Boko Haram Gathers Strength as Nigeria Prepares For Elections
Anand Kumar
December 11, 2018
Boko Haram’s resurgence might affect the holding of credible polls in parts of northeast Nigeria in the upcoming February 2019 general elections.
One of the most notorious terrorist organizations in the world, the Boko Haram, has intensified its terror activities in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. Since July 2018, there have been at least 17 attacks on military bases in Nigeria, almost all of them in the region around Lake Chad. The Islamic State (IS) claimed its militants had killed 118 people in five operations in Nigeria and Chad between November 15 and 21. On November 18, in a daring attack, the IS-allied Boko Haram jihadists killed at least 43 soldiers when they overran a base in Metele village near the border with Niger. The survivors however put the death toll at more than a hundred. The Boko Haram has reportedly taken over two towns in this area, with the Nigerian military suffering huge damages.
The resurgence of the Boko Haram is especially glaring as Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari declared the terrorist organization as ‘technically defeated’, after assuming power in 2015. Even in January 2018, Buhari insisted that Boko Haram has been defeated. With the Boko Haram intensifying its activities by attacking villages and military bases in the Lake Chad region, it has become clear that the terrorist organization has not been weakened. On the contrary, it appears to have only gathered strength. Now questions are being asked as to how a virtually defeated terrorist organization is able to cause so much damage to the Nigerian security forces and its people.
Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. Yusuf was captured by the Nigerian police following the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising. He was summarily executed in public view outside the police headquarters in Maiduguri. Police officials had initially claimed that Yusuf was shot while trying to escape. The group has been led by Abu bakar Shekau since 2009, and the terrorist organization has been active since then in northeastern Nigeria. The influence of Boko Haram has gradually spread to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In Nigeria alone, more than 27,000 people have been killed over the past nine years, and the violence has forced out some 1.8 million people from their homes. One of the most notorious acts of the Boko Haram was the abduction of Chibok girls in April 2014. The group advocates Sharia law and rejects Western education.
The insurgency led by the Boko Haram is especially strong in the area known as the Lake Chad region. This is a strategic area where the borders of four countries – Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, converge. Since 2015, these four countries have been collaborating militarily as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). After the recent upsurge in Boko Harm violence, leaders of all four countries met in the Chadian capital on 29 November 2018 to devise a joint response.
Boko Haram split in August 2016, when IS supported a group of militants who wanted to part ways with Shekau. They crowned Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new governor of Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA). Shekau has not accepted this change and continues to command militants loyal to him under the group’s previous name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). The Shekau faction of Boko Haram is notorious for using suicide bombers to attack military and civilian targets.
When President Buhari came to power in 2015, there was lot of hope that he would improve the economy and deal effectively with the extremism. Hope on both these fronts seems to be vanishing as Nigeria prepares for elections in February 2019. The economy of Nigeria largely dependent on export of oil was in turmoil after the international oil prices fell in 2016.
The upsurge in the Boko Haram violence has forced the Nigerian government to improve security forces deployment. There are now about 7000 personnel deployed in the destabilized Borno State. There have also been frequent changes in commanders of the force handling insurgency. In the latest change, the Federal Government of Nigeria ordered Chief of Army staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, to return to the northeast to oversee the fight against Boko Haram. He is expected to stay there until Boko Haram insurgents are crushed. The federal government has also instructed Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Abayomi Olonisakin, and Gen. Buratai, to overhaul the conduct of major operations in the country. These include Operation Lafiya Dole in the northeast, Operation Delta in the Niger Delta, Operation Sharan Daji in Zamfara and Katsina states, and Operation Awatse in the Southwest. President Buhari has also ordered the immediate procurement of critical equipment for the armed forces.
While Buhari has been criticised for having termed Boko Haram as a ‘ technically defeated’ outfit, he is also accused of providing poor training and inappropriate weapons to the army resulting in massive casualties. Some are even accusing the President of purposely doing this so that military could be discredited, to prevent any possible coup d’etat. In the 55 years of Nigeria ’s post-colonial history, the country has been ruled by army generals for 40 years.
Boko Haram has proved to be much more resilient than Nigerian authorities had anticipated. Its resurgence might affect the holding of credible polls in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in February 2019. These areas are too volatile and vulnerable to the Boko Haram banditry. Nigeria needs a long term strategy to defeat Boko Haram as the latest round of violence indicates that the terrorist organization is expected to survive beyond the February 2019 elections. In the near term, if the Nigerian state is able to check Boko Haram’s present activities by the increased deployment of its security forces and holds credible elections in the troubled areas, that itself would be a big achievement.
Dr Anand Kumar is currently Visiting Professor and Chair (India Studies) at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Renaissance and Reticence in India’s North-South Connectivity Platform
Philip Reid
November 30, 2018
The distraction of Chabahar’s questionable economic rationale and the embellishment of a centuries-old fascination with Suez alternatives, whilst entirely logical from a Muscovite perspective, must cede priority to New Delhi’s immediate interests in its own strategic backyard
A Tale of Three Cities
The seasonal transition has seen a renewed sense of impetus within the diplomatic milieu of India’s Eurasian connectivity agenda. The greatly anticipated trilateral meeting of the Coordination Council of the Chabahar Agreement finally took place on October 23rd in Tehran and committed to convene a follow-on meeting before the end of the year.1 This encouraging development supervenes the first tripartite meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of India, Iran and Afghanistan in Kabul on September 11th and a timely conference on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that inaugurated this year’s annual International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA) World Congress on September 25th. That the conference was held in New Delhi ahead of visits by Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was also symbolic and both occasions were availed of to reinforce mutual acknowledgement of historical linkages: economic, political and, in the case of Uzbekistan, cultural; as well as the prevailing spirit of connectivity that is shaping contemporary regional relations in Central and South Asia. This seasonal effusion of dialogue has, however, not been substantiated by material progress along the multiple courses of the INSTC, and the renaissance of India’s medieval commercial axis with Central Asia remains constrained by the shadow of post-Soviet reticence.
The abstraction of a ‘North-South Corridor’ is often collocated, at least in the context of Indian regional strategy, with New Delhi’s $500 million commitment to the Chabahar port development in the Sistan-Baluchistan region of Iran, located outside the Strait of Hormuz on the Makran Coast and widely understood as a counter-weight to China’s conspicuous development of Gwadar in neighbouring Pakistan. Indeed, the route from Chabahar to Sarakhs on the Turkmen border, the most appropriate crossing for onwards transit to Uzbekistan, was presented by the Iranian delegation on September 25 as one of several integral to the INSTC vision.2 Indian commentators too discuss hinterland connections emanating from Chabahar and those from Bandar Abbas, the de facto Persian Gulf hub for the INSTC, in synchronic terms.3 Bureaucratic equivocation however, has, so far choked the release of funds that would otherwise serve as not least a symbolic physical milestone for Eurasian connectivity in the Indian mould, but also as an immediate and necessary catalyst for the realization of a largely assumptive trade corridor. The Chabahar-Zahedan rail link continues to remain suspended in the early stages of fruition, awaiting Indian fulfilment of its track-laying obligations. Perhaps more significantly however, funds have yet to be released for the procurement of rail-mounted gantry cranes for the Shahed Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, and an immediate opportunity to reassure commercial stakeholders by meeting a latent transhipment demand in, for example, Iranian cement, is being forfeited at the Indian-operated facility, which has seen little throughput since a showcase delivery of wheat and pulses to Afghanistan in 2017.
Not in My Backyard
When confronted on this issue, political actors in New Delhi exhibit a reflexive deference to a sanctions-related alibi and the impasse is generating frustration among stakeholders on both sides of the Arabian Sea. Indeed, Massoud Roshagi, Iran's Deputy Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, chided earlier this year that: "It is expected that India takes immediate necessary measures in this regard if its cooperation and engagement in Chabahar port is of a strategic nature".4 Whilst continuing uncertainty surrounding the annulment of JCPOA sanctions relief, an issue directly addressed by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale in Kabul, had, until mid-November, offered a degree of explanatory power, a second, more oblique perspective also finds credence when acknowledging India’s historic hesitation in implementing an assertive foreign policy in the strategic backyard of its erstwhile Cold War ally, Moscow. It has been observed in past commentaries that it was this hesitation by New Delhi, immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union, 5 that resulted in India’s persuasive historical stake in Central Asia, one with a clear precedent, being marginalized by the more assertive track one proactivity of first the European Union and the United States, and, more recently, China. Indeed, perhaps testifying to Moscow’s pervasive influence at both ends of the North-South axis, the Central Asian Republics’ calls for substantive ties with India - Islam Karimov’s first visit outside the Commonwealth of Independent States was to New Delhi, have gone largely unheeded since independence. It was only a concern that Pakistan might exploit this diplomatic vacuum to solicit support for its nuclear aspirations and on the Kashmir issue, which finally prompted New Delhi into recognizing this disjuncture, after more than a decade of hesitation.6
Whilst the round of successive convocations in Kabul, New Delhi and Tehran may give disillusioned observers some cause for optimism, the contrast between trilateral signalling and the sobering ground reality on September 25 at the most high-profile business forum on North-South connectivity to date, initiated at the behest of Moscow and dominated by Russian transport executives, reveals a seldom acknowledged divergence between the strategic ambition underpinning India’s commitment to Chabahar and the broader INSTC narrative. Whilst the emphasis on the commercial bottom-line provides a frame of reference for the INSTC’s official aspirations and, at least partially, explains the apparent acceptance of the Bandar Abbas-Astara corridor as the primus inter pares of North-South connectivity in Southern Eurasia, it also belies the conflicting geopolitical rationales that underpin, on the one hand, the prodigious scope of ‘Mumbai-Moscow’, and, on the other, the spirit of the Ashgabat Agreement to which India acceded in 2016.
This multi-modal transport agreement, to which Russia is not a signatory, symbolizes more direct ambitions for linking Central Asia with India’s near seas. It is this latter component that is best given expression by shared Indo-Uzbek objectives in Afghanistan and the proposed Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad transport corridor – somewhat embryonic but nevertheless an existential problem for the Russian position in Central Asia, already diluted by the construction of heterodox transcontinental infrastructures, the Sino-Turkmen Pipeline for example. That Mr Mirziyoyev’s visit also, on this occasion, portended neither Uzbekistan’s accession to the INSTC nor a formal acknowledgement of its inexorable interest in the success of Chabahar, is also revealing. Whilst the semantic embroidery of bilateral and trilateral declarations appears to ensure all parties a seat at the table, commercial representatives from Afghanistan and Uzbekistan were noticeably absent from the INSTC conference.
From Beneath the Veil of Sanctions
It has long been tacitly acknowledged in circles close to the project, that Indian operations at Chabahar are less vulnerable to targeted sanctions than other areas of cooperation with the Iranian regime. This is largely on account of their geographical and institutional aloofness from Tehran, as well as the immense potential the port offers in respect of shared international priorities on Afghanistan’s reconstruction, an amenable phrase but one nevertheless stipulated in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012. These expectations have now been validated by the US State Department’s granting of an exception with respect to both the development of Chabahar and the Zahedan rail link. This follows an extension of the JCPOA sanctions waiver on Indian oil purchases from Iran and both have rightly been interpreted as positive markers for a buoyant episode in Indo-American relations. As the year-end now approaches therefore, the use of sanctions-related extenuation to mask what may ultimately be revealed as vestiges of New Delhi’s strategic trepidation will become less credible as transactional clarity on Trump-era foreign policy within the US-Iran-India triangle is more forthcoming. In a connectivity landscape where other regional actors have demonstrated a willingness to contemplate losses approaching tens of billions of dollars in order to shape the contours of transcontinental trade corridors in their own interest, New Delhi’s apparent qualm in the context of significantly more modest capital outlays appears partially ingenuous and partially a clear manifestation of its most dependable bilateral relationship.
India is a nation more favourably situated than most to benefit from the maritime economy and the globalization of Central Asian trade and it was with this in mind that a thitherto inviable commercial proposition received political patronage almost two decades ago. The distraction of Chabahar’s questionable economic rationale and the embellishment of a centuries-old fascination with Suez alternatives, whilst entirely logical from a Muscovite perspective, must cede priority to New Delhi’s immediate interests in its own strategic backyard and a pragmatic consensus on the very real atrophy that will result from the perpetuation of Indian ambivalence along its now heavily-marketed Central Asian axis. This is necessary in order to overcome the bureaucratic apathy that is delaying the fulfilment of India’s obligations under the 2016 Trilateral Agreement and outright leadership on the Makran Coast. Furthermore, now that one source of ambiguity has been surmounted ad interim, New Delhi must exploit the current momentum and place greater urgency on leveraging its robust bilateral relationships with Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, to solicit a symbolic stakeholder in Chabahar. This would confirm, unequivocally, the port’s Central Asian orientation and eliminate a contradiction absent from other regional connectivity initiatives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Pourbarkhordari A. (2018) INSTC Transit via Iran, The Tarkib Transit Company, Presentation: Conference on International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC)FIATA World Congress, Download available at: https://www.fiata2018.org/presentation.php
Another Capitulation and another Win for the TLYP in Pakistan
Yaqoob-ul-Hassan
November 22, 2018
The challenge that the TLYP poses to Pakistan’s internal stability is even more dangerous than the threat of terrorism.
Ever since the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) assumed power in August 2018, it has been struggling with many challenges. The most pressing of these has been the growing financial crisis. However, an internal challenge appears to have overtaken the economic challenge for the time being. This has come in the form of the Supreme Court’s verdict on Asia Bibi blasphemy case. Incidentally, it was the protests around this case, originating in 2010, that had led to the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri which in turn resulted in the formation of the Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYP), a politico-religious formation of the Barelvi community.
The TYLP has, since then, come to dominate religious party politics in Pakistan. It debuted a new political party – the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)- in this year’s election, coming in as the third largest party in terms of votes polled – well ahead of the Pakistan Peoples Party even though it did not get as many seats. It has remained buoyant ever since and has been able to rally around people in large numbers to pressurise the government to fulfil its various demands. So why do governments repeatedly capitulate to its demands? And what does the TLP ‘s stunning electoral success mean for the politics of religion in general and future of Barelvi politics in particular?
Post-2001, most of the sectarian organisations belonging to the Deobandi school of thought and Shia minority were banned or put under terror watch list. However, the Barelvi-backed organisations were seen as moderate compared to other groups and were even promoted by the state so as to keep the other sects in check. They enjoyed the patronage of both the Pakistani state and the international community.
The rise of Barelvi politics in Pakistan is not a sudden phenomenon. For the most part, it has remained apolitical and peaceful sect, generally supportive of the state. Over the years, there was a growing political awakening within the sect as it was felt that it was losing its influence and appeal to other sects, especially to the Deobandis. In the sectarian turf wars with other sects, the Barelvis found themselves on the receiving end. Most of their top leaders were killed in a suicide attack carried out by suicide bombers allegedly from the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which ripped through a congregation of the 12th Rabiul Awwal at the Nishtar Park in April 2006. Since then there have been many unsuccessful attempts to bring unity within their ranks as there are many groups within the Barelvi sect who compete for political and religious influence. Developments in 2015 changed the political fortunes of the Barelvis’. The first development was Mumtaz Qadri’s hanging. Mumtaz Qadri, a Barelvi, had assassinated Punjab Governor Salman Taseer. Many believed the Qadri had upheld the path ordained by the prophet by killing Taseer and he was even showered with rose petals when he was produced in the court during the murder trial.
The TLYP was founded in 2015 in Karachi at the same place where its top leadership was killed by Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a handicapped cleric who had been convicted under the 4th schedule of anti-terrorist law for his hate speeches and anti-state activities. Rizvi exploited the popular sentiments that arose after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri. Subsequently, he successfully weaponised the blasphemy issue and brought the fractious Barelvi school together.
The first sign of the Barelvi resurgence came in the form of NA-120 (Lahore) and NA-4 (Peshawar) by-elections held in September and October 2017 respectively. The TLYR supported candidate, Azhar Hussain Rizvi, stood at third position with 7,130 votes in NA-120. In NA-4, TLYP’s Muhammad Shafiq Amini got 9,934 votes. Although, they didn’t win any seat, the percentage of votes they secured emboldened them to stand for the General Elections in 2018. The TLP fielded around 259 candidates for the National Assembly elections held in July 2018 and polled 2.2 million votes, nearly half of the Islamist vote bank. It drew away votes mostly from the PML-N, PTI and the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) — an alliance of religio-political parties that had emerged on the country’s political horizon by contesting the 2002 general elections. Many analysts have also described TLP as a spoiler party which managed to draw away right-wing votes from the other mainstream parties such as PML-N and PTI. The table below will help us to understand how TLYP emerged as a significant spoiler in the last general elections.
