On 29 December 2006, China released its latest white paper on national defence. Though this document is widely perceived as opaque in budgetary facts and figures, it gives policy makers and analysts enough information to analyse China's regional and global security and political roles. Two crucial aspects of the paper -- defence modernisation plan and defence budget -- have significant bearing on India, considering the political and economic rivalry between the two neighbours. From India's point of view, it is important not only to have an understanding of the Chinese defence plan but also to comprehend the significance of producing a white paper of its own.

On the issue of defence modernisation, China emphasises on the role of ultimate military modernisation through mechanisation and 'informationization' and sets a three-stage strategy ending around 2050 when it could win 'informationized war', i.e., a war which is "high-paced, high-technology and digitised" in nature. In its preparatory efforts towards an 'informationized war', China tries to ensure that its armed forces are "revolutionary in nature, modernised and regularised", and fully compatible with the Revolution in Military Affairs. For this, it has stepped up efforts to build a joint operational command system and enhancing systems integration of services and arms. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its training programmes are now more focussed on technology content and innovation. Also, it has taken a conscious decision to reduce the PLA's strength over the years by 1.7 million to allow more room for technology and to optimise resources.

In its efforts to plan for a long-term weaponry programme, China has been pursuing a scientific approach of balancing equipment needs and resource availability. The equipment needs are made to go through feasibility studies and developmental strategies based on the goals, directions and priorities. Besides, China is looking for an improved mechanism for defence-related science and technology to support high-tech military needs. The PLA has established mechanisms for civil-military equipment support systems. It has also strengthened equipment support force building, equipment support training, pre-field training of qualified equipment personnel, to promote the "organic and systematic development of operational and support capabilities of equipment". Besides, China has taken measures to eliminate the bottlenecks in its arms procurement policies in the last two years and has doubled the percentage of funds from 10 per cent to 20 per cent for arms procurements, highlighting its intention to beef up its military build-up.

On the aspect of defence budget, China categorically links growth of defence expenditures with the pace of economic development. The linkages between economic growth and the size of the defence budget assumes added importance considering the economic growth rates that China has achieved in the past decade and a half. In 2004 and 2005, the Chinese economy grew by 10.1 per cent and 10.2 per cent respectively, and according to IMF estimates, it is set to grow by 10 per cent each in 2006 and 2007. The White Paper mentions that from 1990 to 2005 the average annual expenditure on defence has registered a 15.36 per cent growth rate, which translates into nearly 10 per cent of real annual average growth rate, after negating the inflationary pressures based on consumer price index. The defence budget for 2006 is set at US$35.6 billion, up by 12.5 per cent from $30 billion in 2005.

However, the Chinese budget figures for 2006 are far lower than the estimates of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which puts the figure in the range of $70 - to 105 billion, up from $60 - to 75 billion in 2005. In 2005, China pegged its defence expenditure at 1.35 per cent of its GDP, against 4.03 per cent of the US, 2.71 per cent of the UK, and 2.45 per cent of Russia. But according to SIPRI estimates, China spends around 2.3 - to 2.4 per cent of GDP on it national defence. Taking 2.4 per cent as the minimum benchmark and factoring 10 per cent growth rate of China's GDP in 2006, the defence budget could be around at $60 billion in 2006 or three times higher than India's defence budget in 2006-07. Upgrading the benchmark to 3 per cent of GDP, China's defence budget stands at $74 billion in the same year. Assuming 2.4 per cent of GDP spent on defence and a minimum 10 per cent annual average growth in defence expenditure, China's defence budget will stand at $97 billion at the end of five years and at $155 billion at the end of 10 years from 2006. The figures will change to $120 billion (five-year) and 190 billion (10-year) if China spends 3 per cent of its GDP and the annual average growth of defence expenditure is kept at 10 per cent.

