The United States finds its position increasingly challenged by two emerging powers with global ambitions, China and Russia. This rivalry now threatens to engulf the continent of Africa as well. China has expanded its economic interests in Africa even as the US and European countries pulled back from the continent. During the last one decade, China has become the largest trading partner of Africa. Punching above its weight, Russia has also joined the competition and its presence in the continent, which was dormant after World War II, now extends from the Central African Republic (CAR) to Eritrea.1 In response to this new geo-strategic competition, the US has recently devised a new ‘Africa strategy’

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union had left the US without any rival. As a result, in the post-Cold War era, every year from 1994 to 2001, the US considered terrorism as a significant danger to its national security.2 By 1998, terrorism ranked in the top tier of threats for the US, along with other transnational dangers such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In February 2001, seven months before September 11, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) testified that terrorism was the single greatest threat to US national security.3 That belief, which was strengthened by the September 11 attacks and the War on Terror that the US waged thereafter, is now changing. There seems to be a consensus among both Republicans and Democrats that China poses a more immediate threat to US interests and its security than anything else.

This change in the source of threat perception is now getting reflected in changes being effected in American policy. The US is now trying to counter China through various means and in various regions. One of the largest battle grounds is likely to be Africa. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti. The Chinese military base is in close vicinity of the US base in Djibouti which had been established earlier to aid counter terror operations in Africa.

Speaking at the Washington-based conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation, on 13 December 2018, the US National Security Adviser John Bolton said that in Africa the greatest threat is not from poverty or Islamic extremism but from the expansionist policies of China and Russia. He accused these countries of deliberately and aggressively targeting investments in the continent to gain a competitive advantage over the United States. He also alleged that China was using bribes, opaque agreements and the strategic use of debt to make African states comply with its wishes and demands. According to Bolton, China’s ultimate goal of using its predatory influence over Africa to advance its global dominance would ultimately leave the continent in a far worse shape. Bolton also accused Russia of seeking to increase its influence in Africa by advancing political and economic relationships with little regard for the rule of law or accountable and transparent governance. He also blamed Russia for continuing to sell arms and energy in exchange for votes in the United Nations and claimed that both China and Russia were extracting resources from the region for their own benefit.

This has led to the Trump administration’s framing of a new Africa strategy whereby it plans to give more attention to the African continent. The new Africa strategy is designed to benefit both America as well as Africa. Bolton stated that under “our new approach, every decision we make, every policy we pursue, and every dollar of aid we spend will further US priorities in the region." The new strategy is expected to bring new jobs to America by increasing trade with Africa, which, in turn, would also be beneficial for the African people. In short, it is transactional in nature.

Under its new Africa Strategy, the US now also wants to re-evaluate its engagement in UN peacekeeping operations in the continent and discontinue the ineffective ones. It also says that America would no longer provide indiscriminate assistance to all African countries. Instead, it would select its partners on the basis of their voting patterns in the United Nations. It would also not support countries that are governed by corrupt leaders who just siphon off money as a result of which benefit flows to the people.

The new US strategy, to a large measure, is also designed to counter growing Chinese influence on the continent. As part of this policy, the Trump administration in October 2018 decided to create a US International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) with a funding of $ 60 billion. This would provide loan and risk insurance to American companies to make it easier for them to invest in Africa. However, this American plan pales into insignificance when compared with the Chinese plan to spend $60 billion over the next three years.

The US also wants African nations to take ownership over peace and security in their neighbourhood. However, this approach of the US has not worked in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan. African nations need sufficient stability to attract foreign investment, which they are incapable of achieving in the near future on their own. Also, many African leaders who are perceived to be corrupt prefer Chinese economic assistance as it does not ask uncomfortable questions about the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Moreover, Bolton has himself conceded that the US has limited resources to compete with the tens of billions of dollars that China is pouring into Africa. In this situation, it is not very clear how effective America’s new strategy would be in Africa in containing China. But it has definitely made African people worried that their continent might be used to advance the agenda of major global powers.

