying between 20 and 60. There is also a difference of opinion about North Korea’s technical ability to miniaturize the bomb. What is, however, reasonably clear is that North Korea might acquire the ability to deliver a warhead on the continental United States before Trump completes his term in 2020.
US Success at the UN Security Council
The US scored a diplomatic victory by getting Resolution 2371 (5 August 2017) unanimously passed at the Security Council. This came even as US-Russia relations plunged to a new low with Putin’s order ‘expelling’ 755 staff from the US mission in Russia (30 July) in retaliation for fresh US sanctions on Russia. North Korea has been under sanctions since 2006, but the new resolution, if implemented, will cut its export earnings by US$1 billion from the current level of $3 billion.
China’s Calculations
Though China has publicly advised North Korea to abide by the resolution, only time will tell as to whether it will scrupulously abide by the UNSC resolution. In this context, it is important to raise a question or two about China’s real intentions in the matter. Does it want to see a permanent resolution of the matter by getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons? May be. But, is it not in China’s interest to keep the pot boiling so that the US seeks its help from time to time? Trump has once again said that if China helps in stopping the tests by North Korea he is prepared to accept the huge trade imbalance with China.
Obviously, China does not want the regime in North Korea to collapse for good and sufficient reasons. If the regime were to collapse, millions of Koreans will seek refuge in China. Further, Korea will be united under Seoul. Such a united Korea will adversely affect China’s security as US troops can be stationed in the north of Korea. In short, the assumption that China will put pressure on Kim to halt and reverse his nuclear programme is rather naïve. China’s putting pressure by hurting North Korea’s economy itself might start an exodus of North Koreans to China.
US Policy in Disarray
It is important to note the mixed signalling from the US. On 8 August 2017, Trump threatened North Korea with ‘fire and fury’ if it does anything to endanger the US. The implication was that he might use nuclear weapons. Hours later, North Korea paid back in the same coin by threatening to send a missile that will fall in the waters 30 to 40 km off Guam. The US has an important military post in Guam with B-1 bombers and fighter jets that might be used against North Korea in case of war. It should be noted that North Korea did not say that it was going to send a missile to Guam.
Secretary of State Tillerson is doing his best to let the world know that the words of his President should be taken with a pinch of salt. Earlier, he had said that the US did not want to change the regime in North Korea, North Korea was not an enemy, and talks can take place ‘under appropriate conditions’. Tillerson gave an unconvincing defence of Trump by saying that the latter was speaking in the only language understood by Kim and that Americans could sleep peacefully at night. Promptly, Tillerson was rebuked by White House aide Sebastian Gorka who said that it was ‘nonsensical’ for Tillerson to speak of ‘military matters’. Tillerson’s spokesperson Heather Nauert hit back by saying that her boss was the fourth in succession in case of a vacancy in the White House and that he carried a ‘big stick’.
What is sad and frightening is that Kim might take Trump’s words seriously. The US lacks access to Kim to talk to him. Talking through the media to a man like Kim is most dangerous.
Why Does Kim Want Nuclear Weapons?
If the 1953 Armistice had been followed by a peace treaty that North Korea had asked for repeatedly, Kim might not have been seeking nuclear weapons. Basically, he believes that keeping in mind what happened to Saddam and Gaddafi after they abandoned their search for nuclear weapon capability, his own survival and that of his regime calls for the pursuit of nuclear weapons until a proper peace treaty is in place.
A Possible Solution?
Reflection will show that the US has to sit down and talk to North Korea. Kim has rejected Seoul’s offer to talk as he feels that he has to talk to the US. Washington should approach the issue with a sense of realism. Sanctions have not worked in the past. They are unlikely to work in the future. Even if the North Korean economy breaks down, Kim might survive even after half his population tries to flee to China. The six-party talks (the two Koreas, US, Japan, Russia, and China) in the past did give some results.
The talks have to start without conditions and what is realistic is a halt to North Korea’s programme against economic aid and political respect; as the confidence level improves, it might be possible to denuclearize the Korean peninsula over a period of time after signing a peace treaty ending the Korean War.
It will make more sense to have two-party (US and North Korea) talks rather than revive the six-party talks. Trump who promised out of the box thinking on foreign policy should be able to see the advantages of talking to Kim. And Trump has a better chance of getting domestic support for such talks than Obama ever had. Obama’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ was flawed as he should have combined it with talks.
What might happen?
Neither Kim nor Trump will stop their belligerent rhetoric. There are enough indications that the Secretaries of Defense and State are of the firm view that the US should not carry out any 'preventive' or 'pre-emptive' strike for obvious reasons. Kim might or might not send a missile to land in the sea 30 or 40 km off Guam. Even if he sends one, it might be intercepted and in any case no harm will come to anyone in Guam even if it is not intercepted. Trump will have no good reason to order the Pentagon to carry out a strike. If he chooses to do so, there are two possibilities: Either the order is carried out or the Defense Secretary resigns.
This is the time the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres should make a discreet intervention. He should ask Kim and Trump what each wants from the other. A public statement that he is ready to mediate if both sides ask for it will not do.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
NOTE: The last two paragraphs in the original post have been removed. These had been inadvertently retained from an earlier draft. We regret the editorial oversight.
The Doklam Standoff - Should India Project its Stand More Vigorously?
Ashok Sajjanhar
August 11, 2017
The Doklam standoff has emerged as a litmus test for India in terms of how resolutely it can stand up against an increasingly hegemonic China to protect the interests of Bhutan as well as its own interests.
Two months have elapsed since the eruption of the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on the cold, deserted plateau of Doklam on the India Bhutan China tri-junction in the Sikkim sector. The standoff flared-up on 8 June, exactly the day Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping were meeting in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit. At this meeting, held in a warm and cordial atmosphere, it was agreed that the two sides will not allow ''differences'' between the two countries to transform into ''disputes''.
News of the Doklam stalemate hit the headlines around the end of June when Prime Minister Modi was in Washington DC for his first meeting with President Donald Trump on 26 June. It is not difficult to conceive that the timing of these developments was anything but coincidental!
In this short span of two months, much water has flowed in the Ganga and the Yangtze. It has been a psychological roller-coaster for the Indian public and media to be subjected to the unending tirade and spiel of vituperative expletives, threats and insults emanating from the Chinese communist party and state-controlled media as well as from spokespersons of the Chinese Foreign Office and the People's Liberation Army. The Communist party controlled tabloid Global Times went so far as to call External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj ''a liar'' for her Statement in Parliament on 20 July 2017 that all countries are with India on this issue.
The above sequence of events appears to be the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for China while dealing with countries with which it has differences, particularly those it considers to be weaker than itself. First, China encroaches upon the target country’s land or maritime territory and starts building heavy infrastructure on it, then lays claim to the territory on ''historical grounds'', next projects itself as a victim, and subsequently starts issuing threats to withdraw and succumb to demands. In most cases, China has been successful in achieving its objectives.
The most recent case is China's gradual, sneaking intrusion into the South China Sea where it has successfully extended control over about 3.9 million square kilometres of maritime territory and constructed many artificial islands, notwithstanding the verdict by the International Court of justice against its claims.
China appears to have become increasingly aggressive as it has steadily risen in power and as the influence of the West has progressively declined. It seems to have been spurred by the ineffectual response of the international community, particularly the United States, on the South China Sea discord.
The Doklam standoff has emerged as a litmus test for India in terms of how resolutely it can stand up against an increasingly hegemonic China to protect the interests of Bhutan as well as its own interests. India is also sending out a message to other neighbours and countries around the world that India is not a country that can be pushed around by a belligerent China.
Bhutan has conducted itself in an exemplary manner. It has stood steadfast with India. Its support should not be taken for granted. India needs to engage Bhutan at every level on a continuing basis. This seems to be happening. One of China’s objectives seems to be to disrupt the special relations between India and Bhutan. To this end, senior officials from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi have been visiting Thimphu and meeting leaders and officials at all levels. Elections next year to the Bhutanese Parliament also need to be watched carefully. China will try to get a Parliament elected which is more favourably inclined towards it than towards India. It is understandable that Bhutan does not wish to get embroiled in a muscular tussle between two neighbouring giants. But it also realizes that its interests – political, security, economic, cultural, and civilizational – are more intimately tied with India. Bhutan is the only other country, in addition to India, with which China has not settled its boundary out of the 14 countries with which it shares land borders. Like in the case of India, so also with Bhutan, China keeps the boundary dispute alive for applying pressure when it wants to.
While the salvoes from the Chinese side, particularly from the slander-mongering Global Times and from the foreign office, have diminished somewhat in intensity and frequency in recent days, no change is visible in the tone of comments from China aimed at intimidating and coercing India to withdraw its forces.
In the most recent and most detailed volley yet, China issued a 15-page statement on 2 August 2017 slamming India's stand and demanding "immediate and unconditional withdrawal". It claims that it had "notified India in advance" of its plans to build a road in Doklam and also cited a "non-paper" reportedly presented by India during the 2006 Special Representatives border talks that said "both sides agree on the boundary alignment in the Sikkim sector.'' It accuses India of using Bhutan ''as a pretext.'' It warned that no country should ever underestimate the resolve of the Chinese government and people to defend China's territorial sovereignty.'' It rebutted India's statement of 30 June and accused India of inventing various excuses to justify its illegal action.
India's comments have been measured, reasonable, free of accusations and polemics. This has served India's purpose well thus far. India has manitained that diplomacy and dilogue is the way to solve this issue. China has spurned this suggestion saying that dialogue can take place only after Indian troops have withdrawn. India has not thought it fit to respond to the substantive issues raised in the above Chinese Statement except to refute that the number of Indian troops has not come down from the earlier 400 to 40 as claimed. None of the other issues raised in the Note, for instance, that India had brought in two bull-dozers to the area, have been contradicted.
Some Indian analysts complain that the Indian media is meticulosly carrying all commentaries and statements from China and none from India. The ostensible reason for this is that barring the 30 June Press Release issued by the Ministry of External affairs and the External Affairs Minister’s statements to Parliament on 20 July and 3 August, there have been no formal or official statements from India. India needs to urgently address this shortcoming. It is recognised that a resolution of the isue has to be sought through quiet and behind the scenes dialogue. China, however, seems to be getting an undue advantage of moulding the public perception in its favour. The fact that India does not respond with facts and figures also gives the impression that India is not certain and confident of its position and has something to hide.
India’s publicity and public diplomacy efforts have been found wanting and inadequate. It is no one’s contention that India should enter into a tit-for-tat slanging match with the Chinese media or officialdom. But India’s public outreach instruments need to stay upfront to cogently and vigorously explain and rebut the calumny of falsehoods that China has been peddling. It is as necessary to reach out to the Indian populace as it is to inform the international policy makers and thought leaders on the accurate sequence of events.
India does not desire a conflict or confrontation with China. It would like a peaceful resolution to the issue so that status-quo ante of 16 June is restored. Reasons for China to maintain peaceful ties with India are also several, including its vulnerabilities in Tibet, preventing a reversal of established policy by India on Tibet and Taiwan, attractiveness of the Indian market, anxiety at India forging closer strategic ties with the US and Japan, and China’s need for a peaceful, non-threatening image in its aspiration for great power status.
Having been left with few viable choices because of its strident and offensive accusations, China might feel compelled to take some precipitate action against India. If such an eventuality were to play out, India should be prepared to fully protect its interests and in the process also avenge its defeat of 1962 and reclaim some of the prestige and credibility that it lost on that occasion. India has a fighting force which has been exposed to action on the ground incessantly over the last many decades. Chinese forces, in contrast, have not engaged in any armed conflict since the war with Vietnam in 1979.
From all available indications, it appears that the standoff on the cold, deserted plateau will not get sorted out anytime soon. It will be a long haul. India will have to psychologically and logistically be determined to dig in its heels to protect its security in the short and medium term and promote its strategic interests in the long term.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Doklam, China’s Strategic Calculus and India’s Policy Options
G.G. Dwivedi
August 11, 2017
To effectively cope with the PRC’s hostile attitude, India needs to reduce the power asymmetry, articulate a clear security policy based on a realistic threat assessment, reorganise the military, and revamp the border management mechanism.
It is almost two months since Indian and Chinese soldiers became locked in a standoff at Doklam in the Sikkim Sector. The faceoff was triggered when a team of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was prevented by Indian troops from extending a class-5 track in the Dolam Plateau area which is part of Bhutanese territory. The Indian Army acted in response to a request from the Royal Bhutan Army under the terms of the 2007 Bilateral Friendship Treaty. Moreover, the PLA’s track building is in contravention of the 2012 Agreement between the Special Representatives of India and China, whereby the status quo was required to be maintained in the said area until the resolution of the trijunction in consultation with Bhutan.
Post 1962, there have been numerous border incidences between the Indian and Chinese militaries; Nathu La in 1967 and Sumdrong Chu two decades later. In the recent past too, the Depsang Plateau and the Chumar-Demchok area witnessed face-offs in April 2013 and September 2014, respectively, with the latter intriguingly coinciding with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India. Incidentally, the current Chinese incursion in Bhutan happened around the time of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States.
Given the opaque Chinese system, deciphering the intent of its Communist leadership poses a real challenge. According to the eminent scholar Derek Bodde, those who deal with China are often bewildered when the actions of its leadership send mixed signals, making clear interpretation extremely difficult. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) draws from its ancient thinkers. Its actions are always deliberate, like the moves on a checker board. It is imperative to gain an insight into the Chinese psyche and decode China’s strategic calculus in order to effectively cope with its grand designs.
Decoding the Chinese Strategic Calculus
The PRC’s assertiveness around its periphery is attributable to its age old belief of a ‘subdued neighbourhood’ being an essential prerequisite for stability. In his book On China, Henry Kissinger has brought out that the PRC perceives itself to be a returning power and does not view exercising influence as unnatural. Alastair Johnson, an expert on Chinese strategic culture, has stated that there is no pacifist bias in the Chinese strategic tradition but only realpolitik. Nations are either friendly or hostile. This is why servile countries such as Pakistan and North Korea are generously rewarded, while those like India or Vietnam which counter China’s aggressive behaviour invite its wrath.
Chinese thinking since ancient times advocates mitigating a threat by eliminating it. Thus, during the period 1950-85, the PRC opted to use force eight times. When confronted with a stronger adversary, non-coercive means may be adopted as an interim expedient.
China’s grand strategy encompasses three concise objectives: safeguarding sovereignty, maintaining stability, and sustaining economic progress. Any danger to the Communist Party is perceived as an ‘existential threat’. Sovereignty implies, besides external non-interference, safeguarding core interests, control of the South China Sea, unification of Taiwan, and integration of claimed territories with the mainland including South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh). In the pursuit of these vital national interests, the use of force remains an option.
President Xi has emerged as an all-powerful leader. Designated as a ‘Core’ leader and addressed as ‘Chairman’ (Zhuxi), he is poised to join the league of Mao and Deng. During the forthcoming 19th Party Congress in November, Xi is set to consolidate his grip further. The earlier policy enunciated by Deng that China should “bide time, hide capability and not to claim leadership” has undergone a visible shift under Xi. Xi’s ‘China Dream’ envisions a ‘prosperous and powerful’ China restored to its past greatness.
In the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP), hard power is the key component. China’s military culture lays immense emphasis on the ‘strategic configuration of power’, creating a favourable disposition of forces to obviate actual fighting. By exploiting its asymmetric edge to coerce smaller nations, China has effectively pursued the surreptitious strategy of ‘fighting and talking concurrently’ in order to extend its control over the South China Sea. China’s military doctrine of “Local Wars under Informationalised Conditions” envisages short-swift engagements to achieve political objectives. Under President Xi, the PLA is in the process of path breaking transformation to emerge as a modern military in the coming decades.
