The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), bordering Afghanistan, is considered one of the world’s most significant geopolitical regions. These tribal regions have been the scene of the world’s deadliest military operations, which started when the Taliban and affiliated groups established full control over this area. These terrorist groups let loose through a reign of terror by killing the maliks, the tribal chiefs. The operations undertaken by the Pakistan Army to push back the Taliban uprooted millions of people from this tribal belt, resulting in a sense of alienation and injustice. But successive governments in Islamabad failed to undertake measures for the social and economic uplift of the region, which continues to be governed by the regressive British-era law called the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act (FCR). Under this law, neither parliament nor the courts have any jurisdiction over the region. Although recently the jurisdiction of the Pakistan Supreme Court has been extended to FATA, there is still a long way to go before this becomes functional. Due to the lack of access to the modern legal system, the power to decide the fate of the people in the region lies with the Jirga courts which are governed by customary laws. These jirgas will continue to remain influential and may create hurdles in the way of the official courts dispensing justice. Although, the PML-N government proposed to review and revisit the FCR in 2017, as such, no attempt was made to persuade the local politicians to support the FATA bill which recommends the merger of FATA with KP. The mainstreaming of FATA will automatically scrap the FCR. Due to political expediency, however, the PML-N government dropped the FATA bill from the priority list in spite of the Pakistan military backing the merger.

Grievances have been brewing among the Pashtuns since the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, when the Pakistan Army started military operations in the region to clear the area of armed foreign terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan. These operations turned the region into a war zone because of the local sympathy for Afghan militants in the region. On top of this, the media and political parties have maintained a long drawn silence over the atrocities faced by the Pashtuns especially in the Tribal area during the course of the operations of the Pakistan Army.

It is against this backdrop that the Pashtun Tahfuz Movement (PTM) has emerged. Does its emergence represent the reckoning moment for the Pashtuns? Will this movement, led by the youth, unravel the already existing fault lines between the Pashtun people and the Pakistani military establishment? What previous movements or nationalist parties could not do, the PTM has done by emerging as a pan Pashtun movement, supported not just by the Pashtuns of the tribal area or of KP, but also those settled in Sindh, Punjab and the wider diaspora who are enthusiastically extending support for the movement. This can be gauged from the fact that the PTM was able to mobilise thousands of the people in Lahore and other areas of Pakistan.

Origins of the Pashtun Tahfuz Moment

While the Pashtuns have a long list of complaints, one particular grievance is their stereotyped image as terrorists. The extra-judicial killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud on 13 January 2018 was the tipping point that snowballed into a countrywide Pashtun movement. Initially, the demands of the PTM were specific: the removal of military checkpoints, an end to enforced disappearances, humiliation at army checkpoints and clearance of landmines laid by the Army. According to a report by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS), more than 2,000 cases of landmine blasts were reported in FATA during the past two years.1

The government acknowledged the Pashtun grievances and took a few steps to address their demands. Many persons who had disappeared but were in government custody were released, the Army started clearing the landmines and the Watan card2 was deemed as no longer necessary for the tribal people. These initial positive gestures were not, however, sustained and the Pakistan Army soon reverted to the old rhetoric and accused the PTM of being sponsored by foreign elements inimical to Pakistan.

The Army’s change of mind had much to do with the growing popularity of the PTM. For its part, the PTM openly criticized the Pakistan Army and raised slogans such as, “Wardi wale Dashatgardi Nahi challayge (we will not tolerate terror of the uniform)” and “We have to identify the place that destroyed us. It is GHQ!” This seems to have touched a raw nerve in the Pakistan Army.

Manzoor Ahmed Pashteen, the leader of the PTM, is a 26 year old youth activist from the South Waziristan region of FATA. He first founded the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement in 2014 as an organisation for protecting the people of his tribe, the Mehsuds. When the Pakistan Army launched its operation against the Taliban in 2009, the Mehsuds were displaced to the neighbouring districts. In the name of the war on terror, the Pakistan Army not only displaced millions of Pashtuns but also killed thousands and ‘disappeared’ many others. It is this campaign during the course of the last 15 years that created resentment and anger among the Pashtuns. Pashteen claims that it is this human cost of the conflict that propelled him towards activism and, later, the fight towards the rights of the Pashtuns. According to Pashteen, he was forced to abandon his hometown, kept in unlawful detention and often harassed for suspected links with armed groups in Pakistan and those across the border in Afghanistan. Naqeebullah Mehsud’s killing united all the Pashtuns to fight against state injustice towards the FATA region and its people. With the ever increasing support and swelling number of protesters, Pashteen changed the name of the organisation from the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement to Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a Movement for the Protection of Pashtuns.