Dr Anand Kumar is currently Visiting Professor and Chair (India Studies) at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Salem Solomon, “From the CAR to Eritrea, Russia’s African Ambitions Unfold,” at https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-in-africa/4653190.html
• 2. Amy B. Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms before September 11,”

  Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 40.

• 3. Ibid

At an intergovernmental conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations in Marrakesh, Morocco, 164 nations adopted a pact on 10 December 2018 to manage the global migration crisis. The 'Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration' is the first, intergovernmental agreement that covers all dimensions of global migration. The legally non-binding pact aims to promote efforts to strengthen regular migration pathways and protect the human rights of migrants. Its objectives and commitments provide states and international agencies a means to coordinate migration policies and ensure that migration works for all. However, on the flip side, the non-participation of some important countries raises questions about the future of the pact.

Why a Global Compact

The last few decades have experienced massive population shifts across the globe. The conflicts in West Asia, Africa and South America, and the extreme violence associated with them have forced people to leave their homes and seek a haven in foreign countries. In addition, climate change effects also contributed to the growing number of migrants and refugees. According to the United Nations, approximately 258 million migrants around the world are living outside their country of birth. Out of these, around 68 million are in the “forcibly displaced” category, more than at any time in the recorded history of the modern world. Since 2000, the number of global migrants has grown by 49 per cent, from 2.8 to 3.4 per cent of the global population. The UN data also shows that, since then, more than 60,000 migrants have lost their lives while on the move.

On the other side, resentment against migrants has intensified across the globe, particularly in Europe and the United States. Though the global migrant population constitutes merely 3.4 per cent of the world’s population, burgeoning protests against migrants have created a wider perception that migrants are threats to national economies. The rising tide of resentment in these countries has also produced the impression that most migrants are settled in the developed world whereas the reality is otherwise. Studies show that the developing world hosts more than half of the global migrant population and that migrants have contributed to the development of both sending and hosting countries.

Against this backdrop, recognizing the need for enhanced international cooperation and a comprehensive approach to the issue of migrants, all the 193 members of the UN adopted a resolution called New York Declaration in September 2016. The resolution demanded the protection of the ‘safety, dignity human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migratory status.’ Combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination towards migrants, supporting the host countries, and developing non-binding principles and guidelines for treatment of migrants were the other proposals of the declaration. In addition, the New York declaration recommended two global compacts: a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration.

Deliberations and Stocktaking

As proposed by the New York Declaration, elaboration of the Global Compact for Migration took place in three phases; consultation, stocktaking, and negotiation. The first phase involving six rounds of informal thematic sessions, which aimed to gather substantive inputs and recommendations for the Global Compact, was held between April and December 2017. The human rights of migrants, drivers of migration, irregular migration, international cooperation, smuggling and trafficking, and contribution of migrants were the main foci of these deliberations. In addition, five UN regional consultations (Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Western Asia), multi-stakeholder hearings, and regional civil society consultations also took place in 2017.

Subsequently, the stocktaking phase reviewed and analysed the information gathered during the consultations. The meeting provided “a platform for delegations and other stakeholders to jointly shape a vision for the Compact and collectively identify actionable commitments as well as respective means of implementation and partnerships the Compact may include.” The outcome was a 'Zero Draft' jointly prepared by Mexico and Switzerland, the co-facilitators of the process. Finally, the third phase, intergovernmental negotiations began with the release of the draft in February 2018 and ended with its finalization in July 2018. The final draft, which was agreed to by all 193 members of the UN, has four sections: vision and guiding principles, objectives and commitments, implementation, and follow up.

