What pales the counter-terrorism regime is not that its procedures are cumbersome or that its working is not transparent, but that it only selectively raises the cost for those who inflict terror.
Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi was listed as an international terrorist to be subject to sanctions on May 1, 2019 by the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). He has been noted as the founder of the Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HUM/ Harakat-ul-Ansar) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), both of which had been listed as entities related to the Al Qaeda in October 2001. The listing was done in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2368 (2017), which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to improve the effectiveness of international efforts to prevent the disruptive activities of the waning Islamic State and its breakaway groups.1 India’s earlier attempt to list Masood Azhar was made in 2009 in connection with the serial explosions in Mumbai trains in July 2006, but was unsuccessful as both China and the United Kingdom opposed the listing.2 A renewed effort to list him began in February 2016 in the wake of the terrorist attack on an Air Force base at Pathankot in Punjab earlier that year.3 But this was move opposed by China, which first placed a technical hold on the decision and eventually blocked it in December 2016.4 Subsequently, in January 2017, the United States, United Kingdom and France approached the Committee a second time,5 which effort was also blocked by China. The latest attempt was made in the aftermath of the dastardly suicide terror attack in Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir in February 2019, and succeeded as much due to India’s diplomatic efforts as due to China’s geostrategic calculations.6
Masood Azhar’s is the latest in the long list of designations, numbering 262 individuals and 83 entities at present, made by the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee since 2001.7 This Committee is among the 14 sanctions committees currently working under the aegis of the UN Security Council. Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidan was among the earliest individuals listed on January 25, 2001 for his association with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Abu Sayyaf Group was among the earliest entities listed on October 6, 2001 for its association with and support to Al Qaeda.
In the present case, the gap of 18 years between the listing of the entity of Jaish-e-Mohammad and the listing of its leader is often cited by the Indian leadership as lamentable considering that the automatic designation of the leaders of a listed entity is stipulated in the guidelines for the procedure to be followed by the Committee.8 A lag between the two is, however, seen in many cases and is attributable to a combination of factors, including the requirement for consensus among all members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, and the need for incontrovertible evidence. In some cases, such as that of Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri of Al Qaeda, he was listed on January 25, 2001, months before the listing of Al Qaeda as an entity on October 6, 2001 in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; many others were listed simultaneously with the entity.
Among those who had been responsible for terrorist attacks in India, Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, wanted for his role in the bombing of the Mumbai stock exchange in 1993, was the earliest to be listed for his connection with the Al Qaeda and the Lashkar -e-Tayyiba (LeT) in November 2003. The LeT itself was listed on May 2, 2005, along with its front organisation the Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD). Its leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and senior members Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Haji Muhammad Ashraf and Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq were listed on December 10, 2008 within a month of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Arif Qasmani, who was linked to the July 2006 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and to the February 2007 attack on the Samjhauta Express was listed in June 2009, without much lag. Mohammad Yahya Mujahid, who headed the media unit of LeT since 2001 and had made several statements including on the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, was also listed on the same day. Another prominent leader Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi, who set up the LeT’s madrassa network and inspired the youth to undertake martyrdom in Mumbai in 2008, was listed in March 2012.
If India’s experience is anything to go by, diplomatic successes in this multilateral realm come after suffering very high domestic and personal costs inflicted by well entrenched terrorist networks. Since its inception in 1999, the counter-terrorism regime has evolved substantially, though under the shadow of geopolitics.9 From its origins as the 1267 Committee to its current incarnation, the Committee has developed a “governance and accountability system” that prevents arbitrary listing, improves the scope for delisting and creates a more robust review mechanism,10 all aimed at protecting fundamental human rights. It has been able to adopt resolutions that make it mandatory for states to adopt stringent measures to curb the activities of terrorist groups and their access to finances.11 It has been able to name and shame the perpetrators of heinous acts of terrorism, but this takes too much effort. Once the naming (read listing) is done, the entities and individuals face asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes, as may be applicable. However, there are no consequences for states that are lackadaisical in implementing these measures; and should the states fall short, the individuals or entities listed remain at large. Though not without its share of controversies, individuals who are indicted for crimes against humanity are also punishable by the International Criminal Court.12
What pales the counter-terrorism regime despite much progress is not that its procedures requiring consensus are cumbersome or that its working is not transparent, but that, in the fight against terrorism, it only selectively raises the cost for those who inflict terror. As a result, a regime that has otherwise done well to take morality away from terrorism, is failing to prevent the loss of innocent lives. In the evolution of the UN counter-terrorism regime, it is time that the shapers of the regime address this ethical aspect.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. The JeM has been alleged to have carried out terrorist attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly (October 2001), the Indian Parliament (December 2001), a Police Station in Gurdaspur, Punjab (July 2015), the army base in Uri in Jammu and Kashmir (September 2016), and the Indian embassy in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan (July 2018).
7. This assessment is based on the count of the Committee’s “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing”, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/narrative-summaries, accessed on May 2, 2019. The numbers do not include delisted individuals/entities. Also, after 2011, a separate Taliban sanctions committee was formed.
9. Samuel Makinda, “Global Governance and Terrorism”, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol.15, No.1, pp.43-58, DOI:10.1080/0951274032000044513.
10. Thomas Gehring and Thomas Dörfler, “Division of Labor and Rule-based Decisionmaking
Within the UN Security Council: The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime”, Global Governance, Vol. 19, 2013, pp. 567–587.
11. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss, “United Nations Policy: An Argument with Three Illustrations”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 10, 2009, pp.18-35.
12. Kennedy Graham, “The Security Council and Counter Terrorism: Global and regional Approaches to an Elusive Public Good”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17, Nos 1-2, pp. 37-65, DOI:
10.1080/09546550590520555
United Nations, Counter-Terrorism, Global Governance
The Easter bomb blasts is a grim reminder of how the undercurrent of ethno-religious violence remains a dominant factor in Sri Lanka’s chequered history.
The Easter Sunday carnage in which more than 250, mostly Christians, were killed is the most violent terrorist act in Sri Lanka since the end of the Eelam war in 2009. A terrorist attack on this scale involving the use of high-explosives in coordinated suicide missions on eight different targets by a relatively unknown entity, the National Towheed Jamath, reflects the state of complacency that has set in despite the receipt of prior intelligence. It is also indicative of the undue emphasis of the state security apparatus on the potential re-emergence of a LTTE type entity and the consequent focus on the northern province.
It is not that Sri Lanka was not aware of growing radicalism within the Muslim community, mostly generated by violence perpetrated against Muslims at the local level by groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Government officials have for long flagged concerns about Muslim youth who had gone to participate in the civil war in Syria. During the Rajapakse presidency, Muslims from Pakistan, India, Maldives, Bangladesh and some Arab countries who came to preach as part of Tabligh Jamaat were actually turned away at the airport due to the fear of radicalisation. There is, however, no history of animosity between Muslims and Christians that can place in context the Easter attacks. What does exist is a history of tension between the Sinhalese and Muslims since the end of the civil war. Many in the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress have even argued that Muslims are the new enemy of the Sinhalese. But an attack of this nature was not anticipated even by the Muslim community, although community leaders and some leaders of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress have been highlighting the trend of radicalisation due to the attacks orchestrated by the BBS, which many believe, had the blessings of the Rajapakse family.
Youths from well off families taking to suicide bombing is not a new phenomenon. In 2016, educated boys from affluent families caused mayhem in the Dhaka café attack. But Sri Lankan Muslim youth did not become radical or violent even after the LTTE had evicted their community and later bombed mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur killing nearly 300. Therefore, the question arises as to what prompted the latest suicide attacks and what has caused this turn of Sri Lankan Muslim youth towards radicalisation? Could this carnage have been prevented, as some argue including former President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brother former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse (who is also the next presidential candidate of Sri Lanka Podujana Peremuna)? Or did the rift between President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe ensure that the attack went through without any decisive countermeasures being taken even after the receipt of intelligence?
Factors of Muslim Alienation
Sri Lanka has a history of ethno-religious conflict. The first major conflict between Tamil speaking Muslims and Sinhalese occurred in 1915. After independence, Muslims were successfully co-opted by the Sinhala majority in order to wean them away from Tamils who began to demand a separate homeland and politically challenge Sinhala majoritarianism. After the end of the war with the LTTE in 2009, there was a discernible increase in violence against Muslims. Some argue that fringe Sinhala Buddhist extremists riding on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism searched for a new enemy and the Muslims fit their narrative. This should be seen in the context of the global portrayal of Muslims as extremists and radicals. The Buddhist-Muslim conflict in Myanmar and the attack on Buddhists in Ramu in Bangladesh fed the narrative of extremist groups like the BBS and Ravana Balaya. The drive against ‘halal’ certification, protest against Burqas, and attacks against Muslim business houses – all took place under the watchful eyes of the Rajapakse government. These included: the 2012 attack of Buddhist monks on a mosque in Dambullah which led to the relocation of the mosque; the attacks in Aluthgama in the South West coast of Sri Lanka in 2014; the attack on the Muslim owned fashion chain, the Fashion bug, in 2013; and, the March 2018 attack on Muslims in Kandy.
The NTJ, which is the main suspect for the Easter Sunday attacks, came into the limelight only recently. Moulavi Zaharan, a teacher in Kattankudy Madrassah and also one of the suicide bombers in the attack at Shangri La hotel, was well known for his hate speeches. There are reports that NTJ broke away from its parent organisation Towheed Jamath in December 2018, when, in a series of incidents, Buddha statues were broken in Mawanella in Kandy district. The Muslim Council of Sri Lanka had earlier warned the authorities about the activities of these radicals. In 2014, The Peace Loving Moderate Muslims in Sri Lanka (PLMMSL) had issued a statement urging the government to ban the Towheed Jamaat saying that “this movement has fast become cancer within Muslim community in Sri Lanka, preaching and practicing religious intolerance.”
Radicalisation of Muslims has been happening in Sri Lanka for several years now. In 2012, the country expelled nearly 160 members of the Tabligh Jamaat who had come on tourist visas to preach. Reportedly, around 100 Sri Lankan Muslim youths are believed to have joined ISIS. Some Muslims from Kerala who had joined ISIS are believed to have travelled through Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, which was part of the political alliance that the Rajapakse regime had crafted, highlighted growing radicalism and warned the government to take steps against the BBS which was behind several attacks on Muslims.
Failure of Intelligence?
When Muslims from the northern province were expelled en masse by the LTTE because it suspected them to be government informers, many settled in Puttalam in the north. In January 2019, the Sri Lankan military had discovered at a coconut farm in Lacktowatta in Wanathawilluwa in Puttalam a large cache containing 100 kilogrammes of explosives, 20 litres of nitrate acid, wire codes, two firearms, ammunition, a computer, a camera and a stock of dry food. Although investigations revealed that some Muslim youths were involved, it was taken as a one off occurrence. Intelligence inputs provided by India, which contained a more specific warning of an impending attack, was treated as a routine matter. Though a national alert was issued by the police chief, security was not beefed up in the church or the hotels located in the High security zone including the Cinnamon Grand which is not very far from the Prime Minister’s residence.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the government machinery was more focussed on the threat that LTTE sympathisers could pose and dismissed any threats that could be posed by radicalised Muslims. It also ignored the fact that Muslims from Sri Lanka have joined ISIS and local groups may have been infected by the latter’s radical narrative especially in the aftermath of several attacks on Muslims.
There could be several reasons for the terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday. Radicalised Muslims consider the state responsible for attacks on them. Sinhala speaking Christians were seen as part of the larger Sinhalese community. Increasingly, the state and the majority Sinhala community are seen as synonymous and responsible for the injustice meted to Muslims despite their support for the state against the LTTE.
Dysfunctional government
The politicisation of the suicide bombings has already began with the President and the Prime Minister blaming each other for the security failure. It is true that since October 2018 President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickramasinghe have been at logger heads. Sirisena, since his failed dismissal of Wickramasinghe, has been holding the portfolios of Police, Law and Order, and Defence. Differences between them had reached such a level that they even prepared to send two separate delegations to represent the country at the UN Human Rights Council, although sanity prevailed and a joint delegation was eventually sent.
The Prime Minister has publicly stated that he was not invited to National Security Council meetings and was kept out of the loop on issues concerning national security. Interestingly, the time and venue of these meetings were kept a secret to prevent the PM from attending. The resignation of the Defence Secretary only proves that the President does not want to take the blame. Some deep thinking is necessary as personal enmity between the President and Prime Minister has made government defunct for more than two years. Not surprisingly, former President Mahinda Rajapakse is exploiting the government’s failure to score political points. In an article published in the Colombo Telegraph, Rajapakse who wants to become Prime Minister, wrote, “The Easter Sunday attacks would never have taken place under our government… The armed forces personnel who carried out their duties on behalf of the nation were harassed and hunted down by this government…. I request the government to halt the persecution of the armed forces at least now.” This is a reference to the UNHRC resolution to fix accountability for human rights violations during the civil war.
In the wake of Sri Lanka’s worst terrorist carnage of the decade, the national narrative will turn its focus on security and the threat posed yet again by another minority. It is likely that the emergence of a national security state will empower the security apparatus at the cost of the minorities. Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism will triumph once again.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Belt and Road Initiative: An opportunity or risk for Africa?
Ruchita Beri
April 15, 2019
China's Belt and Road Initiative helps African countries in reducing the infrastructure gap in the region. However, it also leaves them open to the risk of unsustainable debt.
The forthcoming Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum meeting, scheduled to be held in Beijing in late April, has put the spotlight on the growing engagement of China with African countries. In the last two decades, China’s engagement with African countries has grown by leaps and bounds. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched by China in 2013, with the focus on funding infrastructure development projects, provides an opportunity for African countries to address the infrastructure deficit on the continent. African leaders have in turn prioritised infrastructure development as the main pillar underpinning national as well as regional development. This task requires significant financing and Chinese support in this regard will no doubt help them achieve their infrastructure goals. However, it also leaves these countries open to the risk of unsustainable debt and mounting dependence on China.
Belt and Road Initiative
BRI, also known as the One Belt, One Road initiative, was introduced by President Xi Jinping in September 2013.1 It involves China underwriting billions of dollars of investment in infrastructure projects to connect China with rest of the world, on the lines of the ancient Silk Road. It is an ambitious project straddling countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. This encompasses investments in infrastructure projects in various fields such as construction, power, transport, communication, and energy. China has proposed “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds,” as the five major goals of cooperation underlying the BRI.2
Initially, Africa found limited space in the conceptualisation of the BRI. However, over the years, the scheme has become an important part of the continent’s relationship with Africa. In fact, the declaration issued at the end of the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) notes that “Africa, being part of the historical and natural extension of the Belt and Road, has been an important participant in this initiative”.3 South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt were some of the initial countries to sign up to this project. In addition, China managed to get the support of Djibouti by opening its first overseas military support base in the country in 2017. As per the latest count, the African Union and 37 African countries have agreed to join the BRI.4
Opportunity or Risk?
There are a large number of BRI projects already being executed on the continent. It is to be noted though that some of these are pre-BRI infrastructure projects financed by China, to build ports, roads and railways all across Africa. A notable example is the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project in Kenya. President Uhuru Kenyatta signed the deal during his visit to China in August 2013.5 This connects Mombasa port with Nairobi and will eventually extend to other landlocked countries in East Africa such as Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.6
China’s increasing role in Africa, including its assistance in infrastructure development, is generating competing narratives across the continent. The first considers China as a partner in the progress of the continent. For decades, African countries looked towards traditional donors, such as the USA, France and the UK or multilateral institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) for addressing the huge infrastructure gap. However, the conditional terms of lending and emphasis on good governance have left them wary of continuing to look at these sources for infrastructure funding. In contrast, Chinese approach eschews conditionalities related to good governance or human rights and concentrates solely on the task of infrastructure building, which offers an attractive alternative for these countries.
African leaders often reiterate that cooperation with China through the Belt and Road Initiative will broaden the continent’s developmental prospects. President Kenyatta, while inaugurating the SGR, a BRI project, noted that this project “is a testament to the comprehensive China-Kenya relationship, which is based on mutual benefits” and “marks a transformative moment for Kenya and for Africa”.7 Moreover, for other land locked countries like Ethiopia, the BRI offers access to new markets such as Europe. Ethiopia has in recent years become a manufacturing hub, with the help of Chinese development assistance. The flagship BRI project in the country, the standard gauge railway line connecting Addis Ababa to a port of Djibouti, facilitates imports and exports.8
As against the above view, the competing narrative views Chinese involvement in the continent negatively. Voices in countries across Africa from Djibouti to Zambia accuse China of indulging in debt trap diplomacy. They claim that China has laden a number of countries with heavy debt and may exploit the defaulters by appropriating vital strategic assets. There are fears that Djibouti may face the same fate as that of Sri Lanka. In 2015, Sri Lanka ceded control of Hambantota port on a 99 years lease to China as it defaulted on repayment of loans. Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa, has a debt to Gross Domestic product (GDP) ratio of 88 percent, with China responsible for bulk of the debt. 9 It seems that China is tightening its grip over the Duraleh container terminal in Djibouti. In February 2018, Djibouti government announced that it was suspending its contract with the UAE based firm, DP World, to manage the port.10 The state owned China Merchant Holdings (CMP), the same company that is in control of Hambantota, owns 23.5 percent of the port. Thus speculation is rife that Djibouti government may cede Duraleh to China in the near future.