Another reason why the Pakistan Army is hostile to the PTM is the sympathy that the latter has received from Afghanistan. The President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, has stated that the movement is ‘historical’ and termed it a positive initiative against fundamentalism.3 Lawmakers in the Mesharano Jirga, Afghanistan’s Upper House of Parliament, wore the red and black-patterned Afghanistan-made Mazari caps — made famous by the PTM leader Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen and now also known as the Pashteen cap — to express support for the PTM’s campaign and demands. The ex-Chief of NSD Afghanistan, Amrullah Saleh, who is known for his open criticism of Pakistan, tweeted about the PTM’s success, further angering the Pakistani military establishment.

Media Bias

The mainstream media in Pakistan has not given any noteworthy space to the emergence of the PTM phenomenon and the people of Pakistan have remained mostly unaware of developments in FATA. It is the PTM’s activism on social media platforms that forced the mainstream media, particularly the English and electronic media, to reluctantly provide some coverage for the protesters led by PTM.

Even the attempt by mainstream political parties – their warning to Pashtun members and affiliates that participation in PTM rallies would lead to expulsion – has not been able to hamper the protests. In particular, the participation of women in the recent Peshawar protest was a surprise element, keeping the conservative Pashtun culture in view. Manzoor Pashteen has suggested that “if by banning the media from covering the movement, Pakistan believes that it can crush and fizzle the movement, it’s mistaken”. It has to be noted here that international media organisations like the Voice of America, BBC, and Aljazeera are covering the movement on a large scale, and additionally, PTM is using social media to disseminate news about the movement to the outside world. The Pashtun diaspora is very actively following this movement. Through social media, the Pashtun diaspora has successfully internationalised the predicament of the Pashtuns in Pakistan.

PTM’s Political Prospects

Although the PTM is a still a movement, it has all the ingredients for graduating into a political party representing the Pashtuns. Apart from massive public support, the PTM has raised popular issues which mainstream parties, particularly the nationalists, had failed to address. Sensing the support PTM is getting, other political parties such as Awami National Party (ANP), the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) initially supported it. But later they distanced themselves from the movement and also advised their party activists not to attend PTM gatherings because the latter’s ultra-ethno-nationalist views were eroding their own political appeal and agenda.

Conclusion

It is too early to expect that the PTM will shape up as a viable nationalist movement, the kind seen in the past when the Pashtunistan movement was at its height. The reason for this scepticism is on account of the fact that the Pashtuns are fragmented along tribal and sub-tribal lines. In the past, this division has made them vulnerable to manipulation and left them at the receiving end of state repression. Another division among the Pashtuns is ideological in nature. They are divided between progressive and extreme conservative/ideological orientations, with no meeting ground between these two groups. This fragmented nature of their society differentiates them from the Bengalis of East Pakistan who successfully started a movement and were able to establish an independent state.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “IEDs, landmines still a serious threat in FATA,” Pakistan Today, 05 November 2017, at https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/05/ieds-landmines-still-a-serious-threat-in-fata/
• 2. It contains biographical details and a photograph specifically for Pashtuns to visit their homeland. This card stratifies Pashtuns from the other citizens of Pakistan.
• 3. “Ashraf Ghani supports 'Pashtun Protest' in Islamabad,” The Nation, 09 February 2018, at https://nation.com.pk/09-Feb-2018/ashraf-ghani-supports-pashtun-protest-in-islamabad

Discussions on nuclear security in South Asia generally focus on the India-Pakistan relationship. Given the volatile military equation and frequent sabre-rattling between these two neighbours, that is unsurprising. China as a nuclear power that has a bearing on nuclear security and stability in South Asia is discussed in India primarily in terms of its nuclear relationship with Pakistan – the materiel and technology that Indian analysts believe China provides to bolster Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. That the India-China relationship might itself merit a discussion on issues of nuclear security, perhaps even Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), is seldom mooted. A dialogue on nuclear security between the two is supposed unnecessary since – a) Chinese analysts maintain that India’s nuclear capability is apparently inconsequential and China does not believe it is in a deterrence relationship with India; b) given that no shots have been fired along the disputed border, there is no realistic scenario in which the two states would enter into a military conflict; and, c) both countries have a declared no-first-use (NFU) policy, which is believed to be guarantee enough against nuclear escalation. There are, however, many reasons to re-examine this comfortable assessment of the impossibility of nuclear escalation between India and China.