Internationally, PRC remains a lonely power. It has used diplomacy effectively to exploit differences among the adversaries to its advantage. China’s threat assessment perceives the US and Japan to be the prime security concerns, while India is seen as a potential threat. As US and Western countries yield space, China under Xi has pronounced itself as a champion of globalization and sustainable growth to fill the void. Major initiatives like the ‘Belt-Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Road’ have been launched in a quest to shape a Sino-Centric global order.
The PRC’s action at Doklam is in consonance with its policy of intimidating smaller neighbours. Apparently, China did not anticipate India to step in. The Communist leadership is infuriated with India for abstaining from its signature projects. New Delhi’s growing proximity to Washington and Tokyo has also irked Beijing. Given its focus on the Western Pacific, the mounting tension on the Korean Peninsula, economic imperatives and internal stability concerns in the run-up to the forthcoming Party Congress, China will avoid an armed confrontation with India, despite its rhetoric. However, it will keep up the pressure militarily and pursue aggressive diplomacy to deal with the issue.
The PRC has pursued the policy of delinking complex political issues from economic ones. It enjoys strong trade linkages with the US, Japan and Taiwan, despite serious political differences. Beijing will continue with its policy of marginalising New Delhi politically in international forums, while seeking to avoid a negative economic fallout.
India’s Policy Options
In its efforts to engage China, India has followed a policy of appeasement. And its responses to PRC’s misadventures have been in the form of crisis management. To effectively cope with the PRC’s hostile attitude, India needs to evolve a pragmatic China policy centred on core national interests. Some essential facets which merit serious consideration are summarised below.
Firstly, given the PRC’s policy of asymmetric coercion, India has no option but to narrow the existing CNP gap between the two countries. Developing strategic partnerships, initiatives like ‘Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor’, ‘Act East Policy’ and counter balancing strategies are steps in the right direction.
Secondly, national security policy needs clear articulation, based on a realistic threat assessment. Apex organizational structures require streamlining to telescope the decision making process. The current format of military modernization demands a holistic review.
Thirdly, in an era of ‘limited wars’, a ‘joint military doctrine’ is a sine qua non and ‘tri service theatre commands’ are prerequisites for synergised application of the war waging potential. In the prevailing scenario, facing the PLA’s Western Theatre Command are India’s seven Army and Air Force commands, which is a serious lacuna. In short engagements, the timely application of requisite combat power at the point of decision is critical. This calls for creating essential infrastructure on highest priority.
Lastly, the border management mechanism needs to be revamped. A single nodal agency is required to coordinate the functions of the various organs. Operational control astride the Line of Actual Control ought to rest with the Army. A well calibrated response mechanism must be put in place, with disputed vulnerable areas effectively dominated and troops fully prepared to meet any eventuality. Paramilitary Forces deployed for manning the borders require urgent upgrade to match the PLA’s Border Regiments.
While many seem to know China, few understand it. In the desperation to engage the PRC, there is a tendency to lose sight of the bigger picture. Given the conflicting interests coupled with unresolved issues, relations between India and China are bound to be marked by contradictions, leading to frequent confrontations. However, through deft diplomacy, differences can be managed. While solutions to vexed problems may not be on the horizon, disputes turning into conflict can be avoided in the larger interest of both nations.
The Chinese are shrewd negotiators with tremendous stamina and penchant to sit across the table, but with equals. India must, therefore, firmly stand its ground and forthrightly safeguard its strategic interests. To deal with China on a level footing, the Indian leadership needs to make pragmatic assessments, possess the courage to accept home truths and display audacity for bold decisions.
The writer has served as Defence Attaché in China, North Korea and Mongolia; commanded a Division in the Eastern Sector; and currently is Professor of International Studies, Aligarh Muslim University.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Marriages of Insurgent Convenience along the Indo-Myanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge
Alex Waterman
August 10, 2017
While decades of counterinsurgency operations and peace processes have taken the sting out of the region’s major insurgencies, collaboration between groups continues to pose security challenges, particularly in the exploitable border areas adjacent to the upper Sagaing Region of Northwest Myanmar.
On celebrating its “army day” on 16 March 2017, a United Liberation Front of Asom – Independent (ULFA – I) statement lauded the success of joint operations carried out with the Manipur-based insurgent umbrella organisation Coordination Committee (CorCom). The group was referring to two attacks conducted in conjunction with CorCom militants near the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border on 19 November 2016 and 22 January 2017, in which five security forces personnel were killed.1 Moreover, on 3 December 2016, militants of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Khaplang (NSCN – K) ambushed an Assam Rifles convoy near the India-Myanmar border in Nginu, Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh, killing two troopers in the attack.2 ULFA – I, CorCom and NSCN – K form part of a broader, loose, alliance of non-ceasefire signatory insurgent groups in the region that have increasingly conducted joint operations and exploited the porous border with Myanmar.
Cooperation between armed groups in the Northeast has been portrayed as a sign of the growing desperation and long-term decline of insurgent actors in the region.3 Such collaboration is, however, not a new phenomenon. The first two major insurgencies in the region, the Naga National Council and the Mizo National Front, collaborated from the late 1960s.4 After it emerged in 1980, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim played a crucial role in granting assistance to other armed groups. And after fragmentation in 1988, the NSCN – IM and NSCN – K proceeded to forge their own umbrella coalition groups in the form of the NSCN – K’s Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) and the NSCN – IM’s equivalent, the Self Defence United Front of South East Asian Himalayan Region (SDUFSEAHR).5 It is the crucial role played by Naga insurgent groups in these umbrella organisations, a product of their clear regional advantages in training, combat capabilities and access to international borders, that afforded the Naga insurgency the status of the “mother of all insurgencies” in the region.
Clearly, the situation in the Northeast has dramatically improved since the 1990s. On 3 June 2017, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted that during 2016 insurgency-related fatalities in the region reached a 20-year low, suggesting that a modicum of peace and stability had been restored to the region.6 Against this backdrop, despite potential sticking points and contradictions,7 the peace process between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak-Muivah (NSCN – IM) appeared to hold firm, while ceasefires with the many breakaway NSCN factions, NSCN – Kitovi-Neokpao (NSCN – KN) and NSCN – Reformation were renewed for another year in Spring 2017. On 9 June, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju suggested that substantive progress was being made between the government and the ULFA – Pro Talks Faction (ULFA – PTF),8 just days after the government’s new interlocutor, Dinesh Sharma, chaired a series of talks with the group and with pro-talk Bodo armed groups.
However, substantial challenges remain in confronting the remaining non-ceasefire signatory groups such as ULFA – I, NSCN – K and the CorCom umbrella group, which have increasingly shifted their strategies towards the conduct of cross-border strikes in areas adjacent to the international border. The Sagaing region across the India-Myanmar border has long provided sanctuary for armed groups, while simultaneously offering opportunities for networking and operational coordination. On 10 January 2017, Assam’s Assistant Director General of Police suggested that up to 2,500 militants from Northeast Indian armed groups were residing across the border, with up to 1,000 of these being from NSCN – K, which, in 2012, signed a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar.9 For NSCN – K, which has gradually seen an erosion of its India-based support networks following splits in 2011 and 2015,10 the areas of India in proximity to Myanmar, such as Tirap, Changlang and Longding districts of Arunachal Pradesh, Tinsukia district of Assam, Chandel district of Manipur and Mon district of Nagaland, appear to have assumed newfound importance as it attempts to retain operational relevance in India. The group, which is arguably the dominant group within its own umbrella organisation, the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWESEA), and amongst its CorCom allies, has hosted several of these groups in camps in its areas of influence since the mid-2000s.11
Since the NSCN – K abrogated its 14-year ceasefire agreement with the Indian government in April 2015, the group has conducted major attacks in conjunction with its allies from within these networks. This strategy appeared to take off in earnest on 4 June 2015, after an ambush on an Army convoy in Manipur’s Chandel district led to the death of 18 jawans. The attack was claimed in a joint statement by NSCN – K,12 Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and a faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP).13 Since then, joint group operations have become a regular aspect of the NSCN – K’s approach to insurgency in the region. While few “spectaculars” have taken place since the Chandel ambush, the interception of joint insurgent teams by the security forces is indicative of the extent of cooperation between the groups. For example, on 16 February 2016, Army personnel encountered and killed three NSCN – K militants and one ULFA – I militant in Dirak Chirali, Lohit district of Arunachal Pradesh. The extent of cooperation between NSCN – K and ULFA – I in particular was also evident on 7 June 2017, after three ULFA – I militants were killed during a clash near the international border in Lappa, Mon district of Nagaland.
The death of NSCN – K chairman S. S. Khaplang in Myanmar on 9 June 2017 led to renewed calls for peace talks as well as to rumours that the group may face internal power struggles as its leaders vie with one another to succeed Khaplang.14 Assam police sources also suggested that ULFA – I might lodge a bid for leadership of the UNLFWESEA movement. However, the succession of Khango Konyak as the leader of both the NSCN – K and the umbrella organisation UNLFWESEA pointed towards continuity at least for the immediate future. Indeed, on 21 June, NSCN – K and ULFA – I militants once again linked up during a clash with security forces personnel in Choknyu, Mon district of Nagaland, suggesting that such cooperation is likely to remain a feature of the insurgency environment for the foreseeable future.
Options for tackling the issue
State actors have clearly recognised and are taking steps to address these changing dynamics of insurgency in the region. On 10 January 2017, L. R. Bishnoi, Additional Director General of Police, Assam, suggested that the cross-border joint operations approach constituted a “new strategy.”15 During a review of the security situation with officials on 24 March 2017, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh urged officials to enhance their vigilance along the international border. The Myanmar government also intensified border fencing activities along the India-Myanmar border adjacent to Nagaland. However, these efforts produced a significant public backlash from local Naga populations on both sides of the border during the first months of 2017, resulting in the suspension of construction activities in February 2017. Since a hostile local population would undermine the purpose of such a border fence and raise questions about its utility,16 the Indian government should liaise with its Myanmarese counterpart to discourage such efforts. At the same time, the two governments should agree to deepen cooperation in checking the misuse of the 16 km visa-free zone on either side of the international border. Reports that such agreements were arrived at during the 21st India-Myanmar national-level meeting on 5-6 July is a positive step in this direction.17
Furthermore, the use of cross-border “surgical strikes,” such as those conducted in the immediate aftermath of the Chandel ambush in June 2015,18 can disrupt the sense of security that militants in cross-border camps enjoy, while sending a clear message to the insurgent leadership that such attacks will not be tolerated. However, the diplomatic risks such operations carry limit the extent to which they can become a regular component of India’s counterinsurgency approach against cross-border groups. Such “hard” operations should thus be combined with proactive diplomatic measures to improve high-level and operational-level ties with Myanmar.
In-country options include the intensification of presence-based operations in the Tirap, Changlang and Longding areas of Arunachal Pradesh as well as Mon district of Nagaland, which constitute the key transit points into India. However, the ability to intercept incoming parties of NSCN – K, ULFA – I and other allied militants will depend on developed intelligence networks, which, in turn, are dependent upon local support, a dynamic that has already been recognised by the Army in its assessment of Arunachal Pradesh.19 This points towards the continued importance of keeping local border populaces onside. Thus, the changing dynamics of insurgency becoming cross-border in character should not detract from the continued importance of both maintaining a presence and continuing to win “hearts and minds” within.
Finally, while the death of S. S. Khaplang does not appear to have sparked immediate and major change at the operational level, efforts to bring elements of the group into dialogue should be pursued in a concerted manner. Khaplang’s unilateral decision-making processes had over the years reportedly alienated key constituents,20 causing the group to fracture twice in the space of four years. Offers of rehabilitation to NSCN – K militants of Indian origin were announced a day after Khaplang’s death.21 However, this alone would not fully remove the problem of allied organisations such as ULFA – I and the CorCom, which were housed in NSCN – K territory even during the NSCN – K’s ceasefire with the government, meaning a comprehensive approach combining reconciliation with aggressive interdiction mechanisms would need to be built into future policy efforts to tackle cross-border collaboration among armed groups.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. ‘Arunachal Pradesh: 2 Assam Rifles Soldiers Killed in an Encounter with NSCN (K) Terrorists in Changlang’, Financial Express, 22 January 2017 [accessed 26 July 2017]; Ajit Kumar Singh, ‘Assam: Troubles in Tinsukia’, South Asia Intelligence Review, 15.22 (2016) [accessed 26 July 2017].
2. ‘Two Assam Rifles Soldiers Killed in Arunachal, 8 Injured in Ambush on Convoy’, Hindustan Times, 4 December 2016 [accessed 26 July 2017].
3. For example, on 13 May Assam Director General of Police Mukesh Sahay pointed to ULFA - I’s increasing dependency on cooperation with other armed groups as a by-product of successful counterinsurgency operations in the region. See IISS Armed Conflict Database, India (Assam) (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 13 May 2017) [accessed 26 July 2017].
4. Marcus Franke, War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas, Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 109, 111.
5. Rajeev Bhattacharyya, ‘Birth of UNLFWSEA: Internal Dynamics and Implications for India’s North-East’, Journal of Defence Studies, 9.4 (2015), 95–110 (p. 99).
6. Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Shri Rajnath Singh Highlights Achievements & Key Initiatives of MHA in the Last 3 Years’, 2017 [accessed 26 July 2017].
7. See for example Gautam Sen, ‘Political Fallout of the Creation of New Districts in Manipur’, IDSA Comment, 2016 [accessed 26 July 2017].
8. ‘Peace Agreement with ULFA to Sign Shortly: Rijiju’, India Blooms, 9 June 2017 [accessed 26 July 2017].
9. Samudra Gupta Kashyap, ‘Chinese Agencies Helping North East Militants in Myanmar’, Indian Express, 10 January 2017 [accessed 26 July 2017].
10. Namrata Panwar, ‘From Nationalism to Factionalism: Faultlines in the Naga Insurgency’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28.1 (2017), 233–58 (pp. 250–52) .
The People’s Liberation Army at Ninety – Poised for a ‘Great Leap’
G.G. Dwivedi
August 07, 2017
It will take some time before the PLA can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. But the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the ‘balance of power’ dynamics.
On 31 July 1997, the Central Hall of the China World Hotel in Beijing was all decked up to host a banquet dinner to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Military Attaché Corps was present in strength as President Jiang Zemin was to grace the occasion, being the Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body. It was a gala affair with a resounding undertone – that the military must continue to serve the Party in the finest traditions of the PLA.
The PLA traces its roots to the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ of 1 August 1927. It was on that day that the Communists led by stalwarts like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De revolted against the Nationalist Forces. In December 1929, the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened its ninth meeting for building the Party and the Army. The venue was Gutian, a town in the South West of Fujian Province. During the Conference, Mao addressed the men of the Fourth Army and clarified the role of the military as being “to chiefly serve the political ends”. From there on, the absolute control of the CPC over the Red Army became entrenched; the PLA was to be the military of the Communist Party, not of China.
The symbiotic relationship between the two most powerful organs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Party and PLA, is unique. The PLA played a key role during the revolution and its top commanders, Mao and Deng, emerged as iconic First and Second Generation leaders. It has been well represented in the Politburo and Central Committee, the apex political policy making bodies. The PLA top brass are also members of the CMC.