Similarly, in December 2018, a leaked report linked to the Kenyan auditor general claimed that the Mombasa port was used as collateral for the $3.2 billion loan from China for development of SGR, a BRI project.11 This leaves the Mombasa port exposed to seizure by the Chinese government in the event of a default. While both the Chinese and the Kenyan governments have denied the report, this development has opened a national debate. Many questions have been raised about the risks involved in borrowing from external powers for large infrastructure projects. China continues be a major bilateral lender, though multilateral institutions and traditional powers also contribute to Kenya’s overall external debt. 12
Hence the jury is still out as to whether China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an opportunity or risk for the African countries. It will depend on the African countries negotiating skills to navigate the future relations with the Asian giant to their benefit.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of people’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries” 7 September 2013 at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_66... ( Accessed April 10, 2019)
3. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, “ Beijing Declaration-Toward an Even Stronger China-Africa Community with a Shared Future” 12 September 2018 at https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594324.htm (Accessed on April 9, 2019)
9. John Hurley, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelanc, Examining the debt implications of belt and Road initiative from a policy perspective CGD Policy Paper 121, Washington: Centre for Global Development, March 2018
India needs a comprehensive space security architecture consisting of a dedicated Space Command for operational aspects as well as an exclusive Defence Space Research Agency to focus on scientific and technical aspects.
In a remarkable technological feat and a clear demonstration of national resolve, India conducted Mission Shakti, an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, on March 27, 2019 by successfully engaging an orbiting target satellite at an altitude of nearly 300 km. In the process, it emerged as the fourth member of the exclusive club of space powers (US, Russia and China) that have had demonstrated ASAT capabilities. Mission Shakti demonstrates the “nation’s capability to defend its assets in the outer space,” besides vindicating the technological competence of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the exclusive research and development (R&D) department of the Ministry of Defence. That the feat was achieved with a totally home-grown technology was not only an icing on the cake, but a big boost to the on-going Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme. Having achieved technological success and informing the world about India’s new deterrent capability in space, the DRDO has a few more crucial tasks to perform before making possible the full exploitation of outer space for military purposes.
ASAT and BMD Programme
The ASAT test of March 27 is significant for several reasons. Apart from gaining India global status and a greater say in international negotiations on outer space, the test’s real significance lay in the demonstration of the progress made in the BMD programme under which the DRDO is developing, in two distinct phases, a two-layered shield against hostile missile attacks. Under Phase-I of the programme, which envisages the interception of up to 2000 km range ballistic missiles in both the endo-atmosphere and exo-atmosphere in the altitude range of 15-25 km and up to 140 km, respectively, the DRDO has so far carried out 13 tests. With the required success achieved through these tests, Phase-I is now ready for operational deployment, possibly under the command of the Indian Air Force.
It is important to note that the missile used for the ASAT test was not part of the BMD programme’s existing interceptor missile inventory, namely the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for endo-atmospheric interception and the Prithvi Delivery Vehicle (PDV) missile for exo-atmospheric interception, though it has benefited from the DRDO’s various missile developmental programmes, including BMD. A brand new three-stage missile with two solid rocket boosters, weighing 18 ton and measuring 13 metres, was independently developed for the ASAT test after the government go-ahead about two years ago. Developing a new missile in a short span of time, with 150-odd scientists working around the clock for the past six months, is indeed an accomplishment for the DRDO which is often subject to criticism for time and cost overruns as well as performance shortfalls of many of its programmes.
The greater significance of the ASAT lies in its technological spin off for Phase-II of the BMD under which the DRDO aims to intercept longer range missiles of 5000 km range at a higher altitude of up to 400 km. It is important to note that though the target Indian satellite of the March 27 test was hit at a range of 283 km, the missile is actually capable of shooting down hostile objects moving at 10 km per second at a far higher altitude of nearly 1200 km. The technological capability for intercepting such a high velocity moving target at a higher altitude has a direct bearing on Phase-II of the BMD programme which envisages intercepting missiles travelling with a similar or lesser speed at a greater distance. Besides, the new missile developed for the ASAT test in record time will boost the confidence of DRDO scientists to undertake the development of more advanced missiles required for Phase-II of the BMD programme.
ASAT Test: What Next?
Having demonstrated the technical feasibility, it is only natural that India would move towards weaponising this capability and all the associated space technologies so as to effectively deter adversaries from destroying Indian space assets. Going forward, this is where equally important challenges lie. To weaponise the ASAT capability and related technologies would require the government’s support and provision of resources. More importantly, it also needs a comprehensive defence space security architecture encompassing a defence space command for operational control of the weapon, as well as a dedicated space research agency to harness the full military potential of space.
Defence Space Command
Though India has always advocated the peaceful use of outer space, the fact remains that space is increasingly being used by countries, particularly the US and China, for military purposes. China, which has made a giant stride in space capability, operates nearly 70 military satellites in orbit, which perform the tasks of communication, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Communication) and navigation. China also established a Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2015, integrating space, cyberspace and electronic warfare (EW) aspects into a joint command under the Central Military Commission.
Given this reality of the military utility of outer space, it is only logical that India exploits its new capability in the fourth domain of warfare to further national security interests. India made a modest beginning in this regard in 2001 by implementing a space based surveillance programme. A further impetus was provided when an Integrated Space Cell (ISC) was constituted in 2009 under Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) to coordinate the space-related aspects of the three defence forces. Now, this Cell needs to be upgraded to a dedicated defence Space Command to cater to all user services. It may be headed by a senior military officer, with a strong component of specialists from various scientific and technical organisations including DRDO, National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The Command would also be responsible for the operational aspects of all space based platforms and associated assets, besides laying out the strategy and doctrine for space warfare.
Defence Space Research Agency (DESRA)
In addition to establishing a Space Command, India also needs to create a dedicated Defence Space Research Agency (DESRA) to harness the entire spectrum of space technologies with defence applications. Such an agency may be set up under the DRDO, which has gained a head start in this crucial area. Suffice it to mention that, apart from the ASAT capability, DRDO has also developed an Electro-Magnetic Intelligence Satellite (EMISAT), which was launched on April 01, 2019. Besides, with the successful design, development and deployment of the Agni series of missiles, the DRDO has the requisite capability to meet the launch-on demand for urgent satellite launches. Some of the technologies and areas that DESRA should exclusively focus upon include:
Space Situational Awareness (SSA): Going forward, SSA would play a critical role in mapping and cataloguing space-borne objects, including those of potential adversaries, for the purpose of devising suitable counter strategies. This would require development and deployment of a vast network of telescopes, long-range radars, and space-based sensors and a dedicated pool of experts to undertake the required task.
SIGINT/COMINT/ELINT/IMAGEINT Satellite: All these complex and military grade satellites are primarily used for fulfilling specific military and intelligence community tasks ranging from active and passive intelligence gathering, communication mapping and imaging using advanced techniques like high resolution optical imaging techniques, hyper spectral and spectral mapping, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and other ELINT capabilities.
Formation Flying: To take advantage of the combined capability of a group of satellites flying in formation. Typically, swarm missions involving satellites are utilised for various tasks where orbiting satellites operate in various formations to achieve a variety of objectives ranging from killing adversary satellites to undertaking coordinated intelligence gathering operations.
Launch on Demand: To meet the urgent requirement of launching satellites in a matter of a few hours, if not days. This capability should include rapidly deployable launch vehicles, launch facilities (both mobile and stationary) and reconfigurable / retrievable launch vehicles, among others.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW): DEWs is fast emerging as an alternative to direct ascent ASAT missiles and are difficult to attribute to a source. DEWs include systems such as high power microwaves, precision high power lasers and light-directed energy capabilities. These technologies are essential since they provide an effective mechanism for contactless, non-kinetic means to achieve superiority in space.
Electronic Warfare (EW): It involves jamming and spoofing technologies to disturb the electromagnetic spectrum and other mission critical systems which are essential for conducting wars in a network centric environment. Some of the examples include global positioning system (GPS) / navigation system / communication system. Like DEWs, EW is also difficult to attribute to the source.
Rogue Satellites: Used to cause damage to adversary assets, these satellites use a combination of kinetic kill vehicles, high-power microwaves, lasers, jammers, robotic instruments and chemical sprayers.
Greater Sophistication of ASAT: The technology demonstrated on March 27 may require continuous upgradation, in terms of miniaturisation of the missile, a more capable thruster and seeker, as well as multiple launch options (ground-, air- and sea-based), to make it more effective.
Questions may be raised as to why India would need a DESRA-like agency while its existing civilian counterpart, ISRO, is doing a fabulous job in space launch and satellite manufacturing and assembly. The answer lies in ISRO’s civilian character, which enables it to access key technologies from other countries. ISRO is also committed to various international treaties that promote the peaceful, or non-military, uses of outer space. Changing ISRO’s character to an overtly military one may not be in the best interest of the organisation’s progress as well as the national interest. Hence the need for a military counterpart of ISRO.
Conclusion
With the successful conduct of Mission Shakti, India has demonstrated its capacity in space weapons. It has also demonstrated the increasing maturity of its Ballistic Missile Defence programme, the first phase of which is ready for operational deployment. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India now needs to weaponise the technology and, at the same time, harness all possible space-related military technologies to put in place an effective deterrent against potential adversaries. To achieve this, India has a few more tasks cut out before it. It needs a comprehensive space security architecture consisting of a dedicated Space Command for operational aspects of space weaponry and an exclusive Defence Space Research Agency under DRDO to focus on scientific and technical aspects that include, inter alia, space situational awareness; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; directed energy weapons; electronic warfare; formation flying; and rogue satellites. It is only when India has a deployable ASAT weapon and a range of other space related capacities and capabilities to deter adversaries, can it claim to be a true military power in outer space.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons, Space Technology, Space weapons
Given India’s dependence on imports for 90 per cent of its telecom equipment, the decision to allow Huawei to bid for 5G should be in line with the national interest, rather than taking sides and constraining options.
Well before 5G could make its first full-scale commercial deployment,1 it is caught in a global spat over alleged snooping charges which saw Chinese telecommunication equipment manufacturers being banned from the international markets. More than half a dozen countries have either got Huawei off their 5G trials or are revisiting the company’s role in their 5G roll-out plans. American prosecutors have pressed criminal charges against Huawei for bank fraud, theft of trade secrets and breach of American sanctions on Iran, and even arrested the company’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou2 in December 2018. In a pushback, Huawei filed a lawsuit earlier this month, challenging the US law that bans federal agencies from buying its products and services.
It is noteworthy that 5G has set global players such as Cisco, Samsung, Ericsson, Nokia and Huawei scrambling to secure their share of the pie. The GSM Association forecasts 5G connections to reach 1.1 billion, around 12 per cent of total mobile connections by 2025.3 The competition is not immune to politics and power play, especially when it is destined to be a money spinner and an enabler for a host of much-awaited next generation applications including self-driving cars and the Internet of Things.
Chinese telecom players however have had a troubled history. The US had blacklisted Huawei and ZTE Corporation way back in 2012,4 when the House Intelligence Committee concluded that they pose a national security threat on account of spying, stealing of intellectual property and potential ties to the Chinese Government.5 The House Intelligence Committee could not ascertain the corporate structure, history, ownership, operations, financial arrangements and the management of Huawei, and recommended that the Committee on Foreign Investment must block acquisitions, takeovers or mergers involving Huawei and ZTE and government systems. In particular, sensitive systems should not include Huawei or ZTE equipment including component parts. The National Defense Authorization Act – signed in August 2018 – forbids government agencies from procuring telecommunications equipment or services produced or provided by Huawei and ZTE Corporation.6
Apprehensions over State influence in Huawei’s operations and products also stem from its founder Ren Zhengfei’s close ties with the Chinese Government and his previous employment with the engineering corps of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and thereafter in a state owned enterprise. Ren is not an ordinary serviceman; he was invited to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1982. Huawei is the face of China’s growing technology prowess that was initiated in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. Founded almost a decade later in 1987 at Shenzhen coastal special economic zone, Huawei now supplies products and builds solutions for around 1500 telecom networks in 170 countries, which helps connect one third of the world’s population.7
Figure 1: Mobile Infrastructure Market Share - 2017 Source:IHS Markit
Over the last three decades, Huawei has carved out largest share in the global cellular base station market, pegged at 28 per cent8 (see Figure 1) with its telecom equipment revenue as large as Nokia and Ericsson put together.9 More than technology, cost effectiveness has helped Huawei a great deal; its equipment is said to be 20 to 30 per cent cheaper than the ones Nokia and Ericsson have to offer. Apparently, the US led allegations have not made any significant dent in Huawei’s revenue but has certainly kept Huawei on its toes all the while.
A Desperate Bid
As a fallout of the American ban, States both within and outside the “Five Eyes” (an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US and UK) are revisiting their relationship with Huawei and ZTE Corporation. These entities, over the years, have made inroads not just in the telecom equipment manufacturing segment, but also in research and development,10 and a host of operations and business support services. In a bid to address the mounting concerns of the United Kingdom (UK) Government and intelligence agencies, Huawei had even set up a Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) in 2010 – an independent security testing lab – entirely at its own cost. Huawei has left no stone unturned to assure Western governments and law makers that it is not a security threat. In 2011, it had published an open letter addressed to the US Government denying allegations levelled against it and reassuring that Huawei equipment is not a threat to its national security. The letter had clarified that it receives tax incentives from the Chinese Government, similar to the US companies, as support for some research and development initiatives.11
A similar letter addressed to Australian members of parliament (MPs) had surfaced in June last year12, amidst espionage concerns and possibilities of exclusion from the 5G roll-out from Australia. More recently, the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee asked Huawei for an explanation to both: the rising security concerns among members of “Five Eyes” alliance13 and the technical issues in its engineering processes raised in the report of HCSEC Oversight Board in July 2018.14 Again, in an open letter, Huawei refuted the concerns, and the reply was no different from its previous attempts to douse the fire. However, Huawei promised to invest US$ 2 billion over the next five years to improve its software engineering capabilities.15 Table 1 summarises the status of Huawei in the 5G roll-out across different countries, both within and outside “Five Eyes” alliance.
Table 1: Status of Huawei on 5G
Country
Impacted TSPs
Status of Huawei on 5G
US
AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon
Recommendations of the House intelligence committee in 2012 led to a ban on Huawei and ZTE Corporation on account of spying, stealing of intellectual property and potential ties to the Chinese Government.
National Defense Authorization Act of August 2018 forbids government agencies from using technology from Huawei and ZTE Corporation.
Australia
Vodafone, Optus and TPG
In 2012, Huawei was blocked from the bidding for the Australian National Broadband Network.
One of the first responders, Australian Government blocked Huawei and ZTE from providing 5G technology equipment in August 2018.16
New Zealand
Vodafone NZ, Spark
New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau blocked its top telecom firm from using Huawei equipment for its 5G mobile network in November 2018.17
However, there has been no final decision and New Zealand still has not ruled out Huawei from 5G network upgrade.18
UK
O2, Vodafone UK, BT
In December 2018, British Telecom said it would remove Huawei’s equipment from its existing 3G/4G mobile operations.
UK maintains the stance that any risks posed by Huawei can be mitigated.
Canada
Telus, Bell Canada
Canada is currently considering whether to Huawei from providing equipment for 5G cellular networks.19
Germany
Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Telefónica
Germany’s 5G spectrum auction began on March 20, 2019, and the government has not excluded Huawei from providing networking equipment.20
Germany has been vocal about its unwillingness to ban Huawei from building its 5G networks.21
France
Orange, Iliad
France does not plan to ban Huawei. Instead, it is stepping up controls and safeguards in telecom infrastructure for the next-generation networks in the form of a new amendment to draft business legislation.22
Orange has confirmed it will not be using Huawei as a 5G kit supplier in France.
Japan
NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Rakuten
In December 2018, Japanese Government banned Huawei and ZTE Corporation from official contracts for its upcoming 5G infrastructure. The top three telecom operators followed suit.23
India
Airtel, Vodafone Idea Ltd.
Huawei had received an invitation from the government in September to conduct 5G trials in India, along with Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung and Cisco.24
There is ambiguity as in late February the Telecom Secretary said that the government is yet to take a decision on whether to allow Chinese equipment makers or not.
A Power Play?
The global response to Huawei’s role in 5G implementation has been mixed. The US is both persuading and pressurising its allies and members of the “Five Eyes” to do away with Huawei from their 5G deployment plans. During the 2019 Munich Security Conference, US Vice President Mike Pence called on security partners of the US to reject Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies.25 Within the “Five-Eyes”, Australia was quickest to follow suit. Germany and UK on the other end do not seem to be caving in to the American pressure, although the US has threatened to restrict intelligence sharing with allies who do not comply with its call for a ban on products and services from Chinese telecom majors. Meanwhile, China’s Ambassador to Canada has warned Ottawa of “repercussions” if it drops Huawei from its 5G plans. Both Canada and New Zealand, caught in a tug of war between China (economic reasons) and US (security reasons), are playing their cards cautiously and buying time before taking the final call.