Chinese scholars continue to state that China’s technological superiority implies that India’s nuclear weapons capabilities do not pose a threat to China and that India does not feature in China’s nuclear calculus. This seems singularly peculiar given that Indian analysts and even ministers have repeatedly stated that India’s nuclear deterrent is primarily a safeguard against nuclear blackmail by China. Despite the overt unwillingness to acknowledge the reality of a neighbour with nuclear weapons, Chinese views of Indian capabilities are certainly changing. This is best exemplified in the changing tone of statements made by Beijing in response to India’s missile tests. In the wake of India’s first intercontinental ballistic missile test of Agni V in 2012, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) did not so much as allude to the missile test and emphasised only that China and India were cooperative partners rather than rivals.1 By 2016, when India undertook the fourth Agni V test, China’s reaction to the test was very hostile. Not only did the MoFA spokesperson insinuate that India’s missile test was in violation of United Nations Security Council Regulations, but also sought clarity on its “intentions”.2 From muted reactions that seemed to ignore missile development to belligerent statements that place the blame for destabilising South Asia at India’s door, there has clearly been a change in perception regarding India’s nuclear capabilities within the Chinese government. When considered along with the fact that China maintains nuclear missile launch sites and storage facilities in the provinces bordering India, it seems reasonable to suppose that China’s security assessments do actively account for India’s growing nuclear capabilities.

It would be wilful ignorance to deny that the bilateral relationship between India and China remains hostage to the territorial dispute which is becoming increasingly acrimonious. Perhaps, as a prelude to the final settlement of the outstanding border dispute and with a view to bolstering their respective negotiating positions, both sides are seeking to increase their areas of “regular” operations in disputed territory. This has not only led to a steady increase in the number of border “transgressions” logged by each country, but also brought troops in face-offs more frequently. While it is true that the India-China border has not seen skirmishes of the sort witnessed on India’s borders with Bangladesh or Pakistan involving the use of small arms or artillery and can thus be termed provisionally “peaceful”, fisticuffs and stone-throwing along the Western border3 indicate that tensions remain high.

As India and China compete for greater influence in the Asia-Pacific, this history of mistrust and the legacy of an unresolved territorial dispute continue to dog their diplomatic efforts. A zero-sum analysis predominates assessments of foreign policy. India’s ‘Act-East’ policy is assessed by Chinese scholars as an attempt by India to position itself as an economic and military alternative to China in Southeast Asia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is viewed with suspicion in India not merely because there is lack of clarity on the details of the vision, but also because the reflex with regard to developments concerning China is one of assessing what India might lose. The possibility that efforts by both countries in Southeast Asia and beyond can be synthesised for mutual benefit is considered utopian.

The stand-off at Doklam demonstrated that they could well become embroiled in territorial disputes that are not strictly bilateral. Could a similar stand-off occur in the South China Sea if Indian naval vessels were to be challenged by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy? The rapid militarisation of features controlled by China in the disputed waters of the South China Sea along with the active expansion of China’s area of operations in the region make this a real possibility. Chinese investment and military presence in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor too raises the prospect of Chinese military involvement in conflict between India and Pakistan in the area.

What does a declared NFU policy mean when there exists a trust deficit between two countries? How far can declaratory positions be relied upon in the event of a conflict? Leaders in both countries have stoked nationalism in aid of legitimising their positions in power. In the event of a military conflict, how would a country losing a conventional war explain adherence to NFU to its domestic constituency? Does the reliance on declared NFUs make military conflict more likely given the assurance that the adversary will not use nuclear weapons?