Objectives and Commitments

The Global Compact aims to ensure that migration 'works for all' by setting out a common understanding and shared responsibilities. It strives to foster international cooperation among “all relevant actors on migration, acknowledging that no State can address migration alone, and upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law.” Its central principles are people-centredness, national sovereignty, international cooperation, rule of law and sustainable development. The 23 objectives of the Compact seek to minimize the factors which force people to leave their country, ensure legal identity and documentation, provide regular pathways, eradicate trafficking, and facilitate return and readmission of all migrants. Moreover, to achieve these objectives, it spelt out 187 actions and many commitments.

One of the positive aspects of the Global Compact is the framing of migration in the logic of development. The significant case against migration has been the perceived negative economic impact on host countries. However, migrants spend 85 per cent of their earnings in their host communities. Similarly, migrants across the globe sent approximately USD 600 billion in remittances in 2017, which is three times higher than the global Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). In this way, migrants contribute to the development of both the country of origin and host states. By accepting this known but concealed fact and developing policies to utilize the potential of migrants, the Global Compact aims to minimize the global resentments against migration. The Compact also states that it is rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In addition, the Global Compact puts the rights of migrant women and children at its heart by mainstreaming a gender perspective. Among the 258 million migrants around the world, more than 50 per cent are women and girls. Moreover, women constitute 74 per cent of international migrant domestic workers. The Compact has two guiding principles that articulate the need for ‘gender-responsive’ and ‘child-sensitive’ migration policies. Moreover, many of its objectives and commitments argue for ‘gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.’ Terms such as 'gender-responsive'/'gender-equality' or 'gender-based violence' appear 29 times in the 34-page document. Similarly, the Compact aims to enhance global cooperation to reduce migration-related deaths, and in combating smuggling and trafficking, all of which are priorities for any government.

Climate change is another global problem contributing to the migration crisis The Global Compact recognizes climate change as a driver for migration and lays out a framework for dealing with it. According to the World Bank, around 143 million people, especially in the developing world, could be forced to relocate within their countries by 2050. Another study shows that about 2 billion people may become climate change refugees by 2100. The Compact proposes building a Platform on Disaster Displacement” and developing an 'Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change' to address the issue.

Prospects and Challenges

With its comprehensive approach to migrants and their problems, the Global Compact for Migration provides both opportunities and challenges. First, it puts forth a balanced approach by framing goals that correspond to the interests of different stakeholders. For instance, while Objective 20, promoting the transfer of remittances, serves the interest of states of origin, Objective 21, facilitating return and readmission, satisfies the receiving countries. While respecting national sovereignty and international law, the Compact acknowledges the prerogative of States to decide who they allow onto their territory. It, therefore, provides for enhanced cooperation among states to manage global migration.

Second, migration, provided it can be monitored appropriately, can positively contribute to the development of both the countries of origin and the host. However, fear of the outsider has created massive popular sentiments against migrants in host nations. s. The Global Compact helps to dispel these fears by giving preference to evidence-based policies through data collection and accurate information about migrants. This approach will be helpful in dispelling misguided and xenophobic policies, particularly in Europe and the United States. Proper implementation of the objectives of the Compact will ensure that migration works for all and contribute to solving the global migration crisis. The adoption of the Compact by New Zealand just a few days after the Marrakech Conference shows that the Compact is finding resonance and acceptability and is a step in the right direction.

Third, many see the non-binding nature of the Global Compact as a challenge and the most significant limitation. They fear that the Compact will be just another talking shop without making any real difference to the migration problem. However, in international politics, distinction between binding texts (hard law) and non-binding texts (soft law) is minimal because the parties, i.e., the states themselves, enforce both types of agreements. Moreover, soft law also ensures the support of the maximum number of members and a fast process since it usually does not require voting in domestic parliaments. None of the objectives or commitments of the Compact imposes any new obligation on the signatories. Instead, it reiterates the existing treaties and conventions. Issues with hard law can be seen in the approach of the UN member states towards the 1951 Refugee Convention, a legally binding document. Even after six decades of its adoption, more than 50 countries are yet to sign the agreement.

