

## **Session – II: Case Studies**

### ***Opening Remarks by Mr Kalim Bahadur (Chair)***

...Non-State actors who are of great influence on all the movements from Egypt in the West to Indonesia in the East. There are going to be four presentations, all of them by well known experts in the field. Dr Shaul Shay and Mordechai Kedar both are well known scholars in the field, they have specialised in Islamic Terrorism, Radical Islam and so on and so forth. There is also D'Souza and Arpita Anant both of them are working on these subjects which we are going to discuss in this session. Each presentation should be about 20 minutes, the discussant will have 15 minutes. I hope I won't have to stop anyone from speaking, I would not like to do so, please keep to the timing.

### ***Presentation by Dr Shaul Shay on Al Qaeda***

I think that the challenge to speak first after lunch is pretty unfair but I have no choice. Any way I will try to follow the orders and to be short. My topic is Al Qaeda and I will discuss it a little bit from a conceptual, historical perspective and then I will try to link it to both Israel and India. Experts used to say that Al Qaeda was formed in 1988, I am not sure but it is an accepted date for the formation of Al Qaeda and if it is true we can celebrate this year as the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this organisation. I am not sure that we have a good reason to celebrate but we have to understand that this phenomenon exists such a long period. I will try to share with you some ideas on what is the uniqueness of Al Qaeda compared to other radical Islamic organisations.

First of all I think that Al Qaeda is the most significant product of the jihad in Afghanistan. This organisation emerged I think partly as a result of the misunderstanding of the threat of radical Islam by the West. As we remember from 1979 there was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, then came the call from the local Muslims to the rest of the Muslims in the world to join the jihad and it created a new phenomenon in the history of the Islam that first time it was, if I will use a western term, an Islamic international like if I can compare it to the civil war in Spain that the most radical elements from Islam joined the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. At that time on the background of the Cold War era, a very unique alliance emerged – the alliance between the radical Islam and the West. They cooperated on the background of one common goal to defeat the Soviet Union and it was quite a successful coalition. But in order to be fair, the radical Islam along all the way they said now we are ready to cooperate with the devil but later on it will be your turn. The West preferred to listen only to the first part of the sentence. So actually in 1989 the agreement was signed that the Soviet forces will withdraw by 1992 and we know what was the end. By coincidence more or less this was the period that the Soviet Union collapsed. Not it is not important it is true or not true but from the radical Islam's point of view they succeeded to defeat the Soviet Union on the battlefield and they defeated not just the military capabilities of the Soviet Union but they defeated an ideology. Then they were available to continue that jihad to the rest and the first priority was of course the United States and the West. So, in 1988 almost at the end of the war against the Soviets, Osama Bin Laden and the less known but I think most important partner of Osama Bin Laden was a Palestinian named Abdallah Azam. He was the ideologist of the jihadi movement. I hope that next year I will publish a book about his writings and they formed Al Qaeda. Later on in 1989 he passed away, some people blame Bin Laden that he detonated a bomb and made Abdallah Azam shaheed and Osama Bin Laden followed the way.

What is unique regarding Al Qaeda? First of all it is an international organisation, unlike most of the radical Islamic movements that has roots and origin in a local Muslim state. Who are the members of Al Qaeda? Radical Muslims from all around the world but it is interesting to look at the leadership. The leadership if we are analysing on one hand Osama Bin Laden and his partner Ayman Al Zawahari they are representing the concept