Even as far as the declaratory postures of the two countries are concerned, there appears to be continued uncertainty. From a recommendation attributed to the third National Security Advisory Board for India to consider withdrawing from a NFU commitment in 2003,4 to remarks made in 2016 by then defence minister Manohar Parrikar suggesting that India need not bind itself to NFU,5 there has been recurring speculation that India is reconsidering its NFU policy. Similar speculation over changes in China’s nuclear posture is also ongoing. Within China there are scholars who emphasise the need to review China’s NFU position.6 Furthermore, discussion over the possible loss of China’s retaliatory strike capabilities has led to suggestions since 2013 at least that the PLA implement a hair-trigger alert in the event of a confirmed incoming attack.7 Given President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on combat-readiness and restructuring the military for a rapid response, the idea does not seem far-fetched. If Xi condones some version of a “launch on alert” mechanism, it could potentially lead to accidental or mistaken launch triggered by a false alert since the fallibility of detection and monitoring systems has been amply demonstrated in the past.

That there will be no nuclear escalation between India and China has become conventional wisdom. The growing capabilities, competing aspirations and overweening hubris of these two neighbours, however, suggest that reliance on accepted assumptions will lead to complacency. It may therefore be time for India and China to discuss nuclear issues bilaterally with a view to mediating the uncertainties borne of their differing perspectives and postures.

Rukmani Gupta is a New Delhi based Defence and Security Analyst

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Zhang, CC. (2012, 20 April). China says India is a 'partner, not rival' after missile launch. CNN. Retrieved 23 January 2018, from https://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/20/world/asia/china-react-india-missle/index.html
• 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (2016, 27 December). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on December 27, 2016. Retrieved 23 January 2018, from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1427046.shtml
• 3. Times of India. (2017, 19 August. Watch: Scuffle between Indian and Chinese soldiers near Ladakh's Pangong Lake [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7szW8u52I0
• 4. Rediff. (2003, 9 January). Abandon no-first use policy, Security Board tells govt. Rediff News. Retrieved 25 Jan 2018, from http://www.rediff.com/news/special/ia/20030109.htm
• 5. Chaudhury, DR. (2016, 11 November). Why bind ourselves to 'no first use policy', says Manohar Parrikar on India's nuke doctrine. The Economic Times. Retrieved 25 January 2018, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/why-bind-ourselves-to-no-first-use-policy-says-parrikar-on-indias-nuke-doctrine/articleshow/55357808.cms
• 6. For a summary of these views see lecture by Maj Gen Jin Yi Nan https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYpj3OsoOSw
• 7. Kulacki, G. (2015). The Chinese Military Updates China’s Nuclear Strategy. Union of Concerned Scientists. Retrieved from https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/chinese-nuclear-strategy-full-report.pdf

Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman is scheduled to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Annual Defence Ministerial Meeting to be held in Beijing on April 24. This is the first time that an Indian Defence Minister will be attending such a meeting, which will have the participation of SCO’s Secretary-General and Director, Executive Committee of RATS. The meeting reviews pressing global and regional security matters, coordinates action plans, and issues a Joint Communiqué.

The meeting will certainly offer an opportunity to reset India-China ties especially after last year’s 73-day long standoff at Doklam. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval has just returned from Shanghai after meeting with the Chinese Politburo member Yang Jiechi on 13 April – both agreed to set ties on track in a comprehensive way.

The critical point is whether India is willing to join the SCO’s defence solidarity and coordination efforts defined under the “Shanghai Spirit”.

The agenda this year is to hold a Fanfare for Peace Military Tattoo in China and Peace Mission 2018, the Joint Counter Terrorism Military Exercise in Russia. India was part of this decision taken early this year when an Indian military delegation led by Major General Ajay Seth participated for the first time in a meeting of the international military cooperation departments of the SCO since joining the bloc last year.

Importantly, India and Pakistan also joined an anti-cyber-terrorism drill in Xiamen organised by the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) last December. It was designed to improve coordination in a scenario dealing with a terrorist group that had infiltrated into SCO countries. Apparently, Pakistan and India expressed willingness to actively participate in defence and security cooperation within the SCO framework to contribute to regional security and stability.

The SCO’s common security threats were conceptualised as fighting against the “Three-evils”. Article 6 of RATS stipulates action by SCO Parties to deal with the three-evils including sharing of intelligence on extremist groups and individuals. RATS is based in Tashkent, and gathers information on terror networks, spread of ideology and propaganda, cross-border organised crime, and terrorist financing and money laundering. So far, it has seemingly curbed over 500 terrorist crimes, eliminated over 440 training bases; caught 1050 international terrorists. It maintains a list of terrorist outfits that are banned in the SCO space.