Unlike China, in India there is no stated policy of linking growth of defence expenditure with that of economic development. Investment in defence is looked upon as wastage of funds, and crowding out of social investments. In the last five years (2001-02 to 2004-05), annual average Indian defence expenditure has grown by 8.9 per cent at current prices. At the same rate of growth, India could afford $30 billion at the end of the next five years and around $45 billion at the end of the next ten years. This leaves a huge gap between Chinese and Indian investments on Defence. Unless India makes a huge stride in defence investment, allocates a fixed proportion of GDP on Defence, and links defence expenditure with economic growth, the country will be left far behind China in the span of 5 to 10 years, a gap that will be virtually impossible to bridge.

As regards Chinese military modernisation process based on a long-term plan, India has yet to assign a long-term vision to its Armed Forces. Unlike China, which aims to win future battles, and prepares for it through modernisation, mechanization and informationization, India is simply busy closing the capability gap. Even this is more often constrained due to various financial, technical and bureaucratic problems. Besides, the modernisation process in various areas like troop optimisation, technology development and collaboration, efficient arms procurement measures, integrated planning process, joint training programmes, etc. are either met with political indecisiveness or defeated by vested interests, leading to a further widening of the gap.

While China has a white paper on its national defence, India has so far failed to come out with a national security policy paper. At present the National Security Council (NSC) and its support structures like the Strategic Policy Group (SPG) and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) make periodic reviews of the country's internal and external security concerns. But the absence of an institutionalised and Constitution-validated structure undermines the present mechanism, and the Council's failure to publish a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review evokes suspicion in some quarters concerning the seriousness of its deliberations. In the absence of a national security policy paper, which has been long demanded by many strategic groups, the Defence Minister of India issues Rakhsa Mantri's Operational Directives which only serves the planning purpose of the Armed Forces, not the nation as a whole.

In many ways, India can draw lessons from China's publication of its defence white paper. First, the country has to acknowledge that a white paper will act as an acceptable guiding principle at the national level, not being at loggerheads with the various Ministries, Departments or groups. In India, in the absence of an institutionalised national security policy paper, various Ministries confront the decisions of the NSC, undermining the relationship between national security and departmental priorities. Second, a defence white paper assigns some goals to the defence establishment on the basis of the current and emerging security threats, and provides sufficient time to achieve it. But till now, the role of the Indian Armed Forces has not been defined on a long-term perspective, or in relation to other countries like China. This is one reason behind the ever-widening defence capability gap vis-à-vis China. Third, once the goals and objectives of the white paper are fixed, it allows financial allocations in a scientific manner by linking it to some standard developments like economic growth or other benchmarks. As regards the Indian defence budget, allocations do not follow a scientific trend. Fourth, publishing white papers at regular intervals allows policy makers to evaluate and readjust the current programmes, which reduces risks involved.

Despite the Chhattisgarh government's two-pronged strategy of police operation combined with socio economic programmes against the Naxalites, there appears to be deterioration in the law and order situation in the state due to the escalation of Naxal violence. Frequent use of police forces against tribals in the name of anti-Naxal operations, forceful eviction due to mining and the establishment of industries by the state machinery have left the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh a virtual battle zone. Of late, the Naxalites' new tactics of deception against the security forces personnel engaged in anti-Naxal operations has further worsened the situation. In general, people in the State are feeling insecure in the face of frequent attacks on the security forces.

Seven security forces personnel, including an Assistant Commandant of the Central Reserve Police Force and an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Chhattisgarh Police, were killed on January 16, 2007, when Naxalites triggered landmines on a joint operation team in Jharghati jungle near Narayanpur town in Bastar district. At least five policemen were injured in the blasts, after which the Naxalites carted away three AK-47 rifles, two SLRs, two Insas rifles and two walkie-talkies from the slain security personnel. Over 100 armed Naxalites, divided in groups, took positions on both sides of the road to ambush the 38-member police party. This ambush had been preceded on December 21, 2006 by another set of two landmine blasts at Polampalli in Dantewade district, which resulted in the death of five people two of whom were security forces personnel and injury to four others.