From business point of view, the US does not have much to lose as 90 per cent of its wireless infrastructure rests on equipment from Ericsson and Nokia.26 For over six-seven years US has kept Huawei and ZTE Corporation at bay, although they are much more integrated to the telecommunications infrastructure among other countries listed in Figure 1, especially Huawei. Out casting Huawei and ZTE Corporation from the international market will have consequences both for the developed and developing economies. A retrospective ban means telecom service providers would need to spend a fortune in retro-fitting network gear. Already skewed profit margins mean that telecom service providers will quite likely pass on the cost to the customers. Taking a major player down can also shoot the prices up for 5G deployment, which is not a favourable case for developing economies.
If the US dogma is fuelled by technology competition, then this certainly is not the right way to quell the competitors. If it is about technology protectionism, then it may seriously undermine global technology research, innovation ecosystem and supply chains. And, if it is about power politics, then middle powers and growing economies are going to pay the price. Germany and UK stand out in this brawl, with a relatively mature and thoughtful approach. A threat to the US does not necessarily equate to a threat to other countries. There is no apparent reason for India either to blindly ban Huawei from its own 5G roll-out plans. However, the final decision should be based on an independent review of Huawei’s telecommunications equipment and the respective security situation. As the negative sentiment against Huawei grows, India can perhaps leverage the opportunity to bargain a better price from the global players for the roll-out of its 5G services. It could also be used as a bargaining chip to correct the trade imbalance vis-à-vis China.
India however would need to tighten few lose ends at the security front domestically and walk a tight rope at the political front internationally. The Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Rules 2017 provision mandatory testing and certification for telecom equipment prior to sale or import in India, under the Mandatory Testing and Certification of Telecom Equipment (MTCTE) rules of the Telecom Engineering Centre (TEC).27 Performance testing encompasses safety of the equipment with radio interface, its immunity to electrostatic discharge, operating frequency, output power and conformance to receiver and transmitter parameters.28 The deadline for enforcement of MTCTE procedure has already been pushed from April 01 to August 01, 2019.29 Moreover, there is acute ambiguity over the status, functioning, capacity and competence of Security Lab under the TEC30, whose role is critical in the aftermath of snooping allegations on Chinese equipment manufacturers. Security lab of such significance and scope should possess the competence to rip apart a telecom gear and review the components at both source-code and hardware levels.
India’s decision to allow Huawei to bid for India’s 5G infrastructure development and continue its investments in manufacturing and R&D should be in line with its own national interest, rather than taking sides and constraining options. For India, whose 90 per cent of telecom equipment (worth US$ 21,847.92 million31) is imported,32 the concerns over foreign surveillance would always loom large, whether it is Huawei (China), Nokia (Finland) or Ericsson (Sweden). Since domestic production is a bridge too far, it is the ability to test and verify security aspects of the imported equipment that can mitigate the risks and instil confidence in the near term.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Meng Wanzhou is the daughter of the company's founder Ren Zhengfei. She is facing extradition proceedings in Canada where she was arrested in December at the request of the US.
4. The ban also covers video surveillance and telecommunications hardware produced by China’s Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company and Dahua Technology Company. See Catherine Shu, “New defense bill bans the U.S. government from using Huawei and ZTE Tech”, TechCrunch, August 13, 2018 (accessed March 18, 2019).
30. Scope is mentioned as “testing the security features of all types of IP and telecom / ICT equipments in access, transport, control and application layers of wireless and wireline domain deployed in the telecom network e.g. NGN, IMS, LTE etc.” See “Scope of Telecom Security Test Lab”, Telecommunication Engineering Centre, Government of India (accessed March 22, 2019).
The Balakot Strategic Shift – Needed a ‘Counter Proxy War’ Doctrine
G.G. Dwivedi
March 28, 2019
There is an urgent need to formulate a ‘Counter Proxy War Doctrine’ that integrates diplomacy, defence, development and other tools of hard and soft power.
26 February 2019 marked a turning point in India’s fight against terrorism. The events of that day signified a strategic shift in the Indian approach from ‘Counter Terrorism’ operations inside own territory to ‘Counter Proxy War’ inside Pakistan. This change from a defensive to an offensive approach manifested itself in the form of the pre-emptive strike by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft against a Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM) training camp at Balakot in Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa, a non-military target across the International Border (IB). India’s actions against Pakistan sponsored terrorist groups has until then been confined to the Line of Control (LoC), primarily by way of fire assaults.
According to Ashley Tellis, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons serve multiple purposes against India: licence for open ended terrorism, deterrence against conventional retaliation, and catalytic device to seek international intervention to restrain Indian retribution. Pakistan’s grand strategy has been based on the assumption that there are only two steps in the escalatory ladder, ‘sub conventional war’ and ‘nuclear war’, with no space for conventional operations in between. But the IAF strike at Balakot has shaken Pakistan out of this assumption, and in the process shattered two myths. First, Islamabad’s sense of impunity in perpetrating cross border terrorism, given New Delhi’s long practised policy of strategic restraint. And second, its nuclear arsenal acting as a protection against India’s conventional retaliation.
Over the past seven decades, the corner stone of Pakistan’s national policy has been its obsession with India as an existential threat. To deal with this illusory challenge, Islamabad persistently sought strategic parity vis-a-vis New Delhi. Having repeatedly failed to achieve its grand objectives through conventional war, the Pakistan Army changed its strategy in the early 1980s. The fuelling of militancy in Punjab marked the beginning of Pakistan’s ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC) warfare against India. Around this time, President Zia’s policy of Islamization including of the military redefined its motto; Iman (faith), Taqwa (abstinence) and Jihad (war in name of god). In pursuit of its ‘bleed India strategy’, the Pakistan Army unleashed a ‘Proxy War’ in Kashmir towards the late 1980’s. The mainstay of this new game was Pakistani jihadi terrorist outfits, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and later Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), complemented by Hizbul Mujahidin (HM) cadres.
Ironically, India’s approach of dealing with the Pakistan sponsored ‘Proxy War’ as ‘cross border terrorism’ was a strategic blunder. What this resulted in was a tactical response: the adoption of a counter infiltration posture astride the LoC and establishment of a ‘Counter Insurgency’ grid in the hinterland. There was no action plan to take on the jihadi breeding grounds inside Pakistan or raise the costs for the Pakistan Army – the real perpetrators of the new form of warfare. This ‘low cost-high return’ option served Rawalpindi well, evident from the fact that, during the last three decades, the Indian security forces suffered over 5000 fatalities. Despite eliminating some 21000 terrorists during this period, the security situation in the Kashmir Valley remains volatile.
Strategic Shift
In response to the deadly terrorists attack carried out by JeM cadre on the Indian Army base camp in Uri on 18 September 2016, a retaliatory surgical strike was conducted by the Special Forces, targeting the terrorist launch pads across the LoC. The action was intended to give a clear political message to Pakistan, defining India’s threshold. Pakistan, following its traditional ‘policy of denial’, dismissed India’s claim of surgical strikes and chose not to react; thus remaining undeterred and continuing with the proxy war.
JeM owned up responsibility for the dastardly suicide attack on the CRPF convoy at Pulwama on 14 February 2019 which claimed more than 40 lives. However, Pakistan authorities as usual sought proof to act against the outfit. Given India’s past response to major terrorist strikes, be it on Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008, Pakistan felt assured that India’s response will be muted, at best a repeat of the 2016 type surgical operation, for which its forces were well prepared. Hence, the 26 February aerial strike at Balakot came as a shook for the Pakistani political and military leadership.
Making a departure from its ‘denial strategy’, Islamabad confirmed that the IAF aerial strike did take place but declared that there was no damage. However, the prompt retaliation by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) employing a package of some 20 fighter aircraft the next very day vindicated India’s claims of the effectiveness of the Balakot strike. In the ensuing dog fight, Wing Commander Abhinandan piloting a MIG 21 (Bison) brought down a PAF F-16.
As a politico-military action, the Balakot operation was an astounding success. It achieved the strategic aim of conveying a clear message to Pakistan that, here on, the proxy war will be fought on its soil. The Pakistan military also felt the heat. The international community stood by India and even Pakistan’s closest allies, China and Saudi Arabia, were rather tight lipped in their response, advocating restraint. The PAF’s employment of F 16 jets, in violation of the purchase condition that they would be used only for defence and counter insurgency operations within own territory, came under close scrutiny.
Due to intense international pressure and the fear of being black listed, Pakistan has commenced action against some terrorist organizations by banning the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Fallah-e-Insaniyat (FeF). JeM Headquarters at Bahawalpur has been reportedly taken over by the local administration. Some 144 terrorist have been arrested including the son and brother of JeM chief Masood Azhar. These actions are of cosmetic value as such measures have been taken earlier too.
In the prevailing environment, Pakistan’s effort is to somehow wriggle out of the log jam it finds itself in. Its likely strategy in the near future would be to scale down the intensity of terrorist activities to small actions by local militants. After the situation de-escalates, Pakistan is expected to be back at its game, may be with greater vigour, as spare Taliban hands from Afghanistan could well be diverted to the Kashmir Valley.
Way Ahead
China, Pakistan’s all-weather ally, has used Pakistan as a low cost option to checkmate India. To demonstrate solidarity with Islamabad, Beijing blocked for the fourth time the move at the UN Security Council to declare Masood Azhar a global terrorist, showing utter disregard for international opinion.
Pakistan as a State is a combustible mix of religion and politics. Its Army runs the nation’s foreign and defence policies, with nuclear weapons and terrorists serving as strategic assets. Therefore, the odd aerial strike by India is not going to change Pakistan’s basic strategy of ‘proxy war’. Until Pakistan takes irreversible actions to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and provides verifiable proof, India must not let Islamabad off the hook. This implies making cross border terrorism a cost prohibitive option for Rawalpindi.
There is an urgent need to build credible capability to thwart the Pakistani design of destabilising India. The growing China-Pak nexus is a reality which cannot be wished away. Ironically, due to the neglect of military modernization, the Indian Army has been repeatedly pitched against a better equipped enemy. To address this serious flaw, a concerted effort is needed to accelerate the capacity building of our Armed Forces. This entails enhancing defence budgetary allocations, fast-tracking arms cum equipment acquisition procedures and indigenization of defence production.
In tune with Joseph Nye’s conception of ‘Smart Power’, India needs to combine its resources into a successful strategy through the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defence, development and other tools of hard and soft power. In other words, defeating Pakistan’s Proxy War is a national effort demanding the employment of all components of ‘National Comprehensive Power’.
There is an urgent need to formulate a ‘Counter Proxy War Doctrine’ that is multi-pronged and all-encompassing. There has to be a ‘zero tolerance policy’ against Pakistan providing safe haven to terrorists. A relentless diplomatic offensive to isolate Islamabad must be sustained and cooperation with nations like Iran, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, which too are victims of Pakistan sponsored terrorism, must be scaled up. On the economic front, a concerted effort is required to tighten the noose around Pakistan through international bodies like the IMF and FATF. Militarily, all options must be on the table including covert ones, to punish Islamabad if it continues with its misadventure. Simultaneously, internal fault lines need to be addressed on priority.
The writer is a former Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff and currently a Professor of International Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s ASAT Test: Joining the Arms Race in Outer Space?
A. Vinod Kumar
March 28, 2019
An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival.
When the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) undertook an interception of a dysfunctional satellite in low-earth orbit in February 2008, the agency used the ballistic missile defence (BMD) interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), fired from a Aegis-class destroyer deployed in the Pacific Ocean to successfully complete that mission.1 A year before China had undertaken its first ever Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 using the KS/SC-19, which Western observers claimed was a reconfigured DF 21-C or DF-25, the same platform that supposedly doubled up as the Chinese mid-course interceptor for its first BMD test in January 2010.2 The first Indian demonstration of ASAT capability on 27 March 2019 also used a long-range BMD interceptor that is currently being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Besides the use of BMD platforms for ASAT applications, what is the common thread in the ASAT tests by these powers competing in the space frontier? All of them, by word or deed or a combination of both, have been ardent advocates of mitigating arms race in space, and yet have contributed in considerable measure towards the militarization of outer space.3
Though the US has largely been averse to negotiations on treaties to prohibit the weaponisation of space, there has been general consensus (since the post-Strategic Defense Initiative days) among successive US administrations until recently against steps that could trigger an arms race in outer space.4 While the current Trump Administration has been hyper about the need to harness the space frontier for military applications as also ‘space basing’ of missile interceptors, the Pentagon has no platforms that could shoot down missiles from space.5 All the while, it has to be noted that Washington did not claim the SM-3 interception in 2008 as an ASAT test, but only described it as a real-time satellite interception by a BMD system. The caution can be attributed to the US criticism of the Chinese ASAT test in the previous year as a provocative step towards space weaponisation. Equally amusing could be the fact that both Russia and China had censured the US for risking their space assets through the SM-3 test–all of which demonstrate the oddities of great power behaviour when it comes to the space domain.
China and India too have been vociferous votaries of legal instruments against the weaponisation of, or arms race in, outer space. Besides partnering with Russia on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and demanding a treaty banning weapons in outer space, Beijing had been profoundly critical of the US BMD programme by terming it as an effort to militarise the space frontier.6 China’s eventual decision to conduct both ASAT and BMD tests is evidence of the fact that great powers cannot abstain from technological races where their rivals have a clear edge or can swing the strategic balance. The Indian ASAT test has to be seen in this context, and follows a techno-strategic trajectory that might not be linear to the Chinese course of action but certainly illustrates the prevalence of a security dilemma and the urge to come up with technological ripostes to its arch rival.
The ASAT-BMD Overlap
With an altitude range of close to 200 km, the SM-3 could intercept missiles both within the Earth’s atmosphere (endo-atmosphere) and beyond (exo-atmosphere). Yet, it was intriguing that for the 2008 interception the MDA preferred the SM-3 over the Ground-based Mid-course Defence (GMD) system, which was the flagship BMD for outer space interception, though at that point struggling with development failures. The intention then was seemingly to signal that the interception was driven by a safety contingency (of a ‘cold’ satellite falling to Earth with toxic debris likely to hit population centres) and that a system that could destroy the vehicle just before atmospheric re-entry could be used to ensure that space assets in low-earth orbit are not affected.
Interestingly, the Chinese ASAT test, even if only a demonstration of capability, also targeted a falling weather satellite, though Beijing did not bother to espouse any ‘civilian’ applications except for stating that the test was not targeted against any country. That the same platform (an IRBM or MRBM) was used to undertake an exo-atmospheric BMD interception underlines the overlap of BMD and ASAT missions, on the one hand, and strategic forces, on the other.
On similar lines, the Indian test of March 27 is also a decisive demonstration of capability, albeit with ambiguous intent. The bigger significance of the test, however, lies in its latent indication that India has attained the capability for exo-atmospheric interception of long-range missiles in their mid-course. Though targeting algorithms for ASAT and ballistic missile interception in outer space might be markedly different, the FAQ put out by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) on March 27 confirmed that the ASAT test was done using the long-range interceptor of the BMD programme, christened as the AD (PDV 1 & 2).7 While the anticipated DRDO statement could provide greater clarity on this aspect, this demonstration of exo-atmospheric interception is a major milestone for the BMD programme. Having worked on two endo-atmospheric systems – Advanced Air Defence (AAD) and Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) –for more than a decade, the DRDO has been struggling on the long-range system for exo-atmospheric interception, reportedly hampered by the absence of a long-range tracking radar.8 While the Israeli Green Pine radar with a range of 600 km was the mainstay for earlier systems, the DRDO and the Indian Air Force have been working on extending its range beyond 1000 km in order to guide the PDVs towards precision interception using Agni platforms.
Consequently, the first PDV test of April 2014 could not achieve interception at a range of 120 km, although the DRDO claimed that the mission was successful (in terms of inertial guidance and target seeking).9 While the second PDV test in February 2017 was reported as a success, the DRDO has been cautious in hastening a tight test schedule for the PDV, or in declaring early successes, as was done in the case of PAD and AAD.10 The March 27 test, even if for an ASAT, thus indicates a breakthrough for the DRDO. This is also indication that an actual mid-course BMD test using the PDV might soon be in the offing, which, if successful, could be the more significant accomplishment than the ASAT test.
What India’s ASAT intends to achieve?
Notwithstanding the sense of ‘national accomplishment’ associated with the announcement, the FAQ issued by the MEA points to a lack of clarity and the role of exogenous factors driving the ASAT test. The MEA document states that the test was done “to verify … the capability to safeguard our space assets.” This is a problematic contention. An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any space asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival (China seems to be the only threat), a fact, which, though, has not found mention in any statements.11
The FAQ also justifies the test citing India’s Mangalyaan and Gaganyaan programmes, its legacy of 102 spacecraft missions and criticality of the space programme, none of which, though, constitute a rationale for an ASAT capability. There are many space-faring nations (and communities like the European consortium) with far greater numbers of assets in space, but none is considering the need to defend them using ASAT systems. Undoubtedly, competing with China seems to be the only driver for this test. However, considering that China is far ahead in strategic technologies, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV), Directed-Energy weapons and MaRVs (manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles), it would be unwise for India to seek to match China on a competing scale. As a developing nation with scare resources for defence technological development, India cannot afford to divert massive resources on fictitious and hypothetical scenarios like space wars. Greater emphasis should, instead, be on addressing formidable gaps in India’s air-delivery platforms, air defence and propelling the mid-course interception capability towards fruition.
