S. K. Ghosh

Publication

The Indo–Soviet Treaty and China

The post-Second World War era may be divided broadly into four periods in terms of international strategic power balance. The first period stretched up to 1953–54, when the USA had a clear nuclear weapon superiority; the second period, 1953–54 to 1962–63, was a period of ‘delicate balance of terror’, when both the USA and the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons and delivery systems largely concentrated in first strike capabilities; the third period, 1963–1970, was the period of ‘stabilised deterrence’, with both countries having fairly balanced first and second strike capabilities. From 1970 onwards this bipolar strategic balance has been in the process of being disturbed, mainly as a result of the entrance of a new actor, China, in the arena of international power game. This has become possible as a result of China’s attainment of a big power status by virtue of its rapid advance towards a viable nuclear force.

Chinese Air and Missile Power

Air force Built up with Russian aid in the wake of the Korean War in the early fifties, the Chinese Air Force grew up around 1960 to be the third-largest in the world with about 3,000 fighter interceptors (mostly MiG-15s, MiG-17s and a few MiG-19s) and about a thousand light jet bombers (mostly JL-28s) and transport aircraft. There were about 10,000 pilots. Flying schools, training depots and instructional centres were developed under Russian guidance and there was a regular flow of supply and replacement of craft and spares. A division of parachute troops was also in the process of formation during 1959–60 with Russian help. China’s first Air Force Chief Liu Ya-lou spelt out the magnitude of Soviet assistance, when he said in July 1957 that, ‘the Soviet Union has not only given us first-class modern equipment, but also sent here a large number of very learned and experienced experts to teach us aviation science, tactics, superior aviation techniques and air force tactics, and all kinds of advance experience’.