The January 16 blasts were reportedly caused by at least three landmines. They were systematically co-ordinated and executed, and the Naxals followed it up by opening fire from all directions on the police party. The police believe that it was in fact a booby trap, for they had embarked upon that particular operation upon learning from informers that the some top Naxal leaders could possibly visit the area to pay tribute to four cadres who had recently been killed by the security forces in an encounter. The Naxals thus seem to have used disinformation to deceive the police and its intelligence system.

The attack seems to have been deliberately planned to demoralize the security forces personnel and to ensure that in future they do not carry out immediate actions upon receiving intelligence inputs. If such a situation were to come to pass, it will help the Naxalites in political mobilization. Further, the attack indicated that the Naxalites' intention was to walk off with arms from the security forces personnel, given that they are running short of arms and ammunition due to frequent police raids on suspected Naxalite arms factories and dumps. On January 11, 2007, for example, the police unearthed a Naxalite arms factory in Satnami Nagar area in Bhopal and recovered a huge consignment of arms. Subsequently, the police also unearthed Naxalite arms factories in Jamshedpur and Rourkela.

Another explanation has been given for the recent Naxal attacks given by Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh. He said that the Naxalites carried out the attack out of frustration and warned that stringent action would continue against the rebels. In fact, the State has been taking stringent actions against the Naxalites after imposing a ban on the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and its front organisations under an ordinance issued on September 5, 2005. Despite this, the state government has failed to check violence in Bastar. A Union Home Ministry report indicated that the Naxalites could capture nearly 60 per cent of the land area of Chhattisgarh by 2010, if decisive operations are not carried out to dismantle their bases. Moreover, an Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) report suggested that in the year 2006, 48 per cent of the Naxalite-related killings were reported from Chhattisgarh. The report also said that a total of 749 people, including 285 civilians, were killed in Naxalite violence in India during the year 2006 and that about 80 per cent of these were victims of landmine attacks.

Although various reports suggest that Naxalite violence in Chhattisgarh had gone down in 2006, in comparison to 2005, the recent attacks indicate that the movement is down but not wiped out. It is still capable enough to hit at will. The attack raises questions on the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the state as well as about the nature of the Naxalite movement there. Instead of treating the conflict as a law and order problem, state authorities should understand the true nature of the problem. What the Naxalites are engaged in is an agrarian and livelihood based revolutionary war, in which man, not weapon, is the decisive factor. The Chhattisgarh government has consistently failed to provide basic infrastructure - schools, hospitals, roads, and gainful employment to the tribal groups. At the same time, the tribal groups' access to natural resources is being increasingly curbed due to stringent forest and mining Acts formulated by the State from time to time. These policies have consistently deprived them of their fundamental rights. As a result they have become easy recruits to the Naxalite cause. Moreover, although the State adopted a pro-business Mining policy in 2001, it is yet to formulate a Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) policy.

Instead of addressing the root cause of Naxalism in Chhattisgarh, the State police have been blaming other state governments for the rise of the Naxal threat. According to Chhattisgarh police chief, his state is suffering mainly because of Andhra Pradesh's incoherent policies on Naxalism. Similarly, the chief of police in Jharkand, another Naxal-affected state, has accused the neighbouring Bihar and West Bengal governments of being non-committal when it comes to launching a joint offensive against Naxals.

While bureaucrats accuse other states, the matter is more serious at the political level. Chhattisgarh is ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its neighbouring states - Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand - are governed by the Congress, Biju Janata Dal and an independent alliance backed by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), respectively. Hence, it is observed that there is lack of political will to arrive at a common agenda to address Naxalism in the region. Apart from unaddressed socio-economic issues that provide it with a sustained motive, the Naxal movement has also been able to sustain itself for more than 40 years because different political parties ruling the affected states create hurdles for joint operations. As a result, Naxalites take shelter at state tri-junctions during police action in these states.