The PLA jumped into the Korean War in 1950, barely a year after the Communist revolution, to take on the US-led UN Forces. It fought the adversary to a stalemate, suffering over half a million casualties in the process. In 1962, it defeated the Indian Army in a limited conflict. However, the PLA performed poorly in 1979 during its bid to teach Vietnam a lesson. Thereafter, it went through sustained restructuring and modernization programmes as Defence was one of the’ Four Modernizations’ enunciated by Deng to transform China. However, until recently, the process lacked strategic direction.
Military reforms have been high on President Xi’s agenda since he assumed power four years back. The sense of urgency could be attributed to geopolitical considerations like the US policy of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific Region. The reform process commenced in 2013 with the establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC), with the President as its Chairman. The rationale behind the reforms is twofold; prepare the military for China’s expanding global role, and establish the Party’s firm control over the armed forces. Interestingly, on 30 October 2014, Xi Jinping visited Gutian to address a ‘Military Political Work Conference’. In his speech, he reiterated that “PLA still remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”; exactly what Mao had asserted 85 years earlier.
Thrust of Current Military Reforms
The Chinese military strategic culture believes in exploiting the ‘strategic configuration of power’ to achieve the given objectives. The aim is not annihilation of the adversary but the deployment of resources to gain a position of advantage so that fighting becomes unnecessary. China’s present military doctrine of ‘Local Wars under Informationalised Conditions’ envisages short, swift, military engagements by leveraging technology to achieve political objectives. Joint operations and integrated logistics are essential components of the new doctrine. The current military reforms are doctrine driven and oriented towards capability building and force projection. President Xi has stressed upon the importance of the military adapting to an era of Information based wars.
The theme of China’s ‘Ninth White Paper on National Defence’ published in May 2015 was “Active Defence” with the focus on winning ‘local wars in conditions of modern technology’. It also heralded a major shift in naval strategy from ‘off shore waters defence’ to a combined strategy of ‘offshore waters defence with open sea protection’.
Overall, the main thrust of military reforms is on revamping the systems and structures across the board, i.e., political, strategic and operational levels. At the macro level, the focus is on civil-military integration, jointness and optimisation. The composition of the CMC has been balanced out to remove the previous bias towards the ground forces. The CMC is now responsible for policy formulation, controlling all military assets and higher direction of war. The PLA’s erstwhile four key departments have been replaced by 15 offices/departments, fully integrated into the enlarged CMC, thus ensuring centralised control at the highest level. In the new command structure, the President as the Commander-in-Chief exercises direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operations Center’. Three additional Headquarters, namely Ground Forces, Rocket Force and Strategic Force, have been created.
At the operational level, the erstwhile 17-odd army, air force and naval commands have been reorganized into five ‘theatre commands’ with all the war fighting resources in each command placed under one commander. This will ensure seamless synergy in deploying land, air, naval and strategic assets in a given theatre. In all, 84 corps level organizations have been created including 13 operational corps as well as training and logistics installations. To make the PLA nimbler, the reduction of 300,000 rank and file, mostly from non-combat positions, has been ordered. This will downsize the military to around 1.8 million.
President Xi reviewed an impressive parade at Zhurihe, a newly created training base in Inner Mongolia on 30 July 2017 to mark the PLA’s 90th Anniversary. He exhorted the troops to- “unwaveringly uphold the principle of absolute party leadership of the military, always obey and follow the Party”. The Supreme Commander also spelt out three core tenets for a strong military; confidence, competence and commitment. The mega event served multiple objectives. For the domestic audience, it vindicated the dictum ‘party rules the gun’, projected President Xi as the ‘core’ and ‘Chairman’ (Zhuxi)- in the same league as Mao and Deng, and assured the public of the PLA’s capacity to defeat any threat to national sovereignty. For the international community, it was a demonstration of power projection capability.
Implications
The ongoing reforms in the Chinese Armed Forces are perhaps the biggest military shake up in a generation. Envisaged to be in place before President Xi’s term ends in 2022, the accretion in the war waging potential of the Chinese military will have serious ramifications at both the regional and global levels. While the Communist leadership asserts that the PRC’s rise is peaceful, this is being viewed by neighbouring countries with scepticism because of the former’s assertive conduct in pursuit of national objectives and territorial claims.
For India, the complexity of its relations with China, coupled with an unsettled border, is leading to a pattern of frequent face offs between the two militaries. The PLA’s rapidly increasing capability as well as offensive design are a reality which cannot be wished away. Currently, the structure of India’s higher defence organization is service specific, lacking integration and jointness. The country is yet to formulate a comprehensive ‘limited war’ doctrine. Due to bureaucratic gridlock, the decision making loop is tenuous. In operational terms, seven odd army and air force commands face China’s Western Theatre Command. This configuration will pose enormous coordination challenges in the event of a conflict. While the probability of a major conflict between the two countries remains low, local skirmishes cannot be ruled out, especially in the event of incursions by the PLA in the disputed areas. As limited engagements demand speedy deployment and a flatter logistics chain, inadequate infrastructure in the border areas stands out as a major constraint for India. These shortcomings need to be addressed on priority.
Since 1979, China has not engaged in any major military confrontation. However, it has cleverly pursued the strategy of “nibbling and negotiating” (yi bian tan yi bian da – talking and fighting concurrently). This low cost model in the form of stand-offs like at Doklam or confrontation in the South China Sea are likely to be the new normal. For the realisation of Xi’s ‘China Dream’, Beijing does not have the luxury of indulging in a major conflict.
Coincidently, at present, China faces no external threats unless it creates one. Its main security concerns are more internal; namely economic slowdown, corruption, environmental degradation and the diminishing clout of the CPC. To ensure the CPC’s unchallenged hold, the PLA’s identity as the military of the Party needs to remain sacrosanct. The envisaged process of PLA transformation will be a long drawn out one. It will take some time before the Chinese Armed Forces can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. No doubt, the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the existing ‘balance of power’ dynamics.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
13th Five-Year Defence Plan (2017-22) – A Re-Run of the Past
Amit Cowshish
July 31, 2017
Achieving the intended outcomes of the 13th five-year defence plan is critically dependent on the ability of the Ministry of Finance to increase the defence budget by at least 100 per cent from next year onward.
The 13th five-year defence plan (2017-22) envisages an allocation of Rs 26,83,924 crore for the armed forces.1 This includes Rs 13,95,271 crore under the revenue segment and the remainder for defraying the capital expenditure. Given the secrecy surrounding the plans, it is unlikely that much will be known about the outcomes intended to be achieved.
Although other stakeholders were apparently consulted while preparing the plan, in all probability this projection does not include the requirements of the Defence Research & Development Organisation, Ordnance Factories, Coast Guard, Border Roads Organisation, and many other organisations as well as activities carried out under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It certainly does not include the money required for defence pensions.
The total allocation for these aforesaid organisations, activities and defence pensions adds up to Rs 1,36,746.10 crore for the year 2017-18, with defence pensions alone accounting for Rs 85,737.31 crore. Without factoring in any increase in the coming years, the requirement on this count for the plan period will work out to Rs 6,83,730.50 crore.
Assuming that the requirement has been worked out based on immaculate costing and there will be no cost overruns or additional requirements, the total requirement of the armed forces, other organisations and defence pensions would thus add up to Rs 33,67,654.50 crore.
Since the current financial year happens to be the first year of the 13th five-year plan and a total sum of Rs 3,59,851.43 crore already stands allocated for the current year, a sum of Rs 29,07,803.07 crore will be required for the remaining four years at an annual average of Rs 7,26,950.76 crore. This figure may undergo some minor change if additional sums are allocated, or the allocation reduced, at the Revised Estimate (RE) stage.
Achieving the intended outcomes of the plan, therefore, is critically dependent on the ability of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to increase the budget by at least 100 per cent from next year onward, pushing it to around three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is considered by many to be an ideal level of funding. It is, therefore, possible that the plan is actually based on the assumption that allocations totalling three per cent of the GDP will be made available for defence during the 13th defence plan period.
It is not known whether the MoF was asked about the possible level of funding before commencing the planning process. In any case, meeting the projected requirement will require the MoF to revisit its Midterm Fiscal Policy of 2016-17, which estimated the defence expenditure, including its capital component, to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19.2 It will also have to make serious efforts to raise more revenue in the coming years to be able to meet the requirement.
From now on, the discourse on the 13th defence plan will follow a familiar course. To begin with, there is bound to be clamour for an early ‘approval’ of the plan. Though there is no procedural or statutory requirement of seeking the approval of any authority outside the MoD, the expectation will be that the plan will be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for immediate approval.
For the record, only three of the 12 five-year plans so far have been approved by a cabinet committee. The sixth and seventh plans for the periods 1980-85 and 1985-90 were approved by the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), and the ninth plan for the period 1997-2002 was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
Stung by protracted deliberations with the MoF on the size of the 11th defence plan which led nowhere and forced it to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval, the MoD decided to let matters rest after the 12th five year plan was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) within the ministry on April 2, 2012.
But the view that defence plans must be approved by the CCS continues to find strong support in the public discourse, although hardly any information is available on the impact of such approvals on the achievement of the intended outcomes of the plans in the past or, conversely, the impact of non-approval on defence preparedness. The general view is that CCS approval would make it binding on the government to make the projected funds available for spending during the plan period.
The clamour for seeking CCS approval, with strong prodding from Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD), may force the MoD to abandon the precedent set in 2012 and actually seek CCS approval. This will lead to the re-emergence of the problem which had led the MoD in the first place to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval for the 11th plan and instead deciding to approve it within the ministry.
According to the laid down procedure, MoD will need to first consult the MoF on putting up the 13th defence plan for CCS approval. The expectation implicit in this process is that the government will ‘commit’ itself to the projected level of funding, irrespective of any other developments which may have a bearing on its ability to generate additional revenues to meet the commitment. While nothing is impossible, this seems improbable and, consequently, so does the possibility of obtaining CCS approval any time soon, causing disappointment all around.
This might also lead to some feeble questioning of the utility of basing five year or other plans on unrealistic assumptions about how much money is likely to be available for achieving the desired objectives. It does not help either that the plans are not overarching in so far as they do not encompass other organisations which must necessarily play a complementary or supplementary role in achieving the overall objectives.
Defence planning was synchronised with national plans only in 1980 when the sixth defence plan for the period 1980-85 was made coterminous with the sixth national plan covering the same period. It is not clear what purpose was served by this, as there has never been any direct linkage between the two.
While there is no question that planning is an important facet of defence management, the question whether objectives can be achieved only be persisting with the concept of five-year defence plans as a part of the three-tiered structure of defence planning is moot. The entire gamut of defence planning needs to be revisited against the backdrop of the dismantling of the national five-year centralised planning regime and the Niti Aayog – successor of the Planning Commission – vowing to venture into defence. There is no indication that the proposed 13th defence plan takes into account the Niti Aayog’s vision for defence.
A financially pragmatic and outcome oriented plan covering a compressed time span has a better chance of showing results in the short run and setting the stage for a long haul towards achieving the highest level of defence preparedness. It is time that financial viability, including the ways and means of augmenting financial resources, is recognised as an inalienable factor in planning, however abhorrent that idea may be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Maximum autonomy may be accorded in ethnic, cultural and developmental realms to autonomous councils for all Naga areas in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and even Assam, through suitable amendment to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.
The Framework Agreement for Naga settlement was initialled on 3 August 2015 by Thuingaleng Muivah, leader of the Nationalist Council of Nagalim (Issac Swu– Thuingaleng Muivah) (NSCN: IM) and R.N. Ravi, the Central government`s interlocutor on the Naga issue. Even after two years, the framework has not led to a final outcome, although Ravi and the Central government have been working off-camera, painstakingly, with the various stakeholders. In the meantime, NSCN(IM) leader Issac Swu has died and so has S. S. Khaplang, a Hemi Naga, citizen of Myanmar, and leader of the other major Naga rebel outfit, NSCN (Khaplang). Their deaths have created a void in the old guard insurgent leadership.
Violence perpetrated by the NSCN factions has remained contained, although their collection of levies from civil society, business persons and various establishments continue. This has largely been due to the ceasefire in force in Nagaland since August 1997 with NSCN(IM) and later with the NSCN(K) from September 2001. However, after the NSCN(K)`s unilateral abrogation of the ceasefire in April 2015 and the attacks by its cadres on the Indian Army and its allied forces in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh in June 2015, the outfit has remained outside the ceasefire arrangements. But there is an undercurrent of feeling in the state among the people at large that the NSCN(K) should be eventually brought within the fold of the Agreement when its contents are finalised.
In Naga society, in Nagaland in general, and in the contiguous areas inhabited by Nagas such as the hill districts of Manipur and the north-eastern areas of Arunachal, there is a yearning for peace and a final settlement of the issue concerning their emotional, ethnic and socio-political identity and the content of its integration with the Indian Union. It would be judicious and politically farsighted for the Central government to consummate the Agreement at the earliest, in any event before the forthcoming state assembly elections in February 2018. If the Agreement does not attain finality in the next six months, political uncertainty will set in, with multi-faceted ramifications from the internal security and geopolitical perspectives.
A situation of political drift is already prevailing in Nagaland because of factionalism within the ruling Naga Peoples` Front (NPF). Large, violent, public demonstrations and arson were witnessed in February 2017 because of the T. R. Zeliang-led NPF government`s decision to reserve seats for women in local bodies. The public upsurge was against what was viewed as the imposition of a system that was violative of local Naga institutions, customs and traditions. The inability of the state government to deal with the situation was an ominous indicator of the failure of constitutional authority and rule of law. Such a milieu could not but have affected, even if indirectly and temporarily, the progress towards accommodation of the NSCN groups in a broad-based settlement under the Framework Agreement. The political situation has become further fluid in the wake of change in the state’s political leadership, with Zeliang re-assuming the chief ministership.
An early final settlement of the Naga issue will stem the existing drift in governance in Nagaland. Moreover, it would signify acceptance and the assuaging of the emotional disconnect which had developed among a substantial segment of the Naga people, give them political space and lead to a strengthening of the accommodative attributes of the Indian polity. According to Ravi, the Framework Agreement respects the Naga aspirations of recognition of their uniqueness, thereby implying an acceptance of their unique history, ethnicity and culture and related socio-economic attributes. It is now a question of formalising this recognition within the Indian Constitution and institutions of governance.
The success of the Agreement will, however, hinge on not disturbing the existing provincial territorial disposition and retaining the present inter-state boundaries in the region. Maximum autonomy may be accorded in ethnic, cultural and developmental realms to autonomous councils for all Naga areas in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and even Assam, through suitable amendment to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The extent of autonomy may be derived from constitutional provisions and not based on state legislature-enacted statutes in order to prevent subsequent tinkering by the state governments concerned as per their political compulsions. Such an arrangement will obviate situations of the nature which arose after three controversial bills on citizenship, registration of shops and establishments, etc. were passed by the Manipur legislature without consultation with the hill councils of the state in 2016, leading to a huge agitation in the Naga and Kuki dominated hill areas of the state. Adequate fiscal powers also need to be devolved to such councils as part of a final Naga settlement, with arrangements for direct transfer of funds to the autonomous councils for Naga areas. This could be a unique arrangement, distinct from the policies being followed by the present Central government since 2015-16 for maximum transfers through the state budgets as against the earlier system of devolution to organisations executing programmes. Without such direct devolution, it may be difficult for Naga autonomous councils to effectively govern their areas.