The most significant challenges before the Compact lie in its implementation and in the many significant countries that have not signed up to it. The refusal of many countries, including the United States, Australia and Hungary, to adopt the Compact corresponds with the rise of populism and anti-immigrant sentiments across the globe. These countries view the adoption of the Compact as an instance of surrender of sovereignty. Addressing the gap between reality and perception about migration and migrants will be a great challenge before the Compact in the coming years. Finally, the Compact does not talk about who will coordinate, monitor and fund its implementation. Since member states are responsible for implementation, they will have to do much more than mere reviews and occasional follow up in order to achieve the goals of the Compact.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

If democracy means peaceful political transition through the ballot, Bangladesh passed that test yesterday by successfully concluding its eleventh parliamentary election. Violence, compared to previous elections, was minimal, with 18 dead and 200 injured in clashes that were confined to a few constituencies. There was also sporadic violence in the run-up to the elections, which some critics argued was a tactic aimed at forewarning opposition supporters to stay away from the vote. The Awami League (AL) gained a comfortable majority to rule the country for the next five years. The seven seats won by the Jatiyo Oikyo Front (National Unity Front) would not be able to provide any meaningful opposition for the ‘nouka’ (Boat – the election symbol of AL) to have a smooth sailing. As the opposition mulls about a strategy going forward, what is at stake is stability and continued development (unnati r dhara), as AL has described. However, an opposition-less parliament is not conducive for the future of democracy.

Politics of Alliance Making

Before the election, the Awami League formed what is known as ‘Mahajot’ (Grand Alliance) with several smaller parties that have been its key allies since 2008. Though many of them were not very happy with the number of seats allotted to them as part of the grand alliance, they had little choice but to remain with the winning group. One of these was the Jatiyo Party (JP) led by former military dictator General H.M. Ershad. Unhappy with the small number of seats allocated to it, JP had fielded 145 rebel candidates, although it withdrew them before voting commenced. Earlier, it had attempted to negotiate an understanding with the AL and for that purpose Ershad had even replaced Ruhul Amin Hawaldar with Moshiur Rahman Ranga as the party’s General Secretary, but to no avail.

Interestingly, the AL had more number of Islamic parties as part of the ‘Mahajot’ compared to the BNP, which latter is seen as a centre right party. Its electoral understanding with Hefajat-e- Islami – a madrassa based ulema coalition which had once demanded implementation of the 13-point radical Islamist agenda in 2013 – made many secularists and minorities uncomfortable. The alliance also created division within HeI, with opposition stemming from those not comfortable with an electoral understanding with AL which is not seen as an Islamic friendly party.

The AL fielded 258 candidates and left the rest to its allies. Its main ally, the Jatiya Party, was given only 29 seats to contest. The returning officers rejected the candidature of three AL nominees. Several rebel candidates from the AL had filed nomination paper against party nominees, but most withdrew following party president Hasina’s appeal.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has significantly weakened as a political party in the wake of its Chairperson being convicted on corruption charges. It formed a broad based coalition with the Jatiyo Oikyo Front (National Unity Front) under the leadership of veteran freedom fighter and eminent jurist, Dr Kamal Hossain, who was once the Law Minister and then Foreign Minister in the Mujib government and also one of the authors of the 1972 Constitution. Ironically, his decision to form an alliance with the BNP, which has Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) as an alliance partner, a party that earlier stood against the liberation of Bangladesh, raised several eyebrows. Some in Bangladesh accused Hossain of rehabilitating the ‘anti-liberation force’ by providing it legitimacy. It is true that both the BNP and the Oikyo Front led by Gono Forum (Peoples Forum) needed each other to form a formidable opposition against the ruling party, which is perceived as a common enemy by both. Not surprisingly, their agendas were different. The BNP wanted its leader, former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, released from jail. Dr Hossain underlined that his objective was to restore the people’s right to choose –a reference to the one-sided election held in 2014, in which the ruling Awami League had won 153 seats uncontested. While the BNP put out a lacklustre manifesto, the Oikyo Front had an ambitious one, which aimed at ‘restoring peoples right’ or jono gono r adhikar. The battle lines between the two major coalitions were drawn thus: pro-liberation vs anti-liberation, and development vs democracy.