Source: Ahmed Yousf, “What is behind the Sudden Rise of TLP, Dawn, August 5, 2018.
The second development which encouraged the TLYP leadership was the outcome of the Faizabad dharna in 2017. This dharna was led by the Rizvi on the issue of changes in the oath of the electoral candidates in the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (the finality of Prophethood) clause. Initially, the then government of the PML-N did not cave into the pressure. They used force to quell the protesters. But the police action only multiplied the government’s problems amid a worsening law and order situation in Islamabad and other cities. The government called in the army to disperse hundreds of activists of a religious group camping at an arterial traffic intersection of the federal capital which they had occupied for more than three weeks. But the army refused to come to the rescue of the government; instead the army Chief Gen. Bajwa called the then prime minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and advised him to handle the Faizabad sit-in peacefully as “violence is not in the national interest”1. This led to the resignation of then federal Law Minister Zahid Hamid2. It is the military and the intelligence agencies which finally mediated an end to the Faizabad dharna.
The third development the TLYP touts as a triumph was the cancellation of the blasphemous cartoon competition in the Netherlands by the Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders. The TLYP led the protest in front of the Punjab and National Assembly against the cartoon competition.
The fourth was forcing the Imran Khan government to backtrack from its decision to appoint Dr Atif Mian who is an Ahmadiyya to the Economic Advisor Council (EAC).
The fifth was the recent Supreme Court decision which acquitted Asia Bibi who was serving a death sentence for the blasphemy. Soon after the Supreme Court decision, protesters thronged on the streets, in response to a call given by the Khadim Rizvi in which other religious organisations also participated. Rizvi even called for the assassination of Supreme Court judges and mutiny within the ranks of Pakistan military in his speeches. Imran Khan addressed the nation after meeting with army chief and said that state would not surrender to the mob and threatened the protesters that they would be dealt with force. However, with no respite in sight to the demonstration and lacklustre support from the Army High command, the present government also finally agreed to negotiate with Rizvi. The government agreed to accept the TLYP's demands to put Asia Bibi in the Exit Control list till the review petition filed in the Supreme Court is heard3. The Imran government may have survived but the state had lost another battle to the extremists.
Conclusion
The challenge that the TLYP poses to Pakistan’s internal stability is even more dangerous than the threat of terrorism. The TLYP has successfully created a narrative for itself as the defender of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic identity’ They have sympathisers in mainstream political parties, bureaucracy and in the armys rank and file. Pakistan has achieved some tactical gains and succeeded in creating a counter-narrative to deal with terrorism but would find it tough and challenging to create and take the ownership of any narrative which will go against the Barelvi resurgence. Even if the Pakistan state is sincere to implement the much-debated National Action Plan to curb extremism, it will still take decades to lower the current level of extremist feelings and over religiosity currently existing in Pakistani society and polity. The state also has to make sure that it stops appeasing extremists and revisit its policy of mainstreaming sectarian and terrorist organisations. For now, the TLYR has the upper hand through its strategy of implementing its political agenda through street protests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Revisiting Aadhaar System: Post the Supreme Court Verdict
Kritika Roy
November 02, 2018
One understands that long term benefits of Aadhaar actually outweighs many concerns. However, adequate norms need to be laid down from collection to retention of biometric data, in addition to formulating strong data protection and privacy laws.
Aadhaar system has been stuck in a cauldron of debates and deliberations since its inception in 2009. Centre’s flagship Aadhaar scheme was advocated as a tool to initiate and improvise on welfare administration scheme while eliminating corruption. However, many also saw it as a means of creating a “surveillance state” and thereby “invasion of privacy”. With the new verdict passed by the Supreme Court of India on September 26, 2018, Aadhaar project has been declared as constitutionally valid, but with conditions attached. This has set the ball rolling for a new set of argument.
Decoding the verdict
Aadhaar card is must for availing welfare schemes and government subsidies.Staunch supporters of Aadhaar see it as a means of empowering the poor and marginalised sections of the country while eliminating corruption. On the contrary, many analysts are of the opinion that Aadhaar has also become a major reason for the “exclusion” of citizens to the basic government provided amenities.1 Though such exclusions are in no way targeted or deliberate, but loopholes in the Aadhaar system often create such scenarios.
During the Aadhaar registration process, individuals are required to authenticate their fingerprints and iris on a machine that determines their identity. This sole identity gives them access to their “entitlements”. The verification process for instance in the case of public distribution system (PDS) also requires electricity, internet and connectivity for accessing the centralised database, in addition to the fact that biometric details of an individual should match during availing of services. In case the fingerprints fail to match at the time of availing of facilities like ration, a person may be denied the same.
Absolute faith on the biometric system is based on a misplaced assumption that human body parts do not age. Testing by International Biometric Group highlights that “over time, many biometric systems are prone to incorrectly rejecting a substantial percentage of users. Verifying a user immediately after enrolment is not highly challenging to biometric systems. However, after six weeks, testing shows that some systems' error rates increase ten-fold.”2
Similarly, it is mandatory to link Aadhaar number to the registry number in the public distribution database, otherwise amenities provided by the government stands cancelled. Many such incidents where individuals were denied welfare or pension services have come to limelight, especially people suffering from leprosy, engaged in manual labour and those who are genetically predisposed to not having fingerprints. There were reports that alternate means of identification are being done to accommodate the ones who lack proper biometrics.3 Like facial recognitions or iris scanners.4 However, it is still not clear how such alternatives are being operationalised. For instance, leprosy patients are now being exempted from linking Aadhaar card. But then question arises, can all verification facilities vouch to have in place the required technical infrastructure that allows other means of verification? If yes, then what are they? Even if it is a process of offline verification, same has not been clearly laid down.
Aadhaar card is mandatory for ITR and allotment of PAN. According to the recent verdict, Aadhaar is no more mandatory for opening a bank account but linking the Permanent Account Number (PAN) to Aadhaar remains vital to filing the Income Tax Return (ITR).
Schools and entrance exams like NEET, CBSE, UGC do not require Aadhaar card. There were also concerns that Aadhaar was preventing many students from applying and receiving scholarships. Though the Supreme Court verdict has eliminated the need of Aadhaar for above purposes, there is persistent skepticism that in the absence of Aadhaar card the admission process may become more cumbersome, such that the individual might end up taking an Aadhaar.
Section 57 of Aadhaar Act permitting private entities to use Aadhaar data for verification purposes struck down as unconstitutional. This basically means that no company or private entity can anymore seek Aadhaar details. Commercial banks, e-wallets (such as Paytm, Mobikwik, etc.) and payments bank can no longer insist on Know Your Customer (KYC) verification using Aadhaar. The telecom service providers too cannot seek Aadhaar details for verification purposes. This is significant in the wake of increasing cases of financial crime, especially due to Aadhaar’s expanding tentacles in the telecom and other cellular and payment related sectors. One such recent incident was the way Airtel’s payment bank routed approximately Rs. 190 crores to its payment bank accounts, wherein some accounts were opened and force-seeded with Aadhaar without the informed consent of the customers.5 There was a lot of speculation about the corporate use of Aadhaar as it was seen to be opening up doors for data mining, data misuse and profit making.
Section 47 of Aadhaar Act stating criminal complaints for data breach can be filed only by UIDAI struck down as unconstitutional. Initially,the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was the sole authority that could initiate action in case of misuse of Aadhaar or data breach, and the individuals had to reach out to UIDAI to file a complaint. Striking the section down means an individual could directly book a complaint with the concerned authority rather than approaching UIDAI and waiting for it to take action.
Much ado about something
Despite Supreme Court’s laudable verdict, there still are issues that need to be addressed. Of particular concern are issues pertaining to data protection, limitations of biometric identification, and personal data mining. In the absence of a clear framework, there is also the lingering fear of state’s ability to access databases to map the data of an individual at the backend and create a “digital image”. Linking of Aadhaar card actually brings together different aspects of life like travel accounts, personal information, employment history, bank accounts, etc. Thus, integrating disjointed data silos enable tracking and profiling, i.e., invading privacy in many ways.
Initially with Section 57 in place, Aadhaar was seen as a project conflating state power and corporate power at the cost of citizen’s privacy. The situation was grave as it facilitated corporate surveillance to go hand in hand with state surveillance. This would have enabled targeted advertising and profit reaping. Now with the invalidation of Section 57, the question that remains is what happens to the data of individuals already registered? Though the government has issued orders to several telecom companies to submit plans to delink Aadhaar data associated with user profiles,6 but then would there be a mechanism of verification that the data was deleted and no backups were taken in the process?
Another aspect that has not been clearly brought out is the credibility of alternate procedures of verification. What if they are more cumbersome for people who do not have an Aadhaar card? Convenience over security would definitely be a dilemma. However, government has started taking stringent measures to ensure security. For instance, masking Aadhaar number while authenticating for a third party.7 This is done by generating Aadhaar Virtual ID, a 16-digit random number, which is mapped to a person’s real Aadhaar number and can be used whenever authentication or KYC services are performed. It remains to be seen how many people would actually adopt the “Virtual ID” or understand its significance.
Another issue that came to the forefront was that of ghost or fake ration cards. Many a time the link between Aadhaar number and the ration card could not be validated. In such scenarios, the individual was denied basic amenities. Government claimed successfully tracing fake ration cards but many a time there were genuine cases of exclusion passed off as savings due to Aadhaar. This has also led to cases of death due to starvation.8 Corrective measures in this regard are yet to take course. When talking about corruption the quantity fraud is not being factored in. Quantity fraud translates that a person may be forced to sign on something that he/she might not have received of the same quantity that the person is entitled to. However, one cannot also ignore the fact that in many places Aadhaar has actually replaced the middlemen.9
A long way to go
The Supreme Court verdict, in response to petitions filed against the ‘draconian’ nature of Aadhaar, has been a mixed bag. Concerns around the Aadhaar project have broadly been centred on “welfare and privacy”. These have included questions of “surveillance, access to basic rights, liberty and data commercialisation.” The most welcome part of the verdict is the scrapping of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, which allowed private entities to use Aadhaar for verification purposes. Far too many people have been duped into opening accounts in mobile phone payment banks while being forced to conduct an e-KYC procedure with Aadhaar for their SIM (subscriber identity module) cards.
However, the verdict has still left many open-ended questions. For the state to be able to build trust among the citizens and ensure that individuals have the sole control of the data and no misuse could take place, it is pertinent to push for a system that protects people and their data and does not exclude the most vulnerable.
Biometrics via Aadhaar is an untested territory. Biometrics as a foundation for Aadhaar, without addressing the security concerns raised by people, paves the way for more doubts and fear. Securing identity systems is particularly challenging as the number of data breaches across the world are on the rise. Identity data in the modern world and particularly as governments come to require it so much more often, becomes the key to perpetrate fraud and undertake surveillance. Adequate norms thus need to be laid down from collection to retention of biometric data, in addition to formulating strong data protection and privacy laws.
Aadhaar could become a “one stop solution” if implemented in a more accommodative manner. One understands that long term benefits of Aadhaar actually outweighs many concerns. However, the government needs to work towards plugging the loopholes and taking prompt action in addressing the genuine concerns and grievances of the people.
It will take time to make Aadhaar more foolproof. After all, Rome was not built in a day!
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Strategic Petroleum Reserves: Stocking Oil for Rainy Days
Shebonti Ray Dadwal
November 02, 2018
A strategic petroleum reserve offers India the leverage to be a serious player in the international oil market, as it will have the option to release supplies when prices spike and recharge the reserve when prices are low.
India’s 2004 decision to construct a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) in the wake of increasing demand, stagnating domestic production, rising international oil prices and dependence on the unstable West Asian region for imports, had come in for criticism. At that time, the decision was to create reserves for 15 days partly because it was reckoned that any supply disruption would not last longer and partly due to the huge costs it entailed. Yet, in June 2018, the government announced that it would increase the size of the SPR to 87 days’ worth of the country’s net crude oil imports by 2020. This includes 12 days’ worth of imports plus 67 days’ worth of commercial stocks held by refineries (apart from the armed forces stocks). There is also a plan to construct two additional reserves at Bikaner and Rajkot, taking the tally to 91 days’ worth of net imports, akin to those held by developed countries which are members of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Surprisingly, the June 2018 decision to increase the size of the Indian SPR came at a time when the US has been debating whether its strategic stockpile should be cut to half the current size of 727 million barrels, driven by the shale revolution and the country’s dramatic resurgence as a net oil exporter. Moreover, globally, there are no perceived shortages envisaged in oil supplies, at least in the foreseeable future. Given that the global oil market is currently awash with oil, why has India decided to undertake such a huge capital investment, estimated at Rs. 4098.35 crore for the three original SPR sites alone,1 to enlarge its SPR?
SPRs were introduced by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock when Arab countries cut production by around five million barrels a day (mbd) from 20.8 mbd to about 15.8 mbd, and OPEC raised prices by some 400 per cent. Subsequently, to ensure that OECD countries, which were the largest oil consumers at that time, would not be caught flatfooted in the event of any supply disruptions, the IEA was formed in 1974 and tasked to coordinate policies and advise member countries on protecting their energy interests. A core condition for the 30 member countries is for each to maintain 90 days’ worth of net oil imports, which would be used collectively in the event of a supply disruption. Oil could also be released under exchange arrangements with private firms, which, in turn, could be repaid in kind within a certain date with additional premium barrels. Originally, the stocks were meant to correct a shortage in the market caused by a supply disruption; however, over the last decade, the US has released oil from its SPR for a variety of reasons, including to finance policy initiatives and keep running domestic refineries hit by natural disasters, leading some analysts to caution against using the SPR as a “piggy bank”.2
So far, the IEA has coordinated a drawdown of its SPR only five times. The first was in 1991, during the first Gulf War, when IEA member states made up to 2.5 mbd of additional oil to the market for 30 days3 to ensure adequate supplies; the second and third instances occurred in 1996 and 1999-2000 with a view to countering rising oil prices; the fourth came in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina; and, the fifth in 2011 to counter the disruption of oil supplies from Libya.4 Thus, over time, SPRs have been used more as a cushion for price shocks rather than for dealing with supply disruptions and shortages.
Today, while shortages of oil due to conflict or embargoes are deemed unlikely, price volatility has become a regular feature due to global politics and the proclivity of some producers to manipulate production for influencing prices or protecting their market share. Given the global character of the oil market, production outages in any part of the world has a cascading impact on prices globally. For example, the 2016 drop in prices was the result of OPEC members pumping up production to prevent US shale from taking over market share. Similarly, the historic December 2016 agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC producers to curtail production was intended to shore up prices. Be that as it may, production manipulations by producers leaves countries like India, which are dependent on imports, vulnerable to such manoeuvres.
While India’s huge and growing thirst for energy, including oil, ensures that it is a premium market for producers, the pricing of oil is an issue that has major ramifications for the Indian economy as oil imports constitute the largest outflow of foreign exchange. Years of stagnating domestic production and the rising demand for crude (82 per cent is imported) have seen India’s crude oil import bill grow by 42 per cent to US$125 billion (Rs. 881,282 crore) in the current financial year ending March 2019.5 It is against this backdrop that the decision to speed up the process of enlarging the Indian SPR was taken.
Despite the government’s stated intention to reduce dependence on oil imports, oil will remain in demand for the next few decades. Therefore, the issue today is not so much whether oil will be available, but whether affordable oil will be available. A case in point is the most recent oil price spike triggered by geopolitical factors. With Iranian sanctions expected to take around one mbd off the market, spare oil capacity is around 1.5 to 2 mbd (the US Energy Information Administration puts it at 1.4 mbd, and predicts that it will come down further to 1.2 mbd by end-2019). Moreover, with production outages from other producers, an increase in US oil production may not be sufficient to prevent supplies from tightening, which, in turn, could send prices up. Under these circumstances, having an expanded SPR would provide some relief from price hikes. This is certainly more practical than the earlier plan to construct an SPR that would cater for only 15 to 45 days of imports.
Second, having a SPR option would offer India the leverage to be a serious player in the international oil market, as it will have the option to release supplies when prices spike and recharge the SPR when prices are low. Moreover, by maintaining adequate strategic stocks, India could use its SPR as an arm of energy diplomacy by providing joint stockpiling opportunities to friendly countries, both producers as well as net importers. India has signed an agreement with the UAE’s ADNOC to fill its SPR in Mangalore, scheduled to commence in November 2018. Two-thirds of the volume would be available for India, and ADNOC could store the remaining volumes or sell the oil in the domestic market.6 Alternatively, countries which cannot afford to maintain SPRs could purchase crude from India in the event of a disruption, which, in turn, could strengthen bilateral relations. With India now an associate member of the IEA, it could coordinate with the Agency in times of supply shortages as well as manage demand.