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of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden representing the Wahabism, came from Saudi Arabia, his origin. Ayman Zawahari is representing the Salafi school. Both of them if you are looking at their education one is an engineer and the other is a doctor. So it is a combination of the past and the present, I mean if I have to use the term fundamentalism it relates equally to both of them. This is the threat as well of this organisation. So as I said first of all it is an international one. The second point is that it is a non-territorial organisation. I mean they have no commitment to protect any specific soil. If we are looking a little bit to the history of Al Qaeda, shortly after the end of the war in Afghanistan he moved back to Saudi Arabia. Then in 1991 he was forced to leave Saudi Arabia and then he was hosted by Hasan Al Turabi in Sudan till 1996. In 1996 when Taliban came to power in Afghanistan he was forced to leave Sudan and he returned to Afghanistan. Since 2001 till this date probably he is somewhere in this region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, he is not committed to protect any specific soil. According to his ideology, the theatre of his jihad is the globe and this is the concept of the structure of the organisation. When I say that this organisation exists for 20 years it is very interesting to see how many significant attacks this organisation carried out. I can count it on one hand. This is not the name of the game. If I analyse the history of Al Qaeda I think that the first most significant period was the Sudanese period. This was the period that Osama Bin Laden built his global network, operational as well as financial, a global network of charities, of businesses partly legitimate, and the rest non-legitimate and of course the operational network. Later on when he returned to Afghanistan under the Taliban regime he was able to operate openly and he found what we used to call the second generation of the Afghan veterans. I mean not the guys who fought the Soviets but this one who were recruited from all around the world sent to training camps in Afghanistan and then returned to their own places and this is the second generation of Al Qaeda. The third point that I would like to highlight is that Osama Bin Laden understood that it is not important how many terror attacks you carry out. The importance is what is the target and what is the benefit from the modern media. So you don't have to do many attacks, you have to make significant attacks. Actually if you are looking before 9/11 there are two significant operations of Al Qaeda – one is the bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the second, USS Cole, a warship in Yemen. Then the 9/11. On the way he failed to carry out a big operation on the eve of the millennium, an operation that was supposed to be carried out simultaneously in Los Angeles airport and in Jordan. But this is more or less, again there is a debate if the operations of 1993 of Ramzi Yusuf if it was on behalf of Al Qaeda or not, even if I include it I don't pass five. But I think that everybody here in the room and elsewhere in the world if I ask you to close your eyes and if you can see Bin Laden yes, he is with us all the time. So what I am trying to say regarding Al Qaeda is that its main strength is the understanding that we are dealing with a psychological warfare. In order to create the best psychological effect it is necessary to analyse your adversary, to find his weaknesses and to use his weaknesses.

If I am looking at the 9/11 attack as a model I would like to say three things about this attack. First of all, the system. Bin Laden was not the first to adopt the strategy of the suicide attacks. Actually Hezbollah started much earlier, 10 years earlier than Al Qaeda and even the Palestinians before and of course the Tamil Tigers here in this region. But he understood that on the one hand if we are looking at the western society what is the highest value of the western society – the human life, and after the human life, all the freedoms as a part of the democratic system. His argument is that on the other hand the opponent of the West is a society that its highest value is the self sacrifice of the individual life for the sake of Islam. Now if we take these two societies to a certain point in future from his point of view it is clear that Islam will be on the upper hand. Therefore it is necessary for Al Qaeda to try to carry out most of the terror attacks by this system, not because this is the only system to carry out the attack but because of the symbolic significance of this suicide strategy. The second point is the understanding of the weakness of the Western society. I think that it is clear for Bin Laden that it is impossible

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to defeat America by military means. If we are speaking today about asymmetric wars, it is totally asymmetric, it is impossible. So in order to win this war it is necessary to hit the soft belly of the western society. How to do it, by choosing symbolic targets. What were the targets in the 9/11? World Trade Centre is the symbol of the Western economy. The Pentagon is the symbol of the Western military capabilities and there is still a debate if the fourth aeroplane that crashed in Pennsylvania the target was the White House or the Capital both of them representing the Western political system. If the name of the game was just to create a huge number of victims, I believe that they could choose a study on a basket ball team with 30000 people in the stadium, probably the number of victims could be high. So this is the second point. The third point is the term time. I think that some of the speakers today touched a little bit on this term. In the Western society the term time has a very important significance. Actually it is a kind of society that even the food has to be fast food. We want information in real time. The political system is built on frames of more or less four years of elections. The term time for the radical Islam is entirely different. Therefore if to prepare the 9/11 attack it took two years, it is okay, he has the time. For Bin Laden it is not important if his grandson's grandson will enjoy the fruits of his war today. Because anyway along the way all the victims will become shaheeds and the goal is the unification of the Muslims. So we have to understand that Al Qaeda understand the west better than the West understands Al Qaeda. This is one of our weaknesses. Therefore I think that [unclear] said before, we have to change the diskette in our computer system and to understand. Again it is very difficult to use the term victory. It is going to be a war that will take may be decades. So along this period with our timeframing mindset we will be frustrated along all the way because there are ups and downs in this conflict. The radical Islam is ready for this type of conflict. He has no problems with it. The problem is our problem.

