Events

Non-State Armed Groups and Asian Security in the 21st Century

Concept Note

As part of its ongoing efforts to bring together experts on security issues of mutual interest, IDSA and BESA are hosting a Bilateral Dialogue on “Non-State Armed Groups and Asian Security in the 21stCentury”. The sovereign state has been increasingly undermined by transnational, supra-national and sub-national non-state actors. Some like civil society groups, are nonviolent and have played a critical role in reforming state policy and improving governance. Others like the Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and the LTTE, are violent and have become threats to national security and international peace. Such groups, designated as Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) are defined as “groups that use force, flow across state boundaries, utilize global communication and transportation networks, seek international influence, and increasingly undertake military operations against dominant states.” In different ways and to varying degrees, these groups have challenged two aspects of state power- sovereignty over the territory and the exclusive right to use force.

The nature of NSAG’s differs considerably since they aspire to different goals- some desire statehood while others have transcendent millenarian objectives. The main challenge in dealing with them is that while posing as threats to existing states, they perform important social welfare functions that give them legitimacy. According to the dataset of the Military Balance (IISS, 2007), there are 343 armed groups, 187 of them operate in Asia. They indulge in a range of activities such as terrorism (transnational and domestic), separatism, extremism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, opposition to governments, ethnic violence, border violence, drug smuggling and other crimes. Their presence complicates the internal and international security dynamics and compels us to give serious consideration to issues such as ungoverned and misgoverned spaces, the problems they pose to nation-building and peace and security in the contemporary world.

The Dialogue aims to bring together scholars studying some of the important NSAGs, with the aim to arrive at a focused, structured, comparative understanding of these actors and implications for Asian security. Theoretical propositions regarding the success/failure of states and non-state groups have been based on the impact of power/interest asymmetries and strategic interaction between the two sides. In an attempt to further refine and/or reinforce the ongoing debate, the first session will cover the following topics:

• The Uncertain Meaning of Victory in Contemporary Conflicts
• Small Wars: Theory and Practice
• Sub-national Insurgencies: Lessons from the Indian Experience
• The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism in Asia

The following NSAGs will be discussed during the Dialogue: 1. Hezbollah 2. HAMAS 3. Al Qaeda 4. Islamic Brotherhood 5. Taliban 6. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)7. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) 8. Harkat ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) 9. Jama’atul Mujaheedin Bangladesh (JMB) 10. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). While this list is not comprehensive, the groups selected are representative of the dominant trends and therefore, it is hoped that an in-depth analysis of these groups will bring forth important conclusions regarding how to deal with NSAGs in Asia.

With the aim of arriving at a comprehensive, focused and structured comparative study, each of these case studies will focus on certain common criteria such as:

1. Organisation of the Group- hierarchical or network-based; centralized/localized decision-making; functional sub-units such as military, intelligence, political and financial
2. Membership- size; recruitment and training strategies; sources of motivation and continued membership; social and political origins
3. Leadership- their ideology; world-view; motives; sources of legitimacy/moral authority; nature of leadership and its impact on effectiveness of the group; cohesiveness/factions among leadership
4. Ideology- political, social economic vision as a source of legitimacy; justification of violence
5. Resources- infrastructure; sources of funding, linkages with other non state armed groups/state actors, sources of weapons; intention to acquire WMDs
6. Strategy- operational doctrines; declared strategies and tactics; intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities, flexibility, balance-sheet of operational and strategic effectiveness; targets.
7. State responses to these armed groups and their counter-reactions.

Transcript

• Inaugural Session
• Session – I: Non-State Armed Groups and Security: Some Theoretical Aspects
• Session – II: Case Studies
• Talk by Professor Efraim Inbar

A five day workshop on “Frameworks of Conflict Management” was jointly organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Norway at New Delhi between January 7 and 11, 2008. The aim was to provide an opportunity to discuss conceptual issues relating to conflict management in India as well as in other parts of the world. The workshop was primarily focused on capacity building for civil servants, peace negotiators, army personnel and members of civil society. Presentations focused on both Indian and international experiences in conflict management. The workshop comprised of five sessions, namely, conceptual frameworks of conflict management, insurgencies in India’s North East and the Naxal conflict, the Sami Parliament of Norway, the Northern Ireland Assembly and a Gaming Exercise on Peace Negotiations.