Finally, notwithstanding the current adequate supply condition, there is little certainty in oil markets, and there is a perception that a period of plenty could be followed by a supply crisis. Nor is the longevity of shale production certain over the long term. Hence, while an SPR may not suffice in the event of a long-term supply disruption, it could provide some relief from price spikes, albeit for a limited period, and allow the market time to adjust to price spikes and attain some balance.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Civilian Aviation Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, though fairly well drafted, constitute only a stop gap measure for regulating drone operations in the civil sector.
After a prolonged wait, the Director General Civil Aviation’s (DGCA’s) Civilian Aviation Requirements (CAR) for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), popularly called drones, were finally released on 27 August 2018 and would take effect from 1 December 2018. Alongside, the DGCA also published FAQs to guide and clarify some specific regulatory aspects of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flying.
It is now well understood that the future will be the era of UAVs. However, the flip-side of UAVs has also started to gain prominence since the last decade, where incidents of near misses with aircraft, breaches of privacy and threats of terrorism have started to become increasingly reported. As a result, whatever little UAV flying used to go on in India was also disallowed in the civil sector in 2014. Vide a DGCA Public Notice dated 7 October 2014, UAV flying without clearance from multiple high level agencies was disallowed until the appropriate rules and regulations were put in place. The DGCA Public Notice highlighted the safety issue and security threat as the main reasons for restricting UAV flying.
In these four years, however, the role of UAVs the world over saw an uptick and their prohibition in India started to hamper progress and was becoming counterproductive. Since then, civil UAV operations have been awaiting the go ahead of the government to make a start in many sectors. The commercial and professional uses of UAVs will lie in relieving humans from ‘Dirty, Dangerous and Dull’ jobs as well as in effecting savings in terms of time, effort and costs that are often needed in many tasks like inspection, supervision, deliveries, photography, etc. UAVs are also appealing recreational devices, for children and hobbyists.
The terrorism potential of drones was quite a menacing one and it increased substantially in the last two decades. Terrorist organisations in West Asia increasingly employed drones not only for making propaganda films and intelligence gathering but also for attacks on coalition forces using small calibre bombs. The latter highlighted the potential for more sensational attacks by using chemical, radiological or biological weapons or substances on populations anywhere. In fact, experts had started warning that it was only a matter of time before such an attack took place. All this alerted governments to the importance of enacting laws, rules and requirements to govern the manufacture and operations of UAVs in the civil sector.
The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued its UAV regulations in June 2016, and modified them further for hobby and recreational flying in October 2018 vide FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The UK Civil Aviation Authority also put out an elaborate set of regulations in March 2015 vide CAP 722. The European Union issued its own set of drone regulations on 12 June 2018, Russia did so in March 2016, and the Civil Aviation Administration of China in June 2018. As in the case of other aviation laws, these regulations are considerably similar to each other and generally focused on safety and security. Most of these regulations are also under revision after having undergone ‘testing’.
The new DGCA regulations also seem to have drawn their essence and benefitted from the prevailing laws in other nations. Its different aspects bear many similarities, for example, in weight categories, flight ceilings, flying in controlled airspaces, etc. While the release of the CAR is the first such effort in Indian aviation regulatory framework for UAVs, the question is whether these would be effective in curbing the menace of drones and, if not, what more needs to be done.
At present, the CAR, though fairly well drafted, have emerged just as a gap filler for UAS operations in the civil sector. The DGCA seems to have taken a very cautious approach in framing the requirements. The CAR are highly restrictive and will initially prove to be cumbersome for UAV operators to meet, especially fresh starters. But they have indeed given an opening for UAV operations and over time could be effective in ensuring safe operations of registered drones to an extent. This is where other countries’ regulations have mostly reached so far.
The CAR get their teeth from the IPC, Aircraft Act 1934, Aircraft Rules 1937 and other civilian aviation rules of the DGCA. This is similar to the approach taken by other nations. A second aspect is that UAVs are still an evolving technology with many aspects such as reliability yet to match the levels of manned aircraft. Therefore, as UAV operations evolve and mature, so will the regulatory framework evolve in parallel. The DGCA has indicated a similar intention and is reportedly constituting a task force to draft the next set of regulations, which have been termed by the media as the ‘Indian Drone Policy 2.0’ and which could come out sooner than later.
Some of the other noteworthy aspects of the CAR are:
all administrative and procedural control of drones would be website based (called Digital Sky Platform) on the DGCA’s website, right from applying for a Unique Identification Number (UAV registration number called UIN) to the filing of flight plans and obtaining briefings;
compulsory UIN for all UAVs above ‘nano’ category (250 grams upwards);
only daylight and line of sight flying permitted;
no flying by foreigners or foreign entities;
no carriage of living payload’
informing the police even for micro category drone flying below 200 feet;
ceiling of 400 feet;
no flying within the vicinity of airports, sensitive areas, crowd gatherings, etc.
All of this is with a caveat of case to case basis clearance for things that are not allowed in the present regulations, but considered desirable. Four mandatory electronic systems have to be fitted on the UAVs above ‘micro’ category (weighing two kilograms or more and divided into Small, Medium and Large categories) in uncontrolled airspace: Global Navigation Satellite System, Automatic Flight Termination or Return Home systems, RFID and GSM SIM Card or No Permission No Take-off, and a flight controller with data logging facility. These will substantially enhance the safety of UAVs and the accountability of drone operators. More safety electronics have been mandated on UAVs operating in controlled airspace (where there is air traffic) like Geofencing, SSR transponder, detect and avoid capability, etc.
All this, however, does not eliminate or alleviate the threat posed by drones. However, in the absence of a regulatory framework, it was difficult to bring violators to book, which the CAR now provide. A lot will now depend on how well the regulations are implemented. Most of the commercial and professional users of UAVs will fall in line as they generally like to adhere to and stay within the framework of rules and regulations, and were in fact looking forward to a regulatory mechanism so that they could launch operations, as a flurry of related enthusiastic media articles after the release of regulations indicates. Even hobbyists would generally stick to the rules. The CAR have tried to exempt the very small category of drones (‘nano’ and ‘micro’) from the burden of stricter requirements outside controlled air spaces (restricted air spaces) and flying at low heights, thus catering for children’s toys and hobby flying, which, as such, would be very difficult to control. These small drones could, however, be converted into flying bombs or chemical spray devices. Controlling their use through law and supervision is very difficult indeed, with experts opining that ‘it was now not a matter of ‘if’ but of ‘when’ such a terror attack will take place.’
The real threat would emanate from UAVs operated by malevolent individuals with the intention of causing harm. It will be very difficult to control as not only hobby and toy UAVs could be modified, but drones could also be made out of components using ‘Do-it-Yourself’ kits or components removed from toy drones with a certain amount of autonomy in flying. UAVs could easily be innovated from commonly and more and more easily available items and materials with electronic components. Aeromodelling hobby stores have models and UAV electronics are easily available.
Serious and sensational terrorist acts could be rather easily pulled-off using UAVs, which would be difficult to counter. A drone attack on the Venezuelan President during a military parade on 4 August 2018 is a good recent example. Countering such a threat would need to include measures like putting a cap on power systems or tightly controlling the sale of electronics which could be used as control systems, online sale of each and every drone sold by the vendors, electronic defence systems in controlled airspaces, etc. So much more would need to be done to curb the flip side of drone usage. The current regulations in place are only the first step.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Defence Technology, Air Defence
Making Private Companies Accountable For Breach of User Private Data
Ashish Chhibbar
October 24, 2018
Mega data breaches of user’s private digital data in the last two years has drawn the world’s attention towards protection, safe custody and management of this extremely valuable commodity.
Background
On 28 September 2018, Facebook informed the general public that an attack on its computer network, discovered by its engineers, had exposed the personal information of nearly 50 million users. The breach was the largest in the company’s 14 year history. Facebook is not the only IT giant whose user’s private data have been compromised. Topping the list of user data breaches is Yahoo Inc. where 3 billion user accounts were breached in 2016, followed by credit rating agency Equifax (150 million user accounts in 2017) and LinkedIn (117 million user accounts in 2016).
In the case of Facebook, three software flaws allowed hackers access to user accounts. The attackers exploited a vulnerability in Facebook’s code which ran “View As” feature that lets the user see how his/ her profile looks like to an outsider. View As should have been a view only feature. However, in one specific configuration, it allowed a third person to post a video onto the user’s Facebook page. A new version of video uploader functionality (introduced in July 2017) also generated an access token (equivalent of user’s digital key which keeps the user logged into the system even when they turn off the application so that the user need not re-enter the password every time they use the mobile app) in addition to uploading the video, which it should not have. When the video uploader appeared as a part of View As feature while using a particular combination, it generated the access token not of the viewer (person uploading the video) but of the user whose Facebook page was being accessed. This access token (user name and password) was clearly visible in the Hyper Text Mark-up Language (HTML) code of the user’s Facebook page which was generated and could be easily exploited to not only gain access to Facebook but also on Instagram, Spotify and hundreds of other apps which allow log in based on Facebook’s credentials.
Clayes C Arnold, a professional law corporation, and Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group filed a class action suit against Facebook in the US District Court, Northern District of California the same day of the announcement of the breach. The suit claimed that the Personal Individual Information (PII) which included name, birthday, hometown, addresses, locations, interests, relationships, email addresses, photos, videos etc. had been compromised in the Facebook data breach of 25 Sep 2018 due to lax and non-existent data safety and security policies and protocols of Facebook. The suit was filed on behalf of all US citizens whose data has been compromised by Facebook. This is not the first class action suit concerning user’s data privacy being served on Facebook. A Class action law suit was filed against Facebook and Cambridge Analytica for stealing and improperly using more than 71 million user’s data on 10 April 2018 in Federal District Court of Delaware.
India presently lacks data privacy laws. Thus, the act of data compromise or harvesting data by social media companies can be considered immoral and unethical but not illegal. Hence, users in India are presently unable to sue social media companies for data loss or compromise. Like other governments, the Indian government, where Facebook has over 300 million users, also asked Facebook to provide an update on the country specific impact of the data breach. As per newspaper reports, Facebook has informed Computer Emergency Response Team, India (CERT-IN), that no Facebook account in India has been affected by the recent data breach. The company responded that accounts in India have been attacked or targeted, but none have been compromised. Facebook is yet to quantify the exact country specific impact of the data breach to the Indian government, despite the fact that the highest number of Facebook users are from India.
Facebook has been at the centre of more than one private data misuse investigationthis year. In the famous Cambridge Analytica data breach scandal, the whistle-blower Christopher Wylie had revealed the sheer scale of operation of harvesting millions of Facebook profiles to predict and influence choices during elections. He also revealed that since 2015, Facebook was aware that user’s privacy data was being harvested at an unprecedented scale and yet hardly any measures were taken to secure the confidential data. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg himself admitted that mistakes had been made and Facebook has a “responsibility” to protect user’s data and if it fails, “we don’t deserve to serve you”.
Individual digital privacy concerns have recently drawn the attention of governments and law makers the world over. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) have been enforced since 25 May 2018. Under the GDPR, firms anywhere in the world that collect data on EU citizens need to offer the user the option to see the information collected about them and to move or delete that information. Firms are also required to report any data breach within 72 hours of occurrence. The penalties for violating GDPR are also significant with maximum of US $ 23.5 million or 4 % of firm’s revenue, whichever is larger. The US Congress is also in the process of finalising the Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2018, which in many ways resembles the GDPR.
The Chinese approach to data privacy is different than that of EU and US. While EU believes that data privacy is the responsibility of the user and the US believes that it is the responsibility of the tech firms who should police themselves, the Chinese believe that it is the government’s responsibility to protect individual user’s private data. The Chinese cybersecurity laws which were enforced in 2017, require Critical Information Infrastructure Operators (CIIOs) to store personal information and important data collected and generated within China. It is also in the process of formulating rules for cross border transmission of personal Information and important data.
In India, the Justice BN Shrikrishna committee submitted a draft data protection bill called The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 to the government on 27 July 2018. The draft bill calls for comprehensive data protection laws to include data protection obligations, grounds for processing of personal data, rights of the data principal(confirmation, access, correction, data portability and right to be forgotten), various transparency and accountability measures, and restrictions on cross border transfer of personal data.
Another aspect linked with user digital privacy rights is the mass surveillance of digital data being carried out by various countries. A number of court judgements have come out recently where the courts have outlined how such activities maybe undertaken keeping in mind both user rights as well as national security considerations. In the case of “Big brother watch and others V. The United Kingdom” concerning bulk interception of communications, intelligence sharing with foreign governments and obtaining communication data from communication service providers, the European Court of Human Rights gave the following judgment on 13 Sep 2018 :-
(a) Bulk interception regime violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Right to respect for private and family life/ communication).
(b) The regime of obtaining communications data from communication service providers also violated Article 8 of the convention.
(c) Both bulk interception regime and regime of obtaining communication data from communication service providers violated Article 10(Freedom of expression) of the convention.
(d) The regime for sharing intelligence with foreign governments did not violate either Article 8 or Article 10 of the convention.
On 25 May 2018, the US Supreme court, in the case of “Carpenter V. United States”, in a landmark judgment ruled that authorities must obtain warrant in order to access mobile tower records which can provide an accurate time bound location of a mobile phone user. Prior to this ruling, authorities could requisition mobile tower records without warrant by claiming that the records were required in connection with ongoing investigations. The ruling is bound to have ramifications on the way citizen’s private data is collected by state agencies and will necessitate stricter procedures on collection and handling of person’s private digital data.
Takeaways
Increased awareness The recent class action suits, judgements by world courts and data privacy laws have increased awareness amongst the general public about the importance of owning one’s digital data and its adverse impact in case of breach and compromise. However, in countries like India there is a need for the government to take suitable initiatives like mass education drives in order to make the citizens, especially those who are illiterate and living in rural areas aware about the importance of safeguarding and owning one’s own private digital data.
Accountability of Social Media Companies Companies that handle user data, in particular, social media companies, are bound to become more serious about the way they store and handle user private data due to the strict penalties outlined by data privacy laws like GDPR and likely adverse impact on their reputation and stock value in case of data breach/ compromise coupled with growing number of class action suits being accepted by courts.
Role of state The recent judgements by the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights will force the governments to rethink their strategy on gathering intelligence through mass surveillance of user private data. In addition, most countries are moving towards protecting the private digital data of their citizens and enacting laws for the same. The draft Personal Data Protection Bill 2018 has enunciated adequate measures along with stringent penalties against defaulters for protecting the private digital data of citizens. The same needs to be enacted into law so that compliance by companies and enforcement by the state can commence.
Towards Cyber Sovereignty Governments have realised that in today’s digital world, data is an important commodity that needs to be protected and rightfully transacted. In addition, recent data privacy laws of China have brought to fore the debate on localisation of data within the state’s territorial jurisdiction. India is also moving in the same direction. The western countries, especially US,are strongly opposing the move claiming that it would result in non-optimal utilisation of resources and fragmentation of the internet. As things stand, data localisation is a must in case the state has to guarantee the safe custody of its citizen’s private digital data which has been considered a fundamental right by the Supreme Court of India.
Conclusion
The mega data breaches of user’s private digital data in the last two years coupled with scandals of mass data harvesting in order to swing election outcomes has drawn the world’s attention towards protection, safe custody and management of this extremely valuable commodity. Attention has also been drawn towards mass surveillance of digital data by states. It is therefore extremely important that firstly the common man be educated about safe custody and management of his personal digital data, secondly, the IT companies, especially social media companies need to relook their existing procedures and strategies concerning safe custody, cross border transit, data analysis and sale of meta data to other companies, and finally, the government needs to implement and enforce adequate laws to ensure protection of personal digital data. There are no easy and quick fix solutions and the class action suits against Facebook and other social media companies are being keenly watched the world over as their outcome will be a pointer towards the way in which cyber space will be managed and governed in future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Relations – the drivers and challenges
Nazir Ahmad Mir
October 24, 2018
While Pakistan clearly seeks to maintain cordial relations with Iran, it is unlikely that it would be willing to incur the displeasure of Saudi Arabia with which it has greater economic and strategic links.