Considering the gravity of the situation, the affected states need to overcome their political and ideological differences. Dr. Manmohan Singh had, at a day-long meeting of six Naxalite affected states' chief ministers in New Delhi on April 13, 2006, in fact said that Naxalism has emerged as the single biggest internal security challenge to the country and advised the states to co-ordinate with each other to manage the problem. There thus needs to be simultaneous combing operations in all bordering districts. The Naxalite movements in all 14 affected states are controlled by separate state committees and five regional bureaus, and each has its own set of demands. There is strong co-ordination between these state committees and regional bureaus and that is why individual states should not try and negotiate only with those within their borders. Naxalites also have the habit of relocating their cadres to neighbouring states during peace talks. This is all the more reason why there needs to be greater co-ordination among the various states affected by Naxal violence. Moreover, to bring the alienated masses to the mainstream of governance, ecological regeneration programmes should be introduced in rural areas. In fact, considering the different approaches and recurring failure of the Naxalite affected states in managing the conflict, the Union government should take the initiative to declare a people friendly Resettlement and Rehabilitation policy at the national level and generally assume a more proactive role in co-ordinating efforts to tackle this single biggest internal security challenge facing the country.

The recent orgy of violence perpetrated by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has brought the issue of security of the common citizen in Assam to the fore again. The scale of violence was highest in Tinsukia with 34 killed, while nine were killed in Sibsagar, eight in Dibrugarh and six in Dhemaji districts. Attacks were also carried out in Golaghat and Guwahati. The orgy of violence started on January 5, 2007, and is likely to continue as indicated by intelligence reports. The ULFA has a history of resorting to acts of terror ahead of important events to pressurize both the Central and State governments to make some concessions. In mid 2006, a series of bomb blasts occurred days before the Central Government and the People's Consultative Group (PCG) were scheduled to hold consultations on the issue of direct talks with ULFA. At that time, it was felt that violent tactics were used to coerce the government to release top ULFA functionaries held in prison on the pretext of holding talks. This time, the spate of targeted violence against the Hindi-speaking migrants began a day after Home Secretary Duggal reviewed security arrangements for the forthcoming National Games to be held in Guwahati in February 2007.

There is widespread speculation that these killings could have been orchestrated by ULFA to disrupt the games. The expectation is that these terror tactics would force contingents participating in the forthcoming Games to pull out amidst fear of more attacks. Indeed, the venue of the games, Guwahati, witnessed two bomb blasts on January 8 near the army cantonment in Satgaon area. These incidents could also be a reaction to the outcome of an opinion poll, carried out by an independent organization, Assam Public Works (APW), in the state's nine districts showing little popular support for ULFA's campaign for a Swadin Asom (Independent Assam).

The ULFA resistance movement, started in 1979, was founded on an ideology of Assamese nationalism. Its slogan was to establish a Swadin Asom ((Independent Assam) comprising the ethnic Assamese speaking people. In the beginning, it did manage to garner support from the Assamese people. Over time, however, its ideological degeneration, terror tactics, extortion, external linkages and acceptance of illegal Bangladeshi migrants in Assam have seriously eroded its popular support. Significantly, the historical narrative on which the ULFA bases its resistance movement have also been challenged by mainstream Assamese intellectuals like Udayon Misra, who argue that ULFA's methodology of historical interpretation reflects a selective bias. Prominent public figures like Amalendu Guha, Dr. Hiren Gohain, Homen Borgohain, Dr. Kanak Sen Deka, Jayanta Madhab, and Dr. Nagen Saikia are highly critical of the outfit's tactic of targeting innocent civilians. ULFA has never attempted to take the people of Assam into confidence regarding its organizational structure, tactics and strategy. It has also disregarded the views of other ethnic groups of Assam like the Bodos, Chutias, Deuris, Dimasas, Karbis, Koch-Rajbangshis, Rabhas, Mising, Nagas, Tiwa, etc. The rebel group is hardly representative of the Assamese people.