Interestingly, this election saw several appeals against the rejection of candidacy by the returning officers. Most of those rejected approached the judiciary and were successful in getting relief from the court. To cater for this contingency, the BNP filed a total of 695 nominations for 298 seats, having a second candidate in reserve in each constituency. However, 141 candidates were rejected after scrutiny by the returning officers and nearly 50 retained their candidature only after the High court ruled in their favour. In spite of such precaution, the BNP and its allies fighting on the election symbol ‘dhaner sish’ (sheaf of paddy) could not manage to retain candidates in 17 seats. Many of the candidates who were previously upazilla chairmen and resigned from the post to contest the election faced a new problem – the government refused to accept their resignation, thereby preventing them from contesting in the election.

Most of the BNP candidates were selected by the Party’s acting Vice Chairman remotely through Skype given his continuing exile in London. The BNP and its allies also had several rounds of negotiations over seat sharing. The JeI was given only 22 seats to contest even though the party demanded more than 40. It had been allotted 32 seats in the 2008 election. However, post the war crimes trials, the BNP reduced the number of seats allotted to the JeI. It could not completely distance itself from the JeI because the latter commands 10 to 12 percentage of votes. The JeI too had filed independent candidates in 20 seats, but withdrew them in favour of the BNP, except in the Cox Bazar seat where BNP extended its support for the JeI candidate. There were 100 new faces among the BNP candidates out of the 238 seats for which the party filed nominations. The BNP had left 60 seats for its allies and extended support to two independent candidates.

What next for the opposition

The BNP, which did not take part in the 2014 election, had to participate in this election with the knowledge that there will be no level playing field. Non-participation meant that the party would lose its registration. It really did not have an alternate option. Its strategy was therefore to participate and fight for the restoration of a caretaker government system to conduct elections. Being out of the parliament also meant the non-availability of an institutional structure through which the opposition can engage the government.

The opposition, as expected, has rejected the election results saying it is a ‘mockery’ and has demanded fresh election under a neutral caretaker government. It is unlikely that the Awami League will heed this demand. This was the third time the election was taking place under an incumbent government. The first one took place in 1988 under the administration of General Ershad, and was rejected by all the political parties. The second was held in January 1996 under a BNP government, which too was rejected by the opposition. That led to the incorporation of a constitutional provision for a neutral caretaker government (CTG) to conduct the general elections. This provision was subsequently set aside through the 15th amendment to the Constitution after the CTG became controversial in 2006. The then ruling BNP wanted to make Chief Justice Hasan the Chief Advisor of the interim CTG. The military backed CTG then took over in January 2007 as massive street violence rocked the country due to disagreement between the two main political parties – AL and BNP – over the CTG. Bangladesh is yet to establish an Election Commission that is seen as neutral and non-partisan and which has the confidence of the opposition to conduct a neutral and credible election. Within the election commission there were divisions and disagreements between members.

As the Awami League celebrates its third consecutive term in power, the Kamal Hossain-led Jatiyo Oikyo Front has rejected the electoral verdict accusing the ruling party of large scale rigging. Yet, the Front does not have the strength to organize street protest. Many BNP workers are fighting cases of arson, killing, violating public order, terrorism etc. instituted against them by the police since 2014. Thousands have been arrested and are behind the bars. The BNP’s organizational structure is in shambles and it is difficult for the party to sustain any movement that could be long drawn and may lead to violence and state reprisal. The Jamaat has the cadres and strength even though many of its cadres have been arrested. But the question is who will give the leadership to anti-government agitation? If Kamal Hossain decides to give leadership, what will be his position on receiving support from the Jamaat for street battles? Many also argue that the government has complete support from the administration and law enforcement authority. A vested interest has already been created among those who have benefited from the AL rule, and it will be difficult for the opposition to break this. Development and political continuity (unnati r dhara) have their own advantage. At the moment, agitational politics may not succeed against the development story that the government has successfully weaved. People really do not have the stomach for violence, as evident from the violence unleashed by the opposition in 2015 which led to the death of nearly 150 people.