Conflict Management Frameworks

The first session witnessed a focused discussion on conflict management frameworks. Uttam Sinha, Research Fellow, IDSA, Ashild Kolas, Senior Researcher, PRIO and Radha Kumar, Director, Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, all offered a broad understanding of the theory and practice of conflict management. Sinha talked about bridging the gap between theory and practice, positing that frameworks of conflict management should be informed by the perspective of practitioners and grass-root activists. He further argued that it is imperative to generate shared perception of issues and interests while also managing the spoilers of the conflict management process. Kolas pointed out that frameworks are structures to understand the conflict, the nature of parties involved and also serve as opportune entry points to identify problems and issues related to conflict resolution. Conflict management essentially requires a reframing of the conflict, which would lead to a change in understanding the perspectives of various actors.

Kumar took the discussion further by flagging a few points relating to the general understanding of conflict before delving into the merits of Indian conflict management practices. She proposed that ‘time factor’ predominantly shapes the preventive phase of conflict management processes. Arguing that one needs to revisit the general understanding of conflict management in technical terms, such as, ceasefire and post-conflict intervention strategies, she drew attention to the practices employed in India during the post-independence era. She emphasised on how the Indian government has successfully dealt with separatist movements in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir. Kumar also focused on the ‘trigger points’ that aggravate conflicts and the processes through which issues get redefined over time, thus endowing a different framework and characteristic to the understanding of conflict management processes.

India’s North East and the Naxal Conflict

This session began with a presentation by N. S. Sisodia, Director General of IDSA, on “Managing Negotiations for Conflict Situations”. Drawing primarily from the Harvard Negotiation Project, Sisodia argued that negotiations require flexibility and a willingness to listen to the other side. Bargaining on the negotiating table must not be based on entrenched positions but must be informed by situational adaptability on the part of the negotiators. He also drew attention to the concept of principled negotiations, which looks at participants as problem solvers, separates people from the problem, is soft on the people but hard on the problem, explores interests, and tries to reach a settlement based on reason and openness without yielding to pressure.

K. Padmanabhaiah, the Indian Government’s chief interlocutor for the ongoing Naga peace talks, provided an overview on the state of the peace process with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah—NSCN (IM). Elaborating on the demands of the NSCN-(IM), he said that the organisation while diluting its demand for sovereignty is concentrating on the integration of all Naga inhibited areas into a 'Greater Nagalim’. A major hurdle to the Naga peace process, in his view, is the presence of multiple militant groups without a common agenda. Highlighting the fact that the North East does not receive the policy attention it deserves from New Delhi, Padmanabhaiah drove home the point that conflict resolution requires political leadership and vision beyond the security paradigm. Lieutenant General R.N. Kapur, former Inspector General, Assam Rifles, also indicated that factional clashes are common in Naga areas.

Sanjoy Hazarika, noted journalist and commentator on North East affairs, argued that the absence of a policy on migration from Bangladesh has further complicated the situation. The unabated inflow of migrants is changing the region’s demographic profile. He identified the need for an identity card scheme and a work permit system as a possible solution to this problem. He strongly opposed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) 1958, which has not been able to resolve the problem of militancy in the region, and demanded its repeal. The police, in his view, should be at the forefront of the fight against militants.

The session on Naxalism threw up an interesting mix of ideas drawn from the experience of policy makers, academics, journalists and social activists. The main speakers in this session were T. N. Rajendran, Inspector General, Police Training College, Tamil Nadu, Professor Nandini Sundar of the Delhi School of Economics, B. G. Verghese, Himanshu Kumar and Srinivas Reddy, Deputy Editor, The Hindu. The session demonstrated how finding a common ground can be thorny, with some speakers focusing on short-term military fixes while others laid stress on long-term development goals as the cornerstone of successful conflict management.