The focus this time is expected to be on anti-terrorism cooperation. Significantly, SCO adopted a draft convention last year on a single consolidated legal framework on terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. The Astana Declaration last year expressed agreement to cooperate against individuals and legal entities related to the recruitment, training and employment of terrorists.

Importantly, the SCO holds the Annual “Peace Mission” or “anti-terrorist” drills, which focus on the anti-terror command, coordination and combat readiness. Currently, Russian and Chinese are the common operating language for military exercises. Whether English will be added to improve interoperability (after the entry of India and Pakistan) is yet to be seen.

SCO also holds the military music festival "Trumpet of Peace” with military bands participating from member States.

The 2017 defence ministerial meeting decided to study and preserve the historical and cultural heritage. It also confers awards on people who contribute to strengthening better cooperation between the organisation's defence ministries.

Defence Ministers normally use the SCO to highlight their respective security and strategic concerns. Examples include: Russia’s position on the Syrian conflict; and China’s position on the South China Sea issue, garnering support for its "One Belt, One Road" connectivity plan under SCO, etc.

So far, China is seen following an opportunistic but non-confrontational approach to using the SCO platform to create a favourable atmosphere for itself based on the idea of deepening strategic cooperation and mutual trust. The consensus-based decision under “Shanghai spirit” tends to serve Chinese interests mainly due to the strong bilateral economic ties it has with other member states. Notably, SCO is also about harmonising China’s policies with Russia’s regional agenda.

The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was revived last year (dead since 2009) in the context of Russia’s renewed interest in Afghanistan to counter the growing threat of ISIS, and China’s interest in playing a peace-building role and expand its BRI and CPEC projects into Afghanistan.

Central Asian defence policies (barring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) remain Russia-oriented owing to their militaries’ Soviet origins, but China has been subtly seeking influence in the regional defence and security areas under the aegis of SCO. Beijing has been hedging its own bets in Afghanistan by formulating a Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) security grouping involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.

From India’s perspective, RATS is important for gaining information on extremist movements from SCO States to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It also collects information on the Taliban’s activities, but it is hard to imagine how all sides would share high value information mainly because of the closed nature of the various intelligence services and the mutual suspicion that generally exists between China and its Central Asian neighbours. It is even harder to imagine RATS sharing hard inputs on terrorist hideouts say in FATA region when Pakistan is also a member.

India has been maintaining security cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian Republics from the days of its support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. India had set up a small field hospital at Farkhor in Tajikistan in 2001. In the post 9/11 era, India made a bold strategic move by undertaking renovation work of Ayni air base in Tajikistan in 2002.

The scale of India’s defence cooperation with the Central Asian states has expanded since then to cover areas ranging from military-to-military cooperation, training and assistance, joint military exercises, servicing and upgrading of military hardware, import of military equipment and spare parts.

The SCO has certainly emerged as the most important regional grouping in the Eurasian region. India joining the SCO has largely a symbolic meaning. As of now, there is lack of clarity about what it means for India in terms of any specific function and benefits. Yet, India cannot afford to be left behind in the strategic Eurasian region where only SCO has emerged as an important geopolitical pole. Therefore, logic demanded that India better be in than out of the SCO. But to be sure, multiple conflicting interests would intersect at the SCO forum, ranging from regional and global issues to combating terrorism.

Last year, Prime Minister Modi reposed full faith in the SCO as he fine-tuned India’s aspirations in the grouping to benefit in economics, connectivity and counter-terrorism cooperation, but he also drew certain redlines of “respect territorial integrity, unite against terror”.

The SCO could become a new frontier for India, but the Pakistan factor could put a spanner in India’s goals. The SCO sees ISIS rather than Taliban as a serious threat to regional security. Moreover, Russia and China seemingly recognise Pakistan’s role in counter-terrorism. Clearly, India’s positions may be at odds there. Yet, it could be used as a neutral forum to discuss terrorism in a broader context as a leverage to obtain Beijing’s cooperation on curbing Pakistan-sponsored terrorism or at least not to unduly favour Pakistan. As it is, China’s concerns about the threat of terrorism are growing and, as the BRI moves ahead, Chinese nationals are getting exposed to a greater threat from terrorist groups.