Finally, there is the question of the moral high ground, which the hyper-realists dominating Indian policy debates may pooh-pooh. The FAQ itself lists India’s lofty commitment to global efforts in mitigating arms race and weaponisation of outer space. As a supposed party to major international treaties relating to outer space, and having committed to ongoing initiatives like PAROS and No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, there is no moral basis to go against this grain and initiate actions that amount to a weapons race in outer space. What is the realpolitik being pursued when India plans to play a future role in drafting a legal instrument to prevent arms race in this domain, as the FAQ claims, after substantially contributing to the same race (as only the fourth country to develop this capability)? This is a game the Cold War era great powers played and which India has hitherto desisted from. No convincing reasons can be seen to change that historic course!
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. This could be distinguished from ‘weaponisation’ of outer space, which entails the deployment of weapon systems on outer space platforms. In principle, the entry of a weapon system, be it a ballistic missile or a directed-energy weapon, could be seen as both militarization and weaponisation of the space frontier, though many experts may not agree with the contention that the passage of an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in its mid-course phase through outer-space should be seen as a weaponisation process. Nonetheless, the targeting and destruction of an outer space asset with a weapon system carries the implicit connotation of weaponisation.
4. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as ‘Star Wars’, was an ambitious initiative by the Ronald Reagan Administration to deploy directed energy weapons (Brilliant Peebles) that could destroy missiles, a game-plan that Reagan insisted will make ‘nuclear weapons obsolete’.
8. It has to be noted that the PAD, with 60-80 km altitude range, only qualifies to be an endo-atmospheric interceptor, though for unknown reasons the DRDO had for many years projected it as an exo-atmospheric system.
9. See DRDO press release, at: http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/dpi/press_release/pdv.pdf, accessed May 2014. A senior DRDO official later confirmed to this author that the interception could not be achieved, and that more tests have to be conducted on the PDV before declaring it fit for deployment.
11. The attainment of ASAT capability, in fact, gives India the luxury of dynamic offensive options in a future conflict scenario, including the possibility of its deployment to degrade Pakistan’s space assets in an act of pre-emption or retaliation. Currently, however, the posture seems to be largely designed for China, the only other power whose ASAT systems that India could feel threatened by.
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons, Space weapons
India at the OIC: Recognition of a Rising Global Power
Sujan R. Chinoy, Md. Muddassir Quamar
March 25, 2019
The best option would be for India to continue to work with individual members of the OIC to establish friendly relations and deepen bilateral cooperation, and work to negate the machinations of Pakistan within the OIC.
On March 1, 2019, history came full circle. In an epochal development, India participated as the “guest of honour” in the 46th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held in Abu Dhabi. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj represented India at the meeting in response to an invitation from Foreign Minister His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates. Coming within days of the Pulwama attack by the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the retaliatory Indian airstrike, her presence at the OIC held exceptional significance for India’s relations with the OIC.
In a magisterial address that symbolized the self-confidence of Naya Bharat (New India), Minister Swaraj took the high ground and congratulated the OIC on completion of 50 years and for its rich contributions, but more importantly, issued a rallying cry about the adverse impact of terrorism in West and South Asia and called for the dismantling of infrastructure that provides shelter and funding to terrorists. She urged the OIC to make the right choices in a world in flux, and to work together with India, a rising economic power, to promote peace and development. The Indian ethos of peace and non-violence and India’s syncretic culture that includes a long history of Islam, were important highlights in a speech that was bound to be thought-provoking for the gathering.
The importance of the invitation to New Delhi lies in the fact that India attended an OIC meeting for the first time since the diplomatic embarrassment at the first Islamic Summit in September 1969 held in Rabat, Morocco. India was invited to be “represented at the government level” to attend the summit but eventually was kept out of the final session which adopted the communique due to opposition by the then Pakistani President General Yahya Khan. The Pakistani leader had taken exception to the participation of an official delegation of the Government of India instead of a representation from “the Muslim community of India”. In 2019, however, Pakistan failed to block India’s participation and, in an unprecedented act of pique, chose to absent itself at the plenary session of the conference. Pakistani theatrics did not cut much ice with either the host UAE or with other OIC members including Saudi Arabia.
In addition to its historical significance, India’s participation in the OIC meeting is important on four counts. Firstly, ever since the OIC’s inception, Pakistan has used the platform to spread canards about the so-called mistreatment of Muslims in India and to alienate India from the Islamic world. Moreover, Islamabad has used the forum to internationalize issues concerning Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). At Pakistan’s initiative, the OIC has established a ‘contact group’ on J&K, which has facilitated the adoption of several ‘resolutions’ and ‘special declarations’ that are critical of India. The pattern has been repeated at OIC meetings almost every year since the 1990s. For example, the 45th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Dhaka in May 2018 adopted a ‘resolution’ (No. 8/45-POL) on the J&K issue emphasizing “that Jammu and Kashmir is the core dispute between Pakistan and India and its resolution is indispensable for realization of the dream for peace in South Asia.” Moreover, OIC has at times asked India to allow “fact finding” teams to visit J&K to investigate alleged human rights violations. New Delhi, expectedly, has taken umbrage and rebuffed these as interference in its internal affairs. Although Indian participation as “guest of honour” did not lead to a change in the OIC’s position on J&K, and Islamabad did get the OIC to adopt a resolution (No. 10/46-POL) referring to the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the fact remains that unlike the 2018 Dhaka Declaration, the Abu Dhabi Declaration eschewed the customary reference to the dispute.
Secondly, the OIC has established itself as the collective voice of the Islamic world based on its core aim of strengthening the “unity and solidarity” of the global Muslim community (the Ummah). Pertinently, the OIC Charter entails the organization “to assist Muslim minorities and communities outside the Member States.” Indian Muslims, even though they number the third largest in the world, have been clubbed under this category for long. At Pakistan’s behest, the OIC has tended to tag Muslims in India as ‘victims’ of state policies and clubbed them with other minority Muslim communities around the world which have been suppressed, such as the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region of China, the Chechens in Russia and the Moro community in Philippines. India has the strength and resilience of a democracy backed by strong constitutional provisions and a vigilant judiciary to address all issues in a fair manner. The situation in India simply cannot be equated with the organized and structural discrimination and violence faced by Muslim or other minorities in many countries, including in some OIC member states. The Indian participation in the OIC’s Council for Foreign Ministers meeting in 2019 provided New Delhi with a unique opportunity to set the record straight.
Thirdly, the invitation underlines OIC’s exploratory overture to India to associate with the grouping in some formal capacity. The debate is not new. In 2003, Qatar had for the first time raised the issue of changing the OIC’s position on India during the 2nd Extraordinary Islamic Summit held in Doha. Subsequently, in 2006, shortly before he visited India, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had stated in an interview that India should have ‘Observer’ status in the OIC akin to that of Russia. More recently, in May 2018, Bangladesh had raised the issue during the 45th Council of Foreign Affairs Conference while discussing the question of reforming the OIC and had received the support of many members, including Turkey, which have traditionally supported the Pakistani stand on India in the OIC. No doubt, the changing global situation is one of the factors behind the OIC’s overture to India, but it is also a result of the OIC realizing the implications of excluding one of the largest Muslim communities in the world from its fold. Moreover, the OIC has since the early 2000s adopted an introspective stance and gradually moved to give priority to a developmental agenda. This was first visible in the 3rd Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit held in Mecca in December 2005 when the OIC adopted the Ten-Year Program of Action (2006-15) (TYPOA). The trend has continued, with the adoption of the ‘OIC-2025: Program of Action’ at the 13th Islamic Summit held in Istanbul in April 2016.
Above all, the invitation is a recognition of India’s economic achievements and its enhanced status as a rising global power. As a nuclear power and as the world’s fastest-growing large economy, India has certainly come a long way since it embarked on the path of economic reforms in the 1990s. Today, it is the third largest global economy (in terms of Purchasing Power Parity). It has enjoyed high levels of sustained economic growth for several years amidst a global economic slowdown. Its diplomatic outreach has been dexterous and well-recognized. India is now a member of most of the important international groupings. It has taken initiatives on issues of global significance such as climate change, building an International Solar Alliance and calling for an international coalition for building disaster-resilient infrastructure. Above all, it has advocated concerted action against terrorism through the early conclusion of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). Simultaneously, New Delhi has established strong and friendly relations with important global and regional powers, including members of the OIC. That the OIC no longer wishes to ignore India is a logical corollary of these developments.
Options for India
While the recognition accorded to India is important, it also raises a number of questions for New Delhi. Should India enter into a formal association with the OIC, in case such an invitation follows, and what should be the nature of such an association?
Article 3 of the current OIC Charter (adopted in 2008) stipulates that “any State, member of the United Nations, having Muslim majority and abiding by the Charter, which submits an application for membership may join the Organisation if approved by consensus only by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the basis of the agreed criteria adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers.” However, out of the 57 current members, 11 including Ivory Coast, Guyana, Togo, Suriname, Mozambique, Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau and Gabon do not have Muslim majority. Moreover, Article 33 of the OIC Charter, which describes the rules of procedure and voting, states that “if consensus cannot be obtained, decision shall be taken by a two-third majority of members present and voting unless otherwise stipulated in this Charter.”
This means that for India to become a full member, special concession has to be invoked as in the case of other Muslim-minority states that became OIC members.1 Furthermore, Article 4 of the current OIC Charter provides for “Observer status to a State, member of the United Nations,” and the decision on this has to be “taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers by consensus only and on the basis of the agreed criteria by the Council of Foreign Ministers.” Currently, the OIC has five Observers including Russia, Thailand, the Central African Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Northern Cyprus.
Should India look at full membership or only seek Observer status? Or should New Delhi continue engaging with important OIC member states, as it is doing now, without any formal association with the OIC? A decision should be based on what optimally serves India’s national interests. If India is invited to join and accepts full membership, it will correct the historic anomaly of 1969 and may provide it an opportunity to deny Pakistan the use of the OIC to spread anti-India propaganda.
However, given the current state of relations between India and Pakistan and the sensitivities of managing their own domestic public opinion, OIC members are unlikely to offer India full membership. It would also be difficult to pull off since such a proposal would vehemently be opposed by Pakistan from within the OIC.
On the other hand, Observer status does not entail voting rights, and Pakistan will continue to embarrass India by raising the J&K dispute in the OIC even if India had Observer status. Therefore, in the given circumstances, the best option would be for India to continue to work with individual members of the OIC to establish friendly relations and deepen bilateral cooperation, and work to negate the machinations of Pakistan within the OIC ranks.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. The likely reason for this could be the 1972 Charter of the OIC being silent on the size of the population and stating that “every Muslim state is eligible to join” and membership application had to be approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers by “a two-third majority.” Most of these countries are least developed countries and likely sought membership to gain financial benefits; the OIC, in turn, gained more members. However, the new Charter adopted in 2008 limits membership to states that are “member of the United Nations, having Muslim majority and abiding by the Charter” and their applications has to be “approved by consensus only by the Council of Foreign Ministers” (emphasis added).
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), India, Indian Foreign Policy
Every time a cyber security organisation comes out with a decrypter to counter the effect of GandCrab, a brand new version of the ransomware is generated by effecting a small fix in the code.
Cyberspace has often been exploited for financial gains. Different permutations and combinations have been used for financial frauds, varying from the stealing of personal data online to skimming debit/credit cards. In recent years, ransomware attacks have become a trend for committing cyber crime. Although the first ever recorded use of ransomware occurred as early as 1989 in the form of the AIDS Trojan, which was used to encrypt hard disks followed by a demand for ransom in return for decryption, this method gained prominence only after the unleashing of the WannaCry Ransomware in 2017. The latter was a massive attack that affected more than 200,000 systems in some 150 countries and accounted for a loss of several million dollars. Since then, the use of ransomware has seen an upward trend.
Malware + Ransom = Ransomware
Ransomware is a kind of malware (software that damages the functions or gains unauthorised access to a computer system) that is used to encrypt important documents or files within a system (Crypto ransomware) or simply lock the original user out of the system (Locker ransomware). The user is then asked for a ransom in return for decrypting the files. Once the ransom is paid within a stipulated period, then the system is either unlocked or the system’s contents are deleted or the system is entirely corrupted. Unlike other cyber attacks, in this form of attack, the user is notified of the attack. Initially, ransomware attacks followed a pattern akin to fire and forget, that is, it was used for small scale extortion from individuals. Now, however, the pattern has shifted to more focused and targeted attacks for larger returns like targeting the server of an organisation. The effect is to turn entire organisations into victims rather than individual users, and the pay-off for the extra effort involved in performing this kind of an attack is often huge.
Owing to the growing menace of ransomware and especially after the WannaCry attack of 2017, states have taken strict measures to curb the spread of ransomware. However, in the latest scan performed by eScan, it was observed that there are still reminiscent artefacts of WannaCry, albeit in a dormant state. On the other hand, many new, better and customized ransomware are coming to the forefront. Those in the active stage include GandCrab and ZZZ.
GandCrab was first spotted near the end of January 2018 and since then its attacks have been growing at a rapid pace. It is generally distributed by “phishing emails” (an attachment in a malicious email gives the ransomware the required information) and “exploit kits” (any security holes that are detected by hackers in any software installed in a system can deliver ransomware to the system). Following infiltration, ransomware starts collecting information like username, PC name, OS (Operating System) and other such data. The virus also creates a unique ransom ID and starts encrypting files stored on the system. As a result, the user is no longer able to access encrypted files without a key which cannot be obtained without a ransom.
Initially, when GandCrab (v1.0 and v1.1) was launched, Bitdefender (an antivirus company) launched a decrypter for the same. This led to the creation of GandCrab 2.0 with a more sophisticated code that was more difficult to crack. In fact, now new variants of the GandCrab are detected almost every month. In the year 2018, GandCrab attackers were able to infect more than 50,000 victims and generate more than USD 600,000 in ransom payments from victims. Though India had its fair share of ransomware attacks, however, there was an increase in the activity of the GandCrab Ransomware attacks particularly in the states of Gujarat, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala. According to researchers, this ransomware has almost 100 active affiliates, and 80 of these participants have successfully dispersed 700 different samples of the malware. More than 70 per cent of infected PCs are dedicated to English-speaking PC users and are prevalent in the US and UK. However, the recent version is providing several languages to choose from, including Japanese, French, Italian, and German.
This form of cyber attack is one of the most convenient ways to engage in financial crime in cyberspace for the simple reason that one can easily buy a customized GandCrab ransomware code on a dark web to use, thus, allowing malicious actors with less technical abilities to get in on the act. Secondly, GandCrab is the first ransomware that demands payment in DASH cryptocurrency (1 DASH cryptocurrency is approximately 1200 USD) and uses the “.bit” top level domain (TLD). Since TLD is not sanctioned by ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), this affords an extra level of security to the miscreants.
Every time a cyber security organisation comes out with a decrypter to counter the effect of GandCrab, a brand new version of the ransomware is generated by effecting a small fix in the code. This highlights the inexhaustible nature of cyber weapons. Moreover, this ransomware is spreading like wildfire. To stay ahead of such threats, it is necessary for cyber defence corporations to have state-of-the-art defences that are enabled with advanced technology like machine learning. Moreover, such attacks are only going to grow in the foreseeable future and there is no fixed measure to prevent them. For now the only plausible option is prevention and risk management in the following ways:
Regularly patching and updating software released by companies.
Any important data should be spread across networks with appropriate backups, thus maintaining redundancy.
Stronger passwords and two-prong authentication should be ensured.
Continuous real-time monitoring within the system and firewalls to protect against any such attacks.
In case of an attack, affected network must be isolated to prevent the virus from spreading.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A dynamic offset policy has to include a mechanism for identifying the causes for likely delay or default on the part of vendors in discharging their obligation and removing the impediments faced by them
In February 2018, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) informed the Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD) that in 11 of the 42 offset contracts signed till then, a final/interim penalty, totalling USD 38.19 million, had been imposed on account of shortfall in discharge of the offset obligation by the vendors. Based on this input, SCoD advised the MoD to ‘ensure that the penalties imposed on the defaulter vendors reasonably compensate for the losses incurred due to shortfall in discharge of offset obligations.’1
This raises two questions. First, why is it that the vendors, most of them reputed global defence companies with vast experience in discharging offset obligations, fail to discharge the offset obligation as per the implementation schedule submitted by them? Second, what ‘loss’ is suffered by the MoD on account of delay in the discharge of offset obligation by the vendors that requires to be ‘compensated’, and whether it would ensure more efficient implementation of the offset contract if this Damocles’ sword is kept hanging on their heads?
The first question is quite puzzling considering that vendors are at full liberty to choose from a basket of six possible avenues for discharging their offset obligation and also to select the Indian Offset Partners (IOPs) through which they want to discharge the offset obligation. The avenues are arguably quite exhaustive, but the eligibility criteria for an Indian entity to be an IOP could certainly not be more liberal.