Reckoning the unique history and legacy of the Nagas, a tribal cultural collective body in the form of a pan-Naga Hoho could be constituted under an act of parliament. This body would take care of the interests of the Nagas of Nagaland as well of Nagas living elsewhere in the country. A constitutional amendment may be necessary to empower the Central legislature to legislate such a body virtually as a Concurrent List subject. The apex Hoho may have representation of Nagas from all Naga areas, i.e., even beyond those residing in Nagaland. Logically, a Central law would be appropriate for the purpose. The jurisdiction of the Hoho will have to carefully crafted and be mutually exclusive of administrative and legislative jurisdictions of the states in which Nagas live, so as to avoid conflictual situations between the Hoho and the states concerned. The Hoho could be constitutionally empowered as the supreme advisory body on Naga cultural matters to both the Centre and the states. If such an overarching Hoho can be established with Central support, it will go a long way towards assuring Nagas of protection and sustenance to their ethnic and cultural identity. Though such an arrangement could be accommodated within the constitutional ambit, there may be repercussions if similar demands were to be raised by other tribal communities similarly spread over more than one state. However, this could be a manageable demand and may not detract from the basic features of the Constitution.
If the basics of Naga autonomy and their unique past can be agreed upon between the Central government and the NSCN (IM), the issue of disarming the insurgents and accounting of their weaponry may not pose much of a problem. An arrangement on the pattern of the disarming of the Maoists in Nepal, with some being absorbed in the state forces after re-training, and the rest being enskilled for civil professions with state support, could be adopted with modifications as per exigencies of the local situation. Absorption of the re-trained insurgent cadres in the Assam Rifles, a Central force manned by different tribals and having a long history of internal security duties in the north-east, is a viable option.
A sensitive issue to be resolved as part of the Agreement to be consummated will be the status and welfare of Myanmarese Nagas. The government of Aung San Su Kyi will have to be on board the Naga settlement, at least tacitly. This is because, there are nearly 120,000 Nagas in the self-administered zone in Myanmar, adjacent to Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. NSCN (K) has a substantial support base among the Nagas of these areas. For success of the Agreement, some arrangement would have to be worked out that allows trade and intercourse as well as cultural connectivity between Nagas on either side of the India-Myanmar border. Sealing or hard-fencing of the border, particularly along the Nagaland segment, will adversely affect the livelihood and welfare of Myanmarese Nagas whose socio-economic status is inferior to that of their brethren in India. As part of the final Agreement, the need for instituting a border regime in concert with Myanmar that promotes the welfare of the Nagas of the region, and particularly trade and social exchanges, may also not be lost sight of.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Northeast India, Nagaland, National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)
While the GCC crisis seems to be de-escalating, there is no end in sight as yet.
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt had listed 13 demands on June 23, 2017, warning that there would be serious consequences if Qatar failed to yield by July 2.1 Qatar rejected the ultimatum and the four countries have not yet carried out their threats. Instead, they have softened their stand, vaguely signaling that it might be enough if Qatar were to accede to ‘Six Principles’. In short, there has been no escalation and we can clearly see a degree of de-escalation.
The June 23 demands were handed over in writing to Kuwait, the mediator, which then passed it on to Qatar. Qatar leaked the text of the demands to the media in order to draw the attention of the international community to their unreasonableness. That was a smart diplomatic move on the part of Doha which has so far handled this crisis with admirable maturity and logic, scrupulously avoiding any action that can spoil its case. The world came to realize that the four countries wanted Qatar to surrender its sovereignty not just in the realm of foreign policy but also align its social, political and economic policies with that of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
Change in US policy
The four countries struck a fortnight after President Donald Trump’s elaborately choreographed visit to Riyadh. The effort was intended to project Saudi Arabia as the undisputed leader of the Muslim world. Initially, Trump tweeted his support for the move against Qatar and came in the way of his Secretaries of Defense and State who wanted to mediate and resolve the crisis. The two Secretaries finally prevailed and Trump stopped publicly supporting Saudi Arabia through tweets or otherwise. The State Department publicly rebuked Saudi Arabia on June 20 for resorting to an embargo against Qatar without justification. That public rebuke probably compelled the four countries to come out with their rather badly drafted set of demands three days later.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who must have met the GCC monarchs in his previous avatar as CEO of Exxon Mobile, visited Kuwait and Qatar on July 11-12. He signed an agreement with Qatar for preventing the flow of funds to support terrorism. Tillerson said that the two countries would work together ‘to interrupt, disable terror financing flows and intensify counterterrorism activities globally’.2
Tillerson then went to Saudi Arabia where he met King Salman and the foreign ministers of the four countries ranged against Qatar. The meeting resulted in a statement welcoming the US-Qatar agreement, but made it clear that there was no question of easing the embargo till Qatar did more. In short, while there was no breakthrough, the four countries got a clear message that the US had taken a stand for an early resolution of the crisis – a position that favored Qatar.
The European Reaction
Qatar received diplomatic support from European countries as well. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel declared that the 13 demands were ‘very provocative’ as they impinged on Qatar’s sovereignty. It may be recalled that Qatar’s Foreign Minister had visited Berlin on June 9 to seek German support. France also extended similar support. And the UK, predictably, took its cue from the US, with Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visiting Kuwait and Qatar, without making much of an impact.
The Climb-down by the Four Countries
Finding that the initial support from President Trump had disappeared, with Washington and the major European powers making it clear that Qatar was being unjustly treated, the foreign ministers of the four countries met in Cairo on July 5 and issued a declaration of ‘Six Principles’. These are:
Commitment to combat extremism and terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their financing or the provision of safe havens.
Prohibiting all acts of incitement and all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred and violence.
Full commitment to Riyadh Agreement 2013 and the supplementary agreement and its executive mechanism for 2014 within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for Arab States.
Commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-US Summit held in Riyadh in May 2017.
To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States and from supporting illegal entities.
The responsibility of all States of international community to confront all forms of extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.”
The declaration expressed appreciation to His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait, ‘for his efforts and endeavor to resolve the crisis with the State of Qatar and expressed sorrow over negligence, lack of seriousness and the negative response received by the State of Qatar to deal with the roots of the problem and not ready to reconsider its policies and practices, reflecting a lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation’.3
Given that there was no explicit commitment to remove the blockade if Qatar abided by these terms, the only response these new ‘principles’ elicited from Qatar was that it was prepared to sit down and talk once the blockade is lifted.
Qatar’s Response to the Blockade
Qatar’s diplomatic response has been a study in resilience, imperturbability, and patience. It has chosen not to retaliate in kind. UAE continues to get natural gas from Qatar, an important source for its electricity and the power to run its aluminum plant. Doha has not expelled 300,000 Egyptians who continue to work in its territory. Qatar has constituted a Compensation Claims Committee to consolidate claims from Qatar Airways, banks, and others who have been affected by the blockade.
In the on-going war of attrition, the four countries have realized, presumably by now, that Qatar will not surrender. Nevertheless, Qatar would obviously like to see an early end of the blockade. The next GCC summit is due in Kuwait on December 5-6. The onus is on Kuwait and the US to find a ‘face-saving’ formula to resolve the situation. While the crisis seems to be de-escalating, there is no end in sight as yet.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A quantum jump in the operational role of UAVs can be expected only with a breakthrough in Artificial Intelligence. Until that happens, their will increase gradually to reach about 50 per cent of combat operations over the next three decades.
Aviation, which started with the Wright Brothers’ first controlled flight of a heavier than air machine on 17 December 1903, has come a long way in the last 114 years. As is true for many technological developments, aviation too quickly acquired a niche for itself in the military matrix. Manned aircraft were first inducted in warfare as high ground observatories to monitor enemy troop movement. Aerial reconnaissance with an observation by the pilot and later with a still camera was the first operational role of aircraft. The next step involved aircrew carrying small bombs and dropping them manually from the cockpit. Thus was born the role of ground attack. In the next phase, aircraft were equipped with guns to engage enemy aircraft in the air and this commenced the aerial combat role. Besides these, the development of bigger airframes and powerful engines enabled the development of transport aircraft, which were subsequently modified with the fitment of radars, jammers and fuel tanks for surveillance, electronic warfare and inflight refuelling, respectively. These roles are being performed by manned aircraft albeit with much better technology and accuracy than was possible during the 20th century.
Technological advancement in computing and communication facilitated the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Controlled from a ground station, the UAV either flies a pre-planned path or can be dynamically controlled. As was the case with manned aircraft about a century ago, the operational roles of UAVs are following a similar trajectory. Besides being used as a weapon, the first operational role for UAVs was of aerial reconnaissance wherein the UAV was fitted with optical cameras. The development of sensor technology and its miniaturisation along with better computation and communication allowed transmission of real time data in various electromagnetic bands, a boon for a military commander. UAVs scored substantially over manned aircraft in this role owing to their longer endurance. Coupled with satellite imagery capabilities, UAVs have practically driven out manned aircraft from the reconnaissance role except in a very few critical cases where their low speed remains an operational impediment. However, UAVs have been able to overcome their speed limitation to a certain extent by their low Radar Cross Section (RCS), making it difficult to detect and engage them.
Going by the precedent of manned aircraft, the next role UAVs were assigned was of ground attack. This required more powerful engines and larger airframes for enabling the UAV to carry weapons. Here too, technology played a pivotal role in enhancing weapons delivery accuracy thus reducing the weapon size required for the same extent of impact on the target. This role by UAVs is being carried out successfully in Afghanistan with Hellfire missiles from USAF MQ9. The UAV’s long endurance allows a high success rate for search and strike missions as compared to a manned fighter aircraft with comparatively limited endurance. The success rate of UAV ground attack missions is to a large extent dependent on their operation in a benign air defence environment.
The full development and employment of UAVs in an air defence role is still some distance away owing to prevailing technological challenges. In the same vein, switching to unmanned transport aircraft may also take a few decades. While the roles of UAVs are gradually increasing in the civil sector, ranging from the delivery of packages to the shooting of high-quality aerial films, a debate is on about the end of an era for manned aircraft for operational missions. There are three critical components involved in the employment of UAVs instead of manned aircraft in combat, viz, basic flying (take off, landing and planned navigation), tactical flying (situation appreciation and changing the plan midway) and weapon delivery (correct and timely targeting). While progress has been made in all three verticals, it is yet to reach a level that would enable the complete replacement of manned aircraft. Factors that need to be considered in this debate are:-
Sensors and Dynamic Situation Processing. In a benign air defence environment and uncontested air space, UAVs are efficient in mission accomplishment. When decision-making autonomy is required or there are rules of engagement or a developing air situation that cannot be explicitly expressed mathematically, a human is essential. The current generation of sensors do not have the capacity to replicate the appreciation by a human eye and pose a limitation in operations because the UAV operator is not situationally aware. The major drawback of the current generation systems is their inability to capture high fidelity data, process, encrypt and transmit it and, based on directions from the ground station, receive, decrypt and process it to execute a command. Based on the type of processor and communication systems, this process may take anywhere from 600 milliseconds to three seconds – a very long duration in combat operations. The development of Artificial Intelligence will overcome this deficiency and provide the requisite autonomy to the UAV.
Speed and Manoeuvrability. UAVs are generally characterised by their low speed and consequent low manoeuvrability as compared to manned fighter aircraft and this makes them vulnerable. At the same time, however, a low RCS and greater endurance are design features that assist UAVs in mission accomplishment.
Weapon Carrying Capacity. Owing to their power, UAVs are capable of carrying low calibre/low weight weapons in limited numbers as compared to manned aircraft. But this limitation can be overcome by converting fighter aircraft into UAVs or through the use of special weapons with high accuracy to reduce Over Target Requirement (OTR)1 in terms of number and size of weapons.
Quantity and Costs. UAVs do not need some of the safety and operating systems that manned aircraft need and thus enjoy better cost efficiency. This normally translates into greater numbers of UAVs for the same cost as compared to a combat aircraft. However, autonomous aviation technology is yet to mature, which can be assessed from the fact that UAV accident rates are four to five times higher than that of manned aircraft. This negates the cost effectiveness partially as of now, but is likely to improve with better technology.
Endurance and Risks. UAVs practically eliminate human endurance as a factor for mission duration. Autonomous inflight refuelling could keep the UAV in the air for days. Risk to life and risk of capture of operators is fully eliminated. However, the control of UAV is heavily dependent on electromagnetic waves, which are susceptible to interference/jamming/technical malfunctions. Any delay in the transmission of critical commands could be lethal. Another aspect of the absence of an aircrew in UAVs is the limited ability of on board systems to diagnose any system malfunction especially owing to an external factor. An aircrew can diagnose an instrument failure and react to save the aircraft, but an UAV with instrument failure will most probably be lost.
Trends. With effect from 2010, the induction of UAVs has outnumbered induction of manned aircraft in the US armed forces. And since 2011, the US Air Force has trained more UAV pilots than fighter/bomber pilots. But most of the financial allocations the world over including in the US are still being made for manned aircraft development and procurement. This will change once better processing power, artificial intelligence and communication equipment are developed and incorporated in UAVs. Technology involving a swarm of UAVs operating in a group and being mutually supportive is at an advanced stage of development and will assist UAVs in garnering a greater share of operational missions.
Efficacy. The conversion of fighter aircraft to UAVs for undertaking training missions has been tried and tested in the cases of the F4 and F16 in the US Air Force and the F6 in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. The same could be developed further for undertaking operational missions with high risk.
Suitable Missions. In the foreseeable future, an optimal solution is a mix of manned aircraft and UAVs till technology can support a better appreciation of situational awareness and command and control aspects. Currently, the most suitable missions for UAVs are the five Ds – Detect, Designate, Dirty, Destructive and Dangerous. Detect missions require long endurance and are pre-planned and repetitive in nature like surveillance over a large area for a prolonged duration to detect a possible development. Designate either in conjunction with Detect or stand-alone missions designate a target system/sub system using laser designators for an attack by an armed aircraft/UAV. Dirty missions are undertaken in an NBC environment in order to negate the risk to human life. Destructive missions are when the UAV is equipped with explosives and is used as a weapon And Dangerous missions involve those against a heavily defended target to either attack the defences or force the adversary to expend missiles on UAVs.
Indian Scenario
While Israel and USA are leaders in UAV technology and operations, the Indian UAV programme is in its infancy. Going by the example of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the production of an Indian combat mission capable UAV is at least a couple of decades away. India will have to depend on imports or joint ventures for Make in India in the interim, as UAVs are essential in any operational matrix. Till a requisite number of mission capable UAVs are inducted in India, some of the operational missions will have to be carried out by manned aircraft, albeit in a suboptimal way. The induction of Su30MKI, LCA and Rafale will continue till 2022 and these aircraft with an average calendar life of 25 years or more will be in service well beyond 2050. By that time, for operational effectiveness, at least 50 per cent of combat missions would be designated to UAVs and that would require a large fleet of various types of UAVs. To meet that challenge, it would be prudent to establish a joint venture for the production of UAVs in India under the Strategic Partnership programme.
Sum Up
With the current state of technology, UAVs are the best bet for operations in an uncontested air space for surveillance and search and strike missions with low calibre high accuracy guided weapons. However, operations in a moderate to dense air defence environment will need manned aircraft to react appropriately, although UAVs can be of great value in reducing the risk to manned aircraft by saturating the air space and attacking air defence systems thus compelling an adversary to expend his missiles. UAVs are essential ingredients of a combat force and their role will continue to increase along with their capability. A quantum jump in the operational role of UAVs can be expected only with a breakthrough in AI. Until that happens, the role of UAVs will increase gradually to reach about 50 per cent of combat operations over the course of the next three decades.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the agreement remains controversial, China is likely to consolidate its presence and Sri Lanka likely to get deeper into the Chinese debt trap even though it has gained temporary relief through the equity for debt swap.