Defence cooperation in the SCO ambit could possibly provide impetus for the Indian military and PLA to shed misgivings about each other besides providing both India and Pakistan a rare opportunity to share several multilateral tables such as the antiterrorism structure, military exercises etc., to work together incoordinating operational details and sharing intelligence, which might change the regional climate in the longer run. But, given existing deep differences, defence and security cooperation with Pakistan and China would remain challenging.

But mainly, India’s journey in the SCO would depend mostly on how India and China weigh ties on security and economic calculations. Of course, it will also depend on other factors, especially the future trajectory of Indo-US relations.

It would be wise on the part of India and Pakistan to maintain a low profile and not act as spoilers. They will have to respect the 38 parameters of the SCO, which, among other things, oblige member states to “avoid active military conflict” and strictly adhere “to maintain long-term Good-neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation”.

For India, the existing bilateral-level defence cooperation with individual states should provide further impetus for enlarging engagement in the SCO.

Significantly, the SCO had banned Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as long as the July 2007 meeting in Bishkek. Even Pakistan had to put terrorist Hafiz Saeed-backed terror outfit 'Tehreek-e-Azaadi Jammu and Kashmir' on the list of "proscribed organisations" a day before it entered SCO as a full member in June 2017, although Islamabad cited its compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the ban.

For its part, India should get the chiefs of JeM (Masood Azhar) and Hizbul Mujahideen (Syed Salauddin) designated as “global terrorists” by the SCO.

Working closely with RATS would be extremely important to ensure that no undesirable elements inimical to India gain a footing in Central Asia. Importantly, India has raised its flag at SCO’s RATS Headquarters in Tashkent on June 15, 2017.

Finally, to increase awareness, visibility and the effectiveness of India’s role in the SCO, India should institute regular strategic and security dialogue and conferences to discuss issues of common interests and identify priority actions for stronger cooperation. In this regard, the foundation laid by the Ladakh International Centre (LIC) and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) through their various projects relating to India’s role in the SCO needs to be built upon.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

After a brief interlude of turbulent bilateral relations starting September 2015, a U-turn appears to have been effected in India-Nepal relations after the December 2017 elections in Nepal. Prime Minister Modi congratulated the top three political leaders of Nepal over telephone on December 21 for holding the elections successfully. Exactly a month later, he congratulated the UML chairman and then PM-in-waiting KP Sharma Oli over the UML-led left alliance attaining a majority in Parliament and offered India’s unconditional support for and commitment to work with the new government in Kathmandu. As part of confidence building measures, on February 1, Modi sent External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj as special envoy to discuss bilateral relations with the left alliance leaders, and especially with Oli. Media reports indicated that the Swaraj visit took place upon a special request from Oli to Modi. During that visit, Swaraj conveyed Modi’s message and also invited Oli to undertake an official visit to New Delhi after assuming office.

Visit outcomes

The U-turn culminated in Prime Minister Oli’s three-day official visit to New Delhi starting April 6. The visit is widely rated as most successful and historical. In contrast to Oli’s previous visit in February 2016, as well as to the visits made by Prachanda and Deuba in September 2016 and August 2017, respectively, the current visit of Oli has been characterised as remarkably different. First, Oli was received at the airport by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh, who is second in rank in the Modi cabinet. Second, not only was Oli’s first foreign visit to India but even his first official meeting as PM took place with Indian business leaders on which occasion he invited Indian investors to Nepal. Third, the two leaders held a one-on-one meeting for over one hour at Modi’s residence before the delegation level meeting. Such one-on-one meetings rarely happen during visits of high level delegations to India. Fourth, other than the 12-point regular joint statement, three special statements on agriculture, rail linkages up to Kathmandu, and inland waterways, were issued during the visit. Fifth, for the first time in the last three years, the joint statement did not mention internal issues of Nepal such as amendments to the new constitution, inclusion of minorities, Madhesi, etc. Last, but not the least, both leaders found synchronization between their favourite development frameworks - ‘Sabka Sath Sabka Bikas’ and ‘Samriddha Nepal Sukhi Nepali’.