To be fair, MoD has been making efforts to make it easier for the vendors to discharge their obligation. For example, vendors used to find it difficult to provide the details of the IOPs at the time of signing of the offset contract, rephase the offset implementation schedule and change the IOPs after signing the contract. These issues have been addressed by allowing the vendors the option of furnishing the details of the IOPs a year before claiming the offset credit or even at the time of claiming the credit and by making it easier for them to rephase the implementation schedule and change the IOPs. It is difficult to say whether this has helped, but what can be said with a reasonable certainty is that these were not the only issues that bedevilled the foreign vendors.
Foreign vendors have been asking for several changes in the offset guidelines. One of their demands has been that they should be permitted to rope in their group companies and Tier 1 to 3 sub-vendors to discharge offset obligation on their behalf without limit. This, and many other suggestions made by vendors, need to be considered. All these may not be acceptable to MoD, but a final decision on them cannot be allowed to hang fire.
To be sure, the problem is not limited to making changes in the offset guidelines on the basis of the suggestions made by the vendors and, for that matter, by the Indian companies which have to discharge the complementary role as IOPs. There are several provisions in the present guidelines which are either not clear, lend themselves to varying interpretations or do not serve the objective of the offset policy. These impact the discharge of the offset obligations in many ways, such as at the stage of formulation of the offset proposals, choice of IOPs or claiming of the offset credits by the vendors.
To give a very simple example, the existing guidelines permit vendors to let their Tier-I sub-vendors under the main procurement contract ‘to discharge offset obligations, to the extent of their work share (by value)’ on their behalf.2 What the guidelines do not make clear is whether the ‘work share’ refers to the sub-vendor’s work share in the main contract or the offset contract. The answer may be clear to those vendors who have had experience of engaging with the MoD on offset matters, but the point is that there has to be textual clarity in the guidelines so that prospective vendors and IOPs do not have to struggle with the interpretation of the existing clauses. It does not require much effort to remove such ambiguities in the guidelines.
It is not only textual ambiguities that may be holding back the offset policy from achieving its true potential. Though it is not one of the stated objectives of the offset policy, it is not uncommon to come across the criticism that it has led to hardly any transfer of technology (ToT). While the actual reasons can be identified only by engaging the vendors in a free and frank discussion, it is possible that they do not find the existing policy attractive enough to transfer technology to the IOPs.
The relevant provision in DPP 2016 says that where the discharge of offset obligations is proposed in terms of ToT to IOPs, ‘the offset credit for ToT shall be 10 percent of the value of (the) buyback during the period of the offset contract, to the extent of value addition in India’.3 How does one interpret it?
Suppose a vendor wants to transfer technology which it considers to be worth, say, USD 10 million, and buys back the products manufactured by using that technology worth USD 5 million within the period of performance of the offset contract (a tall order by any stretch of imagination). The offset credit the vendor can expect to earn for the transferred technology would be just USD 500,000 (10 per cent of the value of the buyback), provided the value added in India is equal to or more than this amount! This apparently not only discourages the choice of ToT as an avenue for discharge of the offset obligation but also provides no incentive for ensuring higher levels of value addition in India or, more importantly, high-end and high-value technologies.
It needs to be recognised that no foreign vendor would willingly, or by sheer incompetence, default on the discharge of its offset obligation. For any reputed manufacturer, the reputation of the company is far more important than the penalty it may have to pay on account of default in discharging the offset obligation. A dynamic offset policy has to include a mechanism for identifying the causes for likely delay or default on the part of vendors in discharging their obligation and removing the impediments faced by them during the course of implementation of an offset contract.
It is arguable whether the MoD suffers a ‘loss’ on account of delay in discharge of the offset obligation and, more importantly, if such a delay can be quantified and compensated by imposing financial penalties. The focus has to shift from enforcing performance of the offset contract by imposing penalties to facilitating such performance. The MoD will do well to put in place a mechanism for regular engagement not just with the industry associations, both foreign and Indian, but with the individual stakeholders who alone can make the offset policy succeed by completing the implementation of the signed contracts.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
What pales the counter-terrorism regime is not that its procedures are cumbersome or that its working is not transparent, but that it only selectively raises the cost for those who inflict terror.
Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi was listed as an international terrorist to be subject to sanctions on May 1, 2019 by the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). He has been noted as the founder of the Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HUM/ Harakat-ul-Ansar) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), both of which had been listed as entities related to the Al Qaeda in October 2001. The listing was done in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2368 (2017), which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to improve the effectiveness of international efforts to prevent the disruptive activities of the waning Islamic State and its breakaway groups.1 India’s earlier attempt to list Masood Azhar was made in 2009 in connection with the serial explosions in Mumbai trains in July 2006, but was unsuccessful as both China and the United Kingdom opposed the listing.2 A renewed effort to list him began in February 2016 in the wake of the terrorist attack on an Air Force base at Pathankot in Punjab earlier that year.3 But this was move opposed by China, which first placed a technical hold on the decision and eventually blocked it in December 2016.4 Subsequently, in January 2017, the United States, United Kingdom and France approached the Committee a second time,5 which effort was also blocked by China. The latest attempt was made in the aftermath of the dastardly suicide terror attack in Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir in February 2019, and succeeded as much due to India’s diplomatic efforts as due to China’s geostrategic calculations.6
Masood Azhar’s is the latest in the long list of designations, numbering 262 individuals and 83 entities at present, made by the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee since 2001.7 This Committee is among the 14 sanctions committees currently working under the aegis of the UN Security Council. Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidan was among the earliest individuals listed on January 25, 2001 for his association with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Abu Sayyaf Group was among the earliest entities listed on October 6, 2001 for its association with and support to Al Qaeda.
In the present case, the gap of 18 years between the listing of the entity of Jaish-e-Mohammad and the listing of its leader is often cited by the Indian leadership as lamentable considering that the automatic designation of the leaders of a listed entity is stipulated in the guidelines for the procedure to be followed by the Committee.8 A lag between the two is, however, seen in many cases and is attributable to a combination of factors, including the requirement for consensus among all members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, and the need for incontrovertible evidence. In some cases, such as that of Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri of Al Qaeda, he was listed on January 25, 2001, months before the listing of Al Qaeda as an entity on October 6, 2001 in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; many others were listed simultaneously with the entity.
Among those who had been responsible for terrorist attacks in India, Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, wanted for his role in the bombing of the Mumbai stock exchange in 1993, was the earliest to be listed for his connection with the Al Qaeda and the Lashkar -e-Tayyiba (LeT) in November 2003. The LeT itself was listed on May 2, 2005, along with its front organisation the Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD). Its leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and senior members Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Haji Muhammad Ashraf and Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq were listed on December 10, 2008 within a month of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Arif Qasmani, who was linked to the July 2006 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and to the February 2007 attack on the Samjhauta Express was listed in June 2009, without much lag. Mohammad Yahya Mujahid, who headed the media unit of LeT since 2001 and had made several statements including on the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, was also listed on the same day. Another prominent leader Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi, who set up the LeT’s madrassa network and inspired the youth to undertake martyrdom in Mumbai in 2008, was listed in March 2012.
If India’s experience is anything to go by, diplomatic successes in this multilateral realm come after suffering very high domestic and personal costs inflicted by well entrenched terrorist networks. Since its inception in 1999, the counter-terrorism regime has evolved substantially, though under the shadow of geopolitics.9 From its origins as the 1267 Committee to its current incarnation, the Committee has developed a “governance and accountability system” that prevents arbitrary listing, improves the scope for delisting and creates a more robust review mechanism,10 all aimed at protecting fundamental human rights. It has been able to adopt resolutions that make it mandatory for states to adopt stringent measures to curb the activities of terrorist groups and their access to finances.11 It has been able to name and shame the perpetrators of heinous acts of terrorism, but this takes too much effort. Once the naming (read listing) is done, the entities and individuals face asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes, as may be applicable. However, there are no consequences for states that are lackadaisical in implementing these measures; and should the states fall short, the individuals or entities listed remain at large. Though not without its share of controversies, individuals who are indicted for crimes against humanity are also punishable by the International Criminal Court.12
What pales the counter-terrorism regime despite much progress is not that its procedures requiring consensus are cumbersome or that its working is not transparent, but that, in the fight against terrorism, it only selectively raises the cost for those who inflict terror. As a result, a regime that has otherwise done well to take morality away from terrorism, is failing to prevent the loss of innocent lives. In the evolution of the UN counter-terrorism regime, it is time that the shapers of the regime address this ethical aspect.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
UNSTARRED QUESTION NO.1703, July 26, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/28712/question+no1703+foreign+based+terrorists, accessed on May 4, 2019.
Within the UN Security Council: The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime”, Global Governance, Vol. 19, 2013, pp. 567–587.
10.1080/09546550590520555
The Easter bomb blasts is a grim reminder of how the undercurrent of ethno-religious violence remains a dominant factor in Sri Lanka’s chequered history.
The Easter Sunday carnage in which more than 250, mostly Christians, were killed is the most violent terrorist act in Sri Lanka since the end of the Eelam war in 2009. A terrorist attack on this scale involving the use of high-explosives in coordinated suicide missions on eight different targets by a relatively unknown entity, the National Towheed Jamath, reflects the state of complacency that has set in despite the receipt of prior intelligence. It is also indicative of the undue emphasis of the state security apparatus on the potential re-emergence of a LTTE type entity and the consequent focus on the northern province.
It is not that Sri Lanka was not aware of growing radicalism within the Muslim community, mostly generated by violence perpetrated against Muslims at the local level by groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Government officials have for long flagged concerns about Muslim youth who had gone to participate in the civil war in Syria. During the Rajapakse presidency, Muslims from Pakistan, India, Maldives, Bangladesh and some Arab countries who came to preach as part of Tabligh Jamaat were actually turned away at the airport due to the fear of radicalisation. There is, however, no history of animosity between Muslims and Christians that can place in context the Easter attacks. What does exist is a history of tension between the Sinhalese and Muslims since the end of the civil war. Many in the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress have even argued that Muslims are the new enemy of the Sinhalese. But an attack of this nature was not anticipated even by the Muslim community, although community leaders and some leaders of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress have been highlighting the trend of radicalisation due to the attacks orchestrated by the BBS, which many believe, had the blessings of the Rajapakse family.
Youths from well off families taking to suicide bombing is not a new phenomenon. In 2016, educated boys from affluent families caused mayhem in the Dhaka café attack. But Sri Lankan Muslim youth did not become radical or violent even after the LTTE had evicted their community and later bombed mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur killing nearly 300. Therefore, the question arises as to what prompted the latest suicide attacks and what has caused this turn of Sri Lankan Muslim youth towards radicalisation? Could this carnage have been prevented, as some argue including former President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brother former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse (who is also the next presidential candidate of Sri Lanka Podujana Peremuna)? Or did the rift between President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe ensure that the attack went through without any decisive countermeasures being taken even after the receipt of intelligence?
Factors of Muslim Alienation
Sri Lanka has a history of ethno-religious conflict. The first major conflict between Tamil speaking Muslims and Sinhalese occurred in 1915. After independence, Muslims were successfully co-opted by the Sinhala majority in order to wean them away from Tamils who began to demand a separate homeland and politically challenge Sinhala majoritarianism. After the end of the war with the LTTE in 2009, there was a discernible increase in violence against Muslims. Some argue that fringe Sinhala Buddhist extremists riding on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism searched for a new enemy and the Muslims fit their narrative. This should be seen in the context of the global portrayal of Muslims as extremists and radicals. The Buddhist-Muslim conflict in Myanmar and the attack on Buddhists in Ramu in Bangladesh fed the narrative of extremist groups like the BBS and Ravana Balaya. The drive against ‘halal’ certification, protest against Burqas, and attacks against Muslim business houses – all took place under the watchful eyes of the Rajapakse government. These included: the 2012 attack of Buddhist monks on a mosque in Dambullah which led to the relocation of the mosque; the attacks in Aluthgama in the South West coast of Sri Lanka in 2014; the attack on the Muslim owned fashion chain, the Fashion bug, in 2013; and, the March 2018 attack on Muslims in Kandy.
The NTJ, which is the main suspect for the Easter Sunday attacks, came into the limelight only recently. Moulavi Zaharan, a teacher in Kattankudy Madrassah and also one of the suicide bombers in the attack at Shangri La hotel, was well known for his hate speeches. There are reports that NTJ broke away from its parent organisation Towheed Jamath in December 2018, when, in a series of incidents, Buddha statues were broken in Mawanella in Kandy district. The Muslim Council of Sri Lanka had earlier warned the authorities about the activities of these radicals. In 2014, The Peace Loving Moderate Muslims in Sri Lanka (PLMMSL) had issued a statement urging the government to ban the Towheed Jamaat saying that “this movement has fast become cancer within Muslim community in Sri Lanka, preaching and practicing religious intolerance.”
Radicalisation of Muslims has been happening in Sri Lanka for several years now. In 2012, the country expelled nearly 160 members of the Tabligh Jamaat who had come on tourist visas to preach. Reportedly, around 100 Sri Lankan Muslim youths are believed to have joined ISIS. Some Muslims from Kerala who had joined ISIS are believed to have travelled through Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, which was part of the political alliance that the Rajapakse regime had crafted, highlighted growing radicalism and warned the government to take steps against the BBS which was behind several attacks on Muslims.
Failure of Intelligence?
When Muslims from the northern province were expelled en masse by the LTTE because it suspected them to be government informers, many settled in Puttalam in the north. In January 2019, the Sri Lankan military had discovered at a coconut farm in Lacktowatta in Wanathawilluwa in Puttalam a large cache containing 100 kilogrammes of explosives, 20 litres of nitrate acid, wire codes, two firearms, ammunition, a computer, a camera and a stock of dry food. Although investigations revealed that some Muslim youths were involved, it was taken as a one off occurrence. Intelligence inputs provided by India, which contained a more specific warning of an impending attack, was treated as a routine matter. Though a national alert was issued by the police chief, security was not beefed up in the church or the hotels located in the High security zone including the Cinnamon Grand which is not very far from the Prime Minister’s residence.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the government machinery was more focussed on the threat that LTTE sympathisers could pose and dismissed any threats that could be posed by radicalised Muslims. It also ignored the fact that Muslims from Sri Lanka have joined ISIS and local groups may have been infected by the latter’s radical narrative especially in the aftermath of several attacks on Muslims.
There could be several reasons for the terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday. Radicalised Muslims consider the state responsible for attacks on them. Sinhala speaking Christians were seen as part of the larger Sinhalese community. Increasingly, the state and the majority Sinhala community are seen as synonymous and responsible for the injustice meted to Muslims despite their support for the state against the LTTE.
Dysfunctional government
The politicisation of the suicide bombings has already began with the President and the Prime Minister blaming each other for the security failure. It is true that since October 2018 President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickramasinghe have been at logger heads. Sirisena, since his failed dismissal of Wickramasinghe, has been holding the portfolios of Police, Law and Order, and Defence. Differences between them had reached such a level that they even prepared to send two separate delegations to represent the country at the UN Human Rights Council, although sanity prevailed and a joint delegation was eventually sent.
The Prime Minister has publicly stated that he was not invited to National Security Council meetings and was kept out of the loop on issues concerning national security. Interestingly, the time and venue of these meetings were kept a secret to prevent the PM from attending. The resignation of the Defence Secretary only proves that the President does not want to take the blame. Some deep thinking is necessary as personal enmity between the President and Prime Minister has made government defunct for more than two years. Not surprisingly, former President Mahinda Rajapakse is exploiting the government’s failure to score political points. In an article published in the Colombo Telegraph, Rajapakse who wants to become Prime Minister, wrote, “The Easter Sunday attacks would never have taken place under our government… The armed forces personnel who carried out their duties on behalf of the nation were harassed and hunted down by this government…. I request the government to halt the persecution of the armed forces at least now.” This is a reference to the UNHRC resolution to fix accountability for human rights violations during the civil war.
In the wake of Sri Lanka’s worst terrorist carnage of the decade, the national narrative will turn its focus on security and the threat posed yet again by another minority. It is likely that the emergence of a national security state will empower the security apparatus at the cost of the minorities. Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism will triumph once again.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
China's Belt and Road Initiative helps African countries in reducing the infrastructure gap in the region. However, it also leaves them open to the risk of unsustainable debt.
The forthcoming Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum meeting, scheduled to be held in Beijing in late April, has put the spotlight on the growing engagement of China with African countries. In the last two decades, China’s engagement with African countries has grown by leaps and bounds. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched by China in 2013, with the focus on funding infrastructure development projects, provides an opportunity for African countries to address the infrastructure deficit on the continent. African leaders have in turn prioritised infrastructure development as the main pillar underpinning national as well as regional development. This task requires significant financing and Chinese support in this regard will no doubt help them achieve their infrastructure goals. However, it also leaves these countries open to the risk of unsustainable debt and mounting dependence on China.