Imran Khan kept tradition alive by undertaking the very first prime ministerial visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is generally believed that Pakistani Prime Ministers seek spiritual guidance from the holy places in Saudi Arabia. As Imran Khan starts his innings, he surely needs the Almighty’s blessings to start the arduous task of steering the economy back from the brink, dealing with the deteriorating relationship with the United States which holds the purse strings of international financial institutions, and managing the challenges of instability in Afghanistan, among others. However, it is also true that Pakistani prime ministers make their first official visit to Saudi Arabia because of the practical reason of that country being a significant political and economic benefactor. Khan was genially welcomed by the Saudis and the doors of the Ka’ba were opened for him, which otherwise remain closed for other visiting Muslims.
Saudi Arabia’s importance to Pakistan is reinforced by two other aspects of Imran Khan’s visit. First, Khan’s visit took place in spite of his announcement that he would not undertake any foreign visit during the first three months as part of an ‘austerity’ drive. Khan making an exception to visit Saudi Arabia underlined that country’s importance “for which,” according to him, “the people of Pakistan have special love.” Second, Khan chose to visit Saudi Arabia even though it was President Hasan Rouhani of Iran who had extended an invitation to him first. Iran wants to have better ties with Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Javed Zarif was the first foreign official of his rank to meet Imran Khan in Islamabad to talk about improving bilateral relations.
Economic and Strategic Aspects
Pakistan has benefited enormously from Saudi Arabia – the Muslim world’s wealthiest nation – through generous financial aid, the supply of oil on a deferred payment basis and aid during crises. For instance, the Saudis provided a grant of US$10 million during the 2005 earthquake, $170 million during the 2010/11 floods, and a $1.5 billion grant when Pakistan faced an economic crisis in 2014. Of late, Saudi Arabia has once again come to Pakistan’s rescue by promising assistance worth $2 billion to stabilise a falling economy.
Besides, there are around two million Pakistani expatriates in Saudi Arabia, and they send back remittances worth over $5 billion every year. Though the trade balance is heavily skewed in favour of Saudi Arabia, the two countries are negotiating a bilateral treaty to help correct the imbalance to some extent. Pakistan has been arguing that “there is huge potential of bilateral trade lying unrealized between the two countries.” It has been importing mainly oil from Saudi Arabia and exports rice, meat, meat products, spices and fruits, footwear and leather goods, and chemicals. Pakistan’s service sector, it is said, has much more potential to expand.
Not only has Saudi Arabia helped Pakistan avoid major economic crises, it has also supported Pakistan’s defence by providing logistic support and financial assistance. For instance, the Kingdom assured Islamabad that it would supply 50,000 barrels of crude oil per day on a deferred payment basis in case Pakistan’s nuclear tests resulted in US and other European sanctions in 1998. In return, Pakistan has stood with Saudi Arabia diplomatically and militarily whenever the latter required such support. Nawaf Obeid, a former advisor to the Saudi Government from 2004 to 2015, summed up the relationship in 2004 thus: ‘We gave money and [the Pakistanis] dealt with it as they saw fit… There is no documentation, but there is an implicit understanding that on everything, in particular, on security and military issues, Pakistan will be there for Saudi Arabia’.
Strains in the Relationship
When, in 2015, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to join the coalition it was leading to undertake the ground offensive in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis, Islamabad refused and let it be known that it would prefer to stand “neutral” in the Iran-Saudi rivalry. The decision was taken keeping in mind the possible implications of joining the coalition on domestic politics and on bilateral relations with Iran. To pacify an upset Saudi Arabia, Pakistan subsequently allowed former Army chief General Raheel Sharif to head the Saudi-led coalition named “Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT)”. This latter decision was seen by many in Pakistan as not in the national interest and as violating the resolution passed by parliament in 2015 spelling out Pakistan’s “neutrality” in the Saudi Arabia-Iran conflict.
The Saudi-Iran conflict in West Asia has serious ramifications for Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia sees Iranian involvement and growing salience in regional politics as a threat to its security. Saudis argue that “Iran is at the root of numerous security problems now plaguing the Middle East” and that it should be prevented from challenging “1,400 years of majority Sunni domination.” The Saudis feel that their long-term ally, the United States, has grown disinterested about continuing to support the current regional order. To ensure its own dominance in the region, Riyadh has undertaken several measures to secure its interests in the region. It has initiated an expansion in its military capability, for which it allocated $64 billion in 2016. It has also formed IMAFT to check any challenge to its dominance.
Pakistan, for its part, is worried about India’s improving relations with West Asian countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. While Pakistan wants to maintain a delicate balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Saudis are not happy with this balancing game and want Pakistan to support them. In March 2018, Pakistan approved the despatch of 1,000 troops to Saudi Arabia as part of their extensive defence cooperation. The decision was taken immediately after General Qamar Bajwa’s visit to Riyadh on 2 February, which was his second in two months and came only a few days before Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Saudi Arabia on 6 to 8 February 2018. The decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia raised some eyebrows within the country, with some arguing that it would make Islamabad look like joining one of the camps in the Saudi-Iran rivalry, which was not in the national interest. It is also said that the decision was taken not only because of India’s growing ties with Saudi Arabia but also due to Iran’s engagement with India. Thus the move was directed at both countries. On one hand, it signalled Iran that Pakistan can jettison its “neutral” stand in the Riyadh-Tehran rivalry. And on the other, it was meant to convey to Saudi Arabia that Pakistan would be there when required.
Conclusion
By undertaking his maiden visit as Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia, Imran Khan underscored that Riyadh is going to remain a priority for Pakistan’s foreign policy. During the visit, Khan reiterated the traditional position that ‘We stand with Saudi Arabia’ in case of need. Highlighting that “Pakistan has tremendous opportunities of investment”, he sought a further strengthening of relations by inviting the Kingdom to invest in Pakistan. While the invitation to invest in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was later retracted by pointing out that CPEC is a bilateral project, Saudi investments in an oil refinery in Gwadar and the Reko Diq gold and copper mines in Balochistan are seen as positive developments.
While Pakistan clearly seeks to maintain cordial relations with Iran, it is unlikely that it would be willing to incur the displeasure of Saudi Arabia with which it has greater economic and strategic links. It remains to be seen how the Khan Government is going to retain the trust of the Saudis while at the same time not angering Iran which is an immediate neighbour.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Khashoggi Affair Unlikely to Affect US-Saudi Strategic Ties
Md. Muddassir Quamar
October 23, 2018
Two factors explain Washington’s lack of enthusiasm for sanctioning Saudi Arabia over the Khashoggi affair despite domestic and international pressure.
Jamal Khashoggi’s killing in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018 has become a diplomatic embarrassment for the Kingdom. After news broke of his disappearance, Saudi authorities initially denied any knowledge of Khashoggi’s whereabouts and claimed that he had left the consulate within an hour. However, Turkish police began an investigation into the matter after receiving a complaint from Khashoggi’s Turkish fiancée, Hatice Cengiz, and revealed on October 6 that it has evidence of Khashoggi being tortured and killed inside the consulate. This news enraged global public opinion against Saudi Arabia including in the United States, leading to President Donald Trump demanding an explanation from Riyadh. Meanwhile, Turkish authorities demanded that they be granted access to the consulate for completing the investigation. Riyadh and Ankara eventually agreed to form a joint team which completed investigations including inside the Saudi consulate on October 18.
After over two weeks of silence and denials, Saudi Arabia confirmed on October 19 that Khashoggi was killed. A Saudi Press Agency report stated that preliminary investigations by the Kingdom’s Public Prosecution found that Khashoggi was killed in a brawl that “took place between him and the persons who met him during his attendance in the Kingdom's consulate in Istanbul.” The report further stated that 18 “individuals who are all Saudi nationals” are under investigation for their involvement in the killing. The same day King Salman issued a royal decree relieving from their positions Saud al-Qahtani, an adviser in the Royal Court, Ahmed al-Asiri, the deputy chief of intelligence, and three other intelligence officers.
President Trump’s initial response to these developments was to observe that the Saudi explanation seems “credible”. But he soon changed his stance under domestic pressure and said that it is “not-satisfactory.” The fact that Khashoggi was a permanent resident of the United States and a Washington Post columnist to boot has led to clamour among Trump’s political opponents and in the US media for holding Saudi Arabia responsible and taking punitive measures against the Kingdom. The administration, however, has been willing to give more time to Riyadh. While demanding a further explanation and through inquiry, President Trump has not blamed King Salman or Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the killing. He has refused to cancel the US$110 billion weapons deal that he had concluded with King Salman during his May 2017 visit to Riyadh, stating “I don't like the concept of stopping an investment of [US]$110 billion into the United States…things that create jobs.”
In the meanwhile, Turkey has kept up the pressure on Saudi Arabia by revealing details of the investigation to the media. Given Khashoggi’s proximity to some of the leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) including close associates of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish authorities have refused to participate in a cover up. Though Ankara has refrained from making any direct allegations against the Saudi leadership, President Erdogan has said that he will issue a statement on October 23 during the AKP’s weekly group meeting in parliament. He has also stated that several questions remained unanswered and need explanation. The semi-official Anadolu Agency has reported that during their October 22 telephonic conversation, Erdogan and Trump agreed on the need to “clear up” all the aspects of the case. However, given that Erdogan has been in touch with Trump on the issue and has been willing to talk to Saudi officials, he is unlikely to press for any punitive action against Riyadh.
Nonetheless, for President Trump, in addition to the domestic pressures, concerns of European allies have also become a factor. Many European leaders have called for a review of ties with Riyadh. Germany, for example, has urged all members of the European Union to stop selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. In a television interview, the German Economy and Energy Minister Peter Altmaier said that Germany “would not approve any new arms sales to Saudi Arabia and would urge other EU member states to follow this example.” He further said that Berlin believes that “it is important to adopt a common European stance,” and that “only if all European states are united, it would make an influence on the government in Riyadh.”
Despite the domestic and international pressure, the Trump administration is not inclined to take any significant punitive action against Riyadh. Two important factors explain Washington’s lack of enthusiasm for sanctioning Saudi Arabia over the Khashoggi affair. Firstly, sanctions will have a serious economic impact not only on the United States which has strong bilateral trade links with Saudi Arabia but also on the global oil market and might lead to a sharp rise in oil prices. Neither the United States nor other rising powers including India want oil prices to rise. Further, Saudi Arabia is one of the major contributors to trade and business in the US and Europe. Notably, Riyadh has vowed to retaliate against any international sanctions with a reminder that the world’s top oil exporter “plays an impactful and active role in the global economy.” More importantly, Riyadh is one of the top buyers of US defence equipment and weapons, which, in Trump’s view, brings much needed business and jobs to the United States and should not be hampered.
Secondly, Riyadh (along with Tel Aviv) is central to US policy in the Middle East. It has been a historical ally of the US and has been welcoming of Trump’s policies in the region. Since assuming office, President Trump has made several policy departures including the Obama policy of forging reconciliation with Iran by unilaterally withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between the P5+1 and Iran. While this was disliked by many, Riyadh and Tel Aviv welcomed the move as a significant step in curbing Iran’s growing regional influence and “expansionism.” Riyadh has also been forthcoming in showing support on the issue of the resumption of the Middle East peace process to resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Washington sees Riyadh as an important actor that has the ability to influence Arab and Islamic public opinion. And though King Salman was leading the Arab-Islamic opposition of the US move to shift its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, that has not affected the alliance between the two countries. The United States and Saudi Arabia are on the same page on various regional issues including Syria, Yemen and Libya.
Finally, Saudi Arabia has shown willingness to accommodate US concerns on the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by promising to thoroughly investigate the matter and punish those found guilty. King Salman has initiated action against intelligence operatives who, Turkey had revealed, were present in the consulate when the incident took place. The King has taken a reconciliatory approach towards Turkey by sending Prince Khaled al-Faisal, the governor of Mecca, to meet with President Erdogan and Turkish leaders to placate Turkish anger. Saudi Arabia has also denied the role of Crown Prince Bin-Salman in the entire issue. That means the three stakeholders, that is, Saudi Arabia, United States and Turkey, are willing to discuss and be accommodative of each other’s concerns.
Even though Trump remains unconvinced about taking serious punitive action against Saudi Arabia despite strong domestic and international pressure, the Khashoggi affair is indeed a serious breach of international diplomatic norms. It has not only momentarily affected Riyadh’s relations with Ankara and Washington but has also dented Saudi Arabia’s international credibility. Nevertheless, given the strong strategic and economic partnership between Washington and Riyadh, the Khashoggi affair is unlikely to affect US-Saudi relations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India
Riyadh committed a crime and blunder; its communication strategy, so far, has been an unmitigated disaster. MbS is facing a challenge, to put it mildly.
Seventeen days after the October 2 "disappearance" of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia officially stated that he was killed in its consulate in Turkey when he went there to collect papers permitting him to marry his Turkish fiancée Hatice Cengiz. The marriage had been fixed for October 3.
Cengiz had waited for hours in vain for Khashoggi to come out of the consulate and informed Reuters about his 'disappearance' on October 3. The same day, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) told the US news agency Bloomberg that he did not know where the journalist was and that consent would be given to Turkey to conduct an investigation inside the Consulate if it were to ask for one. MbS added that he 'had nothing to hide'.
On October 4, the Saudi Embassy claimed that the journalist had left the consulate and that it was trying to ascertain his whereabouts. Reports emerged on October 7 that Khashoggi was killed in the consulate, the veracity of which Saudi Arabia angrily denied. The next day, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, Prince Khalid bin Salman (brother of MbS) sent an unsolicited WhatsApp message to a journalist claiming that Khashoggi had left the consulate. The same day, unnamed Turkish officials told Reuters that Khashoggi had been killed inside the consulate.
On October 9, President Erdogan publicly asked Saudi Arabia to produce CCTV recordings of the journalist leaving the consulate. There was no response. The next day, Turkish officials said that the CCTV footage might have been sent to Riyadh on October 2 itself. On October 11, President Trump pointed out that the journalist was not an American citizen and that if sanctions are imposed Saudi Arabia would take its business elsewhere.
On October 16, CNN quoted an anonymous Turkish official as confirming that the journalist was killed inside the consulate. Trump brought in the theory that 'rogue killers' might have done it. The next day, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. On his return, Pompeo briefed Trump and it was announced that Treasury Secretary Mnuchin would not attend the high profile investment meeting "Davos in the Desert" personally hosted by MbS.
On October 19, Saudi Arabia revealed that Khashoggi was killed after a brawl with consulate officials. Later, an unnamed official claimed that the body was handed over to a local person for disposal. Subsequently, Riyadh asserted that the killing was carried out without the approval of MbS and that his instructions were to bring the journalist to Saudi Arabia.
We may note that the Turkish media was the first to report that Khashoggi had been killed on October 2 inside the Consulate, and that President Trump was the first to advance the theory of 'rogue killers' on October 16, three days before Riyadh took that position.
Trump has been saying different things at different times. But there is no doubt about his approach. He wants to do his utmost to preserve the close relations he has established with Saudi Arabia and which he chose for his first foreign visit as President. For him, Saudi Arabia’s purchase of American arms and its plans to invest in the US, not to speak of past investments in his own real estate ventures, are of great importance. His plans to damage Iran's economy and replace the current Iranian regime with another less unfriendly to the US and Israel need Saudi endorsement. His son-in-law Jared Kushner is a close friend of MbS and it is highly likely that Kushner promoted the elevation of MbS as the Crown Prince, overlooking the claims of other senior princes.
Trump has given different figures for the money the US gets from Saudi Arabia. The highest figures given by him so far are '$450 billion' accounting for 600,000 jobs. There is no question, Trump has made it clear, of losing that quantum of money.
However, Trump has come under pressure from the Congress to punish Riyadh. 40 legislators have written to him; some have threatened that if he does not act Congress will take matters into its own hands. It is too early to say what Trump will do, or will be compelled to do.
While Trump found the Saudi version 'credible', Germany, France, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and others disagreed with him. Essentially, these countries want an independent enquiry to bring out the full facts. Germany has specifically said that arms supplies should be suspended pending the conclusion of that enquiry. The much bruited about 'Davos in the Desert', a huge investment conference hosted by MbS and due to start on October 23, has been deserted by many Western ministers and CEOs. Reluctantly, Trump had to ask his Treasury Secretary to skip it.
The story put out by Riyadh that officials acted without the approval of MbS is not seen as credible by anyone except Trump. Turkey has signalled that it would not permit any 'cover-up'.