Some Sri Lankan economists had privately told me in 2011 that their country will find it difficult to repay the massive loan of USD 8 billion at an interest rate of more than six per cent taken from China for modernising the Hambantota port and that it may ultimately have to convert these loans into equity. That warning came true on July 29, 2017 when Sri Lanka and China signed the Hambantota Port Concession Agreement. Soon after the Agreement was signed, China declared that the Hambantota port is a part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
According to the agreement1, China will pay USD 1.12 billion upfront in a debt-equity swap in the ratio of 70:30 approximately, with the China Merchant Port Holdings Company (CMPort) getting 69.55 per cent of the shares and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), a public sector organization, holding the remainder 30.45 per cent. After 10 years, SLPA can buy another 20 per cent of the shares, making the two companies equal partners.
The agreement envisages the formation of two special vehicle companies — the Hambantota International Port Services Company (HIPS) to provide port services and security, and the Hambantota International Port Group Company (HIPG) to look after the commercial aspects. In HIPS, the SLPA will hold 50.7 per cent of the shares, and CMPort 49.3 per cent. And in HIPG, the CMPort will own 85 per cent of the shares and SLPA 15 per cent. The agreement leases out the port to CMPort for 99 years, but contains a provision for the SLPA to acquire majority stake gradually after ten years. The commercial company HIPG will pay SLPA dividends and royalty.
A financial expert has, however, opined that CMPort’s stake in HIPS is not 49.3 per cent but actually 58 percent because 8.7 per cent of the SLPA’s stake of 50.7 per cent comes from the coffers of the HIPG in which CMPort has 85 percent stake2. Therefore, in effect, CMPort is a majority shareholder in both HIPG and HIPS and is the de facto owner of the port. The share distribution in the HIPS and HIPG raises the question as to whether HIPS, which handles security, can effectively implement the following clause – the Government of Sri Lanka ‘will have the right and authority to grant permission, clearance and approval to berth naval vessels in the port, on mutually agreed payment terms3’ – when China owns the majority stake in that company.
The agreement was submitted to the Sri Lankan parliament on July 27, and a debate was fixed for July 28. But the debate could not take place as commotion broke out in the House over another issue and parliament was adjourned. Yet, the agreement was signed on the very next day (July 29), drawing criticism from the opposition. In order to assure the Opposition, President Maithripala Sirisena undertook to let Parliament debate the Agreement. And he promised that after the debate, if found necessary, the Agreement will be amended. Accordingly, the Minister of Ports, Mahinda Samarasinghe, had to make an announcement in the presence of the Chinese Ambassador and the CMPort’s top brass that the agreement will be debated on August 8. But the debate has been further postponed due to corruption allegations surrounding the Finance Minister. Fearing an Opposition backlash, Sirisena had allowed for the inclusion of a clause stipulating that the agreement could be amended at any time with the consent of the two countries.
The fear that China would eventually take control of the country’s infrastructure was palpable when the Mahinda Rajapaksa government first went ahead with massive infrastructure projects in his electoral constituency of Hambantota district with Chinese funding without assessing their economic viability and long term implications. But the successor Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government, which had accused Rajapaksa of converting the country into a Chinese colony and promised to reverse these decisions, had very little choice other than opting for equity and public private partnership with China. Sri Lanka’s GDP growth had dipped to 3.5 per cent last year. The International Monetary Fund projected a growth rate of five per cent for 2017 only after it became known that the government would opt for a debt-equity swap with China on Hambantota port. On December 8, 2016, a Framework Agreement for the port was signed between Sri Lanka’s Ministries of Ports & Shipping and Development Strategies & International Trade, on one side, and China Merchants Holdings Ltd (now called CMPorts), on the other, for the ‘revitalisation’ of the Hambantota port on a Private–Public Partnership (PPP) model.
The conclusion of an agreement with China to manage the Hambantota port was seen as inevitable after the government buckled under Chinese pressure when the China Communication and Construction Co Ltd, which was building the port city, demanded USD 143 million as compensation for the stalling of the work. The Sri Lankan government was also compelled to renegotiate the Colombo Port city project last year, which had been suspended due to criticism about the Chinese ownership of 20 hectares of freehold land as well as controversy over the project’s possible negative environmental impact.
Compared to the 2016 agreement, the July 29, 2017 Concession Agreement on Hambantota appears to be better with the shareholding of the Chinese company brought down by ten percentage points (from 80 to 70 per cent). And the clause relating to 15,000 hectares of land has been deleted under the new agreement4. Keeping in mind popular protests, the government has decided that only 1,115 hectares of gazetted land will be leased.
Many in Sri Lanka argue that the Hambantota port could make an economic turnaround within a few years5. Their argument is that the SLPA, which has been making loan repayments since 2011, is in a position to fully repay the entire debt by 2032, as was initially envisaged by the previous government6. Some economists in Sri Lanka also feel that the bunkering facility in Hambantota can be utilised for earning foreign exchange to repay the Chinese loan. Port Minister Samarasinghe has, however, said that since 2011, the SLPA has paid China Sri Lanka Rupees (LKR) 47 billion as loan repayment for the Hambantota port, at the rate of LKR 9.1 billion annually, which was not sustainable in the long run. Further, the SLPA announced that it had paid more than LKR 7.1 billion as loan repayment for the loss making Hambantota Port, with LKR 16.7 million as capital and interest in 2016 alone.
Others question whether leasing the port for 99 years is worth the debt to equity swap. But the government argues that the sale of majority share in Hambantota port would help pay the burgeoning interest of 6.3 per cent on the USD 8 billion loan taken from China as well as convert the loss making port and airport into profit-making entities through Chinese investments in the special economic zone.
The deal had been criticised by the Opposition including the Rajapakse faction of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) popularly known as ‘Joint Opposition’. At the heart of the Opposition’s grievance is the government’s decision to lease 15,000 acres of land to CMPort for 99 years without a competitive tender process. Vasudeva Nanayakkara, an ally of Rajapakse, has even filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging this decision.
Ironically, Rajapakse, the main architect behind Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, has effected a complete U-turn. He has stated that he will scrap the Industrial Park proposed to be built on the land forcibly taken over by the government. Protests against the proposal started in December 2016. And when Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe came to inaugurate the industrial park in January 2017, public protests turned violent in which 21 people were injured. Buddhist monks also joined the protesters against the lease of land which was described by Rajapakse as impinging on “Sri Lanka's sovereign rights.7” Media reports note that Arjuna Ranatunga was removed from his post as Minister for Ports because of his opposition to the deal. Parties like the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) are also strongly opposed to this agreement.
India's Concerns
India had expressed concerns regarding Chinese-built projects especially the Colombo Port City and the Hambantota port in the past. In both these cases, the agreements were revised ostensibly to address the concerns of India as well as of some other countries.
India’s main concern has been the long term impact of Chinese state-owned companies acquiring equity in the Sri Lankan economy and the extent to which Chinese influence on Sri Lanka’s economy would affect Colombo’s ability to practice an independent foreign policy. Chinese influence in Sri Lanka will have serious implications for the latter’s relationship with India. This was highlighted by the Sri Lankan decision in November 2014 to permit Chinese submarines to dock in Colombo port in spite of India’s strong protests. India’s fear regarding China’s intentions in its neighbourhood are not unfounded given the latter’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, decision to acquire its first overseas base in Djibouti and its presence in Gwadar as part of the intensifying Sino-Pakistan axis.
To assure India that past policies regarding Chinese submarines would not be repeated, the July 29 agreement has two exclusive clauses that relate to the issue of management of the port. Quoting from the agreement, Nirupama Subramanian writes,
On April 11, 2017, speaking to the press in Colombo on his return from a visit to Beijing, Wickremesinghe had said that Chinese investments in Sri Lanka were ‘an opportunity for everyone to make money. That’s what we do in Asia’. But Sri Lankans are wondering who has made money in the deal this time around. While the agreement remains controversial, China is likely to consolidate its presence and Sri Lanka is likely to get deeper into the Chinese debt trap even though it has gained temporary relief through the equity for debt swap.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Unfortunately, the incoherence in US policy under Trump makes one fear that the probability of a disastrous miscalculation is truly worrisome.
The belligerent rhetoric from Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un is causing serious concern. While a war appears rather unlikely as neither side can afford it, it cannot be completely ruled out. A miscalculation by either side might lead to a war that is certain to cause loss of human lives and destruction of frightful proportions. Policy driven by belligerent rhetoric can indeed engender such miscalculations as both sides paint themselves into a corner. Unfortunately, the incoherence in US policy under Trump makes one fear that the probability of a disastrous miscalculation is truly worrisome.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
It is important to bear in mind that we are in the month of August and should recall with horror the holocaust carried out by President Truman in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two bombs immediately killed more than 120,000 human beings and many thousands more later. Historians have not ceased to debate on the need and justification for such a holocaust. One doubts whether Truman’s predecessor Roosevelt would have done it. It has been argued by the apologists for Truman that it was necessary to use the horrendous atom bomb for compelling Japan to surrender as otherwise US casualties would have been heavy if an invasion of the Japanese islands had been carried out. There may or may not be merit in that argument. But granting that there is merit, the question remains as to why Nagasaki was flattened within three days. Surely, Truman could have waited for a reasonable period for Japan’s response to the destruction of Hiroshima.
We know now that the US was testing out two types of bombs. The ‘Little Boy’, with uranium 235 on Hiroshima and the ‘Fat Man’ with plutonium 239 on Nagasaki. The bombs could have been tested in an unpopulated area, but the US wanted to know the extent of the destruction in terms of lives and property.
Why we are where we are?
It is not the case that only Pyongyang has been repeatedly provoking the US by carrying out nuclear and missile tests. The provocation has come from both sides. In May 2016, candidate Trump had clearly stated that, if elected, he would be willing to talk to Kim Jong-un over a hamburger. But after becoming President, he did not send any signal about talking. The first signal came in early February 2017 when the US and South Korea agreed to install THAAD (Terminal High Area Air Defense) in South Korea. On 5 February, the US and Japan successfully downed a test medium-range ballistic missile with a new interceptor launched from a guided-missile destroyer. That was a message to North Korea that its missiles can be intercepted.
Six days later, North Korea carried out the first of its 18 missile tests since Trump became President. In April 2017, Trump requested China’s Xi Jinping to restrain North Korea from further tests. Xi indicated that there were limits to his ability to persuade Kim, but that he would try. Trump made a triumphant declaration that he expected China to stop further tests by North Korea. Given Kim’s psychology, such an openly announced agreement between Xi and Trump would have made it impossible for him to stop testing. Is there anyone in the US to whom Trump would have listened if he was told of this likely reaction from Kim?
On 30 June 2017, it was announced that Trump was being briefed on military options if North Korea were to carry out a new missile test. On 4 July 2017, obviously to coincide with the US Independence Day, North Korea carried out what it claimed as an ICBM test. The US and South Korea responded by holding a joint missile drill to counteract North Korea's "destabilizing and unlawful actions," as a US Army statement noted. Kim’s response was the test of 28 July, claimed to be ICBM once again.
North Korea’s Capabilities
It is not known how good and accurate US intelligence on North Korea is. Presumably, the US lacks human intelligence. Pundits are divided on the number of warheads Kim has, with the estimate varying between 20 and 60. There is also a difference of opinion about North Korea’s technical ability to miniaturize the bomb. What is, however, reasonably clear is that North Korea might acquire the ability to deliver a warhead on the continental United States before Trump completes his term in 2020.
US Success at the UN Security Council
The US scored a diplomatic victory by getting Resolution 2371 (5 August 2017) unanimously passed at the Security Council. This came even as US-Russia relations plunged to a new low with Putin’s order ‘expelling’ 755 staff from the US mission in Russia (30 July) in retaliation for fresh US sanctions on Russia. North Korea has been under sanctions since 2006, but the new resolution, if implemented, will cut its export earnings by US$1 billion from the current level of $3 billion.
China’s Calculations
Though China has publicly advised North Korea to abide by the resolution, only time will tell as to whether it will scrupulously abide by the UNSC resolution. In this context, it is important to raise a question or two about China’s real intentions in the matter. Does it want to see a permanent resolution of the matter by getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons? May be. But, is it not in China’s interest to keep the pot boiling so that the US seeks its help from time to time? Trump has once again said that if China helps in stopping the tests by North Korea he is prepared to accept the huge trade imbalance with China.
Obviously, China does not want the regime in North Korea to collapse for good and sufficient reasons. If the regime were to collapse, millions of Koreans will seek refuge in China. Further, Korea will be united under Seoul. Such a united Korea will adversely affect China’s security as US troops can be stationed in the north of Korea. In short, the assumption that China will put pressure on Kim to halt and reverse his nuclear programme is rather naïve. China’s putting pressure by hurting North Korea’s economy itself might start an exodus of North Koreans to China.
US Policy in Disarray
It is important to note the mixed signalling from the US. On 8 August 2017, Trump threatened North Korea with ‘fire and fury’ if it does anything to endanger the US. The implication was that he might use nuclear weapons. Hours later, North Korea paid back in the same coin by threatening to send a missile that will fall in the waters 30 to 40 km off Guam. The US has an important military post in Guam with B-1 bombers and fighter jets that might be used against North Korea in case of war. It should be noted that North Korea did not say that it was going to send a missile to Guam.
Secretary of State Tillerson is doing his best to let the world know that the words of his President should be taken with a pinch of salt. Earlier, he had said that the US did not want to change the regime in North Korea, North Korea was not an enemy, and talks can take place ‘under appropriate conditions’. Tillerson gave an unconvincing defence of Trump by saying that the latter was speaking in the only language understood by Kim and that Americans could sleep peacefully at night. Promptly, Tillerson was rebuked by White House aide Sebastian Gorka who said that it was ‘nonsensical’ for Tillerson to speak of ‘military matters’. Tillerson’s spokesperson Heather Nauert hit back by saying that her boss was the fourth in succession in case of a vacancy in the White House and that he carried a ‘big stick’.
What is sad and frightening is that Kim might take Trump’s words seriously. The US lacks access to Kim to talk to him. Talking through the media to a man like Kim is most dangerous.
Why Does Kim Want Nuclear Weapons?
If the 1953 Armistice had been followed by a peace treaty that North Korea had asked for repeatedly, Kim might not have been seeking nuclear weapons. Basically, he believes that keeping in mind what happened to Saddam and Gaddafi after they abandoned their search for nuclear weapon capability, his own survival and that of his regime calls for the pursuit of nuclear weapons until a proper peace treaty is in place.
A Possible Solution?
Reflection will show that the US has to sit down and talk to North Korea. Kim has rejected Seoul’s offer to talk as he feels that he has to talk to the US. Washington should approach the issue with a sense of realism. Sanctions have not worked in the past. They are unlikely to work in the future. Even if the North Korean economy breaks down, Kim might survive even after half his population tries to flee to China. The six-party talks (the two Koreas, US, Japan, Russia, and China) in the past did give some results.
The talks have to start without conditions and what is realistic is a halt to North Korea’s programme against economic aid and political respect; as the confidence level improves, it might be possible to denuclearize the Korean peninsula over a period of time after signing a peace treaty ending the Korean War.