Four main issues and themes were discussed in this session. First, the ‘Naxal problem’ is often simplified at the Centre leading to ‘one problem, one solution’ philosophy. In practice, however, policies vary from state to state ranging from wilful ignorance in Bihar to trained anti-guerrilla paramilitaries in Andhra Pradesh on the one hand and state-funded village-level counterinsurgent groups like the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh on the other. Secondly, an in-depth examination was undertaken of the biggest hot spot of Naxal violence – Dantewara in Chhattisgarh. The conflict there has been more ‘hot’ than ‘cold’ over the past two years. The number of affected people is well over 100,000 as Naxal forces have fought against both official and unofficial troops in the dense jungles. The third theme highlighted the role of law and order approaches to quell Naxal uprisings. The state has a basic duty to its citizens to both provide individual security and enforce the laws by which people are governed. When this duty goes unimplemented due to ignorance or inability, Naxalism will always provide an alternative. Fourth was the role of the media with regard to Naxalism. While a general lack of solid information has contributed to counterproductive strategies in many affected areas, framing the issue as first and foremost a law and order problem, and trying to sell it as ‘senseless yet targeted’ violence, ignores the greater complexities and root causes of the issue.

The Sami Parliament

Session Four examined the Sami Parliament in Norway. Leif Dunfjeld, Senior Advisor, Norwegian Sami Parliament and Bjorn Olav Megard, Deputy Director General, Department of Sami and Minority Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, pointed out that the establishment of the Parliament was one of the successful peace agreements made between a state and a non-state actor. The Sami demand was self- governance. Interestingly, Dunjfeld stated, the Sami people relied on secret talks and diplomatic ties between their leaders and the Norwegian government to achieve their objective.

Megard provided a brief introduction to the Sami people, their history and the demand for self governance. They are an indigenous people numbering 80,000 to 100,000. Their demand for sovereign rights over their affairs was led by a largely unarmed movement, which resulted in fruitful peace negotiations that established a non-territorial self- government system. Dunfjeld explained that cultural and land rights were the most important factor for the Sami.

Northern Ireland

The session on the conflict in Northern Ireland included Marie Breen Smyth, Director, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence, University of Wales, Ryan Gawn, Public Affairs Consultant, Stratagem (NI) Ltd. Belfast, and Naomi R. Long, Member, Legislative Assembly and Alliance Party Deputy Leader, Northern Ireland, as resource persons. Smyth elaborated on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which had critical importance in resolving the conflict. The underlying theme of her presentation was to highlight how the dynamics of the conflict transformed over the years. Conflict fatigue not just among the civilians but also the various political parties and stakeholders in the conflict was one of the crucial reasons that led to the conclusion of the Belfast agreement.

Taking on from Smyth, Gawn focused in detail on the role played by the various political parties, whose approaches and public positions gradually transformed during the course of the conflict. Long, a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, highlighted the ground realities in the working of the Belfast Agreement. Her presentation brought out the institutional and operational limitations of the Belfast Agreement, which would prove crucial for institution building in future conflict zones.

Gaming Exercise on Naga Peace Negotiation

In the last session a negotiation game on the ongoing Naga peace process was conducted. The aim was to analyse the government’s negotiating posture vis-à-vis the NSCN (IM). The game considered the present incompatibilities between the government and the outfit’s positions on the negotiating table. Two teams took part in this game, one representing the Union government and the other the NSCN (IM). The concept of the game was to spend three to four hours concentrating on a given scenario and develop the game further based on the reactions of the players. But the game ended in a stalemate with both sides sticking to their entrenched positions. Ironically, this is also the situation in the real Naga peace negotiations, which is marked by an unending deadlock over issues like “special federal relationship” between the proposed Nagalim and India and territorial unification of Naga areas.

The workshop succeeded in providing a forum for interactions between policy makers, academia, social activists and civil society organisations from conflict affected areas. The discussions were lively and it was interesting to observe police and army personnel, social activists, civil society members and academia sitting in the same room to carve out conflict management frameworks to realistically tackle India’s internal conflicts. The five day workshop highlighted the fact that unless all sections of society come together to frame conflict resolution mechanisms, the future will remain highly uncertain in conflict prone zones like the North East and Naxal affected areas.