The chief flaw in the Saudi official account is the explanation about the body. An unnamed official has told the media that it was handed over to a local 'contractor' to dispose it off. Riyadh will be asked to say more about that 'contractor'.
Meanwhile, Turkish sources have claimed that the body was cut into pieces by using a bone saw and packed into bags; these bags were either taken to Riyadh or disposed off in the nearby forest. Turkish investigators are searching the forest.
Turkish sources have said that they have recordings of what happened when the journalist was killed in about 11 minutes of his entering the Consulate. The Consul General is heard pleading that the killing should not take place in his presence. The Consul General is back in Saudi Arabia. Further, Turkish sources have claimed that the Turkish staff was asked not to attend office on that fateful October 2.
The US has formally asked Turkey for the tapes and Turkey is likely to give it and make it public. The Congressional and media pressure on Trump will increase if the tapes are released.
It is important to realize that Saudi Arabia is in no position to retaliate if Trump were to suspend the delivery of arms, which are badly need for the ill-starred Saudi military intervention in Yemen. It is generally believed that Riyadh is chasing a mirage of military victory. Any decision to get tough with Trump will divide the royal family.
Trump is not dependent on MbS to the extent he (Trump) seems to indicate. On October 2, before the news of the 'disappearance' of Khashoggi caught the attention of the world, Trump addressed a "Make America Great Again" rally in Mississippi. Complaining about the US spending money to protect rich allies, he said:
"We protect Saudi Arabia. Would you say they're rich? And I love the King ... King Salman but I said 'King, we're protecting you. You might not be there for two weeks without us. You have to pay for your military."
Trump is right in believing that on a clear signal from him King Salman will be compelled to clip the wings of the Crown Prince. So far, the King has decided not to do any such clipping of wings and has merely asked MbS to reorganize the Security system that botched up the operation in Istanbul.
In short, Riyadh committed a crime and blunder; its communication strategy, so far, has been an unmitigated disaster. MbS is facing a challenge, to put it mildly.
Ambassador K P Fabian is the author of Diplomacy: Indian Style.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India
Boko Haram’s resurgence might affect the holding of credible polls in parts of northeast Nigeria in the upcoming February 2019 general elections.
One of the most notorious terrorist organizations in the world, the Boko Haram, has intensified its terror activities in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. Since July 2018, there have been at least 17 attacks on military bases in Nigeria, almost all of them in the region around Lake Chad. The Islamic State (IS) claimed its militants had killed 118 people in five operations in Nigeria and Chad between November 15 and 21. On November 18, in a daring attack, the IS-allied Boko Haram jihadists killed at least 43 soldiers when they overran a base in Metele village near the border with Niger. The survivors however put the death toll at more than a hundred. The Boko Haram has reportedly taken over two towns in this area, with the Nigerian military suffering huge damages.
The resurgence of the Boko Haram is especially glaring as Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari declared the terrorist organization as ‘technically defeated’, after assuming power in 2015. Even in January 2018, Buhari insisted that Boko Haram has been defeated. With the Boko Haram intensifying its activities by attacking villages and military bases in the Lake Chad region, it has become clear that the terrorist organization has not been weakened. On the contrary, it appears to have only gathered strength. Now questions are being asked as to how a virtually defeated terrorist organization is able to cause so much damage to the Nigerian security forces and its people.
Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. Yusuf was captured by the Nigerian police following the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising. He was summarily executed in public view outside the police headquarters in Maiduguri. Police officials had initially claimed that Yusuf was shot while trying to escape. The group has been led by Abu bakar Shekau since 2009, and the terrorist organization has been active since then in northeastern Nigeria. The influence of Boko Haram has gradually spread to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In Nigeria alone, more than 27,000 people have been killed over the past nine years, and the violence has forced out some 1.8 million people from their homes. One of the most notorious acts of the Boko Haram was the abduction of Chibok girls in April 2014. The group advocates Sharia law and rejects Western education.
The insurgency led by the Boko Haram is especially strong in the area known as the Lake Chad region. This is a strategic area where the borders of four countries – Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, converge. Since 2015, these four countries have been collaborating militarily as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). After the recent upsurge in Boko Harm violence, leaders of all four countries met in the Chadian capital on 29 November 2018 to devise a joint response.
Boko Haram split in August 2016, when IS supported a group of militants who wanted to part ways with Shekau. They crowned Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new governor of Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA). Shekau has not accepted this change and continues to command militants loyal to him under the group’s previous name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). The Shekau faction of Boko Haram is notorious for using suicide bombers to attack military and civilian targets.
When President Buhari came to power in 2015, there was lot of hope that he would improve the economy and deal effectively with the extremism. Hope on both these fronts seems to be vanishing as Nigeria prepares for elections in February 2019. The economy of Nigeria largely dependent on export of oil was in turmoil after the international oil prices fell in 2016.
The upsurge in the Boko Haram violence has forced the Nigerian government to improve security forces deployment. There are now about 7000 personnel deployed in the destabilized Borno State. There have also been frequent changes in commanders of the force handling insurgency. In the latest change, the Federal Government of Nigeria ordered Chief of Army staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, to return to the northeast to oversee the fight against Boko Haram. He is expected to stay there until Boko Haram insurgents are crushed. The federal government has also instructed Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Abayomi Olonisakin, and Gen. Buratai, to overhaul the conduct of major operations in the country. These include Operation Lafiya Dole in the northeast, Operation Delta in the Niger Delta, Operation Sharan Daji in Zamfara and Katsina states, and Operation Awatse in the Southwest. President Buhari has also ordered the immediate procurement of critical equipment for the armed forces.
While Buhari has been criticised for having termed Boko Haram as a ‘ technically defeated’ outfit, he is also accused of providing poor training and inappropriate weapons to the army resulting in massive casualties. Some are even accusing the President of purposely doing this so that military could be discredited, to prevent any possible coup d’etat. In the 55 years of Nigeria ’s post-colonial history, the country has been ruled by army generals for 40 years.
Boko Haram has proved to be much more resilient than Nigerian authorities had anticipated. Its resurgence might affect the holding of credible polls in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in February 2019. These areas are too volatile and vulnerable to the Boko Haram banditry. Nigeria needs a long term strategy to defeat Boko Haram as the latest round of violence indicates that the terrorist organization is expected to survive beyond the February 2019 elections. In the near term, if the Nigerian state is able to check Boko Haram’s present activities by the increased deployment of its security forces and holds credible elections in the troubled areas, that itself would be a big achievement.
Dr Anand Kumar is currently Visiting Professor and Chair (India Studies) at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The distraction of Chabahar’s questionable economic rationale and the embellishment of a centuries-old fascination with Suez alternatives, whilst entirely logical from a Muscovite perspective, must cede priority to New Delhi’s immediate interests in its own strategic backyard
A Tale of Three Cities
The seasonal transition has seen a renewed sense of impetus within the diplomatic milieu of India’s Eurasian connectivity agenda. The greatly anticipated trilateral meeting of the Coordination Council of the Chabahar Agreement finally took place on October 23rd in Tehran and committed to convene a follow-on meeting before the end of the year.1 This encouraging development supervenes the first tripartite meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of India, Iran and Afghanistan in Kabul on September 11th and a timely conference on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that inaugurated this year’s annual International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA) World Congress on September 25th. That the conference was held in New Delhi ahead of visits by Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was also symbolic and both occasions were availed of to reinforce mutual acknowledgement of historical linkages: economic, political and, in the case of Uzbekistan, cultural; as well as the prevailing spirit of connectivity that is shaping contemporary regional relations in Central and South Asia. This seasonal effusion of dialogue has, however, not been substantiated by material progress along the multiple courses of the INSTC, and the renaissance of India’s medieval commercial axis with Central Asia remains constrained by the shadow of post-Soviet reticence.
The abstraction of a ‘North-South Corridor’ is often collocated, at least in the context of Indian regional strategy, with New Delhi’s $500 million commitment to the Chabahar port development in the Sistan-Baluchistan region of Iran, located outside the Strait of Hormuz on the Makran Coast and widely understood as a counter-weight to China’s conspicuous development of Gwadar in neighbouring Pakistan. Indeed, the route from Chabahar to Sarakhs on the Turkmen border, the most appropriate crossing for onwards transit to Uzbekistan, was presented by the Iranian delegation on September 25 as one of several integral to the INSTC vision.2 Indian commentators too discuss hinterland connections emanating from Chabahar and those from Bandar Abbas, the de facto Persian Gulf hub for the INSTC, in synchronic terms.3 Bureaucratic equivocation however, has, so far choked the release of funds that would otherwise serve as not least a symbolic physical milestone for Eurasian connectivity in the Indian mould, but also as an immediate and necessary catalyst for the realization of a largely assumptive trade corridor. The Chabahar-Zahedan rail link continues to remain suspended in the early stages of fruition, awaiting Indian fulfilment of its track-laying obligations. Perhaps more significantly however, funds have yet to be released for the procurement of rail-mounted gantry cranes for the Shahed Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, and an immediate opportunity to reassure commercial stakeholders by meeting a latent transhipment demand in, for example, Iranian cement, is being forfeited at the Indian-operated facility, which has seen little throughput since a showcase delivery of wheat and pulses to Afghanistan in 2017.
Not in My Backyard
When confronted on this issue, political actors in New Delhi exhibit a reflexive deference to a sanctions-related alibi and the impasse is generating frustration among stakeholders on both sides of the Arabian Sea. Indeed, Massoud Roshagi, Iran's Deputy Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, chided earlier this year that: "It is expected that India takes immediate necessary measures in this regard if its cooperation and engagement in Chabahar port is of a strategic nature".4 Whilst continuing uncertainty surrounding the annulment of JCPOA sanctions relief, an issue directly addressed by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale in Kabul, had, until mid-November, offered a degree of explanatory power, a second, more oblique perspective also finds credence when acknowledging India’s historic hesitation in implementing an assertive foreign policy in the strategic backyard of its erstwhile Cold War ally, Moscow. It has been observed in past commentaries that it was this hesitation by New Delhi, immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union, 5 that resulted in India’s persuasive historical stake in Central Asia, one with a clear precedent, being marginalized by the more assertive track one proactivity of first the European Union and the United States, and, more recently, China. Indeed, perhaps testifying to Moscow’s pervasive influence at both ends of the North-South axis, the Central Asian Republics’ calls for substantive ties with India - Islam Karimov’s first visit outside the Commonwealth of Independent States was to New Delhi, have gone largely unheeded since independence. It was only a concern that Pakistan might exploit this diplomatic vacuum to solicit support for its nuclear aspirations and on the Kashmir issue, which finally prompted New Delhi into recognizing this disjuncture, after more than a decade of hesitation.6
Whilst the round of successive convocations in Kabul, New Delhi and Tehran may give disillusioned observers some cause for optimism, the contrast between trilateral signalling and the sobering ground reality on September 25 at the most high-profile business forum on North-South connectivity to date, initiated at the behest of Moscow and dominated by Russian transport executives, reveals a seldom acknowledged divergence between the strategic ambition underpinning India’s commitment to Chabahar and the broader INSTC narrative. Whilst the emphasis on the commercial bottom-line provides a frame of reference for the INSTC’s official aspirations and, at least partially, explains the apparent acceptance of the Bandar Abbas-Astara corridor as the primus inter pares of North-South connectivity in Southern Eurasia, it also belies the conflicting geopolitical rationales that underpin, on the one hand, the prodigious scope of ‘Mumbai-Moscow’, and, on the other, the spirit of the Ashgabat Agreement to which India acceded in 2016.
This multi-modal transport agreement, to which Russia is not a signatory, symbolizes more direct ambitions for linking Central Asia with India’s near seas. It is this latter component that is best given expression by shared Indo-Uzbek objectives in Afghanistan and the proposed Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad transport corridor – somewhat embryonic but nevertheless an existential problem for the Russian position in Central Asia, already diluted by the construction of heterodox transcontinental infrastructures, the Sino-Turkmen Pipeline for example. That Mr Mirziyoyev’s visit also, on this occasion, portended neither Uzbekistan’s accession to the INSTC nor a formal acknowledgement of its inexorable interest in the success of Chabahar, is also revealing. Whilst the semantic embroidery of bilateral and trilateral declarations appears to ensure all parties a seat at the table, commercial representatives from Afghanistan and Uzbekistan were noticeably absent from the INSTC conference.
From Beneath the Veil of Sanctions
It has long been tacitly acknowledged in circles close to the project, that Indian operations at Chabahar are less vulnerable to targeted sanctions than other areas of cooperation with the Iranian regime. This is largely on account of their geographical and institutional aloofness from Tehran, as well as the immense potential the port offers in respect of shared international priorities on Afghanistan’s reconstruction, an amenable phrase but one nevertheless stipulated in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012. These expectations have now been validated by the US State Department’s granting of an exception with respect to both the development of Chabahar and the Zahedan rail link. This follows an extension of the JCPOA sanctions waiver on Indian oil purchases from Iran and both have rightly been interpreted as positive markers for a buoyant episode in Indo-American relations. As the year-end now approaches therefore, the use of sanctions-related extenuation to mask what may ultimately be revealed as vestiges of New Delhi’s strategic trepidation will become less credible as transactional clarity on Trump-era foreign policy within the US-Iran-India triangle is more forthcoming. In a connectivity landscape where other regional actors have demonstrated a willingness to contemplate losses approaching tens of billions of dollars in order to shape the contours of transcontinental trade corridors in their own interest, New Delhi’s apparent qualm in the context of significantly more modest capital outlays appears partially ingenuous and partially a clear manifestation of its most dependable bilateral relationship.
India is a nation more favourably situated than most to benefit from the maritime economy and the globalization of Central Asian trade and it was with this in mind that a thitherto inviable commercial proposition received political patronage almost two decades ago. The distraction of Chabahar’s questionable economic rationale and the embellishment of a centuries-old fascination with Suez alternatives, whilst entirely logical from a Muscovite perspective, must cede priority to New Delhi’s immediate interests in its own strategic backyard and a pragmatic consensus on the very real atrophy that will result from the perpetuation of Indian ambivalence along its now heavily-marketed Central Asian axis. This is necessary in order to overcome the bureaucratic apathy that is delaying the fulfilment of India’s obligations under the 2016 Trilateral Agreement and outright leadership on the Makran Coast. Furthermore, now that one source of ambiguity has been surmounted ad interim, New Delhi must exploit the current momentum and place greater urgency on leveraging its robust bilateral relationships with Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, to solicit a symbolic stakeholder in Chabahar. This would confirm, unequivocally, the port’s Central Asian orientation and eliminate a contradiction absent from other regional connectivity initiatives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The challenge that the TLYP poses to Pakistan’s internal stability is even more dangerous than the threat of terrorism.
Ever since the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) assumed power in August 2018, it has been struggling with many challenges. The most pressing of these has been the growing financial crisis. However, an internal challenge appears to have overtaken the economic challenge for the time being. This has come in the form of the Supreme Court’s verdict on Asia Bibi blasphemy case. Incidentally, it was the protests around this case, originating in 2010, that had led to the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri which in turn resulted in the formation of the Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYP), a politico-religious formation of the Barelvi community.
The TYLP has, since then, come to dominate religious party politics in Pakistan. It debuted a new political party – the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)- in this year’s election, coming in as the third largest party in terms of votes polled – well ahead of the Pakistan Peoples Party even though it did not get as many seats. It has remained buoyant ever since and has been able to rally around people in large numbers to pressurise the government to fulfil its various demands. So why do governments repeatedly capitulate to its demands? And what does the TLP ‘s stunning electoral success mean for the politics of religion in general and future of Barelvi politics in particular?
Post-2001, most of the sectarian organisations belonging to the Deobandi school of thought and Shia minority were banned or put under terror watch list. However, the Barelvi-backed organisations were seen as moderate compared to other groups and were even promoted by the state so as to keep the other sects in check. They enjoyed the patronage of both the Pakistani state and the international community.
The rise of Barelvi politics in Pakistan is not a sudden phenomenon. For the most part, it has remained apolitical and peaceful sect, generally supportive of the state. Over the years, there was a growing political awakening within the sect as it was felt that it was losing its influence and appeal to other sects, especially to the Deobandis. In the sectarian turf wars with other sects, the Barelvis found themselves on the receiving end. Most of their top leaders were killed in a suicide attack carried out by suicide bombers allegedly from the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which ripped through a congregation of the 12th Rabiul Awwal at the Nishtar Park in April 2006. Since then there have been many unsuccessful attempts to bring unity within their ranks as there are many groups within the Barelvi sect who compete for political and religious influence. Developments in 2015 changed the political fortunes of the Barelvis’. The first development was Mumtaz Qadri’s hanging. Mumtaz Qadri, a Barelvi, had assassinated Punjab Governor Salman Taseer. Many believed the Qadri had upheld the path ordained by the prophet by killing Taseer and he was even showered with rose petals when he was produced in the court during the murder trial.