Another point that I would like to highlight is regarding non-state actors. I completely agree with all the speakers that explained that the nation states formed the armed forces in order historically traditionally to fight other states. So, the problem is when the US went to the war in Afghanistan first, and later on to Iraq, it was more or less against an evil regime and I think that we all agree that both regimes were evil regimes, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. From military point of view they achieved a decisive victory in both theatres without making mistakes even in Afghanistan learning the lessons from the Soviet Union. But the question is what will be the next step. Because turning states to failed states creates the optimal theatre for non-state actors like Al Qaeda, like the Taliban and then the first victory is not important anymore because now you have to rebuild the state. Now how to do it? This is the big question mark. I think that all these non state actors are living like fishes in the water in such failed states and non governed areas. This is the area that they operate and the problem is not that they exist in this area but this area is the base to operate worldwide. I think that this is one of the main challenges and of course the goal of Al Qaeda is to create as much as possible these types of theatres. So it is not a coincidence that on the eve of the 5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> anniversary of 9/11 Ayman Zawahari in his audio tape said look from our point of view the jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan is almost over, the results are clear, it is a question of time the west will withdraw and now we are declaring the two new theatres of jihad, the Gulf and Palestine. But I can add to him some more. For instance, Somalia, Africa in general is going to be a very significant theatre of Al Qaeda and its allies.

Time is short so I would like to finish my part by saying a few words about Al Qaeda, India and Israel. I checked some of the audio tapes of Bin Laden and Zawahari and other members of Al Qaeda between 2003 and 2007. I found it very interesting that they are linking together Israel and India at least in a part of their messages. For instance in Al Jazeera September 29, 2003, Zawahari warned the Pakistani officers and soldiers that the President would hand them over to the Hindus and flee to enjoy his secret bank account if India attacked their country. Of course it is on the background of the support of Musharraf to the global war against terror and the other point was he also condemned

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Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India saying the agreements signed were a drop in the ocean of the American-Jewish-Indian alliance against their country. So this was one of the messages in 2003. In a jihadi website in April 29, 2006, again Zawahari, it was on the background of the visit of President Bush to India in March and among other things he said, Musharraf is fight Islam in Pakistan, threatened national security in Pakistan, has placed Pakistan's nuclear programme under American, therefore Jewish and Indian control. I am not sure that you will agree with this argument but he said that. Two other interesting messages are local ones for a news services in Srinagar it was first in July 2006 a guy named Abu Al Khadid he claimed that Al Qaeda had created a wing in Kashmir and that Abu Abdul Rehman Ansari is the chief commander in the State and called all the Muslims to join. I read that you saw that it is a fake or a false message but any way a year later in June 2007 again in a news service in Srinagar again it was a message we declare a Holy War against India on behalf of God the Great in which Jammu and Kashmir will be the launch pad for holy war in India. America and Israel and other western nations in collaboration with India were trying to divide Kashmir to gain hegemony in the region and set up military bases in this region. We declare jihad against India, Jammu and Kashmir shall be the gateway for such a jihad. Why India? Why West, it is quite clear as early as 1998 they declared a war against the alliance between the crusaders and the Jews, historically it is an impossible combination. But what do they have against India? From my understanding there are three main reasons to operate against India. First of all India and its population except the Muslims are recognized as part of the infidels and the conflict is against the rest of the world, not just against the west. West is first priority but the rest as well. The second is the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir and of course Al Qaeda is on the side of the radical Muslim part who operate in this area. I think that the third one as I quoted before is the alliance of India with the West, with Russia and friendship with Israel that are good reasons to put India on the list of Al Qaeda. I think that my time is over. Thank you.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** Thank you Dr Shay for encapsulating the philosophy and ideology of Osama Bin Laden. Next speaker is Dr D'Souza on Taliban. She has been working on Afghanistan and Taliban since some time and she has done some very good work.

***Presentation by Dr Shanthie D'Souza on Taliban***

Thank you Sir. I will start my presentation and I follow the structure which was given by the organisers. I will start with what I mean by a resurgent Taliban or a Taliban led insurgency. It is a loose amalgamation or alliance of Taliban guerrillas, followers of the Afghan Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, Al Qaeda recruits foreign terrorists, religious leaders, narcotics traffickers, bandits, tribal fighters, and also other parts of petty criminals in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. The Taliban and Al Qaeda share a symbiotic relationship and even after the post Operation Enduring Freedom the relationship has not been affected in any way. This is the Taliban frontline. If you see it starts from the East around Nuristan and it is spread here till Farhat and it is going up to Herat, Bagdis and as of 2007 it is in Faryab also. So this is the broad Taliban frontline in Afghanistan today. The insurgent activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2007 are depicted in this map. The area with permanent Taliban presence is red in colour, the area with substantial Taliban presence is pinkish in colour, and the area with light Taliban presence is grey in colour. The number of insurgent activities have increased around Kabul, Jalalabad, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Lashkargan, Talimkot and all these kinds of areas. The insecurity has spread and if you see the women in Mazar-e-Sharif, a very progressive town, during my field work I captured some of these pictures in June last year.