One significant reason for the ULFA losing popular support is its growing nexus with external agencies. After the military operations against the outfit in the early 1990s, the ULFA established its base in Bangladesh and forged close links with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh's Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI). Top ULFA leaders including Paresh Barua and Arabinda Rajkhowa are believed to be operating from Bangladesh. Assam Police has in its possession a list of 12 residential addresses, all in Dhaka, where Paresh Barua, had lived between 1990 and 2004. This list includes several posh localities of Dhaka including New Eskaton Road, Mirpur, Uttara, Mohammedpur and Dhanmondi. The ULFA has invested heavily in real estate and transportation business especially in Sylhet and Chittagong districts of Bangladesh.

Over the past several years, the Indian security establishment has gathered substantial evidence showing the ISI and DGFI's hand in sponsoring terrorism in the northeast through various insurgent groups active in the region. Available evidence suggests that the ULFA-ISI-DGFI nexus began way back in the early 1990s. On May 15, 2005, a team of Assam and Meghalaya Police arrested an ISI agent, Mohammed Hasifuddin on the Assam-Meghalaya border. He was alleged to have supplied explosives to ULFA for the Independence Day bomb blast at Dhemaji town on August 15, 2004. These blasts killed 17 persons, mostly children. There is evidence to establish that in November 2006, the ULFA collaborated with the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an associate of Pakistan's ISI, to engineer a bomb blast in the Haldibari-New Jalpaiguri passenger train. It is not a coincidence that in its recent spate of violence, the ULFA has targeted Hindi speaking migrants and not the illegal Bangladeshi migrants.

Over the years, the government of India has been expressing its desire to hold direct talks with the ULFA. However, its past experience has not been encouraging due to the ULFA's intransigence. The ULFA's offer to hold talks with the Centre during major security operations has been aimed at getting the security forces off its back. This happened during Operation Bajrang in 1990 and Operation Rhino in 1991. In 1992, in response to ULFA's offer to hold talks, the Centre released five of its senior leaders. But soon after the first round of talks, the leaders slipped into Bangladesh and never returned to the negotiating table. Similarly, in the aftermath of Operation All Clear in 2003, when its bases in Bhutan were destroyed and most of its cadres killed or arrested, the ULFA again expressed a desire for talks in 2005. It established the PCG in October 2005 comprising eleven members it nominated. The PCG's mandate was to hold exploratory talks with the government on behalf of the ULFA and prepare the groundwork for a dialogue. While three rounds of talks were held with the PCG, they broke down, as the Centre wanted the ULFA's assurance that it would shun violence and participate in direct talks. The ULFA, on the other hand, insisted on the release of its five top leaders lodged in jails, asserting that the 10-member ULFA executive committee alone could decide on holding direct peace talks with the government.

In August 2006, the Central government unilaterally announced a ceasefire with the outfit and the ULFA also responded by promising to end hostilities. However, after a period of six weeks, the government called off the ceasefire and resumed military operations on the ground that the ULFA had not kept its promise. On September 27, 2006, the PCG withdrew from negotiations protesting against the Central government's decision to resume military operations against the outfit. Thus, the peace talks came to an abrupt end even before they really took off. In view of the repeated failure of peace negotiations and the recent surge in violence, the Centre is contemplating a massive military operation.

These operations would need to be conducted under sound policy guidelines. The objective should be the complete disarmament of the militant outfit. There is no scope for half measures given the history of the rebel group's penchant for staying low while military operations are being undertaken and re-emerging once operations are called off. India must also prevail upon Bangladesh to stop providing shelter and support to various insurgent groups operating in the North East. It is also important that both Central and State governments engage important civil society groups like the Assam Sahitya Sabha in peace negotiations. The latter is representative of the people of Assam cutting across ethnic lines and therefore has the influence to garner vital popular support for a peace package. Without popular support, any peace deal with the ULFA would be stillborn. In the immediate future, the National Games must go ahead as planned and all measures should be taken to ensure full participation and smooth conduct of the games. The Centre must persevere with its policy of not engaging with the ULFA unless it shuns violence unequivocally. Refusing to concede under the threat of terrorist attacks is the only way to discredit ULFA as a force.