Belt and Road Initiative
BRI, also known as the One Belt, One Road initiative, was introduced by President Xi Jinping in September 2013.1 It involves China underwriting billions of dollars of investment in infrastructure projects to connect China with rest of the world, on the lines of the ancient Silk Road. It is an ambitious project straddling countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. This encompasses investments in infrastructure projects in various fields such as construction, power, transport, communication, and energy. China has proposed “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds,” as the five major goals of cooperation underlying the BRI.2
Initially, Africa found limited space in the conceptualisation of the BRI. However, over the years, the scheme has become an important part of the continent’s relationship with Africa. In fact, the declaration issued at the end of the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) notes that “Africa, being part of the historical and natural extension of the Belt and Road, has been an important participant in this initiative”.3 South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt were some of the initial countries to sign up to this project. In addition, China managed to get the support of Djibouti by opening its first overseas military support base in the country in 2017. As per the latest count, the African Union and 37 African countries have agreed to join the BRI.4
Opportunity or Risk?
There are a large number of BRI projects already being executed on the continent. It is to be noted though that some of these are pre-BRI infrastructure projects financed by China, to build ports, roads and railways all across Africa. A notable example is the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project in Kenya. President Uhuru Kenyatta signed the deal during his visit to China in August 2013.5 This connects Mombasa port with Nairobi and will eventually extend to other landlocked countries in East Africa such as Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.6
China’s increasing role in Africa, including its assistance in infrastructure development, is generating competing narratives across the continent. The first considers China as a partner in the progress of the continent. For decades, African countries looked towards traditional donors, such as the USA, France and the UK or multilateral institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) for addressing the huge infrastructure gap. However, the conditional terms of lending and emphasis on good governance have left them wary of continuing to look at these sources for infrastructure funding. In contrast, Chinese approach eschews conditionalities related to good governance or human rights and concentrates solely on the task of infrastructure building, which offers an attractive alternative for these countries.
African leaders often reiterate that cooperation with China through the Belt and Road Initiative will broaden the continent’s developmental prospects. President Kenyatta, while inaugurating the SGR, a BRI project, noted that this project “is a testament to the comprehensive China-Kenya relationship, which is based on mutual benefits” and “marks a transformative moment for Kenya and for Africa”.7 Moreover, for other land locked countries like Ethiopia, the BRI offers access to new markets such as Europe. Ethiopia has in recent years become a manufacturing hub, with the help of Chinese development assistance. The flagship BRI project in the country, the standard gauge railway line connecting Addis Ababa to a port of Djibouti, facilitates imports and exports.8
As against the above view, the competing narrative views Chinese involvement in the continent negatively. Voices in countries across Africa from Djibouti to Zambia accuse China of indulging in debt trap diplomacy. They claim that China has laden a number of countries with heavy debt and may exploit the defaulters by appropriating vital strategic assets. There are fears that Djibouti may face the same fate as that of Sri Lanka. In 2015, Sri Lanka ceded control of Hambantota port on a 99 years lease to China as it defaulted on repayment of loans. Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa, has a debt to Gross Domestic product (GDP) ratio of 88 percent, with China responsible for bulk of the debt. 9 It seems that China is tightening its grip over the Duraleh container terminal in Djibouti. In February 2018, Djibouti government announced that it was suspending its contract with the UAE based firm, DP World, to manage the port.10 The state owned China Merchant Holdings (CMP), the same company that is in control of Hambantota, owns 23.5 percent of the port. Thus speculation is rife that Djibouti government may cede Duraleh to China in the near future.
Similarly, in December 2018, a leaked report linked to the Kenyan auditor general claimed that the Mombasa port was used as collateral for the $3.2 billion loan from China for development of SGR, a BRI project.11 This leaves the Mombasa port exposed to seizure by the Chinese government in the event of a default. While both the Chinese and the Kenyan governments have denied the report, this development has opened a national debate. Many questions have been raised about the risks involved in borrowing from external powers for large infrastructure projects. China continues be a major bilateral lender, though multilateral institutions and traditional powers also contribute to Kenya’s overall external debt. 12
Hence the jury is still out as to whether China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an opportunity or risk for the African countries. It will depend on the African countries negotiating skills to navigate the future relations with the Asian giant to their benefit.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India needs a comprehensive space security architecture consisting of a dedicated Space Command for operational aspects as well as an exclusive Defence Space Research Agency to focus on scientific and technical aspects.
In a remarkable technological feat and a clear demonstration of national resolve, India conducted Mission Shakti, an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, on March 27, 2019 by successfully engaging an orbiting target satellite at an altitude of nearly 300 km. In the process, it emerged as the fourth member of the exclusive club of space powers (US, Russia and China) that have had demonstrated ASAT capabilities. Mission Shakti demonstrates the “nation’s capability to defend its assets in the outer space,” besides vindicating the technological competence of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the exclusive research and development (R&D) department of the Ministry of Defence. That the feat was achieved with a totally home-grown technology was not only an icing on the cake, but a big boost to the on-going Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme. Having achieved technological success and informing the world about India’s new deterrent capability in space, the DRDO has a few more crucial tasks to perform before making possible the full exploitation of outer space for military purposes.
ASAT and BMD Programme
The ASAT test of March 27 is significant for several reasons. Apart from gaining India global status and a greater say in international negotiations on outer space, the test’s real significance lay in the demonstration of the progress made in the BMD programme under which the DRDO is developing, in two distinct phases, a two-layered shield against hostile missile attacks. Under Phase-I of the programme, which envisages the interception of up to 2000 km range ballistic missiles in both the endo-atmosphere and exo-atmosphere in the altitude range of 15-25 km and up to 140 km, respectively, the DRDO has so far carried out 13 tests. With the required success achieved through these tests, Phase-I is now ready for operational deployment, possibly under the command of the Indian Air Force.
It is important to note that the missile used for the ASAT test was not part of the BMD programme’s existing interceptor missile inventory, namely the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for endo-atmospheric interception and the Prithvi Delivery Vehicle (PDV) missile for exo-atmospheric interception, though it has benefited from the DRDO’s various missile developmental programmes, including BMD. A brand new three-stage missile with two solid rocket boosters, weighing 18 ton and measuring 13 metres, was independently developed for the ASAT test after the government go-ahead about two years ago. Developing a new missile in a short span of time, with 150-odd scientists working around the clock for the past six months, is indeed an accomplishment for the DRDO which is often subject to criticism for time and cost overruns as well as performance shortfalls of many of its programmes.
The greater significance of the ASAT lies in its technological spin off for Phase-II of the BMD under which the DRDO aims to intercept longer range missiles of 5000 km range at a higher altitude of up to 400 km. It is important to note that though the target Indian satellite of the March 27 test was hit at a range of 283 km, the missile is actually capable of shooting down hostile objects moving at 10 km per second at a far higher altitude of nearly 1200 km. The technological capability for intercepting such a high velocity moving target at a higher altitude has a direct bearing on Phase-II of the BMD programme which envisages intercepting missiles travelling with a similar or lesser speed at a greater distance. Besides, the new missile developed for the ASAT test in record time will boost the confidence of DRDO scientists to undertake the development of more advanced missiles required for Phase-II of the BMD programme.
ASAT Test: What Next?
Having demonstrated the technical feasibility, it is only natural that India would move towards weaponising this capability and all the associated space technologies so as to effectively deter adversaries from destroying Indian space assets. Going forward, this is where equally important challenges lie. To weaponise the ASAT capability and related technologies would require the government’s support and provision of resources. More importantly, it also needs a comprehensive defence space security architecture encompassing a defence space command for operational control of the weapon, as well as a dedicated space research agency to harness the full military potential of space.
Defence Space Command
Though India has always advocated the peaceful use of outer space, the fact remains that space is increasingly being used by countries, particularly the US and China, for military purposes. China, which has made a giant stride in space capability, operates nearly 70 military satellites in orbit, which perform the tasks of communication, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Communication) and navigation. China also established a Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2015, integrating space, cyberspace and electronic warfare (EW) aspects into a joint command under the Central Military Commission.
Given this reality of the military utility of outer space, it is only logical that India exploits its new capability in the fourth domain of warfare to further national security interests. India made a modest beginning in this regard in 2001 by implementing a space based surveillance programme. A further impetus was provided when an Integrated Space Cell (ISC) was constituted in 2009 under Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) to coordinate the space-related aspects of the three defence forces. Now, this Cell needs to be upgraded to a dedicated defence Space Command to cater to all user services. It may be headed by a senior military officer, with a strong component of specialists from various scientific and technical organisations including DRDO, National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The Command would also be responsible for the operational aspects of all space based platforms and associated assets, besides laying out the strategy and doctrine for space warfare.
Defence Space Research Agency (DESRA)
In addition to establishing a Space Command, India also needs to create a dedicated Defence Space Research Agency (DESRA) to harness the entire spectrum of space technologies with defence applications. Such an agency may be set up under the DRDO, which has gained a head start in this crucial area. Suffice it to mention that, apart from the ASAT capability, DRDO has also developed an Electro-Magnetic Intelligence Satellite (EMISAT), which was launched on April 01, 2019. Besides, with the successful design, development and deployment of the Agni series of missiles, the DRDO has the requisite capability to meet the launch-on demand for urgent satellite launches. Some of the technologies and areas that DESRA should exclusively focus upon include:
Questions may be raised as to why India would need a DESRA-like agency while its existing civilian counterpart, ISRO, is doing a fabulous job in space launch and satellite manufacturing and assembly. The answer lies in ISRO’s civilian character, which enables it to access key technologies from other countries. ISRO is also committed to various international treaties that promote the peaceful, or non-military, uses of outer space. Changing ISRO’s character to an overtly military one may not be in the best interest of the organisation’s progress as well as the national interest. Hence the need for a military counterpart of ISRO.
Conclusion
With the successful conduct of Mission Shakti, India has demonstrated its capacity in space weapons. It has also demonstrated the increasing maturity of its Ballistic Missile Defence programme, the first phase of which is ready for operational deployment. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India now needs to weaponise the technology and, at the same time, harness all possible space-related military technologies to put in place an effective deterrent against potential adversaries. To achieve this, India has a few more tasks cut out before it. It needs a comprehensive space security architecture consisting of a dedicated Space Command for operational aspects of space weaponry and an exclusive Defence Space Research Agency under DRDO to focus on scientific and technical aspects that include, inter alia, space situational awareness; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; directed energy weapons; electronic warfare; formation flying; and rogue satellites. It is only when India has a deployable ASAT weapon and a range of other space related capacities and capabilities to deter adversaries, can it claim to be a true military power in outer space.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given India’s dependence on imports for 90 per cent of its telecom equipment, the decision to allow Huawei to bid for 5G should be in line with the national interest, rather than taking sides and constraining options.
Well before 5G could make its first full-scale commercial deployment,1 it is caught in a global spat over alleged snooping charges which saw Chinese telecommunication equipment manufacturers being banned from the international markets. More than half a dozen countries have either got Huawei off their 5G trials or are revisiting the company’s role in their 5G roll-out plans. American prosecutors have pressed criminal charges against Huawei for bank fraud, theft of trade secrets and breach of American sanctions on Iran, and even arrested the company’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou2 in December 2018. In a pushback, Huawei filed a lawsuit earlier this month, challenging the US law that bans federal agencies from buying its products and services.
It is noteworthy that 5G has set global players such as Cisco, Samsung, Ericsson, Nokia and Huawei scrambling to secure their share of the pie. The GSM Association forecasts 5G connections to reach 1.1 billion, around 12 per cent of total mobile connections by 2025.3 The competition is not immune to politics and power play, especially when it is destined to be a money spinner and an enabler for a host of much-awaited next generation applications including self-driving cars and the Internet of Things.
Chinese telecom players however have had a troubled history. The US had blacklisted Huawei and ZTE Corporation way back in 2012,4 when the House Intelligence Committee concluded that they pose a national security threat on account of spying, stealing of intellectual property and potential ties to the Chinese Government.5 The House Intelligence Committee could not ascertain the corporate structure, history, ownership, operations, financial arrangements and the management of Huawei, and recommended that the Committee on Foreign Investment must block acquisitions, takeovers or mergers involving Huawei and ZTE and government systems. In particular, sensitive systems should not include Huawei or ZTE equipment including component parts. The National Defense Authorization Act – signed in August 2018 – forbids government agencies from procuring telecommunications equipment or services produced or provided by Huawei and ZTE Corporation.6
Apprehensions over State influence in Huawei’s operations and products also stem from its founder Ren Zhengfei’s close ties with the Chinese Government and his previous employment with the engineering corps of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and thereafter in a state owned enterprise. Ren is not an ordinary serviceman; he was invited to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1982. Huawei is the face of China’s growing technology prowess that was initiated in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. Founded almost a decade later in 1987 at Shenzhen coastal special economic zone, Huawei now supplies products and builds solutions for around 1500 telecom networks in 170 countries, which helps connect one third of the world’s population.7
Source: IHS Markit
Over the last three decades, Huawei has carved out largest share in the global cellular base station market, pegged at 28 per cent8 (see Figure 1) with its telecom equipment revenue as large as Nokia and Ericsson put together.9 More than technology, cost effectiveness has helped Huawei a great deal; its equipment is said to be 20 to 30 per cent cheaper than the ones Nokia and Ericsson have to offer. Apparently, the US led allegations have not made any significant dent in Huawei’s revenue but has certainly kept Huawei on its toes all the while.
A Desperate Bid
As a fallout of the American ban, States both within and outside the “Five Eyes” (an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US and UK) are revisiting their relationship with Huawei and ZTE Corporation. These entities, over the years, have made inroads not just in the telecom equipment manufacturing segment, but also in research and development,10 and a host of operations and business support services. In a bid to address the mounting concerns of the United Kingdom (UK) Government and intelligence agencies, Huawei had even set up a Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) in 2010 – an independent security testing lab – entirely at its own cost. Huawei has left no stone unturned to assure Western governments and law makers that it is not a security threat. In 2011, it had published an open letter addressed to the US Government denying allegations levelled against it and reassuring that Huawei equipment is not a threat to its national security. The letter had clarified that it receives tax incentives from the Chinese Government, similar to the US companies, as support for some research and development initiatives.11
A similar letter addressed to Australian members of parliament (MPs) had surfaced in June last year12, amidst espionage concerns and possibilities of exclusion from the 5G roll-out from Australia. More recently, the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee asked Huawei for an explanation to both: the rising security concerns among members of “Five Eyes” alliance13 and the technical issues in its engineering processes raised in the report of HCSEC Oversight Board in July 2018.14 Again, in an open letter, Huawei refuted the concerns, and the reply was no different from its previous attempts to douse the fire. However, Huawei promised to invest US$ 2 billion over the next five years to improve its software engineering capabilities.15 Table 1 summarises the status of Huawei in the 5G roll-out across different countries, both within and outside “Five Eyes” alliance.
Country
Impacted TSPs
Status of Huawei on 5G
US
AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon
National Defense Authorization Act of August 2018 forbids government agencies from using technology from Huawei and ZTE Corporation.
Australia
Vodafone, Optus and TPG
One of the first responders, Australian Government blocked Huawei and ZTE from providing 5G technology equipment in August 2018.16
New Zealand
Vodafone NZ, Spark
However, there has been no final decision and New Zealand still has not ruled out Huawei from 5G network upgrade.18
UK
O2, Vodafone UK, BT
UK maintains the stance that any risks posed by Huawei can be mitigated.
Canada
Telus, Bell Canada
Germany
Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Telefónica
Germany has been vocal about its unwillingness to ban Huawei from building its 5G networks.21
France
Orange, Iliad
Orange has confirmed it will not be using Huawei as a 5G kit supplier in France.
Japan
NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Rakuten
India
Airtel, Vodafone Idea Ltd.
There is ambiguity as in late February the Telecom Secretary said that the government is yet to take a decision on whether to allow Chinese equipment makers or not.
A Power Play?
The global response to Huawei’s role in 5G implementation has been mixed. The US is both persuading and pressurising its allies and members of the “Five Eyes” to do away with Huawei from their 5G deployment plans. During the 2019 Munich Security Conference, US Vice President Mike Pence called on security partners of the US to reject Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies.25 Within the “Five-Eyes”, Australia was quickest to follow suit. Germany and UK on the other end do not seem to be caving in to the American pressure, although the US has threatened to restrict intelligence sharing with allies who do not comply with its call for a ban on products and services from Chinese telecom majors. Meanwhile, China’s Ambassador to Canada has warned Ottawa of “repercussions” if it drops Huawei from its 5G plans. Both Canada and New Zealand, caught in a tug of war between China (economic reasons) and US (security reasons), are playing their cards cautiously and buying time before taking the final call.
From business point of view, the US does not have much to lose as 90 per cent of its wireless infrastructure rests on equipment from Ericsson and Nokia.26 For over six-seven years US has kept Huawei and ZTE Corporation at bay, although they are much more integrated to the telecommunications infrastructure among other countries listed in Figure 1, especially Huawei. Out casting Huawei and ZTE Corporation from the international market will have consequences both for the developed and developing economies. A retrospective ban means telecom service providers would need to spend a fortune in retro-fitting network gear. Already skewed profit margins mean that telecom service providers will quite likely pass on the cost to the customers. Taking a major player down can also shoot the prices up for 5G deployment, which is not a favourable case for developing economies.