It remains to be seen whether AL in its third term will be able to address the issue of rampant corruption that has deeply permeated the governance structure as well as the issue of free speech that many believe the ICT Act has impaired. Another challenging task involves addressing the youth bulge and the demand for jobs. The Awami League needs to learn from the quota protest and the student protest to address the challenge of youth unrest.

Smruti S Pattanaik is currently affiliated to the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka.

President Xi Jinping inherited a host of problems when he came to power in 2012: an economic slowdown, disruption of market supply by the all-powerful State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), bribery and extravagance among members of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and a bloated and inefficient military, all of which threatened the Party’s hold on power. Party members were also less ideologically cohesive, impacting the CPC’s unity. As a result, in 2013, Xi postulated the idea of ‘China Dream’, hoping that it would offer a blueprint for implementing reforms in a stagnating economy. The challenge however was that for the reforms to succeed, Xi wanted the very culture of the CPC to be transformed, especially its leadership, management and power structure. This stemmed from the belief of Xi and his supporters that Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was unable to implement reforms because he pacified the collective leadership to such an extent as to compromise on his policies.

Since Xi and his base believed that reforms would be difficult to implement because of a disinterested bureaucracy and vested interests, they wanted a strong ‘core leader’ in the mould of Deng Xiaoping. They considered both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as weak leaders; the former let technocrats enter the CPC at the cost of ideology, and the latter did not exercise much power over the army. The struggle, it seems, was to extend the legitimacy of the CPC, which they believed had been compromised due to CPC officials forgetting the legacy of the Party’s rule and the ineptitude of officials in wasting public funds and engaging in “formalism” when asked to counter social problems. 1

Xi, unlike any of his predecessors, wanted to leave no room for negotiation, and continued to centralise power to prevent threats to his position from powerful constituencies opposed to his reforms. First, the idea was to use massive political education to make CPC cadres conform to his policies and use disciplinary actions to punish the unwilling.2 The anti-corruption investigations were pursued to break the symbiotic relationship between big business and politicians and introduce accountability at the management level. For Xi, unrelenting corruption within the Party had allowed members to amass massive wealth through bribery from businesses intending to curry favour for contracts or influence.3 It is equally true that Xi used these well-intentioned policies to purge many political opponents.

Political opposition in the Chinese system is one of the lesser-known complexities. Factions are divided on questions relating to legitimacy, reform tendencies, ideology and, importantly, how to usher China into the modern world. Xi and his supporters derive their legitimacy from being sons of the founding fathers of the revolution, known as “second-generation red” (红二代)”. Many of those targeted by Xi are children of high-level officials who have benefitted from China’s economic success, called “second-generation government officials (官二代)”. Predominantly, this latter group opposes Xi’s policies believing that it would disrupt ongoing reforms.

The difference of opinion between the two factions is subtle and nuanced. Both factions believe that the Chinese system as it exists is not conducive to produce further economic growth and stability. However, the disagreement seems to be the method through which these factions would want to reform the system. Xi and his base believe that market forces should decide supply and demand, meaning that the economic growth should not be determined by corrupt officials and vested interests that benefit from maintaining the existing production method, which has resulted in overproduction of goods in backdrop of slowing global demand and saturation in the real estate market. Xi wants to resolve this by micro-managing the economy and strengthening party ideology through his anti-corruption drive, whereas others believe that China should continue to reform the market and its political system.