The Taliban organisation consists of tier-1, which is charismatic leadership of Mullah Omar and zealots who provide the plan. Tier-2 consists of foot soldiers who execute the plan. Tier-3 consists the backbone, local Pushtoons who provide support to the movement. The organisation is a very loose organisation and does not have a

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hierarchical structure as such. The insurgent structure follows this kind of a mode. It has a civilian support network or auxiliary which organises civilians and logistical support. It provides key logistics along main roads in Afghanistan between Kabul-Jalalabad or around the Silk Route. The second component is the underground segment which includes the insurgency's political and financial support network and this segment is very important because it carries out activities against Afghan government. The guerrillas are the armed insurgents who conduct military and paramilitary operations. They are provided strategic command by the front commanders, the tactical and operation control is often delegated to the guerrillas as franchises by the front commanders. This is how the broad insurgency structure operates in Afghanistan.

The Leadership Council – Taliban's most important political and military leadership council is based in Pakistan. The Quetta Shora which deals with political matters is in Baluchistan province, the Peshawar Shora dealing with military matters of the insurgent groups is in North West Frontier Province. Other groups like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Hizm-e-Islami operates in Tir and Bajor area. Al Qaeda functions basically in Waziristan and Chitral area in the Pakistan's tribal areas. The major component for the sustaining of insurgency is external support and Pakistan plays a very direct role. It has provided sanctuaries and safe havens. Taliban leadership is supposed to be based in Quetta. Its financing and recruitment also takes place especially through madrasas. The Taliban's decision making and its logistics are based in Pakistan. There are several Taliban shoras in Quetta each with a Pakistan officer coordinating it. ISI provides immense support in ideological and geostrategic sense to regain foothold in Afghanistan as also to find strategic depth which it has never given up. The other religious party like the MMA in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan is providing major support to the Taliban who are headquartered there. There are lot of insurgent crossing points in the Pak-Afghanistan border along Zabul and Kandahar and they are used as the main ingress routes to infiltrate Southern Afghanistan viz. Kandahar, Uruzgan and Helman. These routes are very easy to crossover because as little as 50 ars and cross the border paying the Pakistani police at this check post. External support of Iran is also involved but there were discovery of Iranian arms in Heart province and gunmen in pickup trucks crossing over into Afghanistan's Farah province from Iran. Border incursions have also been reported. Violations of Afghan airspace has been reported and there has also been evidence of a refugee camp in Iran called Shamsa Habbat where the training occurs. I guess there is no much evidence to prove Iran's role other than to see it in a broader strategic sense of the US-Iran relationship and Iran using as a point of pressure or raising the ante for the United States in Afghanistan.

The membership – This is the second component about the size. In 2005 the data extrapolated from various sources say about 2000-4000 fulltime fighters are existing. There are many more part-time fighters. In 2006 the late Taliban commander Dadullah said that there are about 12000 fighters, an estimate larger than the US estimate of 7000 to 10000. There are lot of part time fighters who are young, disillusioned Afghan men who have resentment against the intrusive western presence in Afghanistan. The most important component of the Taliban today is the foreign jihadi fighters. They are about 2000 of them according to some estimates. They are a loose knit Muslim extremists affiliated with the Al Qaeda. They mainly belong to Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Chechnya and there are lot more other countries also involved. In conjunction with other guerrilla units they act as franchisees with autonomy at the tactical and operational level but takes strategic guidance from the leadership of the Al Qaeda senior leaders. They are not hierarchically organised and form small dispersed units bound by ideology rather than by organisational structure. They are generally adherents of the salafism and strict interpretation of Islam and embrace jihad against the United States and allied governments. The foreign jihadis are full time professional fighters. They play important role as trainers, shock troops and surrogate leaders. In Pakistan's tribal area they train suicide bombers, create roadside

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bomb factories and of high quality suicide bomb material. They also raise fund for the Taliban and indulge in recruiting through videos posted online. They are also bolstering the ranks of Taliban insurgency and changing the face of the Taliban movement as an extreme and violent movement in Afghanistan and the locals in Afghanistan are not very happy with this kind of change and we see the kind of tensions developing in the tribal areas between the local Taliban and foreign elements.