If the US dogma is fuelled by technology competition, then this certainly is not the right way to quell the competitors. If it is about technology protectionism, then it may seriously undermine global technology research, innovation ecosystem and supply chains. And, if it is about power politics, then middle powers and growing economies are going to pay the price. Germany and UK stand out in this brawl, with a relatively mature and thoughtful approach. A threat to the US does not necessarily equate to a threat to other countries. There is no apparent reason for India either to blindly ban Huawei from its own 5G roll-out plans. However, the final decision should be based on an independent review of Huawei’s telecommunications equipment and the respective security situation. As the negative sentiment against Huawei grows, India can perhaps leverage the opportunity to bargain a better price from the global players for the roll-out of its 5G services. It could also be used as a bargaining chip to correct the trade imbalance vis-à-vis China.
India however would need to tighten few lose ends at the security front domestically and walk a tight rope at the political front internationally. The Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Rules 2017 provision mandatory testing and certification for telecom equipment prior to sale or import in India, under the Mandatory Testing and Certification of Telecom Equipment (MTCTE) rules of the Telecom Engineering Centre (TEC).27 Performance testing encompasses safety of the equipment with radio interface, its immunity to electrostatic discharge, operating frequency, output power and conformance to receiver and transmitter parameters.28 The deadline for enforcement of MTCTE procedure has already been pushed from April 01 to August 01, 2019.29 Moreover, there is acute ambiguity over the status, functioning, capacity and competence of Security Lab under the TEC30, whose role is critical in the aftermath of snooping allegations on Chinese equipment manufacturers. Security lab of such significance and scope should possess the competence to rip apart a telecom gear and review the components at both source-code and hardware levels.
India’s decision to allow Huawei to bid for India’s 5G infrastructure development and continue its investments in manufacturing and R&D should be in line with its own national interest, rather than taking sides and constraining options. For India, whose 90 per cent of telecom equipment (worth US$ 21,847.92 million31) is imported,32 the concerns over foreign surveillance would always loom large, whether it is Huawei (China), Nokia (Finland) or Ericsson (Sweden). Since domestic production is a bridge too far, it is the ability to test and verify security aspects of the imported equipment that can mitigate the risks and instil confidence in the near term.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
There is an urgent need to formulate a ‘Counter Proxy War Doctrine’ that integrates diplomacy, defence, development and other tools of hard and soft power.
26 February 2019 marked a turning point in India’s fight against terrorism. The events of that day signified a strategic shift in the Indian approach from ‘Counter Terrorism’ operations inside own territory to ‘Counter Proxy War’ inside Pakistan. This change from a defensive to an offensive approach manifested itself in the form of the pre-emptive strike by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft against a Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM) training camp at Balakot in Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa, a non-military target across the International Border (IB). India’s actions against Pakistan sponsored terrorist groups has until then been confined to the Line of Control (LoC), primarily by way of fire assaults.
According to Ashley Tellis, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons serve multiple purposes against India: licence for open ended terrorism, deterrence against conventional retaliation, and catalytic device to seek international intervention to restrain Indian retribution. Pakistan’s grand strategy has been based on the assumption that there are only two steps in the escalatory ladder, ‘sub conventional war’ and ‘nuclear war’, with no space for conventional operations in between. But the IAF strike at Balakot has shaken Pakistan out of this assumption, and in the process shattered two myths. First, Islamabad’s sense of impunity in perpetrating cross border terrorism, given New Delhi’s long practised policy of strategic restraint. And second, its nuclear arsenal acting as a protection against India’s conventional retaliation.
Over the past seven decades, the corner stone of Pakistan’s national policy has been its obsession with India as an existential threat. To deal with this illusory challenge, Islamabad persistently sought strategic parity vis-a-vis New Delhi. Having repeatedly failed to achieve its grand objectives through conventional war, the Pakistan Army changed its strategy in the early 1980s. The fuelling of militancy in Punjab marked the beginning of Pakistan’s ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC) warfare against India. Around this time, President Zia’s policy of Islamization including of the military redefined its motto; Iman (faith), Taqwa (abstinence) and Jihad (war in name of god). In pursuit of its ‘bleed India strategy’, the Pakistan Army unleashed a ‘Proxy War’ in Kashmir towards the late 1980’s. The mainstay of this new game was Pakistani jihadi terrorist outfits, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and later Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), complemented by Hizbul Mujahidin (HM) cadres.
Ironically, India’s approach of dealing with the Pakistan sponsored ‘Proxy War’ as ‘cross border terrorism’ was a strategic blunder. What this resulted in was a tactical response: the adoption of a counter infiltration posture astride the LoC and establishment of a ‘Counter Insurgency’ grid in the hinterland. There was no action plan to take on the jihadi breeding grounds inside Pakistan or raise the costs for the Pakistan Army – the real perpetrators of the new form of warfare. This ‘low cost-high return’ option served Rawalpindi well, evident from the fact that, during the last three decades, the Indian security forces suffered over 5000 fatalities. Despite eliminating some 21000 terrorists during this period, the security situation in the Kashmir Valley remains volatile.
Strategic Shift
In response to the deadly terrorists attack carried out by JeM cadre on the Indian Army base camp in Uri on 18 September 2016, a retaliatory surgical strike was conducted by the Special Forces, targeting the terrorist launch pads across the LoC. The action was intended to give a clear political message to Pakistan, defining India’s threshold. Pakistan, following its traditional ‘policy of denial’, dismissed India’s claim of surgical strikes and chose not to react; thus remaining undeterred and continuing with the proxy war.
JeM owned up responsibility for the dastardly suicide attack on the CRPF convoy at Pulwama on 14 February 2019 which claimed more than 40 lives. However, Pakistan authorities as usual sought proof to act against the outfit. Given India’s past response to major terrorist strikes, be it on Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008, Pakistan felt assured that India’s response will be muted, at best a repeat of the 2016 type surgical operation, for which its forces were well prepared. Hence, the 26 February aerial strike at Balakot came as a shook for the Pakistani political and military leadership.
Making a departure from its ‘denial strategy’, Islamabad confirmed that the IAF aerial strike did take place but declared that there was no damage. However, the prompt retaliation by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) employing a package of some 20 fighter aircraft the next very day vindicated India’s claims of the effectiveness of the Balakot strike. In the ensuing dog fight, Wing Commander Abhinandan piloting a MIG 21 (Bison) brought down a PAF F-16.
As a politico-military action, the Balakot operation was an astounding success. It achieved the strategic aim of conveying a clear message to Pakistan that, here on, the proxy war will be fought on its soil. The Pakistan military also felt the heat. The international community stood by India and even Pakistan’s closest allies, China and Saudi Arabia, were rather tight lipped in their response, advocating restraint. The PAF’s employment of F 16 jets, in violation of the purchase condition that they would be used only for defence and counter insurgency operations within own territory, came under close scrutiny.
Due to intense international pressure and the fear of being black listed, Pakistan has commenced action against some terrorist organizations by banning the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Fallah-e-Insaniyat (FeF). JeM Headquarters at Bahawalpur has been reportedly taken over by the local administration. Some 144 terrorist have been arrested including the son and brother of JeM chief Masood Azhar. These actions are of cosmetic value as such measures have been taken earlier too.
In the prevailing environment, Pakistan’s effort is to somehow wriggle out of the log jam it finds itself in. Its likely strategy in the near future would be to scale down the intensity of terrorist activities to small actions by local militants. After the situation de-escalates, Pakistan is expected to be back at its game, may be with greater vigour, as spare Taliban hands from Afghanistan could well be diverted to the Kashmir Valley.
Way Ahead
China, Pakistan’s all-weather ally, has used Pakistan as a low cost option to checkmate India. To demonstrate solidarity with Islamabad, Beijing blocked for the fourth time the move at the UN Security Council to declare Masood Azhar a global terrorist, showing utter disregard for international opinion.
Pakistan as a State is a combustible mix of religion and politics. Its Army runs the nation’s foreign and defence policies, with nuclear weapons and terrorists serving as strategic assets. Therefore, the odd aerial strike by India is not going to change Pakistan’s basic strategy of ‘proxy war’. Until Pakistan takes irreversible actions to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and provides verifiable proof, India must not let Islamabad off the hook. This implies making cross border terrorism a cost prohibitive option for Rawalpindi.
There is an urgent need to build credible capability to thwart the Pakistani design of destabilising India. The growing China-Pak nexus is a reality which cannot be wished away. Ironically, due to the neglect of military modernization, the Indian Army has been repeatedly pitched against a better equipped enemy. To address this serious flaw, a concerted effort is needed to accelerate the capacity building of our Armed Forces. This entails enhancing defence budgetary allocations, fast-tracking arms cum equipment acquisition procedures and indigenization of defence production.
In tune with Joseph Nye’s conception of ‘Smart Power’, India needs to combine its resources into a successful strategy through the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defence, development and other tools of hard and soft power. In other words, defeating Pakistan’s Proxy War is a national effort demanding the employment of all components of ‘National Comprehensive Power’.
There is an urgent need to formulate a ‘Counter Proxy War Doctrine’ that is multi-pronged and all-encompassing. There has to be a ‘zero tolerance policy’ against Pakistan providing safe haven to terrorists. A relentless diplomatic offensive to isolate Islamabad must be sustained and cooperation with nations like Iran, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, which too are victims of Pakistan sponsored terrorism, must be scaled up. On the economic front, a concerted effort is required to tighten the noose around Pakistan through international bodies like the IMF and FATF. Militarily, all options must be on the table including covert ones, to punish Islamabad if it continues with its misadventure. Simultaneously, internal fault lines need to be addressed on priority.
The writer is a former Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff and currently a Professor of International Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival.
When the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) undertook an interception of a dysfunctional satellite in low-earth orbit in February 2008, the agency used the ballistic missile defence (BMD) interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), fired from a Aegis-class destroyer deployed in the Pacific Ocean to successfully complete that mission.1 A year before China had undertaken its first ever Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 using the KS/SC-19, which Western observers claimed was a reconfigured DF 21-C or DF-25, the same platform that supposedly doubled up as the Chinese mid-course interceptor for its first BMD test in January 2010.2 The first Indian demonstration of ASAT capability on 27 March 2019 also used a long-range BMD interceptor that is currently being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Besides the use of BMD platforms for ASAT applications, what is the common thread in the ASAT tests by these powers competing in the space frontier? All of them, by word or deed or a combination of both, have been ardent advocates of mitigating arms race in space, and yet have contributed in considerable measure towards the militarization of outer space.3
Though the US has largely been averse to negotiations on treaties to prohibit the weaponisation of space, there has been general consensus (since the post-Strategic Defense Initiative days) among successive US administrations until recently against steps that could trigger an arms race in outer space.4 While the current Trump Administration has been hyper about the need to harness the space frontier for military applications as also ‘space basing’ of missile interceptors, the Pentagon has no platforms that could shoot down missiles from space.5 All the while, it has to be noted that Washington did not claim the SM-3 interception in 2008 as an ASAT test, but only described it as a real-time satellite interception by a BMD system. The caution can be attributed to the US criticism of the Chinese ASAT test in the previous year as a provocative step towards space weaponisation. Equally amusing could be the fact that both Russia and China had censured the US for risking their space assets through the SM-3 test–all of which demonstrate the oddities of great power behaviour when it comes to the space domain.
China and India too have been vociferous votaries of legal instruments against the weaponisation of, or arms race in, outer space. Besides partnering with Russia on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and demanding a treaty banning weapons in outer space, Beijing had been profoundly critical of the US BMD programme by terming it as an effort to militarise the space frontier.6 China’s eventual decision to conduct both ASAT and BMD tests is evidence of the fact that great powers cannot abstain from technological races where their rivals have a clear edge or can swing the strategic balance. The Indian ASAT test has to be seen in this context, and follows a techno-strategic trajectory that might not be linear to the Chinese course of action but certainly illustrates the prevalence of a security dilemma and the urge to come up with technological ripostes to its arch rival.
The ASAT-BMD Overlap
With an altitude range of close to 200 km, the SM-3 could intercept missiles both within the Earth’s atmosphere (endo-atmosphere) and beyond (exo-atmosphere). Yet, it was intriguing that for the 2008 interception the MDA preferred the SM-3 over the Ground-based Mid-course Defence (GMD) system, which was the flagship BMD for outer space interception, though at that point struggling with development failures. The intention then was seemingly to signal that the interception was driven by a safety contingency (of a ‘cold’ satellite falling to Earth with toxic debris likely to hit population centres) and that a system that could destroy the vehicle just before atmospheric re-entry could be used to ensure that space assets in low-earth orbit are not affected.
Interestingly, the Chinese ASAT test, even if only a demonstration of capability, also targeted a falling weather satellite, though Beijing did not bother to espouse any ‘civilian’ applications except for stating that the test was not targeted against any country. That the same platform (an IRBM or MRBM) was used to undertake an exo-atmospheric BMD interception underlines the overlap of BMD and ASAT missions, on the one hand, and strategic forces, on the other.
On similar lines, the Indian test of March 27 is also a decisive demonstration of capability, albeit with ambiguous intent. The bigger significance of the test, however, lies in its latent indication that India has attained the capability for exo-atmospheric interception of long-range missiles in their mid-course. Though targeting algorithms for ASAT and ballistic missile interception in outer space might be markedly different, the FAQ put out by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) on March 27 confirmed that the ASAT test was done using the long-range interceptor of the BMD programme, christened as the AD (PDV 1 & 2).7 While the anticipated DRDO statement could provide greater clarity on this aspect, this demonstration of exo-atmospheric interception is a major milestone for the BMD programme. Having worked on two endo-atmospheric systems – Advanced Air Defence (AAD) and Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) –for more than a decade, the DRDO has been struggling on the long-range system for exo-atmospheric interception, reportedly hampered by the absence of a long-range tracking radar.8 While the Israeli Green Pine radar with a range of 600 km was the mainstay for earlier systems, the DRDO and the Indian Air Force have been working on extending its range beyond 1000 km in order to guide the PDVs towards precision interception using Agni platforms.
Consequently, the first PDV test of April 2014 could not achieve interception at a range of 120 km, although the DRDO claimed that the mission was successful (in terms of inertial guidance and target seeking).9 While the second PDV test in February 2017 was reported as a success, the DRDO has been cautious in hastening a tight test schedule for the PDV, or in declaring early successes, as was done in the case of PAD and AAD.10 The March 27 test, even if for an ASAT, thus indicates a breakthrough for the DRDO. This is also indication that an actual mid-course BMD test using the PDV might soon be in the offing, which, if successful, could be the more significant accomplishment than the ASAT test.
What India’s ASAT intends to achieve?
Notwithstanding the sense of ‘national accomplishment’ associated with the announcement, the FAQ issued by the MEA points to a lack of clarity and the role of exogenous factors driving the ASAT test. The MEA document states that the test was done “to verify … the capability to safeguard our space assets.” This is a problematic contention. An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any space asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival (China seems to be the only threat), a fact, which, though, has not found mention in any statements.11
The FAQ also justifies the test citing India’s Mangalyaan and Gaganyaan programmes, its legacy of 102 spacecraft missions and criticality of the space programme, none of which, though, constitute a rationale for an ASAT capability. There are many space-faring nations (and communities like the European consortium) with far greater numbers of assets in space, but none is considering the need to defend them using ASAT systems. Undoubtedly, competing with China seems to be the only driver for this test. However, considering that China is far ahead in strategic technologies, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV), Directed-Energy weapons and MaRVs (manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles), it would be unwise for India to seek to match China on a competing scale. As a developing nation with scare resources for defence technological development, India cannot afford to divert massive resources on fictitious and hypothetical scenarios like space wars. Greater emphasis should, instead, be on addressing formidable gaps in India’s air-delivery platforms, air defence and propelling the mid-course interception capability towards fruition.
Finally, there is the question of the moral high ground, which the hyper-realists dominating Indian policy debates may pooh-pooh. The FAQ itself lists India’s lofty commitment to global efforts in mitigating arms race and weaponisation of outer space. As a supposed party to major international treaties relating to outer space, and having committed to ongoing initiatives like PAROS and No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, there is no moral basis to go against this grain and initiate actions that amount to a weapons race in outer space. What is the realpolitik being pursued when India plans to play a future role in drafting a legal instrument to prevent arms race in this domain, as the FAQ claims, after substantially contributing to the same race (as only the fourth country to develop this capability)? This is a game the Cold War era great powers played and which India has hitherto desisted from. No convincing reasons can be seen to change that historic course!
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The best option would be for India to continue to work with individual members of the OIC to establish friendly relations and deepen bilateral cooperation, and work to negate the machinations of Pakistan within the OIC.
On March 1, 2019, history came full circle. In an epochal development, India participated as the “guest of honour” in the 46th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held in Abu Dhabi. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj represented India at the meeting in response to an invitation from Foreign Minister His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates. Coming within days of the Pulwama attack by the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the retaliatory Indian airstrike, her presence at the OIC held exceptional significance for India’s relations with the OIC.