The TLYP was founded in 2015 in Karachi at the same place where its top leadership was killed by Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a handicapped cleric who had been convicted under the 4th schedule of anti-terrorist law for his hate speeches and anti-state activities. Rizvi exploited the popular sentiments that arose after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri. Subsequently, he successfully weaponised the blasphemy issue and brought the fractious Barelvi school together.
The first sign of the Barelvi resurgence came in the form of NA-120 (Lahore) and NA-4 (Peshawar) by-elections held in September and October 2017 respectively. The TLYR supported candidate, Azhar Hussain Rizvi, stood at third position with 7,130 votes in NA-120. In NA-4, TLYP’s Muhammad Shafiq Amini got 9,934 votes. Although, they didn’t win any seat, the percentage of votes they secured emboldened them to stand for the General Elections in 2018. The TLP fielded around 259 candidates for the National Assembly elections held in July 2018 and polled 2.2 million votes, nearly half of the Islamist vote bank. It drew away votes mostly from the PML-N, PTI and the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) — an alliance of religio-political parties that had emerged on the country’s political horizon by contesting the 2002 general elections. Many analysts have also described TLP as a spoiler party which managed to draw away right-wing votes from the other mainstream parties such as PML-N and PTI. The table below will help us to understand how TLYP emerged as a significant spoiler in the last general elections.
Source: Ahmed Yousf, “What is behind the Sudden Rise of TLP, Dawn, August 5, 2018.
The second development which encouraged the TLYP leadership was the outcome of the Faizabad dharna in 2017. This dharna was led by the Rizvi on the issue of changes in the oath of the electoral candidates in the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (the finality of Prophethood) clause. Initially, the then government of the PML-N did not cave into the pressure. They used force to quell the protesters. But the police action only multiplied the government’s problems amid a worsening law and order situation in Islamabad and other cities. The government called in the army to disperse hundreds of activists of a religious group camping at an arterial traffic intersection of the federal capital which they had occupied for more than three weeks. But the army refused to come to the rescue of the government; instead the army Chief Gen. Bajwa called the then prime minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and advised him to handle the Faizabad sit-in peacefully as “violence is not in the national interest”1. This led to the resignation of then federal Law Minister Zahid Hamid2. It is the military and the intelligence agencies which finally mediated an end to the Faizabad dharna.
The third development the TLYP touts as a triumph was the cancellation of the blasphemous cartoon competition in the Netherlands by the Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders. The TLYP led the protest in front of the Punjab and National Assembly against the cartoon competition.
The fourth was forcing the Imran Khan government to backtrack from its decision to appoint Dr Atif Mian who is an Ahmadiyya to the Economic Advisor Council (EAC).
The fifth was the recent Supreme Court decision which acquitted Asia Bibi who was serving a death sentence for the blasphemy. Soon after the Supreme Court decision, protesters thronged on the streets, in response to a call given by the Khadim Rizvi in which other religious organisations also participated. Rizvi even called for the assassination of Supreme Court judges and mutiny within the ranks of Pakistan military in his speeches. Imran Khan addressed the nation after meeting with army chief and said that state would not surrender to the mob and threatened the protesters that they would be dealt with force. However, with no respite in sight to the demonstration and lacklustre support from the Army High command, the present government also finally agreed to negotiate with Rizvi. The government agreed to accept the TLYP's demands to put Asia Bibi in the Exit Control list till the review petition filed in the Supreme Court is heard3. The Imran government may have survived but the state had lost another battle to the extremists.
Conclusion
The challenge that the TLYP poses to Pakistan’s internal stability is even more dangerous than the threat of terrorism. The TLYP has successfully created a narrative for itself as the defender of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic identity’ They have sympathisers in mainstream political parties, bureaucracy and in the armys rank and file. Pakistan has achieved some tactical gains and succeeded in creating a counter-narrative to deal with terrorism but would find it tough and challenging to create and take the ownership of any narrative which will go against the Barelvi resurgence. Even if the Pakistan state is sincere to implement the much-debated National Action Plan to curb extremism, it will still take decades to lower the current level of extremist feelings and over religiosity currently existing in Pakistani society and polity. The state also has to make sure that it stops appeasing extremists and revisit its policy of mainstreaming sectarian and terrorist organisations. For now, the TLYR has the upper hand through its strategy of implementing its political agenda through street protests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
One understands that long term benefits of Aadhaar actually outweighs many concerns. However, adequate norms need to be laid down from collection to retention of biometric data, in addition to formulating strong data protection and privacy laws.
Aadhaar system has been stuck in a cauldron of debates and deliberations since its inception in 2009. Centre’s flagship Aadhaar scheme was advocated as a tool to initiate and improvise on welfare administration scheme while eliminating corruption. However, many also saw it as a means of creating a “surveillance state” and thereby “invasion of privacy”. With the new verdict passed by the Supreme Court of India on September 26, 2018, Aadhaar project has been declared as constitutionally valid, but with conditions attached. This has set the ball rolling for a new set of argument.
Decoding the verdict
During the Aadhaar registration process, individuals are required to authenticate their fingerprints and iris on a machine that determines their identity. This sole identity gives them access to their “entitlements”. The verification process for instance in the case of public distribution system (PDS) also requires electricity, internet and connectivity for accessing the centralised database, in addition to the fact that biometric details of an individual should match during availing of services. In case the fingerprints fail to match at the time of availing of facilities like ration, a person may be denied the same.
Absolute faith on the biometric system is based on a misplaced assumption that human body parts do not age. Testing by International Biometric Group highlights that “over time, many biometric systems are prone to incorrectly rejecting a substantial percentage of users. Verifying a user immediately after enrolment is not highly challenging to biometric systems. However, after six weeks, testing shows that some systems' error rates increase ten-fold.”2
Similarly, it is mandatory to link Aadhaar number to the registry number in the public distribution database, otherwise amenities provided by the government stands cancelled. Many such incidents where individuals were denied welfare or pension services have come to limelight, especially people suffering from leprosy, engaged in manual labour and those who are genetically predisposed to not having fingerprints. There were reports that alternate means of identification are being done to accommodate the ones who lack proper biometrics.3 Like facial recognitions or iris scanners.4 However, it is still not clear how such alternatives are being operationalised. For instance, leprosy patients are now being exempted from linking Aadhaar card. But then question arises, can all verification facilities vouch to have in place the required technical infrastructure that allows other means of verification? If yes, then what are they? Even if it is a process of offline verification, same has not been clearly laid down.
Much ado about something
Despite Supreme Court’s laudable verdict, there still are issues that need to be addressed. Of particular concern are issues pertaining to data protection, limitations of biometric identification, and personal data mining. In the absence of a clear framework, there is also the lingering fear of state’s ability to access databases to map the data of an individual at the backend and create a “digital image”. Linking of Aadhaar card actually brings together different aspects of life like travel accounts, personal information, employment history, bank accounts, etc. Thus, integrating disjointed data silos enable tracking and profiling, i.e., invading privacy in many ways.
Initially with Section 57 in place, Aadhaar was seen as a project conflating state power and corporate power at the cost of citizen’s privacy. The situation was grave as it facilitated corporate surveillance to go hand in hand with state surveillance. This would have enabled targeted advertising and profit reaping. Now with the invalidation of Section 57, the question that remains is what happens to the data of individuals already registered? Though the government has issued orders to several telecom companies to submit plans to delink Aadhaar data associated with user profiles,6 but then would there be a mechanism of verification that the data was deleted and no backups were taken in the process?
Another aspect that has not been clearly brought out is the credibility of alternate procedures of verification. What if they are more cumbersome for people who do not have an Aadhaar card? Convenience over security would definitely be a dilemma. However, government has started taking stringent measures to ensure security. For instance, masking Aadhaar number while authenticating for a third party.7 This is done by generating Aadhaar Virtual ID, a 16-digit random number, which is mapped to a person’s real Aadhaar number and can be used whenever authentication or KYC services are performed. It remains to be seen how many people would actually adopt the “Virtual ID” or understand its significance.
Another issue that came to the forefront was that of ghost or fake ration cards. Many a time the link between Aadhaar number and the ration card could not be validated. In such scenarios, the individual was denied basic amenities. Government claimed successfully tracing fake ration cards but many a time there were genuine cases of exclusion passed off as savings due to Aadhaar. This has also led to cases of death due to starvation.8 Corrective measures in this regard are yet to take course. When talking about corruption the quantity fraud is not being factored in. Quantity fraud translates that a person may be forced to sign on something that he/she might not have received of the same quantity that the person is entitled to. However, one cannot also ignore the fact that in many places Aadhaar has actually replaced the middlemen.9
A long way to go
The Supreme Court verdict, in response to petitions filed against the ‘draconian’ nature of Aadhaar, has been a mixed bag. Concerns around the Aadhaar project have broadly been centred on “welfare and privacy”. These have included questions of “surveillance, access to basic rights, liberty and data commercialisation.” The most welcome part of the verdict is the scrapping of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, which allowed private entities to use Aadhaar for verification purposes. Far too many people have been duped into opening accounts in mobile phone payment banks while being forced to conduct an e-KYC procedure with Aadhaar for their SIM (subscriber identity module) cards.
However, the verdict has still left many open-ended questions. For the state to be able to build trust among the citizens and ensure that individuals have the sole control of the data and no misuse could take place, it is pertinent to push for a system that protects people and their data and does not exclude the most vulnerable.
Biometrics via Aadhaar is an untested territory. Biometrics as a foundation for Aadhaar, without addressing the security concerns raised by people, paves the way for more doubts and fear. Securing identity systems is particularly challenging as the number of data breaches across the world are on the rise. Identity data in the modern world and particularly as governments come to require it so much more often, becomes the key to perpetrate fraud and undertake surveillance. Adequate norms thus need to be laid down from collection to retention of biometric data, in addition to formulating strong data protection and privacy laws.
Aadhaar could become a “one stop solution” if implemented in a more accommodative manner. One understands that long term benefits of Aadhaar actually outweighs many concerns. However, the government needs to work towards plugging the loopholes and taking prompt action in addressing the genuine concerns and grievances of the people.
It will take time to make Aadhaar more foolproof. After all, Rome was not built in a day!
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A strategic petroleum reserve offers India the leverage to be a serious player in the international oil market, as it will have the option to release supplies when prices spike and recharge the reserve when prices are low.
India’s 2004 decision to construct a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) in the wake of increasing demand, stagnating domestic production, rising international oil prices and dependence on the unstable West Asian region for imports, had come in for criticism. At that time, the decision was to create reserves for 15 days partly because it was reckoned that any supply disruption would not last longer and partly due to the huge costs it entailed. Yet, in June 2018, the government announced that it would increase the size of the SPR to 87 days’ worth of the country’s net crude oil imports by 2020. This includes 12 days’ worth of imports plus 67 days’ worth of commercial stocks held by refineries (apart from the armed forces stocks). There is also a plan to construct two additional reserves at Bikaner and Rajkot, taking the tally to 91 days’ worth of net imports, akin to those held by developed countries which are members of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Surprisingly, the June 2018 decision to increase the size of the Indian SPR came at a time when the US has been debating whether its strategic stockpile should be cut to half the current size of 727 million barrels, driven by the shale revolution and the country’s dramatic resurgence as a net oil exporter. Moreover, globally, there are no perceived shortages envisaged in oil supplies, at least in the foreseeable future. Given that the global oil market is currently awash with oil, why has India decided to undertake such a huge capital investment, estimated at Rs. 4098.35 crore for the three original SPR sites alone,1 to enlarge its SPR?
SPRs were introduced by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock when Arab countries cut production by around five million barrels a day (mbd) from 20.8 mbd to about 15.8 mbd, and OPEC raised prices by some 400 per cent. Subsequently, to ensure that OECD countries, which were the largest oil consumers at that time, would not be caught flatfooted in the event of any supply disruptions, the IEA was formed in 1974 and tasked to coordinate policies and advise member countries on protecting their energy interests. A core condition for the 30 member countries is for each to maintain 90 days’ worth of net oil imports, which would be used collectively in the event of a supply disruption. Oil could also be released under exchange arrangements with private firms, which, in turn, could be repaid in kind within a certain date with additional premium barrels. Originally, the stocks were meant to correct a shortage in the market caused by a supply disruption; however, over the last decade, the US has released oil from its SPR for a variety of reasons, including to finance policy initiatives and keep running domestic refineries hit by natural disasters, leading some analysts to caution against using the SPR as a “piggy bank”.2
So far, the IEA has coordinated a drawdown of its SPR only five times. The first was in 1991, during the first Gulf War, when IEA member states made up to 2.5 mbd of additional oil to the market for 30 days3 to ensure adequate supplies; the second and third instances occurred in 1996 and 1999-2000 with a view to countering rising oil prices; the fourth came in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina; and, the fifth in 2011 to counter the disruption of oil supplies from Libya.4 Thus, over time, SPRs have been used more as a cushion for price shocks rather than for dealing with supply disruptions and shortages.
Today, while shortages of oil due to conflict or embargoes are deemed unlikely, price volatility has become a regular feature due to global politics and the proclivity of some producers to manipulate production for influencing prices or protecting their market share. Given the global character of the oil market, production outages in any part of the world has a cascading impact on prices globally. For example, the 2016 drop in prices was the result of OPEC members pumping up production to prevent US shale from taking over market share. Similarly, the historic December 2016 agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC producers to curtail production was intended to shore up prices. Be that as it may, production manipulations by producers leaves countries like India, which are dependent on imports, vulnerable to such manoeuvres.
While India’s huge and growing thirst for energy, including oil, ensures that it is a premium market for producers, the pricing of oil is an issue that has major ramifications for the Indian economy as oil imports constitute the largest outflow of foreign exchange. Years of stagnating domestic production and the rising demand for crude (82 per cent is imported) have seen India’s crude oil import bill grow by 42 per cent to US$125 billion (Rs. 881,282 crore) in the current financial year ending March 2019.5 It is against this backdrop that the decision to speed up the process of enlarging the Indian SPR was taken.
Despite the government’s stated intention to reduce dependence on oil imports, oil will remain in demand for the next few decades. Therefore, the issue today is not so much whether oil will be available, but whether affordable oil will be available. A case in point is the most recent oil price spike triggered by geopolitical factors. With Iranian sanctions expected to take around one mbd off the market, spare oil capacity is around 1.5 to 2 mbd (the US Energy Information Administration puts it at 1.4 mbd, and predicts that it will come down further to 1.2 mbd by end-2019). Moreover, with production outages from other producers, an increase in US oil production may not be sufficient to prevent supplies from tightening, which, in turn, could send prices up. Under these circumstances, having an expanded SPR would provide some relief from price hikes. This is certainly more practical than the earlier plan to construct an SPR that would cater for only 15 to 45 days of imports.
Second, having a SPR option would offer India the leverage to be a serious player in the international oil market, as it will have the option to release supplies when prices spike and recharge the SPR when prices are low. Moreover, by maintaining adequate strategic stocks, India could use its SPR as an arm of energy diplomacy by providing joint stockpiling opportunities to friendly countries, both producers as well as net importers. India has signed an agreement with the UAE’s ADNOC to fill its SPR in Mangalore, scheduled to commence in November 2018. Two-thirds of the volume would be available for India, and ADNOC could store the remaining volumes or sell the oil in the domestic market.6 Alternatively, countries which cannot afford to maintain SPRs could purchase crude from India in the event of a disruption, which, in turn, could strengthen bilateral relations. With India now an associate member of the IEA, it could coordinate with the Agency in times of supply shortages as well as manage demand.
Finally, notwithstanding the current adequate supply condition, there is little certainty in oil markets, and there is a perception that a period of plenty could be followed by a supply crisis. Nor is the longevity of shale production certain over the long term. Hence, while an SPR may not suffice in the event of a long-term supply disruption, it could provide some relief from price spikes, albeit for a limited period, and allow the market time to adjust to price spikes and attain some balance.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Civilian Aviation Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, though fairly well drafted, constitute only a stop gap measure for regulating drone operations in the civil sector.
After a prolonged wait, the Director General Civil Aviation’s (DGCA’s) Civilian Aviation Requirements (CAR) for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), popularly called drones, were finally released on 27 August 2018 and would take effect from 1 December 2018. Alongside, the DGCA also published FAQs to guide and clarify some specific regulatory aspects of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flying.