A recent survey by a Colombo-based agency on the peace process revealed that a majority of Sri Lankans prefers India as a peace facilitator rather than the Norwegians. According to the report by the Centre for Policy Alternatives, over 52.5 per cent of Sinhalese and 82 per cent of upcountry Tamils voted for an Indian involvement in the peace process. In recent years, the mood has shifted across Sri Lanka with major parties to the conflict instilling a newfound faith on New Delhi as the ideal arbitrator for the peace process. For the first time since the IPKF debacle and Rajiv Gandhi assassination, all prominent actors, barring some hardliner groups, are in favour of a progressive Indian involvement. If this could be seen as appreciation of India's largely dormant and neutral involvement in the conflict after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it could also be attributed to India's declared support for a federal solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka.

At the other end, a vast majority of Sri Lankan Tamils look towards India for succour when hostilities break out in the North and East. In recent years, a section of the Tamil population, especially in the South, had assimilated with the Sinhalese and distanced itself from the Eelam movement after years of economic deprivation. The split in the LTTE and the emergence of the Karuna faction has made dynamic transformations in the conflict with predictions of massive depletions in the LTTE force levels. Though India maintains a stoic aloofness from the LTTE, statements of repentance made by the LTTE leadership over Rajiv Gandhi's assassination and their attempts at rapprochement have created a new dimension to the conflict. While the Tigers are yet to make any formal proposal for reconciliation with New Delhi, it is amply clear that they would prefer India to have a proactive presence than allowing Western powers to get involved.

Sustained clashes in the North and East, and the LTTE's retribution through suicide attacks in the South in recent months as a response to the military offensive have created a certain urgency for external interference to tackle possibilities of a major refugee exodus from the Northern areas. Though there seems to be a temporary lull in the fighting after talks between the government and the Tigers, and the death of LTTE ideologue, Anton Balasingham, a full-fledged war might break out any time. With the 2002 ceasefire agreement no longer in vogue and the war proclamation by LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the region should be prepared for a major humanitarian crisis as the Tigers prepare for a 'final war' and the Sri Lankan Army readies for a total military subjugation of the LTTE. In fact, the trumpet seems to have blown already. As late as January 2, 2007, there were reports of Sri Lankan military jets bombing LTTE bases in Mannar district. Also, the Army is reportedly attempting to push back the LTTE from Vaharai and Kadirweli, the last two LTTE strongholds in Batticaloa.

The return to full-scale violence since July 2006 is marked by a realignment of forces - primarily the desertion by Karuna and his tactical tie-up with government forces, which has resulted in a serious setback to the LTTE on the Eastern frontier. In recent months, this alliance was strengthened after other splinter Tamil groups like EPDP, PLOTE (Siddarthan) and EPRLF (Perumal) joined hands with Karuna to help the military in constraining the LTTE's operational capabilities. Though Colombo denies giving support to these groups, media reports have pointed to military-level co-operation and co-ordination between these groups and the Army in the East, which forced the LTTE to withdraw from its Sampur campaign in early September 2006. Colombo has not only gone slow on its commitment to disarm the Eastern factions, but has actually allowed Karuna to augment his cadre strength and at the same time has provided his group greater operational space.

Taking on this advantage, the Sri Lankan military now sparkles with belligerence and the confidence of subjugating the Tigers in their burrow. The Army's offensive in recent months in Batticaloa and LTTE territories in the North has forced the Tigers to open new attack points in the South, exemplified by the October suicide attacks in Galle and Habarana. The unprecedented surge by the Sri Lankan Army in the North in recent months displays a predilection of the government to attempt a military solution through a concerted victory over the LTTE. This new belligerence, embodied by the military campaign using Kfir fighter jets and helicopters to gain tactical advantage over the LTTE, has in turn further alienated the Northern Tamils from the Sinhala government. Though Colombo officially contends that its offensive is a response to Tiger aggression at various flashpoints, reports have quoted Army officials as affirming their aim as gaining maximum territorial advantage before the international community forces them to peace talks. On January 3, the Daily Mirror quoted the Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka as saying that the East would be totally rid of the LTTE in two or three months. Fonseka reportedly said that "After eradicating the Tigers from the East, full strength would be used to rescue the North."