Purpose of the visit

The principal purpose of the visit was to remove the mistrust that had emerged in bilateral relations in the wake of Nepal’s adoption of the new constitution and India’s reservations about some of its provisions. The relationship had reached a new low when Nepal unilaterally recalled its ambassador and cancelled its President’s India visit in May 2016. A thaw emerged only after the completion of the Parliamentary elections in December 2017. While addressing Nepal’s Parliament before his three-day India visit, Oli said that “the visit is aimed at deepening the relations that have subsisted between Nepal and India since ages.” From the Nepali point of view, the other purposes of the visit could have been to seek India’s support for economic development, move forward on the implementation of past agreements and ensure a mutually cooperative relationship. Nepal also wanted to re-frame its bilateral relationship with India in the context of recent domestic and regional developments.

Mutual feeling to mend relations

For its part, India too undertook unilateral steps towards course-correction. This, despite all those internal issues in Nepal that had created the rift in bilateral relations, remaining unaddressed. There could be many reasons for India’s course correction. First, since India values democracy, Modi personally felt that the public mandate in favour of the UML-led left alliance needs to be respected and that India should support institution building in Nepal under a popular government. Second, this realization in New Delhi may have also been occasioned by changes at the bureaucratic level — those officials who dealt with Nepal affairs ever since the constitutional promulgation process had left their desks in the foreign office and agencies from March 2017 onwards. It is possible that new officials posted in key positions and tasked with following Nepal perhaps started looking at the bilateral relationship from a different perspective. Third, domestically, Modi came under tremendous pressure to improve relations with neighbouring countries and especially with Nepal with which India shares a multi-layered relationship. The Indian media was particularly critical of Modi’s Nepal policy in the post-constitution period. Fourth, the more than 70 per cent voter turnout and the active participation of Madhesis and Janajatis in Nepal’s three level elections – local, provincial and federal – under the new constitution forced India to revisit its earlier position, shed reservations on the constitution and modify policy towards Nepal.

Even as India reached out to the new government in Kathmandu, the Oli government had its own reasons to respond positively to the Indian overtures. First, it needed massive developmental assistance to fulfil its poll promises like roads, rural electrification, drinking water, irrigation, jobs, hospitals, industrial zones, railways and airports. Despite China’s increasing economic cooperation with Nepal, India continues to remain Nepal’s largest trading and business partner. Further, India is the only transit country for Nepal’s third country trade despite having signed a transit agreement with China in March 2016. Second, the Oli government also realized the requirement for massive funds to implement federalism through the creation of the necessary administrative infrastructure in the provincial capitals. Since China opposed federalism in Nepal, the Oli government was not sure about receiving Chinese financial support for that purpose. Therefore, it decided to explore the prospects for India’s support in this regard. And third, politically, Oli might have felt that rapprochement with India could prevent the formation of a non-UML government in Kathmandu given the slow progress in unification of the two left parties and intra-party factionalism in the UML. If such a situation were to unfold, Oli could seek the support of the Terai based parties to remain in power.

Trilateral cooperation

Therefore, despite winning the elections on a nationalist plank by projecting India as an interfering neighbour, Oli chose New Delhi as his first port of call. He was well aware of India’s obsession about every new Nepali PM undertaking the first official visit to India. He could undertake the visit with confidence without being apprehensive of its fall-out on Nepal’s relationship with China because the latter, in a statement issued in March 2018, appreciated Nepal’s effort towards adopting an independent foreign policy and “developing friendly and positive relations with its neighbours." Earlier, China had also advised Nepal to maintain good relations with India. Chinese analysts argue that such a rapprochement between New Delhi and Kathmandu could create the ground for trilateral cooperation and successful implementation of BRI projects in the Himalayas.

Challenges

No doubt, the purposes of the visit have been achieved and a new phase of relationship has begun with India acknowledging Nepal as an ‘equal partner’. While the visit has set a new tone in the relationship, it has also brought fresh challenges to the fore in terms of each country addressing the other’s concerns. Certainly, the challenges are more for India than they are for Nepal. There is a trust deficit in Nepal because of the Indian reputation for delaying implementation of various projects. This has sent a wrong message in Nepal that the delays are deliberate. After Oli’s latest visit, which has created new expectations in Nepal, India needs to seriously address this problem of delivery-lag.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.