It is now well understood that the future will be the era of UAVs. However, the flip-side of UAVs has also started to gain prominence since the last decade, where incidents of near misses with aircraft, breaches of privacy and threats of terrorism have started to become increasingly reported. As a result, whatever little UAV flying used to go on in India was also disallowed in the civil sector in 2014. Vide a DGCA Public Notice dated 7 October 2014, UAV flying without clearance from multiple high level agencies was disallowed until the appropriate rules and regulations were put in place. The DGCA Public Notice highlighted the safety issue and security threat as the main reasons for restricting UAV flying.
In these four years, however, the role of UAVs the world over saw an uptick and their prohibition in India started to hamper progress and was becoming counterproductive. Since then, civil UAV operations have been awaiting the go ahead of the government to make a start in many sectors. The commercial and professional uses of UAVs will lie in relieving humans from ‘Dirty, Dangerous and Dull’ jobs as well as in effecting savings in terms of time, effort and costs that are often needed in many tasks like inspection, supervision, deliveries, photography, etc. UAVs are also appealing recreational devices, for children and hobbyists.
The terrorism potential of drones was quite a menacing one and it increased substantially in the last two decades. Terrorist organisations in West Asia increasingly employed drones not only for making propaganda films and intelligence gathering but also for attacks on coalition forces using small calibre bombs. The latter highlighted the potential for more sensational attacks by using chemical, radiological or biological weapons or substances on populations anywhere. In fact, experts had started warning that it was only a matter of time before such an attack took place. All this alerted governments to the importance of enacting laws, rules and requirements to govern the manufacture and operations of UAVs in the civil sector.
The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued its UAV regulations in June 2016, and modified them further for hobby and recreational flying in October 2018 vide FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The UK Civil Aviation Authority also put out an elaborate set of regulations in March 2015 vide CAP 722. The European Union issued its own set of drone regulations on 12 June 2018, Russia did so in March 2016, and the Civil Aviation Administration of China in June 2018. As in the case of other aviation laws, these regulations are considerably similar to each other and generally focused on safety and security. Most of these regulations are also under revision after having undergone ‘testing’.
The new DGCA regulations also seem to have drawn their essence and benefitted from the prevailing laws in other nations. Its different aspects bear many similarities, for example, in weight categories, flight ceilings, flying in controlled airspaces, etc. While the release of the CAR is the first such effort in Indian aviation regulatory framework for UAVs, the question is whether these would be effective in curbing the menace of drones and, if not, what more needs to be done.
At present, the CAR, though fairly well drafted, have emerged just as a gap filler for UAS operations in the civil sector. The DGCA seems to have taken a very cautious approach in framing the requirements. The CAR are highly restrictive and will initially prove to be cumbersome for UAV operators to meet, especially fresh starters. But they have indeed given an opening for UAV operations and over time could be effective in ensuring safe operations of registered drones to an extent. This is where other countries’ regulations have mostly reached so far.
The CAR get their teeth from the IPC, Aircraft Act 1934, Aircraft Rules 1937 and other civilian aviation rules of the DGCA. This is similar to the approach taken by other nations. A second aspect is that UAVs are still an evolving technology with many aspects such as reliability yet to match the levels of manned aircraft. Therefore, as UAV operations evolve and mature, so will the regulatory framework evolve in parallel. The DGCA has indicated a similar intention and is reportedly constituting a task force to draft the next set of regulations, which have been termed by the media as the ‘Indian Drone Policy 2.0’ and which could come out sooner than later.
Some of the other noteworthy aspects of the CAR are:
All of this is with a caveat of case to case basis clearance for things that are not allowed in the present regulations, but considered desirable. Four mandatory electronic systems have to be fitted on the UAVs above ‘micro’ category (weighing two kilograms or more and divided into Small, Medium and Large categories) in uncontrolled airspace: Global Navigation Satellite System, Automatic Flight Termination or Return Home systems, RFID and GSM SIM Card or No Permission No Take-off, and a flight controller with data logging facility. These will substantially enhance the safety of UAVs and the accountability of drone operators. More safety electronics have been mandated on UAVs operating in controlled airspace (where there is air traffic) like Geofencing, SSR transponder, detect and avoid capability, etc.
All this, however, does not eliminate or alleviate the threat posed by drones. However, in the absence of a regulatory framework, it was difficult to bring violators to book, which the CAR now provide. A lot will now depend on how well the regulations are implemented. Most of the commercial and professional users of UAVs will fall in line as they generally like to adhere to and stay within the framework of rules and regulations, and were in fact looking forward to a regulatory mechanism so that they could launch operations, as a flurry of related enthusiastic media articles after the release of regulations indicates. Even hobbyists would generally stick to the rules. The CAR have tried to exempt the very small category of drones (‘nano’ and ‘micro’) from the burden of stricter requirements outside controlled air spaces (restricted air spaces) and flying at low heights, thus catering for children’s toys and hobby flying, which, as such, would be very difficult to control. These small drones could, however, be converted into flying bombs or chemical spray devices. Controlling their use through law and supervision is very difficult indeed, with experts opining that ‘it was now not a matter of ‘if’ but of ‘when’ such a terror attack will take place.’
The real threat would emanate from UAVs operated by malevolent individuals with the intention of causing harm. It will be very difficult to control as not only hobby and toy UAVs could be modified, but drones could also be made out of components using ‘Do-it-Yourself’ kits or components removed from toy drones with a certain amount of autonomy in flying. UAVs could easily be innovated from commonly and more and more easily available items and materials with electronic components. Aeromodelling hobby stores have models and UAV electronics are easily available.
Serious and sensational terrorist acts could be rather easily pulled-off using UAVs, which would be difficult to counter. A drone attack on the Venezuelan President during a military parade on 4 August 2018 is a good recent example. Countering such a threat would need to include measures like putting a cap on power systems or tightly controlling the sale of electronics which could be used as control systems, online sale of each and every drone sold by the vendors, electronic defence systems in controlled airspaces, etc. So much more would need to be done to curb the flip side of drone usage. The current regulations in place are only the first step.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Mega data breaches of user’s private digital data in the last two years has drawn the world’s attention towards protection, safe custody and management of this extremely valuable commodity.
Background
On 28 September 2018, Facebook informed the general public that an attack on its computer network, discovered by its engineers, had exposed the personal information of nearly 50 million users. The breach was the largest in the company’s 14 year history. Facebook is not the only IT giant whose user’s private data have been compromised. Topping the list of user data breaches is Yahoo Inc. where 3 billion user accounts were breached in 2016, followed by credit rating agency Equifax (150 million user accounts in 2017) and LinkedIn (117 million user accounts in 2016).
In the case of Facebook, three software flaws allowed hackers access to user accounts. The attackers exploited a vulnerability in Facebook’s code which ran “View As” feature that lets the user see how his/ her profile looks like to an outsider. View As should have been a view only feature. However, in one specific configuration, it allowed a third person to post a video onto the user’s Facebook page. A new version of video uploader functionality (introduced in July 2017) also generated an access token (equivalent of user’s digital key which keeps the user logged into the system even when they turn off the application so that the user need not re-enter the password every time they use the mobile app) in addition to uploading the video, which it should not have. When the video uploader appeared as a part of View As feature while using a particular combination, it generated the access token not of the viewer (person uploading the video) but of the user whose Facebook page was being accessed. This access token (user name and password) was clearly visible in the Hyper Text Mark-up Language (HTML) code of the user’s Facebook page which was generated and could be easily exploited to not only gain access to Facebook but also on Instagram, Spotify and hundreds of other apps which allow log in based on Facebook’s credentials.
Clayes C Arnold, a professional law corporation, and Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group filed a class action suit against Facebook in the US District Court, Northern District of California the same day of the announcement of the breach. The suit claimed that the Personal Individual Information (PII) which included name, birthday, hometown, addresses, locations, interests, relationships, email addresses, photos, videos etc. had been compromised in the Facebook data breach of 25 Sep 2018 due to lax and non-existent data safety and security policies and protocols of Facebook. The suit was filed on behalf of all US citizens whose data has been compromised by Facebook. This is not the first class action suit concerning user’s data privacy being served on Facebook. A Class action law suit was filed against Facebook and Cambridge Analytica for stealing and improperly using more than 71 million user’s data on 10 April 2018 in Federal District Court of Delaware.
India presently lacks data privacy laws. Thus, the act of data compromise or harvesting data by social media companies can be considered immoral and unethical but not illegal. Hence, users in India are presently unable to sue social media companies for data loss or compromise. Like other governments, the Indian government, where Facebook has over 300 million users, also asked Facebook to provide an update on the country specific impact of the data breach. As per newspaper reports, Facebook has informed Computer Emergency Response Team, India (CERT-IN), that no Facebook account in India has been affected by the recent data breach. The company responded that accounts in India have been attacked or targeted, but none have been compromised. Facebook is yet to quantify the exact country specific impact of the data breach to the Indian government, despite the fact that the highest number of Facebook users are from India.
Facebook has been at the centre of more than one private data misuse investigationthis year. In the famous Cambridge Analytica data breach scandal, the whistle-blower Christopher Wylie had revealed the sheer scale of operation of harvesting millions of Facebook profiles to predict and influence choices during elections. He also revealed that since 2015, Facebook was aware that user’s privacy data was being harvested at an unprecedented scale and yet hardly any measures were taken to secure the confidential data. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg himself admitted that mistakes had been made and Facebook has a “responsibility” to protect user’s data and if it fails, “we don’t deserve to serve you”.
Digital Privacy laws
Individual digital privacy concerns have recently drawn the attention of governments and law makers the world over. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) have been enforced since 25 May 2018. Under the GDPR, firms anywhere in the world that collect data on EU citizens need to offer the user the option to see the information collected about them and to move or delete that information. Firms are also required to report any data breach within 72 hours of occurrence. The penalties for violating GDPR are also significant with maximum of US $ 23.5 million or 4 % of firm’s revenue, whichever is larger. The US Congress is also in the process of finalising the Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2018, which in many ways resembles the GDPR.
The Chinese approach to data privacy is different than that of EU and US. While EU believes that data privacy is the responsibility of the user and the US believes that it is the responsibility of the tech firms who should police themselves, the Chinese believe that it is the government’s responsibility to protect individual user’s private data. The Chinese cybersecurity laws which were enforced in 2017, require Critical Information Infrastructure Operators (CIIOs) to store personal information and important data collected and generated within China. It is also in the process of formulating rules for cross border transmission of personal Information and important data.
In India, the Justice BN Shrikrishna committee submitted a draft data protection bill called The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 to the government on 27 July 2018. The draft bill calls for comprehensive data protection laws to include data protection obligations, grounds for processing of personal data, rights of the data principal(confirmation, access, correction, data portability and right to be forgotten), various transparency and accountability measures, and restrictions on cross border transfer of personal data.
Another aspect linked with user digital privacy rights is the mass surveillance of digital data being carried out by various countries. A number of court judgements have come out recently where the courts have outlined how such activities maybe undertaken keeping in mind both user rights as well as national security considerations. In the case of “Big brother watch and others V. The United Kingdom” concerning bulk interception of communications, intelligence sharing with foreign governments and obtaining communication data from communication service providers, the European Court of Human Rights gave the following judgment on 13 Sep 2018 :-
(a) Bulk interception regime violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Right to respect for private and family life/ communication).
(b) The regime of obtaining communications data from communication service providers also violated Article 8 of the convention.
(c) Both bulk interception regime and regime of obtaining communication data from communication service providers violated Article 10(Freedom of expression) of the convention.
(d) The regime for sharing intelligence with foreign governments did not violate either Article 8 or Article 10 of the convention.
On 25 May 2018, the US Supreme court, in the case of “Carpenter V. United States”, in a landmark judgment ruled that authorities must obtain warrant in order to access mobile tower records which can provide an accurate time bound location of a mobile phone user. Prior to this ruling, authorities could requisition mobile tower records without warrant by claiming that the records were required in connection with ongoing investigations. The ruling is bound to have ramifications on the way citizen’s private data is collected by state agencies and will necessitate stricter procedures on collection and handling of person’s private digital data.
Takeaways
Increased awareness The recent class action suits, judgements by world courts and data privacy laws have increased awareness amongst the general public about the importance of owning one’s digital data and its adverse impact in case of breach and compromise. However, in countries like India there is a need for the government to take suitable initiatives like mass education drives in order to make the citizens, especially those who are illiterate and living in rural areas aware about the importance of safeguarding and owning one’s own private digital data.
Accountability of Social Media Companies Companies that handle user data, in particular, social media companies, are bound to become more serious about the way they store and handle user private data due to the strict penalties outlined by data privacy laws like GDPR and likely adverse impact on their reputation and stock value in case of data breach/ compromise coupled with growing number of class action suits being accepted by courts.
Role of state The recent judgements by the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights will force the governments to rethink their strategy on gathering intelligence through mass surveillance of user private data. In addition, most countries are moving towards protecting the private digital data of their citizens and enacting laws for the same. The draft Personal Data Protection Bill 2018 has enunciated adequate measures along with stringent penalties against defaulters for protecting the private digital data of citizens. The same needs to be enacted into law so that compliance by companies and enforcement by the state can commence.
Towards Cyber Sovereignty Governments have realised that in today’s digital world, data is an important commodity that needs to be protected and rightfully transacted. In addition, recent data privacy laws of China have brought to fore the debate on localisation of data within the state’s territorial jurisdiction. India is also moving in the same direction. The western countries, especially US,are strongly opposing the move claiming that it would result in non-optimal utilisation of resources and fragmentation of the internet. As things stand, data localisation is a must in case the state has to guarantee the safe custody of its citizen’s private digital data which has been considered a fundamental right by the Supreme Court of India.
Conclusion
The mega data breaches of user’s private digital data in the last two years coupled with scandals of mass data harvesting in order to swing election outcomes has drawn the world’s attention towards protection, safe custody and management of this extremely valuable commodity. Attention has also been drawn towards mass surveillance of digital data by states. It is therefore extremely important that firstly the common man be educated about safe custody and management of his personal digital data, secondly, the IT companies, especially social media companies need to relook their existing procedures and strategies concerning safe custody, cross border transit, data analysis and sale of meta data to other companies, and finally, the government needs to implement and enforce adequate laws to ensure protection of personal digital data. There are no easy and quick fix solutions and the class action suits against Facebook and other social media companies are being keenly watched the world over as their outcome will be a pointer towards the way in which cyber space will be managed and governed in future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While Pakistan clearly seeks to maintain cordial relations with Iran, it is unlikely that it would be willing to incur the displeasure of Saudi Arabia with which it has greater economic and strategic links.
Imran Khan kept tradition alive by undertaking the very first prime ministerial visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is generally believed that Pakistani Prime Ministers seek spiritual guidance from the holy places in Saudi Arabia. As Imran Khan starts his innings, he surely needs the Almighty’s blessings to start the arduous task of steering the economy back from the brink, dealing with the deteriorating relationship with the United States which holds the purse strings of international financial institutions, and managing the challenges of instability in Afghanistan, among others. However, it is also true that Pakistani prime ministers make their first official visit to Saudi Arabia because of the practical reason of that country being a significant political and economic benefactor. Khan was genially welcomed by the Saudis and the doors of the Ka’ba were opened for him, which otherwise remain closed for other visiting Muslims.
Saudi Arabia’s importance to Pakistan is reinforced by two other aspects of Imran Khan’s visit. First, Khan’s visit took place in spite of his announcement that he would not undertake any foreign visit during the first three months as part of an ‘austerity’ drive. Khan making an exception to visit Saudi Arabia underlined that country’s importance “for which,” according to him, “the people of Pakistan have special love.” Second, Khan chose to visit Saudi Arabia even though it was President Hasan Rouhani of Iran who had extended an invitation to him first. Iran wants to have better ties with Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Javed Zarif was the first foreign official of his rank to meet Imran Khan in Islamabad to talk about improving bilateral relations.
Economic and Strategic Aspects
Pakistan has benefited enormously from Saudi Arabia – the Muslim world’s wealthiest nation – through generous financial aid, the supply of oil on a deferred payment basis and aid during crises. For instance, the Saudis provided a grant of US$10 million during the 2005 earthquake, $170 million during the 2010/11 floods, and a $1.5 billion grant when Pakistan faced an economic crisis in 2014. Of late, Saudi Arabia has once again come to Pakistan’s rescue by promising assistance worth $2 billion to stabilise a falling economy.