It will make more sense to have two-party (US and North Korea) talks rather than revive the six-party talks. Trump who promised out of the box thinking on foreign policy should be able to see the advantages of talking to Kim. And Trump has a better chance of getting domestic support for such talks than Obama ever had. Obama’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ was flawed as he should have combined it with talks.
What might happen?
Neither Kim nor Trump will stop their belligerent rhetoric. There are enough indications that the Secretaries of Defense and State are of the firm view that the US should not carry out any 'preventive' or 'pre-emptive' strike for obvious reasons. Kim might or might not send a missile to land in the sea 30 or 40 km off Guam. Even if he sends one, it might be intercepted and in any case no harm will come to anyone in Guam even if it is not intercepted. Trump will have no good reason to order the Pentagon to carry out a strike. If he chooses to do so, there are two possibilities: Either the order is carried out or the Defense Secretary resigns.
This is the time the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres should make a discreet intervention. He should ask Kim and Trump what each wants from the other. A public statement that he is ready to mediate if both sides ask for it will not do.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
NOTE: The last two paragraphs in the original post have been removed. These had been inadvertently retained from an earlier draft. We regret the editorial oversight.
The Doklam standoff has emerged as a litmus test for India in terms of how resolutely it can stand up against an increasingly hegemonic China to protect the interests of Bhutan as well as its own interests.
Two months have elapsed since the eruption of the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on the cold, deserted plateau of Doklam on the India Bhutan China tri-junction in the Sikkim sector. The standoff flared-up on 8 June, exactly the day Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping were meeting in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit. At this meeting, held in a warm and cordial atmosphere, it was agreed that the two sides will not allow ''differences'' between the two countries to transform into ''disputes''.
News of the Doklam stalemate hit the headlines around the end of June when Prime Minister Modi was in Washington DC for his first meeting with President Donald Trump on 26 June. It is not difficult to conceive that the timing of these developments was anything but coincidental!
In this short span of two months, much water has flowed in the Ganga and the Yangtze. It has been a psychological roller-coaster for the Indian public and media to be subjected to the unending tirade and spiel of vituperative expletives, threats and insults emanating from the Chinese communist party and state-controlled media as well as from spokespersons of the Chinese Foreign Office and the People's Liberation Army. The Communist party controlled tabloid Global Times went so far as to call External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj ''a liar'' for her Statement in Parliament on 20 July 2017 that all countries are with India on this issue.
The above sequence of events appears to be the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for China while dealing with countries with which it has differences, particularly those it considers to be weaker than itself. First, China encroaches upon the target country’s land or maritime territory and starts building heavy infrastructure on it, then lays claim to the territory on ''historical grounds'', next projects itself as a victim, and subsequently starts issuing threats to withdraw and succumb to demands. In most cases, China has been successful in achieving its objectives.
The most recent case is China's gradual, sneaking intrusion into the South China Sea where it has successfully extended control over about 3.9 million square kilometres of maritime territory and constructed many artificial islands, notwithstanding the verdict by the International Court of justice against its claims.
China appears to have become increasingly aggressive as it has steadily risen in power and as the influence of the West has progressively declined. It seems to have been spurred by the ineffectual response of the international community, particularly the United States, on the South China Sea discord.
The Doklam standoff has emerged as a litmus test for India in terms of how resolutely it can stand up against an increasingly hegemonic China to protect the interests of Bhutan as well as its own interests. India is also sending out a message to other neighbours and countries around the world that India is not a country that can be pushed around by a belligerent China.
Bhutan has conducted itself in an exemplary manner. It has stood steadfast with India. Its support should not be taken for granted. India needs to engage Bhutan at every level on a continuing basis. This seems to be happening. One of China’s objectives seems to be to disrupt the special relations between India and Bhutan. To this end, senior officials from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi have been visiting Thimphu and meeting leaders and officials at all levels. Elections next year to the Bhutanese Parliament also need to be watched carefully. China will try to get a Parliament elected which is more favourably inclined towards it than towards India. It is understandable that Bhutan does not wish to get embroiled in a muscular tussle between two neighbouring giants. But it also realizes that its interests – political, security, economic, cultural, and civilizational – are more intimately tied with India. Bhutan is the only other country, in addition to India, with which China has not settled its boundary out of the 14 countries with which it shares land borders. Like in the case of India, so also with Bhutan, China keeps the boundary dispute alive for applying pressure when it wants to.
While the salvoes from the Chinese side, particularly from the slander-mongering Global Times and from the foreign office, have diminished somewhat in intensity and frequency in recent days, no change is visible in the tone of comments from China aimed at intimidating and coercing India to withdraw its forces.
In the most recent and most detailed volley yet, China issued a 15-page statement on 2 August 2017 slamming India's stand and demanding "immediate and unconditional withdrawal". It claims that it had "notified India in advance" of its plans to build a road in Doklam and also cited a "non-paper" reportedly presented by India during the 2006 Special Representatives border talks that said "both sides agree on the boundary alignment in the Sikkim sector.'' It accuses India of using Bhutan ''as a pretext.'' It warned that no country should ever underestimate the resolve of the Chinese government and people to defend China's territorial sovereignty.'' It rebutted India's statement of 30 June and accused India of inventing various excuses to justify its illegal action.
India's comments have been measured, reasonable, free of accusations and polemics. This has served India's purpose well thus far. India has manitained that diplomacy and dilogue is the way to solve this issue. China has spurned this suggestion saying that dialogue can take place only after Indian troops have withdrawn. India has not thought it fit to respond to the substantive issues raised in the above Chinese Statement except to refute that the number of Indian troops has not come down from the earlier 400 to 40 as claimed. None of the other issues raised in the Note, for instance, that India had brought in two bull-dozers to the area, have been contradicted.
Some Indian analysts complain that the Indian media is meticulosly carrying all commentaries and statements from China and none from India. The ostensible reason for this is that barring the 30 June Press Release issued by the Ministry of External affairs and the External Affairs Minister’s statements to Parliament on 20 July and 3 August, there have been no formal or official statements from India. India needs to urgently address this shortcoming. It is recognised that a resolution of the isue has to be sought through quiet and behind the scenes dialogue. China, however, seems to be getting an undue advantage of moulding the public perception in its favour. The fact that India does not respond with facts and figures also gives the impression that India is not certain and confident of its position and has something to hide.
India’s publicity and public diplomacy efforts have been found wanting and inadequate. It is no one’s contention that India should enter into a tit-for-tat slanging match with the Chinese media or officialdom. But India’s public outreach instruments need to stay upfront to cogently and vigorously explain and rebut the calumny of falsehoods that China has been peddling. It is as necessary to reach out to the Indian populace as it is to inform the international policy makers and thought leaders on the accurate sequence of events.
India does not desire a conflict or confrontation with China. It would like a peaceful resolution to the issue so that status-quo ante of 16 June is restored. Reasons for China to maintain peaceful ties with India are also several, including its vulnerabilities in Tibet, preventing a reversal of established policy by India on Tibet and Taiwan, attractiveness of the Indian market, anxiety at India forging closer strategic ties with the US and Japan, and China’s need for a peaceful, non-threatening image in its aspiration for great power status.
Having been left with few viable choices because of its strident and offensive accusations, China might feel compelled to take some precipitate action against India. If such an eventuality were to play out, India should be prepared to fully protect its interests and in the process also avenge its defeat of 1962 and reclaim some of the prestige and credibility that it lost on that occasion. India has a fighting force which has been exposed to action on the ground incessantly over the last many decades. Chinese forces, in contrast, have not engaged in any armed conflict since the war with Vietnam in 1979.
From all available indications, it appears that the standoff on the cold, deserted plateau will not get sorted out anytime soon. It will be a long haul. India will have to psychologically and logistically be determined to dig in its heels to protect its security in the short and medium term and promote its strategic interests in the long term.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
To effectively cope with the PRC’s hostile attitude, India needs to reduce the power asymmetry, articulate a clear security policy based on a realistic threat assessment, reorganise the military, and revamp the border management mechanism.
It is almost two months since Indian and Chinese soldiers became locked in a standoff at Doklam in the Sikkim Sector. The faceoff was triggered when a team of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was prevented by Indian troops from extending a class-5 track in the Dolam Plateau area which is part of Bhutanese territory. The Indian Army acted in response to a request from the Royal Bhutan Army under the terms of the 2007 Bilateral Friendship Treaty. Moreover, the PLA’s track building is in contravention of the 2012 Agreement between the Special Representatives of India and China, whereby the status quo was required to be maintained in the said area until the resolution of the trijunction in consultation with Bhutan.
Post 1962, there have been numerous border incidences between the Indian and Chinese militaries; Nathu La in 1967 and Sumdrong Chu two decades later. In the recent past too, the Depsang Plateau and the Chumar-Demchok area witnessed face-offs in April 2013 and September 2014, respectively, with the latter intriguingly coinciding with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India. Incidentally, the current Chinese incursion in Bhutan happened around the time of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States.
Given the opaque Chinese system, deciphering the intent of its Communist leadership poses a real challenge. According to the eminent scholar Derek Bodde, those who deal with China are often bewildered when the actions of its leadership send mixed signals, making clear interpretation extremely difficult. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) draws from its ancient thinkers. Its actions are always deliberate, like the moves on a checker board. It is imperative to gain an insight into the Chinese psyche and decode China’s strategic calculus in order to effectively cope with its grand designs.
Decoding the Chinese Strategic Calculus
The PRC’s assertiveness around its periphery is attributable to its age old belief of a ‘subdued neighbourhood’ being an essential prerequisite for stability. In his book On China, Henry Kissinger has brought out that the PRC perceives itself to be a returning power and does not view exercising influence as unnatural. Alastair Johnson, an expert on Chinese strategic culture, has stated that there is no pacifist bias in the Chinese strategic tradition but only realpolitik. Nations are either friendly or hostile. This is why servile countries such as Pakistan and North Korea are generously rewarded, while those like India or Vietnam which counter China’s aggressive behaviour invite its wrath.
Chinese thinking since ancient times advocates mitigating a threat by eliminating it. Thus, during the period 1950-85, the PRC opted to use force eight times. When confronted with a stronger adversary, non-coercive means may be adopted as an interim expedient.
China’s grand strategy encompasses three concise objectives: safeguarding sovereignty, maintaining stability, and sustaining economic progress. Any danger to the Communist Party is perceived as an ‘existential threat’. Sovereignty implies, besides external non-interference, safeguarding core interests, control of the South China Sea, unification of Taiwan, and integration of claimed territories with the mainland including South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh). In the pursuit of these vital national interests, the use of force remains an option.
President Xi has emerged as an all-powerful leader. Designated as a ‘Core’ leader and addressed as ‘Chairman’ (Zhuxi), he is poised to join the league of Mao and Deng. During the forthcoming 19th Party Congress in November, Xi is set to consolidate his grip further. The earlier policy enunciated by Deng that China should “bide time, hide capability and not to claim leadership” has undergone a visible shift under Xi. Xi’s ‘China Dream’ envisions a ‘prosperous and powerful’ China restored to its past greatness.
In the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP), hard power is the key component. China’s military culture lays immense emphasis on the ‘strategic configuration of power’, creating a favourable disposition of forces to obviate actual fighting. By exploiting its asymmetric edge to coerce smaller nations, China has effectively pursued the surreptitious strategy of ‘fighting and talking concurrently’ in order to extend its control over the South China Sea. China’s military doctrine of “Local Wars under Informationalised Conditions” envisages short-swift engagements to achieve political objectives. Under President Xi, the PLA is in the process of path breaking transformation to emerge as a modern military in the coming decades.
Internationally, PRC remains a lonely power. It has used diplomacy effectively to exploit differences among the adversaries to its advantage. China’s threat assessment perceives the US and Japan to be the prime security concerns, while India is seen as a potential threat. As US and Western countries yield space, China under Xi has pronounced itself as a champion of globalization and sustainable growth to fill the void. Major initiatives like the ‘Belt-Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Road’ have been launched in a quest to shape a Sino-Centric global order.
The PRC’s action at Doklam is in consonance with its policy of intimidating smaller neighbours. Apparently, China did not anticipate India to step in. The Communist leadership is infuriated with India for abstaining from its signature projects. New Delhi’s growing proximity to Washington and Tokyo has also irked Beijing. Given its focus on the Western Pacific, the mounting tension on the Korean Peninsula, economic imperatives and internal stability concerns in the run-up to the forthcoming Party Congress, China will avoid an armed confrontation with India, despite its rhetoric. However, it will keep up the pressure militarily and pursue aggressive diplomacy to deal with the issue.
The PRC has pursued the policy of delinking complex political issues from economic ones. It enjoys strong trade linkages with the US, Japan and Taiwan, despite serious political differences. Beijing will continue with its policy of marginalising New Delhi politically in international forums, while seeking to avoid a negative economic fallout.
India’s Policy Options
In its efforts to engage China, India has followed a policy of appeasement. And its responses to PRC’s misadventures have been in the form of crisis management. To effectively cope with the PRC’s hostile attitude, India needs to evolve a pragmatic China policy centred on core national interests. Some essential facets which merit serious consideration are summarised below.
Firstly, given the PRC’s policy of asymmetric coercion, India has no option but to narrow the existing CNP gap between the two countries. Developing strategic partnerships, initiatives like ‘Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor’, ‘Act East Policy’ and counter balancing strategies are steps in the right direction.
Secondly, national security policy needs clear articulation, based on a realistic threat assessment. Apex organizational structures require streamlining to telescope the decision making process. The current format of military modernization demands a holistic review.
Thirdly, in an era of ‘limited wars’, a ‘joint military doctrine’ is a sine qua non and ‘tri service theatre commands’ are prerequisites for synergised application of the war waging potential. In the prevailing scenario, facing the PLA’s Western Theatre Command are India’s seven Army and Air Force commands, which is a serious lacuna. In short engagements, the timely application of requisite combat power at the point of decision is critical. This calls for creating essential infrastructure on highest priority.
Lastly, the border management mechanism needs to be revamped. A single nodal agency is required to coordinate the functions of the various organs. Operational control astride the Line of Actual Control ought to rest with the Army. A well calibrated response mechanism must be put in place, with disputed vulnerable areas effectively dominated and troops fully prepared to meet any eventuality. Paramilitary Forces deployed for manning the borders require urgent upgrade to match the PLA’s Border Regiments.
While many seem to know China, few understand it. In the desperation to engage the PRC, there is a tendency to lose sight of the bigger picture. Given the conflicting interests coupled with unresolved issues, relations between India and China are bound to be marked by contradictions, leading to frequent confrontations. However, through deft diplomacy, differences can be managed. While solutions to vexed problems may not be on the horizon, disputes turning into conflict can be avoided in the larger interest of both nations.
The Chinese are shrewd negotiators with tremendous stamina and penchant to sit across the table, but with equals. India must, therefore, firmly stand its ground and forthrightly safeguard its strategic interests. To deal with China on a level footing, the Indian leadership needs to make pragmatic assessments, possess the courage to accept home truths and display audacity for bold decisions.
The writer has served as Defence Attaché in China, North Korea and Mongolia; commanded a Division in the Eastern Sector; and currently is Professor of International Studies, Aligarh Muslim University.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While decades of counterinsurgency operations and peace processes have taken the sting out of the region’s major insurgencies, collaboration between groups continues to pose security challenges, particularly in the exploitable border areas adjacent to the upper Sagaing Region of Northwest Myanmar.