As this tit-for-tat game gradually defeats the internationally mediated peace process, the offensive against the LTTE and its international isolation would complicate the conflict and pave the way for greater involvement by external powers. Interestingly, for the first time since the IPKF debacle and Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, barring some hardliner groups like the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), all prominent actors including the LTTE are in favour of a progressive Indian involvement. However, New Delhi continues to maintain a safe distance while undertaking occasional political parleys with the Sri Lankan government and some Tamil political groups. While sceptics in India reject the LTTE's recent reconciliation efforts as a deceptive gamble, they have ignored the transformed military dynamics in Sri Lanka, which is what has forced the Tigers to seek reconciliation with India. The Tigers have suffered serious setbacks - starting with Karuna's defection, the EU ban, increasing crackdown in places like Canada, and diminishing support in its traditional bases - forcing it to explore accommodation with its erstwhile Indian ally. The split caused by Karuna and recent offensives by the Lankan Army have led to massive depletions in its force levels. It is now becoming clear that the Tigers would consider a proactive political role by India as their safest bet.

Though the UPA government maintains an emotional stigma on the LTTE, the political picture in Tamil Nadu is fast transforming with a subtle sympathy wave now emerging in favour of the LTTE. Vaiko and other pro-LTTE voices continue to make all the right noises for the LTTE in its extended political hinterland even as traditional foes like Jayalalitha have shown surprising restraint towards such crusades. The DMK has attempted to maintain a balancing act by raising an occasional clamour over air raids in Tamil-dominated provinces, while at the same time abstaining from upping the ante against the policy thinking in New Delhi. The LTTE's attempt to cosy up with Karunanidhi was evident during Balasingham's funeral in London, when the head of the LTTE political wing Tamilselvan thanked Karunanidhi for his support to the Sri Lankan Tamils. Through the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs, the LTTE has already approached the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister to lobby with New Delhi for pressuring Colombo to stop the attacks in the North. With the Prime Minister too giving audience to the TNA MPs, hopes might have risen for the LTTE leadership of a major political involvement by New Delhi in the near future.

It would not be long before a consensual voice emerges from Tamil Nadu demanding a review of India's relations with the LTTE. Such a political turnaround, if at all it happens, could be impelled by some peculiar factors. First, a subjugation or forced retreat of the LTTE from its strongholds might widen the trust-deficit between the Tamils and Sinhalese. Second, the LTTE has a pseudo-state character with formidable control over the Northern areas. Thus, its military defeat could lead to a major political and humanitarian crisis, which would force a greater Indian involvement to ensure the safety of upcountry Tamils.

It is thus now time for New Delhi to put the past behind, reinstate its influence and revive possible channels of communication with all parties involved and help create stability in Sri Lanka. Considering that Pakistan and China have already initiated military co-operation with Colombo, India should start negating the ascendancy of new players in its Southern neighbourhood. At the same time, India should also abstain from any kind of military co-operation with Colombo, which could tilt the balance against the LTTE, considering the heavy political risks. Though there is now renewed talk of naval and military co-operation with Colombo, the emphasis should be on playing a political role and assuming charge as a credible facilitator of the peace process. The current peace process in Sri Lanka is in a flux as the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission grapples with new challenges. With the Norwegian initiative losing its sheen, the time is now ripe for India to appreciate the changed dynamics in Sri Lanka and assume leadership of the peace process. As a rising power, India can no longer remain mute to political crises in its neighbourhood. It has to tide over past emotional events and mature as an actor of prominence to engage all parties in regional conflicts and facilitate stability in the region.