Besides, there are around two million Pakistani expatriates in Saudi Arabia, and they send back remittances worth over $5 billion every year. Though the trade balance is heavily skewed in favour of Saudi Arabia, the two countries are negotiating a bilateral treaty to help correct the imbalance to some extent. Pakistan has been arguing that “there is huge potential of bilateral trade lying unrealized between the two countries.” It has been importing mainly oil from Saudi Arabia and exports rice, meat, meat products, spices and fruits, footwear and leather goods, and chemicals. Pakistan’s service sector, it is said, has much more potential to expand.
Not only has Saudi Arabia helped Pakistan avoid major economic crises, it has also supported Pakistan’s defence by providing logistic support and financial assistance. For instance, the Kingdom assured Islamabad that it would supply 50,000 barrels of crude oil per day on a deferred payment basis in case Pakistan’s nuclear tests resulted in US and other European sanctions in 1998. In return, Pakistan has stood with Saudi Arabia diplomatically and militarily whenever the latter required such support. Nawaf Obeid, a former advisor to the Saudi Government from 2004 to 2015, summed up the relationship in 2004 thus: ‘We gave money and [the Pakistanis] dealt with it as they saw fit… There is no documentation, but there is an implicit understanding that on everything, in particular, on security and military issues, Pakistan will be there for Saudi Arabia’.
Strains in the Relationship
When, in 2015, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to join the coalition it was leading to undertake the ground offensive in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis, Islamabad refused and let it be known that it would prefer to stand “neutral” in the Iran-Saudi rivalry. The decision was taken keeping in mind the possible implications of joining the coalition on domestic politics and on bilateral relations with Iran. To pacify an upset Saudi Arabia, Pakistan subsequently allowed former Army chief General Raheel Sharif to head the Saudi-led coalition named “Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT)”. This latter decision was seen by many in Pakistan as not in the national interest and as violating the resolution passed by parliament in 2015 spelling out Pakistan’s “neutrality” in the Saudi Arabia-Iran conflict.
The Saudi-Iran conflict in West Asia has serious ramifications for Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia sees Iranian involvement and growing salience in regional politics as a threat to its security. Saudis argue that “Iran is at the root of numerous security problems now plaguing the Middle East” and that it should be prevented from challenging “1,400 years of majority Sunni domination.” The Saudis feel that their long-term ally, the United States, has grown disinterested about continuing to support the current regional order. To ensure its own dominance in the region, Riyadh has undertaken several measures to secure its interests in the region. It has initiated an expansion in its military capability, for which it allocated $64 billion in 2016. It has also formed IMAFT to check any challenge to its dominance.
Pakistan, for its part, is worried about India’s improving relations with West Asian countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. While Pakistan wants to maintain a delicate balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Saudis are not happy with this balancing game and want Pakistan to support them. In March 2018, Pakistan approved the despatch of 1,000 troops to Saudi Arabia as part of their extensive defence cooperation. The decision was taken immediately after General Qamar Bajwa’s visit to Riyadh on 2 February, which was his second in two months and came only a few days before Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Saudi Arabia on 6 to 8 February 2018. The decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia raised some eyebrows within the country, with some arguing that it would make Islamabad look like joining one of the camps in the Saudi-Iran rivalry, which was not in the national interest. It is also said that the decision was taken not only because of India’s growing ties with Saudi Arabia but also due to Iran’s engagement with India. Thus the move was directed at both countries. On one hand, it signalled Iran that Pakistan can jettison its “neutral” stand in the Riyadh-Tehran rivalry. And on the other, it was meant to convey to Saudi Arabia that Pakistan would be there when required.
Conclusion
By undertaking his maiden visit as Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia, Imran Khan underscored that Riyadh is going to remain a priority for Pakistan’s foreign policy. During the visit, Khan reiterated the traditional position that ‘We stand with Saudi Arabia’ in case of need. Highlighting that “Pakistan has tremendous opportunities of investment”, he sought a further strengthening of relations by inviting the Kingdom to invest in Pakistan. While the invitation to invest in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was later retracted by pointing out that CPEC is a bilateral project, Saudi investments in an oil refinery in Gwadar and the Reko Diq gold and copper mines in Balochistan are seen as positive developments.
While Pakistan clearly seeks to maintain cordial relations with Iran, it is unlikely that it would be willing to incur the displeasure of Saudi Arabia with which it has greater economic and strategic links. It remains to be seen how the Khan Government is going to retain the trust of the Saudis while at the same time not angering Iran which is an immediate neighbour.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Two factors explain Washington’s lack of enthusiasm for sanctioning Saudi Arabia over the Khashoggi affair despite domestic and international pressure.
Jamal Khashoggi’s killing in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018 has become a diplomatic embarrassment for the Kingdom. After news broke of his disappearance, Saudi authorities initially denied any knowledge of Khashoggi’s whereabouts and claimed that he had left the consulate within an hour. However, Turkish police began an investigation into the matter after receiving a complaint from Khashoggi’s Turkish fiancée, Hatice Cengiz, and revealed on October 6 that it has evidence of Khashoggi being tortured and killed inside the consulate. This news enraged global public opinion against Saudi Arabia including in the United States, leading to President Donald Trump demanding an explanation from Riyadh. Meanwhile, Turkish authorities demanded that they be granted access to the consulate for completing the investigation. Riyadh and Ankara eventually agreed to form a joint team which completed investigations including inside the Saudi consulate on October 18.
After over two weeks of silence and denials, Saudi Arabia confirmed on October 19 that Khashoggi was killed. A Saudi Press Agency report stated that preliminary investigations by the Kingdom’s Public Prosecution found that Khashoggi was killed in a brawl that “took place between him and the persons who met him during his attendance in the Kingdom's consulate in Istanbul.” The report further stated that 18 “individuals who are all Saudi nationals” are under investigation for their involvement in the killing. The same day King Salman issued a royal decree relieving from their positions Saud al-Qahtani, an adviser in the Royal Court, Ahmed al-Asiri, the deputy chief of intelligence, and three other intelligence officers.
President Trump’s initial response to these developments was to observe that the Saudi explanation seems “credible”. But he soon changed his stance under domestic pressure and said that it is “not-satisfactory.” The fact that Khashoggi was a permanent resident of the United States and a Washington Post columnist to boot has led to clamour among Trump’s political opponents and in the US media for holding Saudi Arabia responsible and taking punitive measures against the Kingdom. The administration, however, has been willing to give more time to Riyadh. While demanding a further explanation and through inquiry, President Trump has not blamed King Salman or Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the killing. He has refused to cancel the US$110 billion weapons deal that he had concluded with King Salman during his May 2017 visit to Riyadh, stating “I don't like the concept of stopping an investment of [US]$110 billion into the United States…things that create jobs.”
In the meanwhile, Turkey has kept up the pressure on Saudi Arabia by revealing details of the investigation to the media. Given Khashoggi’s proximity to some of the leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) including close associates of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish authorities have refused to participate in a cover up. Though Ankara has refrained from making any direct allegations against the Saudi leadership, President Erdogan has said that he will issue a statement on October 23 during the AKP’s weekly group meeting in parliament. He has also stated that several questions remained unanswered and need explanation. The semi-official Anadolu Agency has reported that during their October 22 telephonic conversation, Erdogan and Trump agreed on the need to “clear up” all the aspects of the case. However, given that Erdogan has been in touch with Trump on the issue and has been willing to talk to Saudi officials, he is unlikely to press for any punitive action against Riyadh.
Nonetheless, for President Trump, in addition to the domestic pressures, concerns of European allies have also become a factor. Many European leaders have called for a review of ties with Riyadh. Germany, for example, has urged all members of the European Union to stop selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. In a television interview, the German Economy and Energy Minister Peter Altmaier said that Germany “would not approve any new arms sales to Saudi Arabia and would urge other EU member states to follow this example.” He further said that Berlin believes that “it is important to adopt a common European stance,” and that “only if all European states are united, it would make an influence on the government in Riyadh.”
Despite the domestic and international pressure, the Trump administration is not inclined to take any significant punitive action against Riyadh. Two important factors explain Washington’s lack of enthusiasm for sanctioning Saudi Arabia over the Khashoggi affair. Firstly, sanctions will have a serious economic impact not only on the United States which has strong bilateral trade links with Saudi Arabia but also on the global oil market and might lead to a sharp rise in oil prices. Neither the United States nor other rising powers including India want oil prices to rise. Further, Saudi Arabia is one of the major contributors to trade and business in the US and Europe. Notably, Riyadh has vowed to retaliate against any international sanctions with a reminder that the world’s top oil exporter “plays an impactful and active role in the global economy.” More importantly, Riyadh is one of the top buyers of US defence equipment and weapons, which, in Trump’s view, brings much needed business and jobs to the United States and should not be hampered.
Secondly, Riyadh (along with Tel Aviv) is central to US policy in the Middle East. It has been a historical ally of the US and has been welcoming of Trump’s policies in the region. Since assuming office, President Trump has made several policy departures including the Obama policy of forging reconciliation with Iran by unilaterally withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between the P5+1 and Iran. While this was disliked by many, Riyadh and Tel Aviv welcomed the move as a significant step in curbing Iran’s growing regional influence and “expansionism.” Riyadh has also been forthcoming in showing support on the issue of the resumption of the Middle East peace process to resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Washington sees Riyadh as an important actor that has the ability to influence Arab and Islamic public opinion. And though King Salman was leading the Arab-Islamic opposition of the US move to shift its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, that has not affected the alliance between the two countries. The United States and Saudi Arabia are on the same page on various regional issues including Syria, Yemen and Libya.
Finally, Saudi Arabia has shown willingness to accommodate US concerns on the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by promising to thoroughly investigate the matter and punish those found guilty. King Salman has initiated action against intelligence operatives who, Turkey had revealed, were present in the consulate when the incident took place. The King has taken a reconciliatory approach towards Turkey by sending Prince Khaled al-Faisal, the governor of Mecca, to meet with President Erdogan and Turkish leaders to placate Turkish anger. Saudi Arabia has also denied the role of Crown Prince Bin-Salman in the entire issue. That means the three stakeholders, that is, Saudi Arabia, United States and Turkey, are willing to discuss and be accommodative of each other’s concerns.
Even though Trump remains unconvinced about taking serious punitive action against Saudi Arabia despite strong domestic and international pressure, the Khashoggi affair is indeed a serious breach of international diplomatic norms. It has not only momentarily affected Riyadh’s relations with Ankara and Washington but has also dented Saudi Arabia’s international credibility. Nevertheless, given the strong strategic and economic partnership between Washington and Riyadh, the Khashoggi affair is unlikely to affect US-Saudi relations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India
Riyadh committed a crime and blunder; its communication strategy, so far, has been an unmitigated disaster. MbS is facing a challenge, to put it mildly.
Seventeen days after the October 2 "disappearance" of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia officially stated that he was killed in its consulate in Turkey when he went there to collect papers permitting him to marry his Turkish fiancée Hatice Cengiz. The marriage had been fixed for October 3.
Cengiz had waited for hours in vain for Khashoggi to come out of the consulate and informed Reuters about his 'disappearance' on October 3. The same day, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) told the US news agency Bloomberg that he did not know where the journalist was and that consent would be given to Turkey to conduct an investigation inside the Consulate if it were to ask for one. MbS added that he 'had nothing to hide'.
On October 4, the Saudi Embassy claimed that the journalist had left the consulate and that it was trying to ascertain his whereabouts. Reports emerged on October 7 that Khashoggi was killed in the consulate, the veracity of which Saudi Arabia angrily denied. The next day, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, Prince Khalid bin Salman (brother of MbS) sent an unsolicited WhatsApp message to a journalist claiming that Khashoggi had left the consulate. The same day, unnamed Turkish officials told Reuters that Khashoggi had been killed inside the consulate.
On October 9, President Erdogan publicly asked Saudi Arabia to produce CCTV recordings of the journalist leaving the consulate. There was no response. The next day, Turkish officials said that the CCTV footage might have been sent to Riyadh on October 2 itself. On October 11, President Trump pointed out that the journalist was not an American citizen and that if sanctions are imposed Saudi Arabia would take its business elsewhere.
On October 16, CNN quoted an anonymous Turkish official as confirming that the journalist was killed inside the consulate. Trump brought in the theory that 'rogue killers' might have done it. The next day, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. On his return, Pompeo briefed Trump and it was announced that Treasury Secretary Mnuchin would not attend the high profile investment meeting "Davos in the Desert" personally hosted by MbS.
On October 19, Saudi Arabia revealed that Khashoggi was killed after a brawl with consulate officials. Later, an unnamed official claimed that the body was handed over to a local person for disposal. Subsequently, Riyadh asserted that the killing was carried out without the approval of MbS and that his instructions were to bring the journalist to Saudi Arabia.
We may note that the Turkish media was the first to report that Khashoggi had been killed on October 2 inside the Consulate, and that President Trump was the first to advance the theory of 'rogue killers' on October 16, three days before Riyadh took that position.
Trump has been saying different things at different times. But there is no doubt about his approach. He wants to do his utmost to preserve the close relations he has established with Saudi Arabia and which he chose for his first foreign visit as President. For him, Saudi Arabia’s purchase of American arms and its plans to invest in the US, not to speak of past investments in his own real estate ventures, are of great importance. His plans to damage Iran's economy and replace the current Iranian regime with another less unfriendly to the US and Israel need Saudi endorsement. His son-in-law Jared Kushner is a close friend of MbS and it is highly likely that Kushner promoted the elevation of MbS as the Crown Prince, overlooking the claims of other senior princes.
Trump has given different figures for the money the US gets from Saudi Arabia. The highest figures given by him so far are '$450 billion' accounting for 600,000 jobs. There is no question, Trump has made it clear, of losing that quantum of money.
However, Trump has come under pressure from the Congress to punish Riyadh. 40 legislators have written to him; some have threatened that if he does not act Congress will take matters into its own hands. It is too early to say what Trump will do, or will be compelled to do.
While Trump found the Saudi version 'credible', Germany, France, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and others disagreed with him. Essentially, these countries want an independent enquiry to bring out the full facts. Germany has specifically said that arms supplies should be suspended pending the conclusion of that enquiry. The much bruited about 'Davos in the Desert', a huge investment conference hosted by MbS and due to start on October 23, has been deserted by many Western ministers and CEOs. Reluctantly, Trump had to ask his Treasury Secretary to skip it.
The story put out by Riyadh that officials acted without the approval of MbS is not seen as credible by anyone except Trump. Turkey has signalled that it would not permit any 'cover-up'.
The chief flaw in the Saudi official account is the explanation about the body. An unnamed official has told the media that it was handed over to a local 'contractor' to dispose it off. Riyadh will be asked to say more about that 'contractor'.
Meanwhile, Turkish sources have claimed that the body was cut into pieces by using a bone saw and packed into bags; these bags were either taken to Riyadh or disposed off in the nearby forest. Turkish investigators are searching the forest.
Turkish sources have said that they have recordings of what happened when the journalist was killed in about 11 minutes of his entering the Consulate. The Consul General is heard pleading that the killing should not take place in his presence. The Consul General is back in Saudi Arabia. Further, Turkish sources have claimed that the Turkish staff was asked not to attend office on that fateful October 2.
The US has formally asked Turkey for the tapes and Turkey is likely to give it and make it public. The Congressional and media pressure on Trump will increase if the tapes are released.
It is important to realize that Saudi Arabia is in no position to retaliate if Trump were to suspend the delivery of arms, which are badly need for the ill-starred Saudi military intervention in Yemen. It is generally believed that Riyadh is chasing a mirage of military victory. Any decision to get tough with Trump will divide the royal family.
Trump is not dependent on MbS to the extent he (Trump) seems to indicate. On October 2, before the news of the 'disappearance' of Khashoggi caught the attention of the world, Trump addressed a "Make America Great Again" rally in Mississippi. Complaining about the US spending money to protect rich allies, he said:
"We protect Saudi Arabia. Would you say they're rich? And I love the King ... King Salman but I said 'King, we're protecting you. You might not be there for two weeks without us. You have to pay for your military."
Trump is right in believing that on a clear signal from him King Salman will be compelled to clip the wings of the Crown Prince. So far, the King has decided not to do any such clipping of wings and has merely asked MbS to reorganize the Security system that botched up the operation in Istanbul.
In short, Riyadh committed a crime and blunder; its communication strategy, so far, has been an unmitigated disaster. MbS is facing a challenge, to put it mildly.
Ambassador K P Fabian is the author of Diplomacy: Indian Style.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India
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