On celebrating its “army day” on 16 March 2017, a United Liberation Front of Asom – Independent (ULFA – I) statement lauded the success of joint operations carried out with the Manipur-based insurgent umbrella organisation Coordination Committee (CorCom). The group was referring to two attacks conducted in conjunction with CorCom militants near the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border on 19 November 2016 and 22 January 2017, in which five security forces personnel were killed.1 Moreover, on 3 December 2016, militants of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Khaplang (NSCN – K) ambushed an Assam Rifles convoy near the India-Myanmar border in Nginu, Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh, killing two troopers in the attack.2 ULFA – I, CorCom and NSCN – K form part of a broader, loose, alliance of non-ceasefire signatory insurgent groups in the region that have increasingly conducted joint operations and exploited the porous border with Myanmar.
Cooperation between armed groups in the Northeast has been portrayed as a sign of the growing desperation and long-term decline of insurgent actors in the region.3 Such collaboration is, however, not a new phenomenon. The first two major insurgencies in the region, the Naga National Council and the Mizo National Front, collaborated from the late 1960s.4 After it emerged in 1980, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim played a crucial role in granting assistance to other armed groups. And after fragmentation in 1988, the NSCN – IM and NSCN – K proceeded to forge their own umbrella coalition groups in the form of the NSCN – K’s Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) and the NSCN – IM’s equivalent, the Self Defence United Front of South East Asian Himalayan Region (SDUFSEAHR).5 It is the crucial role played by Naga insurgent groups in these umbrella organisations, a product of their clear regional advantages in training, combat capabilities and access to international borders, that afforded the Naga insurgency the status of the “mother of all insurgencies” in the region.
Clearly, the situation in the Northeast has dramatically improved since the 1990s. On 3 June 2017, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted that during 2016 insurgency-related fatalities in the region reached a 20-year low, suggesting that a modicum of peace and stability had been restored to the region.6 Against this backdrop, despite potential sticking points and contradictions,7 the peace process between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak-Muivah (NSCN – IM) appeared to hold firm, while ceasefires with the many breakaway NSCN factions, NSCN – Kitovi-Neokpao (NSCN – KN) and NSCN – Reformation were renewed for another year in Spring 2017. On 9 June, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju suggested that substantive progress was being made between the government and the ULFA – Pro Talks Faction (ULFA – PTF),8 just days after the government’s new interlocutor, Dinesh Sharma, chaired a series of talks with the group and with pro-talk Bodo armed groups.
However, substantial challenges remain in confronting the remaining non-ceasefire signatory groups such as ULFA – I, NSCN – K and the CorCom umbrella group, which have increasingly shifted their strategies towards the conduct of cross-border strikes in areas adjacent to the international border. The Sagaing region across the India-Myanmar border has long provided sanctuary for armed groups, while simultaneously offering opportunities for networking and operational coordination. On 10 January 2017, Assam’s Assistant Director General of Police suggested that up to 2,500 militants from Northeast Indian armed groups were residing across the border, with up to 1,000 of these being from NSCN – K, which, in 2012, signed a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar.9 For NSCN – K, which has gradually seen an erosion of its India-based support networks following splits in 2011 and 2015,10 the areas of India in proximity to Myanmar, such as Tirap, Changlang and Longding districts of Arunachal Pradesh, Tinsukia district of Assam, Chandel district of Manipur and Mon district of Nagaland, appear to have assumed newfound importance as it attempts to retain operational relevance in India. The group, which is arguably the dominant group within its own umbrella organisation, the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWESEA), and amongst its CorCom allies, has hosted several of these groups in camps in its areas of influence since the mid-2000s.11
Since the NSCN – K abrogated its 14-year ceasefire agreement with the Indian government in April 2015, the group has conducted major attacks in conjunction with its allies from within these networks. This strategy appeared to take off in earnest on 4 June 2015, after an ambush on an Army convoy in Manipur’s Chandel district led to the death of 18 jawans. The attack was claimed in a joint statement by NSCN – K,12 Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and a faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP).13 Since then, joint group operations have become a regular aspect of the NSCN – K’s approach to insurgency in the region. While few “spectaculars” have taken place since the Chandel ambush, the interception of joint insurgent teams by the security forces is indicative of the extent of cooperation between the groups. For example, on 16 February 2016, Army personnel encountered and killed three NSCN – K militants and one ULFA – I militant in Dirak Chirali, Lohit district of Arunachal Pradesh. The extent of cooperation between NSCN – K and ULFA – I in particular was also evident on 7 June 2017, after three ULFA – I militants were killed during a clash near the international border in Lappa, Mon district of Nagaland.
The death of NSCN – K chairman S. S. Khaplang in Myanmar on 9 June 2017 led to renewed calls for peace talks as well as to rumours that the group may face internal power struggles as its leaders vie with one another to succeed Khaplang.14 Assam police sources also suggested that ULFA – I might lodge a bid for leadership of the UNLFWESEA movement. However, the succession of Khango Konyak as the leader of both the NSCN – K and the umbrella organisation UNLFWESEA pointed towards continuity at least for the immediate future. Indeed, on 21 June, NSCN – K and ULFA – I militants once again linked up during a clash with security forces personnel in Choknyu, Mon district of Nagaland, suggesting that such cooperation is likely to remain a feature of the insurgency environment for the foreseeable future.
Options for tackling the issue
State actors have clearly recognised and are taking steps to address these changing dynamics of insurgency in the region. On 10 January 2017, L. R. Bishnoi, Additional Director General of Police, Assam, suggested that the cross-border joint operations approach constituted a “new strategy.”15 During a review of the security situation with officials on 24 March 2017, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh urged officials to enhance their vigilance along the international border. The Myanmar government also intensified border fencing activities along the India-Myanmar border adjacent to Nagaland. However, these efforts produced a significant public backlash from local Naga populations on both sides of the border during the first months of 2017, resulting in the suspension of construction activities in February 2017. Since a hostile local population would undermine the purpose of such a border fence and raise questions about its utility,16 the Indian government should liaise with its Myanmarese counterpart to discourage such efforts. At the same time, the two governments should agree to deepen cooperation in checking the misuse of the 16 km visa-free zone on either side of the international border. Reports that such agreements were arrived at during the 21st India-Myanmar national-level meeting on 5-6 July is a positive step in this direction.17
Furthermore, the use of cross-border “surgical strikes,” such as those conducted in the immediate aftermath of the Chandel ambush in June 2015,18 can disrupt the sense of security that militants in cross-border camps enjoy, while sending a clear message to the insurgent leadership that such attacks will not be tolerated. However, the diplomatic risks such operations carry limit the extent to which they can become a regular component of India’s counterinsurgency approach against cross-border groups. Such “hard” operations should thus be combined with proactive diplomatic measures to improve high-level and operational-level ties with Myanmar.
In-country options include the intensification of presence-based operations in the Tirap, Changlang and Longding areas of Arunachal Pradesh as well as Mon district of Nagaland, which constitute the key transit points into India. However, the ability to intercept incoming parties of NSCN – K, ULFA – I and other allied militants will depend on developed intelligence networks, which, in turn, are dependent upon local support, a dynamic that has already been recognised by the Army in its assessment of Arunachal Pradesh.19 This points towards the continued importance of keeping local border populaces onside. Thus, the changing dynamics of insurgency becoming cross-border in character should not detract from the continued importance of both maintaining a presence and continuing to win “hearts and minds” within.
Finally, while the death of S. S. Khaplang does not appear to have sparked immediate and major change at the operational level, efforts to bring elements of the group into dialogue should be pursued in a concerted manner. Khaplang’s unilateral decision-making processes had over the years reportedly alienated key constituents,20 causing the group to fracture twice in the space of four years. Offers of rehabilitation to NSCN – K militants of Indian origin were announced a day after Khaplang’s death.21 However, this alone would not fully remove the problem of allied organisations such as ULFA – I and the CorCom, which were housed in NSCN – K territory even during the NSCN – K’s ceasefire with the government, meaning a comprehensive approach combining reconciliation with aggressive interdiction mechanisms would need to be built into future policy efforts to tackle cross-border collaboration among armed groups.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It will take some time before the PLA can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. But the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the ‘balance of power’ dynamics.
On 31 July 1997, the Central Hall of the China World Hotel in Beijing was all decked up to host a banquet dinner to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Military Attaché Corps was present in strength as President Jiang Zemin was to grace the occasion, being the Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body. It was a gala affair with a resounding undertone – that the military must continue to serve the Party in the finest traditions of the PLA.
The PLA traces its roots to the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ of 1 August 1927. It was on that day that the Communists led by stalwarts like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De revolted against the Nationalist Forces. In December 1929, the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened its ninth meeting for building the Party and the Army. The venue was Gutian, a town in the South West of Fujian Province. During the Conference, Mao addressed the men of the Fourth Army and clarified the role of the military as being “to chiefly serve the political ends”. From there on, the absolute control of the CPC over the Red Army became entrenched; the PLA was to be the military of the Communist Party, not of China.
The symbiotic relationship between the two most powerful organs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Party and PLA, is unique. The PLA played a key role during the revolution and its top commanders, Mao and Deng, emerged as iconic First and Second Generation leaders. It has been well represented in the Politburo and Central Committee, the apex political policy making bodies. The PLA top brass are also members of the CMC.
The PLA jumped into the Korean War in 1950, barely a year after the Communist revolution, to take on the US-led UN Forces. It fought the adversary to a stalemate, suffering over half a million casualties in the process. In 1962, it defeated the Indian Army in a limited conflict. However, the PLA performed poorly in 1979 during its bid to teach Vietnam a lesson. Thereafter, it went through sustained restructuring and modernization programmes as Defence was one of the’ Four Modernizations’ enunciated by Deng to transform China. However, until recently, the process lacked strategic direction.
Military reforms have been high on President Xi’s agenda since he assumed power four years back. The sense of urgency could be attributed to geopolitical considerations like the US policy of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific Region. The reform process commenced in 2013 with the establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC), with the President as its Chairman. The rationale behind the reforms is twofold; prepare the military for China’s expanding global role, and establish the Party’s firm control over the armed forces. Interestingly, on 30 October 2014, Xi Jinping visited Gutian to address a ‘Military Political Work Conference’. In his speech, he reiterated that “PLA still remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”; exactly what Mao had asserted 85 years earlier.
Thrust of Current Military Reforms
The Chinese military strategic culture believes in exploiting the ‘strategic configuration of power’ to achieve the given objectives. The aim is not annihilation of the adversary but the deployment of resources to gain a position of advantage so that fighting becomes unnecessary. China’s present military doctrine of ‘Local Wars under Informationalised Conditions’ envisages short, swift, military engagements by leveraging technology to achieve political objectives. Joint operations and integrated logistics are essential components of the new doctrine. The current military reforms are doctrine driven and oriented towards capability building and force projection. President Xi has stressed upon the importance of the military adapting to an era of Information based wars.
The theme of China’s ‘Ninth White Paper on National Defence’ published in May 2015 was “Active Defence” with the focus on winning ‘local wars in conditions of modern technology’. It also heralded a major shift in naval strategy from ‘off shore waters defence’ to a combined strategy of ‘offshore waters defence with open sea protection’.
Overall, the main thrust of military reforms is on revamping the systems and structures across the board, i.e., political, strategic and operational levels. At the macro level, the focus is on civil-military integration, jointness and optimisation. The composition of the CMC has been balanced out to remove the previous bias towards the ground forces. The CMC is now responsible for policy formulation, controlling all military assets and higher direction of war. The PLA’s erstwhile four key departments have been replaced by 15 offices/departments, fully integrated into the enlarged CMC, thus ensuring centralised control at the highest level. In the new command structure, the President as the Commander-in-Chief exercises direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operations Center’. Three additional Headquarters, namely Ground Forces, Rocket Force and Strategic Force, have been created.
At the operational level, the erstwhile 17-odd army, air force and naval commands have been reorganized into five ‘theatre commands’ with all the war fighting resources in each command placed under one commander. This will ensure seamless synergy in deploying land, air, naval and strategic assets in a given theatre. In all, 84 corps level organizations have been created including 13 operational corps as well as training and logistics installations. To make the PLA nimbler, the reduction of 300,000 rank and file, mostly from non-combat positions, has been ordered. This will downsize the military to around 1.8 million.
President Xi reviewed an impressive parade at Zhurihe, a newly created training base in Inner Mongolia on 30 July 2017 to mark the PLA’s 90th Anniversary. He exhorted the troops to- “unwaveringly uphold the principle of absolute party leadership of the military, always obey and follow the Party”. The Supreme Commander also spelt out three core tenets for a strong military; confidence, competence and commitment. The mega event served multiple objectives. For the domestic audience, it vindicated the dictum ‘party rules the gun’, projected President Xi as the ‘core’ and ‘Chairman’ (Zhuxi)- in the same league as Mao and Deng, and assured the public of the PLA’s capacity to defeat any threat to national sovereignty. For the international community, it was a demonstration of power projection capability.
Implications
The ongoing reforms in the Chinese Armed Forces are perhaps the biggest military shake up in a generation. Envisaged to be in place before President Xi’s term ends in 2022, the accretion in the war waging potential of the Chinese military will have serious ramifications at both the regional and global levels. While the Communist leadership asserts that the PRC’s rise is peaceful, this is being viewed by neighbouring countries with scepticism because of the former’s assertive conduct in pursuit of national objectives and territorial claims.
For India, the complexity of its relations with China, coupled with an unsettled border, is leading to a pattern of frequent face offs between the two militaries. The PLA’s rapidly increasing capability as well as offensive design are a reality which cannot be wished away. Currently, the structure of India’s higher defence organization is service specific, lacking integration and jointness. The country is yet to formulate a comprehensive ‘limited war’ doctrine. Due to bureaucratic gridlock, the decision making loop is tenuous. In operational terms, seven odd army and air force commands face China’s Western Theatre Command. This configuration will pose enormous coordination challenges in the event of a conflict. While the probability of a major conflict between the two countries remains low, local skirmishes cannot be ruled out, especially in the event of incursions by the PLA in the disputed areas. As limited engagements demand speedy deployment and a flatter logistics chain, inadequate infrastructure in the border areas stands out as a major constraint for India. These shortcomings need to be addressed on priority.
Since 1979, China has not engaged in any major military confrontation. However, it has cleverly pursued the strategy of “nibbling and negotiating” (yi bian tan yi bian da – talking and fighting concurrently). This low cost model in the form of stand-offs like at Doklam or confrontation in the South China Sea are likely to be the new normal. For the realisation of Xi’s ‘China Dream’, Beijing does not have the luxury of indulging in a major conflict.
Coincidently, at present, China faces no external threats unless it creates one. Its main security concerns are more internal; namely economic slowdown, corruption, environmental degradation and the diminishing clout of the CPC. To ensure the CPC’s unchallenged hold, the PLA’s identity as the military of the Party needs to remain sacrosanct. The envisaged process of PLA transformation will be a long drawn out one. It will take some time before the Chinese Armed Forces can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. No doubt, the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the existing ‘balance of power’ dynamics.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Achieving the intended outcomes of the 13th five-year defence plan is critically dependent on the ability of the Ministry of Finance to increase the defence budget by at least 100 per cent from next year onward.
The 13th five-year defence plan (2017-22) envisages an allocation of Rs 26,83,924 crore for the armed forces.1 This includes Rs 13,95,271 crore under the revenue segment and the remainder for defraying the capital expenditure. Given the secrecy surrounding the plans, it is unlikely that much will be known about the outcomes intended to be achieved.
Although other stakeholders were apparently consulted while preparing the plan, in all probability this projection does not include the requirements of the Defence Research & Development Organisation, Ordnance Factories, Coast Guard, Border Roads Organisation, and many other organisations as well as activities carried out under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It certainly does not include the money required for defence pensions.