In a magisterial address that symbolized the self-confidence of Naya Bharat (New India), Minister Swaraj took the high ground and congratulated the OIC on completion of 50 years and for its rich contributions, but more importantly, issued a rallying cry about the adverse impact of terrorism in West and South Asia and called for the dismantling of infrastructure that provides shelter and funding to terrorists. She urged the OIC to make the right choices in a world in flux, and to work together with India, a rising economic power, to promote peace and development. The Indian ethos of peace and non-violence and India’s syncretic culture that includes a long history of Islam, were important highlights in a speech that was bound to be thought-provoking for the gathering.
The importance of the invitation to New Delhi lies in the fact that India attended an OIC meeting for the first time since the diplomatic embarrassment at the first Islamic Summit in September 1969 held in Rabat, Morocco. India was invited to be “represented at the government level” to attend the summit but eventually was kept out of the final session which adopted the communique due to opposition by the then Pakistani President General Yahya Khan. The Pakistani leader had taken exception to the participation of an official delegation of the Government of India instead of a representation from “the Muslim community of India”. In 2019, however, Pakistan failed to block India’s participation and, in an unprecedented act of pique, chose to absent itself at the plenary session of the conference. Pakistani theatrics did not cut much ice with either the host UAE or with other OIC members including Saudi Arabia.
In addition to its historical significance, India’s participation in the OIC meeting is important on four counts. Firstly, ever since the OIC’s inception, Pakistan has used the platform to spread canards about the so-called mistreatment of Muslims in India and to alienate India from the Islamic world. Moreover, Islamabad has used the forum to internationalize issues concerning Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). At Pakistan’s initiative, the OIC has established a ‘contact group’ on J&K, which has facilitated the adoption of several ‘resolutions’ and ‘special declarations’ that are critical of India. The pattern has been repeated at OIC meetings almost every year since the 1990s. For example, the 45th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Dhaka in May 2018 adopted a ‘resolution’ (No. 8/45-POL) on the J&K issue emphasizing “that Jammu and Kashmir is the core dispute between Pakistan and India and its resolution is indispensable for realization of the dream for peace in South Asia.” Moreover, OIC has at times asked India to allow “fact finding” teams to visit J&K to investigate alleged human rights violations. New Delhi, expectedly, has taken umbrage and rebuffed these as interference in its internal affairs. Although Indian participation as “guest of honour” did not lead to a change in the OIC’s position on J&K, and Islamabad did get the OIC to adopt a resolution (No. 10/46-POL) referring to the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the fact remains that unlike the 2018 Dhaka Declaration, the Abu Dhabi Declaration eschewed the customary reference to the dispute.
Secondly, the OIC has established itself as the collective voice of the Islamic world based on its core aim of strengthening the “unity and solidarity” of the global Muslim community (the Ummah). Pertinently, the OIC Charter entails the organization “to assist Muslim minorities and communities outside the Member States.” Indian Muslims, even though they number the third largest in the world, have been clubbed under this category for long. At Pakistan’s behest, the OIC has tended to tag Muslims in India as ‘victims’ of state policies and clubbed them with other minority Muslim communities around the world which have been suppressed, such as the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region of China, the Chechens in Russia and the Moro community in Philippines. India has the strength and resilience of a democracy backed by strong constitutional provisions and a vigilant judiciary to address all issues in a fair manner. The situation in India simply cannot be equated with the organized and structural discrimination and violence faced by Muslim or other minorities in many countries, including in some OIC member states. The Indian participation in the OIC’s Council for Foreign Ministers meeting in 2019 provided New Delhi with a unique opportunity to set the record straight.
Thirdly, the invitation underlines OIC’s exploratory overture to India to associate with the grouping in some formal capacity. The debate is not new. In 2003, Qatar had for the first time raised the issue of changing the OIC’s position on India during the 2nd Extraordinary Islamic Summit held in Doha. Subsequently, in 2006, shortly before he visited India, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had stated in an interview that India should have ‘Observer’ status in the OIC akin to that of Russia. More recently, in May 2018, Bangladesh had raised the issue during the 45th Council of Foreign Affairs Conference while discussing the question of reforming the OIC and had received the support of many members, including Turkey, which have traditionally supported the Pakistani stand on India in the OIC. No doubt, the changing global situation is one of the factors behind the OIC’s overture to India, but it is also a result of the OIC realizing the implications of excluding one of the largest Muslim communities in the world from its fold. Moreover, the OIC has since the early 2000s adopted an introspective stance and gradually moved to give priority to a developmental agenda. This was first visible in the 3rd Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit held in Mecca in December 2005 when the OIC adopted the Ten-Year Program of Action (2006-15) (TYPOA). The trend has continued, with the adoption of the ‘OIC-2025: Program of Action’ at the 13th Islamic Summit held in Istanbul in April 2016.
Above all, the invitation is a recognition of India’s economic achievements and its enhanced status as a rising global power. As a nuclear power and as the world’s fastest-growing large economy, India has certainly come a long way since it embarked on the path of economic reforms in the 1990s. Today, it is the third largest global economy (in terms of Purchasing Power Parity). It has enjoyed high levels of sustained economic growth for several years amidst a global economic slowdown. Its diplomatic outreach has been dexterous and well-recognized. India is now a member of most of the important international groupings. It has taken initiatives on issues of global significance such as climate change, building an International Solar Alliance and calling for an international coalition for building disaster-resilient infrastructure. Above all, it has advocated concerted action against terrorism through the early conclusion of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). Simultaneously, New Delhi has established strong and friendly relations with important global and regional powers, including members of the OIC. That the OIC no longer wishes to ignore India is a logical corollary of these developments.
Options for India
While the recognition accorded to India is important, it also raises a number of questions for New Delhi. Should India enter into a formal association with the OIC, in case such an invitation follows, and what should be the nature of such an association?
Article 3 of the current OIC Charter (adopted in 2008) stipulates that “any State, member of the United Nations, having Muslim majority and abiding by the Charter, which submits an application for membership may join the Organisation if approved by consensus only by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the basis of the agreed criteria adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers.” However, out of the 57 current members, 11 including Ivory Coast, Guyana, Togo, Suriname, Mozambique, Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau and Gabon do not have Muslim majority. Moreover, Article 33 of the OIC Charter, which describes the rules of procedure and voting, states that “if consensus cannot be obtained, decision shall be taken by a two-third majority of members present and voting unless otherwise stipulated in this Charter.”
This means that for India to become a full member, special concession has to be invoked as in the case of other Muslim-minority states that became OIC members.1 Furthermore, Article 4 of the current OIC Charter provides for “Observer status to a State, member of the United Nations,” and the decision on this has to be “taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers by consensus only and on the basis of the agreed criteria by the Council of Foreign Ministers.” Currently, the OIC has five Observers including Russia, Thailand, the Central African Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Northern Cyprus.
Should India look at full membership or only seek Observer status? Or should New Delhi continue engaging with important OIC member states, as it is doing now, without any formal association with the OIC? A decision should be based on what optimally serves India’s national interests. If India is invited to join and accepts full membership, it will correct the historic anomaly of 1969 and may provide it an opportunity to deny Pakistan the use of the OIC to spread anti-India propaganda.
However, given the current state of relations between India and Pakistan and the sensitivities of managing their own domestic public opinion, OIC members are unlikely to offer India full membership. It would also be difficult to pull off since such a proposal would vehemently be opposed by Pakistan from within the OIC.
On the other hand, Observer status does not entail voting rights, and Pakistan will continue to embarrass India by raising the J&K dispute in the OIC even if India had Observer status. Therefore, in the given circumstances, the best option would be for India to continue to work with individual members of the OIC to establish friendly relations and deepen bilateral cooperation, and work to negate the machinations of Pakistan within the OIC ranks.
Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Every time a cyber security organisation comes out with a decrypter to counter the effect of GandCrab, a brand new version of the ransomware is generated by effecting a small fix in the code.
Cyberspace has often been exploited for financial gains. Different permutations and combinations have been used for financial frauds, varying from the stealing of personal data online to skimming debit/credit cards. In recent years, ransomware attacks have become a trend for committing cyber crime. Although the first ever recorded use of ransomware occurred as early as 1989 in the form of the AIDS Trojan, which was used to encrypt hard disks followed by a demand for ransom in return for decryption, this method gained prominence only after the unleashing of the WannaCry Ransomware in 2017. The latter was a massive attack that affected more than 200,000 systems in some 150 countries and accounted for a loss of several million dollars. Since then, the use of ransomware has seen an upward trend.
Malware + Ransom = Ransomware
Ransomware is a kind of malware (software that damages the functions or gains unauthorised access to a computer system) that is used to encrypt important documents or files within a system (Crypto ransomware) or simply lock the original user out of the system (Locker ransomware). The user is then asked for a ransom in return for decrypting the files. Once the ransom is paid within a stipulated period, then the system is either unlocked or the system’s contents are deleted or the system is entirely corrupted. Unlike other cyber attacks, in this form of attack, the user is notified of the attack. Initially, ransomware attacks followed a pattern akin to fire and forget, that is, it was used for small scale extortion from individuals. Now, however, the pattern has shifted to more focused and targeted attacks for larger returns like targeting the server of an organisation. The effect is to turn entire organisations into victims rather than individual users, and the pay-off for the extra effort involved in performing this kind of an attack is often huge.
Owing to the growing menace of ransomware and especially after the WannaCry attack of 2017, states have taken strict measures to curb the spread of ransomware. However, in the latest scan performed by eScan, it was observed that there are still reminiscent artefacts of WannaCry, albeit in a dormant state. On the other hand, many new, better and customized ransomware are coming to the forefront. Those in the active stage include GandCrab and ZZZ.
GandCrab was first spotted near the end of January 2018 and since then its attacks have been growing at a rapid pace. It is generally distributed by “phishing emails” (an attachment in a malicious email gives the ransomware the required information) and “exploit kits” (any security holes that are detected by hackers in any software installed in a system can deliver ransomware to the system). Following infiltration, ransomware starts collecting information like username, PC name, OS (Operating System) and other such data. The virus also creates a unique ransom ID and starts encrypting files stored on the system. As a result, the user is no longer able to access encrypted files without a key which cannot be obtained without a ransom.
Initially, when GandCrab (v1.0 and v1.1) was launched, Bitdefender (an antivirus company) launched a decrypter for the same. This led to the creation of GandCrab 2.0 with a more sophisticated code that was more difficult to crack. In fact, now new variants of the GandCrab are detected almost every month. In the year 2018, GandCrab attackers were able to infect more than 50,000 victims and generate more than USD 600,000 in ransom payments from victims. Though India had its fair share of ransomware attacks, however, there was an increase in the activity of the GandCrab Ransomware attacks particularly in the states of Gujarat, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala. According to researchers, this ransomware has almost 100 active affiliates, and 80 of these participants have successfully dispersed 700 different samples of the malware. More than 70 per cent of infected PCs are dedicated to English-speaking PC users and are prevalent in the US and UK. However, the recent version is providing several languages to choose from, including Japanese, French, Italian, and German.
This form of cyber attack is one of the most convenient ways to engage in financial crime in cyberspace for the simple reason that one can easily buy a customized GandCrab ransomware code on a dark web to use, thus, allowing malicious actors with less technical abilities to get in on the act. Secondly, GandCrab is the first ransomware that demands payment in DASH cryptocurrency (1 DASH cryptocurrency is approximately 1200 USD) and uses the “.bit” top level domain (TLD). Since TLD is not sanctioned by ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), this affords an extra level of security to the miscreants.
Every time a cyber security organisation comes out with a decrypter to counter the effect of GandCrab, a brand new version of the ransomware is generated by effecting a small fix in the code. This highlights the inexhaustible nature of cyber weapons. Moreover, this ransomware is spreading like wildfire. To stay ahead of such threats, it is necessary for cyber defence corporations to have state-of-the-art defences that are enabled with advanced technology like machine learning. Moreover, such attacks are only going to grow in the foreseeable future and there is no fixed measure to prevent them. For now the only plausible option is prevention and risk management in the following ways:
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A dynamic offset policy has to include a mechanism for identifying the causes for likely delay or default on the part of vendors in discharging their obligation and removing the impediments faced by them
In February 2018, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) informed the Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD) that in 11 of the 42 offset contracts signed till then, a final/interim penalty, totalling USD 38.19 million, had been imposed on account of shortfall in discharge of the offset obligation by the vendors. Based on this input, SCoD advised the MoD to ‘ensure that the penalties imposed on the defaulter vendors reasonably compensate for the losses incurred due to shortfall in discharge of offset obligations.’1
This raises two questions. First, why is it that the vendors, most of them reputed global defence companies with vast experience in discharging offset obligations, fail to discharge the offset obligation as per the implementation schedule submitted by them? Second, what ‘loss’ is suffered by the MoD on account of delay in the discharge of offset obligation by the vendors that requires to be ‘compensated’, and whether it would ensure more efficient implementation of the offset contract if this Damocles’ sword is kept hanging on their heads?
The first question is quite puzzling considering that vendors are at full liberty to choose from a basket of six possible avenues for discharging their offset obligation and also to select the Indian Offset Partners (IOPs) through which they want to discharge the offset obligation. The avenues are arguably quite exhaustive, but the eligibility criteria for an Indian entity to be an IOP could certainly not be more liberal.
To be fair, MoD has been making efforts to make it easier for the vendors to discharge their obligation. For example, vendors used to find it difficult to provide the details of the IOPs at the time of signing of the offset contract, rephase the offset implementation schedule and change the IOPs after signing the contract. These issues have been addressed by allowing the vendors the option of furnishing the details of the IOPs a year before claiming the offset credit or even at the time of claiming the credit and by making it easier for them to rephase the implementation schedule and change the IOPs. It is difficult to say whether this has helped, but what can be said with a reasonable certainty is that these were not the only issues that bedevilled the foreign vendors.
Foreign vendors have been asking for several changes in the offset guidelines. One of their demands has been that they should be permitted to rope in their group companies and Tier 1 to 3 sub-vendors to discharge offset obligation on their behalf without limit. This, and many other suggestions made by vendors, need to be considered. All these may not be acceptable to MoD, but a final decision on them cannot be allowed to hang fire.
To be sure, the problem is not limited to making changes in the offset guidelines on the basis of the suggestions made by the vendors and, for that matter, by the Indian companies which have to discharge the complementary role as IOPs. There are several provisions in the present guidelines which are either not clear, lend themselves to varying interpretations or do not serve the objective of the offset policy. These impact the discharge of the offset obligations in many ways, such as at the stage of formulation of the offset proposals, choice of IOPs or claiming of the offset credits by the vendors.
To give a very simple example, the existing guidelines permit vendors to let their Tier-I sub-vendors under the main procurement contract ‘to discharge offset obligations, to the extent of their work share (by value)’ on their behalf.2 What the guidelines do not make clear is whether the ‘work share’ refers to the sub-vendor’s work share in the main contract or the offset contract. The answer may be clear to those vendors who have had experience of engaging with the MoD on offset matters, but the point is that there has to be textual clarity in the guidelines so that prospective vendors and IOPs do not have to struggle with the interpretation of the existing clauses. It does not require much effort to remove such ambiguities in the guidelines.
It is not only textual ambiguities that may be holding back the offset policy from achieving its true potential. Though it is not one of the stated objectives of the offset policy, it is not uncommon to come across the criticism that it has led to hardly any transfer of technology (ToT). While the actual reasons can be identified only by engaging the vendors in a free and frank discussion, it is possible that they do not find the existing policy attractive enough to transfer technology to the IOPs.
The relevant provision in DPP 2016 says that where the discharge of offset obligations is proposed in terms of ToT to IOPs, ‘the offset credit for ToT shall be 10 percent of the value of (the) buyback during the period of the offset contract, to the extent of value addition in India’.3 How does one interpret it?
Suppose a vendor wants to transfer technology which it considers to be worth, say, USD 10 million, and buys back the products manufactured by using that technology worth USD 5 million within the period of performance of the offset contract (a tall order by any stretch of imagination). The offset credit the vendor can expect to earn for the transferred technology would be just USD 500,000 (10 per cent of the value of the buyback), provided the value added in India is equal to or more than this amount! This apparently not only discourages the choice of ToT as an avenue for discharge of the offset obligation but also provides no incentive for ensuring higher levels of value addition in India or, more importantly, high-end and high-value technologies.
It needs to be recognised that no foreign vendor would willingly, or by sheer incompetence, default on the discharge of its offset obligation. For any reputed manufacturer, the reputation of the company is far more important than the penalty it may have to pay on account of default in discharging the offset obligation. A dynamic offset policy has to include a mechanism for identifying the causes for likely delay or default on the part of vendors in discharging their obligation and removing the impediments faced by them during the course of implementation of an offset contract.
It is arguable whether the MoD suffers a ‘loss’ on account of delay in discharge of the offset obligation and, more importantly, if such a delay can be quantified and compensated by imposing financial penalties. The focus has to shift from enforcing performance of the offset contract by imposing penalties to facilitating such performance. The MoD will do well to put in place a mechanism for regular engagement not just with the industry associations, both foreign and Indian, but with the individual stakeholders who alone can make the offset policy succeed by completing the implementation of the signed contracts.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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