In other words, these other factions believe that while China could maintain certain authoritarian traits, it does however need to bring more political and economic freedom than control. These reforms could be in breaking the monopoly of SOEs, protecting private entrepreneurs, enabling the Chinese public to address their social grievances through legal measures, and fundamentally reducing the role of state in economic decisions. Xi and his base believes that bringing these reforms without strengthening ideology and control of the CCP central authority would be the road to Western interference, leading to societal instability and corrupt practices. That the West would finally achieve the plundering of China through external pressure by using the call for political reforms that is built on Western values.4

However, Xi’s opponents were unable to oppose his anti-corruption drive, given that the Chinese public welcomed it. Only after the 19th Party Congress were they able to successfully capture the apprehension of rise of “personality cult” of Xi, comparing him to Mao Zedong. Secondly, Xi did not want the disadvantaged groups, such as military pensioners, rights activists, lawyers, intellectuals, etc, to coalesce into an effective opposition. Apprehensive of political factions, disadvantaged groups as well as Western countries which could possibly use such groups to spread criticism of his policies in the media and influence public opinion, Xi imposed widespread restrictions on freedom of speech and threatened punitive actions against the bureaucracy if it fell short in implementing his policies.

However, even with such widespread control, Xi was less than successful in implementing economic restructuring to change China from an investment-based economy into a consumption-based economy. Thus, Xi and his support base believed that the second term is too short a time period for Xi to finish the reform agenda, and nominating a successor would have only reduced his influence. Moreover, they believed that there were no strong leaders among the Standing Committee who could take the reins after Xi, who would push the Belt and Road Initiative required to shed their over-capacity. In the end, they decided to increase Xi’s advantage by eliminating the two-term limit for the presidency.

The addition of “Xi Jinping Thought” in the Chinese constitution might be construed as elevating and equating his views with those of Deng and Mao, but is quite acceptable in the Chinese communist system. In this system, bureaucrats and officials often take their cue from the proclamations and statements of leaders to determine the red lines that shall not be crossed. This is in fact a continuation of Deng’s practice and an efficient way for the Party leadership to exert pressure on the entire system to follow central policies. However, the difference seems to be that the restrictions among officials and cadres seem to be very strict and the penalties are higher. In fact, the recent disciplinary guidelines measures are considered as very harsh.5 Not only that, now one’s “self” has to emotionally and spiritually trust and serve the Party.6

Despite such measures, resistance to Xi’s reforms are plenty. Although Xi has substantially reduced the bureaucrats’ ability to misuse government funds, he has been less than successful in restructuring the economy. No one can doubt that Xi has emerged as a core leader and has dominated his rivals. However, comparing him to Mao could lead to the adoption of wrong policies towards China. While Xi has attempted to reorganise the Party under a ‘unified and centralised leadership’, his power is neither permanent nor absolute. The transformations in the Chinese system after the havoc created by Mao’s policies on the social, cultural, economic and political life of China have been fundamental.

Deng Xiaoping’s creation of a consensus system in the political institutions was an attestation of the vehement opposition to the Mao-style destructive politics. Xi cannot escape such systemic resistance unless he succeeds in further economic growth and success.7 Any wide-scale oppression would also bring resistance within the Chinese society who are used to loosening central government control after economic liberalisation and moved away from Mao’s political excesses. These are already visible in the resistance in elite universities, where students are supporting workers’ rights and opposing Mao-style repressive policies.8

Significance for India

In the wake of the India-China Annual Defence and Security Dialogue recently held in Beijing and the 21st Special Representative Talks in Chengdu, it would seem that temporary arrangements such as “post-Wuhan cooperation” and “intensifying efforts on border talks” will not be enough to mitigate the mistrust in the relationship post the Doklam crisis. There is a need to close the perception gap in India’s assessment of the state of Chinese politics, to distinguish between transformation and conflict and respond accordingly.