The total allocation for these aforesaid organisations, activities and defence pensions adds up to Rs 1,36,746.10 crore for the year 2017-18, with defence pensions alone accounting for Rs 85,737.31 crore. Without factoring in any increase in the coming years, the requirement on this count for the plan period will work out to Rs 6,83,730.50 crore.
Assuming that the requirement has been worked out based on immaculate costing and there will be no cost overruns or additional requirements, the total requirement of the armed forces, other organisations and defence pensions would thus add up to Rs 33,67,654.50 crore.
Since the current financial year happens to be the first year of the 13th five-year plan and a total sum of Rs 3,59,851.43 crore already stands allocated for the current year, a sum of Rs 29,07,803.07 crore will be required for the remaining four years at an annual average of Rs 7,26,950.76 crore. This figure may undergo some minor change if additional sums are allocated, or the allocation reduced, at the Revised Estimate (RE) stage.
Achieving the intended outcomes of the plan, therefore, is critically dependent on the ability of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to increase the budget by at least 100 per cent from next year onward, pushing it to around three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is considered by many to be an ideal level of funding. It is, therefore, possible that the plan is actually based on the assumption that allocations totalling three per cent of the GDP will be made available for defence during the 13th defence plan period.
It is not known whether the MoF was asked about the possible level of funding before commencing the planning process. In any case, meeting the projected requirement will require the MoF to revisit its Midterm Fiscal Policy of 2016-17, which estimated the defence expenditure, including its capital component, to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19.2 It will also have to make serious efforts to raise more revenue in the coming years to be able to meet the requirement.
From now on, the discourse on the 13th defence plan will follow a familiar course. To begin with, there is bound to be clamour for an early ‘approval’ of the plan. Though there is no procedural or statutory requirement of seeking the approval of any authority outside the MoD, the expectation will be that the plan will be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for immediate approval.
For the record, only three of the 12 five-year plans so far have been approved by a cabinet committee. The sixth and seventh plans for the periods 1980-85 and 1985-90 were approved by the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), and the ninth plan for the period 1997-2002 was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
Stung by protracted deliberations with the MoF on the size of the 11th defence plan which led nowhere and forced it to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval, the MoD decided to let matters rest after the 12th five year plan was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) within the ministry on April 2, 2012.
But the view that defence plans must be approved by the CCS continues to find strong support in the public discourse, although hardly any information is available on the impact of such approvals on the achievement of the intended outcomes of the plans in the past or, conversely, the impact of non-approval on defence preparedness. The general view is that CCS approval would make it binding on the government to make the projected funds available for spending during the plan period.
The clamour for seeking CCS approval, with strong prodding from Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD), may force the MoD to abandon the precedent set in 2012 and actually seek CCS approval. This will lead to the re-emergence of the problem which had led the MoD in the first place to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval for the 11th plan and instead deciding to approve it within the ministry.
According to the laid down procedure, MoD will need to first consult the MoF on putting up the 13th defence plan for CCS approval. The expectation implicit in this process is that the government will ‘commit’ itself to the projected level of funding, irrespective of any other developments which may have a bearing on its ability to generate additional revenues to meet the commitment. While nothing is impossible, this seems improbable and, consequently, so does the possibility of obtaining CCS approval any time soon, causing disappointment all around.
This might also lead to some feeble questioning of the utility of basing five year or other plans on unrealistic assumptions about how much money is likely to be available for achieving the desired objectives. It does not help either that the plans are not overarching in so far as they do not encompass other organisations which must necessarily play a complementary or supplementary role in achieving the overall objectives.
Defence planning was synchronised with national plans only in 1980 when the sixth defence plan for the period 1980-85 was made coterminous with the sixth national plan covering the same period. It is not clear what purpose was served by this, as there has never been any direct linkage between the two.
While there is no question that planning is an important facet of defence management, the question whether objectives can be achieved only be persisting with the concept of five-year defence plans as a part of the three-tiered structure of defence planning is moot. The entire gamut of defence planning needs to be revisited against the backdrop of the dismantling of the national five-year centralised planning regime and the Niti Aayog – successor of the Planning Commission – vowing to venture into defence. There is no indication that the proposed 13th defence plan takes into account the Niti Aayog’s vision for defence.
A financially pragmatic and outcome oriented plan covering a compressed time span has a better chance of showing results in the short run and setting the stage for a long haul towards achieving the highest level of defence preparedness. It is time that financial viability, including the ways and means of augmenting financial resources, is recognised as an inalienable factor in planning, however abhorrent that idea may be.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Maximum autonomy may be accorded in ethnic, cultural and developmental realms to autonomous councils for all Naga areas in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and even Assam, through suitable amendment to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.
The Framework Agreement for Naga settlement was initialled on 3 August 2015 by Thuingaleng Muivah, leader of the Nationalist Council of Nagalim (Issac Swu– Thuingaleng Muivah) (NSCN: IM) and R.N. Ravi, the Central government`s interlocutor on the Naga issue. Even after two years, the framework has not led to a final outcome, although Ravi and the Central government have been working off-camera, painstakingly, with the various stakeholders. In the meantime, NSCN(IM) leader Issac Swu has died and so has S. S. Khaplang, a Hemi Naga, citizen of Myanmar, and leader of the other major Naga rebel outfit, NSCN (Khaplang). Their deaths have created a void in the old guard insurgent leadership.
Violence perpetrated by the NSCN factions has remained contained, although their collection of levies from civil society, business persons and various establishments continue. This has largely been due to the ceasefire in force in Nagaland since August 1997 with NSCN(IM) and later with the NSCN(K) from September 2001. However, after the NSCN(K)`s unilateral abrogation of the ceasefire in April 2015 and the attacks by its cadres on the Indian Army and its allied forces in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh in June 2015, the outfit has remained outside the ceasefire arrangements. But there is an undercurrent of feeling in the state among the people at large that the NSCN(K) should be eventually brought within the fold of the Agreement when its contents are finalised.
In Naga society, in Nagaland in general, and in the contiguous areas inhabited by Nagas such as the hill districts of Manipur and the north-eastern areas of Arunachal, there is a yearning for peace and a final settlement of the issue concerning their emotional, ethnic and socio-political identity and the content of its integration with the Indian Union. It would be judicious and politically farsighted for the Central government to consummate the Agreement at the earliest, in any event before the forthcoming state assembly elections in February 2018. If the Agreement does not attain finality in the next six months, political uncertainty will set in, with multi-faceted ramifications from the internal security and geopolitical perspectives.
A situation of political drift is already prevailing in Nagaland because of factionalism within the ruling Naga Peoples` Front (NPF). Large, violent, public demonstrations and arson were witnessed in February 2017 because of the T. R. Zeliang-led NPF government`s decision to reserve seats for women in local bodies. The public upsurge was against what was viewed as the imposition of a system that was violative of local Naga institutions, customs and traditions. The inability of the state government to deal with the situation was an ominous indicator of the failure of constitutional authority and rule of law. Such a milieu could not but have affected, even if indirectly and temporarily, the progress towards accommodation of the NSCN groups in a broad-based settlement under the Framework Agreement. The political situation has become further fluid in the wake of change in the state’s political leadership, with Zeliang re-assuming the chief ministership.
An early final settlement of the Naga issue will stem the existing drift in governance in Nagaland. Moreover, it would signify acceptance and the assuaging of the emotional disconnect which had developed among a substantial segment of the Naga people, give them political space and lead to a strengthening of the accommodative attributes of the Indian polity. According to Ravi, the Framework Agreement respects the Naga aspirations of recognition of their uniqueness, thereby implying an acceptance of their unique history, ethnicity and culture and related socio-economic attributes. It is now a question of formalising this recognition within the Indian Constitution and institutions of governance.
The success of the Agreement will, however, hinge on not disturbing the existing provincial territorial disposition and retaining the present inter-state boundaries in the region. Maximum autonomy may be accorded in ethnic, cultural and developmental realms to autonomous councils for all Naga areas in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and even Assam, through suitable amendment to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The extent of autonomy may be derived from constitutional provisions and not based on state legislature-enacted statutes in order to prevent subsequent tinkering by the state governments concerned as per their political compulsions. Such an arrangement will obviate situations of the nature which arose after three controversial bills on citizenship, registration of shops and establishments, etc. were passed by the Manipur legislature without consultation with the hill councils of the state in 2016, leading to a huge agitation in the Naga and Kuki dominated hill areas of the state. Adequate fiscal powers also need to be devolved to such councils as part of a final Naga settlement, with arrangements for direct transfer of funds to the autonomous councils for Naga areas. This could be a unique arrangement, distinct from the policies being followed by the present Central government since 2015-16 for maximum transfers through the state budgets as against the earlier system of devolution to organisations executing programmes. Without such direct devolution, it may be difficult for Naga autonomous councils to effectively govern their areas.
Reckoning the unique history and legacy of the Nagas, a tribal cultural collective body in the form of a pan-Naga Hoho could be constituted under an act of parliament. This body would take care of the interests of the Nagas of Nagaland as well of Nagas living elsewhere in the country. A constitutional amendment may be necessary to empower the Central legislature to legislate such a body virtually as a Concurrent List subject. The apex Hoho may have representation of Nagas from all Naga areas, i.e., even beyond those residing in Nagaland. Logically, a Central law would be appropriate for the purpose. The jurisdiction of the Hoho will have to carefully crafted and be mutually exclusive of administrative and legislative jurisdictions of the states in which Nagas live, so as to avoid conflictual situations between the Hoho and the states concerned. The Hoho could be constitutionally empowered as the supreme advisory body on Naga cultural matters to both the Centre and the states. If such an overarching Hoho can be established with Central support, it will go a long way towards assuring Nagas of protection and sustenance to their ethnic and cultural identity. Though such an arrangement could be accommodated within the constitutional ambit, there may be repercussions if similar demands were to be raised by other tribal communities similarly spread over more than one state. However, this could be a manageable demand and may not detract from the basic features of the Constitution.
If the basics of Naga autonomy and their unique past can be agreed upon between the Central government and the NSCN (IM), the issue of disarming the insurgents and accounting of their weaponry may not pose much of a problem. An arrangement on the pattern of the disarming of the Maoists in Nepal, with some being absorbed in the state forces after re-training, and the rest being enskilled for civil professions with state support, could be adopted with modifications as per exigencies of the local situation. Absorption of the re-trained insurgent cadres in the Assam Rifles, a Central force manned by different tribals and having a long history of internal security duties in the north-east, is a viable option.
A sensitive issue to be resolved as part of the Agreement to be consummated will be the status and welfare of Myanmarese Nagas. The government of Aung San Su Kyi will have to be on board the Naga settlement, at least tacitly. This is because, there are nearly 120,000 Nagas in the self-administered zone in Myanmar, adjacent to Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. NSCN (K) has a substantial support base among the Nagas of these areas. For success of the Agreement, some arrangement would have to be worked out that allows trade and intercourse as well as cultural connectivity between Nagas on either side of the India-Myanmar border. Sealing or hard-fencing of the border, particularly along the Nagaland segment, will adversely affect the livelihood and welfare of Myanmarese Nagas whose socio-economic status is inferior to that of their brethren in India. As part of the final Agreement, the need for instituting a border regime in concert with Myanmar that promotes the welfare of the Nagas of the region, and particularly trade and social exchanges, may also not be lost sight of.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the GCC crisis seems to be de-escalating, there is no end in sight as yet.
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt had listed 13 demands on June 23, 2017, warning that there would be serious consequences if Qatar failed to yield by July 2.1 Qatar rejected the ultimatum and the four countries have not yet carried out their threats. Instead, they have softened their stand, vaguely signaling that it might be enough if Qatar were to accede to ‘Six Principles’. In short, there has been no escalation and we can clearly see a degree of de-escalation.
The June 23 demands were handed over in writing to Kuwait, the mediator, which then passed it on to Qatar. Qatar leaked the text of the demands to the media in order to draw the attention of the international community to their unreasonableness. That was a smart diplomatic move on the part of Doha which has so far handled this crisis with admirable maturity and logic, scrupulously avoiding any action that can spoil its case. The world came to realize that the four countries wanted Qatar to surrender its sovereignty not just in the realm of foreign policy but also align its social, political and economic policies with that of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
Change in US policy
The four countries struck a fortnight after President Donald Trump’s elaborately choreographed visit to Riyadh. The effort was intended to project Saudi Arabia as the undisputed leader of the Muslim world. Initially, Trump tweeted his support for the move against Qatar and came in the way of his Secretaries of Defense and State who wanted to mediate and resolve the crisis. The two Secretaries finally prevailed and Trump stopped publicly supporting Saudi Arabia through tweets or otherwise. The State Department publicly rebuked Saudi Arabia on June 20 for resorting to an embargo against Qatar without justification. That public rebuke probably compelled the four countries to come out with their rather badly drafted set of demands three days later.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who must have met the GCC monarchs in his previous avatar as CEO of Exxon Mobile, visited Kuwait and Qatar on July 11-12. He signed an agreement with Qatar for preventing the flow of funds to support terrorism. Tillerson said that the two countries would work together ‘to interrupt, disable terror financing flows and intensify counterterrorism activities globally’.2
Tillerson then went to Saudi Arabia where he met King Salman and the foreign ministers of the four countries ranged against Qatar. The meeting resulted in a statement welcoming the US-Qatar agreement, but made it clear that there was no question of easing the embargo till Qatar did more. In short, while there was no breakthrough, the four countries got a clear message that the US had taken a stand for an early resolution of the crisis – a position that favored Qatar.
The European Reaction
Qatar received diplomatic support from European countries as well. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel declared that the 13 demands were ‘very provocative’ as they impinged on Qatar’s sovereignty. It may be recalled that Qatar’s Foreign Minister had visited Berlin on June 9 to seek German support. France also extended similar support. And the UK, predictably, took its cue from the US, with Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visiting Kuwait and Qatar, without making much of an impact.
The Climb-down by the Four Countries
Finding that the initial support from President Trump had disappeared, with Washington and the major European powers making it clear that Qatar was being unjustly treated, the foreign ministers of the four countries met in Cairo on July 5 and issued a declaration of ‘Six Principles’. These are:
The declaration expressed appreciation to His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait, ‘for his efforts and endeavor to resolve the crisis with the State of Qatar and expressed sorrow over negligence, lack of seriousness and the negative response received by the State of Qatar to deal with the roots of the problem and not ready to reconsider its policies and practices, reflecting a lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation’.3
Given that there was no explicit commitment to remove the blockade if Qatar abided by these terms, the only response these new ‘principles’ elicited from Qatar was that it was prepared to sit down and talk once the blockade is lifted.
Qatar’s Response to the Blockade
Qatar’s diplomatic response has been a study in resilience, imperturbability, and patience. It has chosen not to retaliate in kind. UAE continues to get natural gas from Qatar, an important source for its electricity and the power to run its aluminum plant. Doha has not expelled 300,000 Egyptians who continue to work in its territory. Qatar has constituted a Compensation Claims Committee to consolidate claims from Qatar Airways, banks, and others who have been affected by the blockade.
In the on-going war of attrition, the four countries have realized, presumably by now, that Qatar will not surrender. Nevertheless, Qatar would obviously like to see an early end of the blockade. The next GCC summit is due in Kuwait on December 5-6. The onus is on Kuwait and the US to find a ‘face-saving’ formula to resolve the situation. While the crisis seems to be de-escalating, there is no end in sight as yet.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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