What is of significance to India is that Xi’s policies have led to a huge disruption in Chinese politics. He is under tremendous pressure to deliver and his strategy of centralising power does have enormous consequences. He faces questions about the legitimacy of his leadership from sections of society that are apprehensive of an increasingly intrusive CPC, intellectuals who fear the impact of lack of criticism on ill-conceived policies, bureaucrats who are not able to trade loyalties and favours, powerful SOEs dependent on massive loans, and political rivals.

Due to the politics of transformation in China, Xi would engage in intense diplomatic and economic engagement to offset his critics and worsening trade war with the US. While India-China high-level political relations had benefitted in changing the atmospherics through the Wuhan summit, the time is now ripe for capitalising on such overtures. India should leverage the Chinese need for deeper political engagement and explore possibilities for concessions of political nature from China.

At the same time, India should be wary of bilateral tensions being used as a stepping stone by various factions jostling for power in Chinese politics. Also, India should engage various centres of power in China by, for instance, initiating dialogue with political commissars from the Chinese military to improve military-to-military relations, and newly relevant organisations such as Ministry of Public Security, National Audit Office, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Science and Technology, and various provincial governments.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. The leadership was very concerned with many issues within the CCP officials. One such was that the inefficiency of the Chinese officials to implement decision-making in a structured and efficient manner. Li Keqiang, China’s Premier Li Keqiang was famous for this criticism of officials that the departments were at constant conflict and the decision-making system was much delayed. His criticisms were known as “(Six Questions and Six Unknowns) 六问六不知”, where he described Chinese officials as lazy.
• 2. “Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection” (习近平在十八届中央纪委二次全会上发表重要讲话), 22 January 2013, at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0122/c64094-20289660.html. The theme of the speech was “More Scientific and Effective Prevention and Control of Corruption, Unswervingly Push the Construction of Anti-Corruption and Honesty” (更加科学有效地防治腐败　坚定不移把反腐倡廉建设引向深入). Also see this report, where Xi Jinping’s “Four Winds” (formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, extravagance) are discussed. “Year is Approaching, These Xi Jinping’s Twenty Sentences Against “Four Winds” are Hard to Keep in Mind” (年关将至，习近平总书记这20句反"四风"硬话要牢记), 31 January 2018, CPC News, at http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0131/c64371-29796727.html
• 3. “440 Senior Officials Investigated for Corruption”, 19 October 2017, China Daily, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/19/content_33443526.htm
• 4. Gordon Watts, “President Xi Warns ‘No One Will Dictate to Chinese People’, Asia Times, December 18, 2018, at http://www.atimes.com/article/president-xi-warns-no-one-will-dictate-to-chinese-people/
• 5. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Issued the “Regulations on Disciplinary Action of the Communist Party of China” (中共中央印发《中国共产党纪律处分条例), Xinhua, 26 October 2018, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-08/26/c_1123331165.htm, Also see “The Central Committee of the CPC Issued the 2018-2022 National Cadre Education and Training Plan”, Xinhua, 1 November 2018, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-11/01/c_1123649916.htm (2018－2022年全国干部教育培训规划)
• 6. “Regarding the Relationship Between Party Members and Organisation, Xi Jinping’s Request” (关于党员与组织的关系，习近平这样要求), China News, 9 July 2018, at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/07-09/8560308.shtml
• 7. Katsuji Nakazawa, “Xi Cools his Jets as China’s Political Battle Extends to Autumn”, Nikkei Asian Review, August 23, 2018. Also see, Katsuji Nakazawa, “Xi Jinping Drops Surprise Hint Over Secret Feud”, Nikkei Asian Review,
• 8. Chinese Maoists Join Students in Fight for Workers’ Right at Jasic Technology”, South China Morning Post, 10 August 2018, at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2158991/chinese-maoists-join-students-fight-workers-rights, Also see, “Chinese Education Officials Sorry for Announcing Mao-style Political Background Check on Students”, South China Morning Post, 9 November 2018, at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2172537/chinese-education-officials-sorry-announcing-mao-style-political