The social and political origins of the movement – As we all know and Shaul had touched on it, it was formed in 1992 as a group of madarasa teachers and students led by Mullah Omar and they formed the movement to put an end to the ongoing power struggle between the mujahideen and to establish a pure Islamic regime. They belong to the Pushtoon ethnic group and they function through social networks. Social networks help them recruit and support. They also follow the code of Pushtoon valley and according to the code of Pushtoon Valley they pushtoons provide them with support and have order, tradition and revenge. This groups is strategically reactive in the sense they are trying to expel foreigners from Pakistan-Afghanistan border region because they don't like the interest of western presence and are against any modernisation plans. The potential for further geographic expansion of the Taliban insurgency rests on the recruitment of local leaders rather than the enlistment of ordinary foot soldiers. In 2006 the Taliban had approached quite a number of leaders and they are planning to expand on the basis of enlistment support from the local leaders. This is the map of Pushtoons in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The area around the red is where the pushtoons are and they are quite in majority in this region and this map shows the insurgent strongholds. There are various groups – the Durani, the Gilzai, Zarbani and all of them and they have found support in this region along the Pak-Afghanistan border area.

The recruiting and training strategies – Taliban recruitment has derived plainly from the disillusionment and alienation among the Afghans. Taliban revival does not imply growing support for the movement. It is rather a protest movement because people are very very upset and not very happy with the way the reconstruction or the Western presence has really not made a difference there. The recruitment for suicide bombers occurs around madrasas along the tribal regions of Pakistan. Shamshatu, an Afghan refugee camp near Peshawar, Manchera district another camp in North Waziristan region. The recruitment in Pakistan also occurs from madrasas funded and operated by the JuI. This was a finding of NATO's post operation report in 2006. As many as two-thirds of Pakistan's seminaries are run by the Deobandi sect and the Taliban has a very strong connection with the Deobandi elements. They also recruit through internet and globalized media by posting videotapes in Jihadi websites to garner support and to find new recruits. The Taliban had set up shadow government and parallel structures and hospitals in Helmund and to win hearts they even set up essential services like hospitals in Arkan and Herat region. The Taliban has recently released a military manual and it is very similar to what the Americans and Brits have detailing on how to spring ambushes, run spies and conducting insurgency against coalition forces in Afghanistan. It has about 10 chapters in 144 pages and deals with preparation of explosives, pictures and diagrams of light and heavy weaponry, ammunition and communication equipment. The leadership part of it, it has a charismatic leadership headed by Mullah Omar and of course Al Qaeda by Osama Bin Laden. They are divinely ordain, it is emir or the Commander of the Faithful as Mullah Omar is known. Taliban's clandestine radio station voice of Shariat, its video arm [unclear] studios and Taliban's own expanded video production has aired dozens of statements by Osama Bin Laden in 2006. They are maintaining linkages with its affiliates.

Ideology – The Taliban seek to impose a radical interpretation of Sunni Islam and is derived basically from the Deobandi school of thought. In recent times the Taliban have increasingly identified themselves as part of the global jihadi movement and the rhetoric has full of references to Iraq and Palestine. These are pictures taken during the fieldwork

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of ruins of what the Taliban did during their time in Afghanistan to a cinema hall. Taliban-Al Qaeda ideological linkages are deep and extensive. The Al Qaeda envisions to restore Afghanistan as a totalitarian state like the pre-2001 Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda affiliated insurgencies like the Taliban have used religious factor to low inhibitions to moral barriers of violence. So may be that is one of the reason for the increase in suicide attacks a 200% approximate rise in suicide bombings in 2007. While Taliban attempts to paralyse the Afghan state, they actively seek to expel the foreigners and infidels, they intimidate and coerce through night letters like Shabnama and they justify their acts of violence and coercion through narratives like lighting the battle with the puppet regime of Karzai and its foreign coalition as a cosmic conflict or a righteous war between the righteous the believers and the infidels.

Sources of funding – One, the most important is the drug trade. The recent UN report says that it is 34% more than 2006, production has increased, providing for 93% of the global opiates market. In 2007 around 70% of the country's poppies were grown in five provinces along the border with Pakistan and 50% comes from Helmer. This whole area forms an arc of regional conflict formation. It is also important to note that in this region where the poppy cultivation has increased there is a very good Taliban hold. The second source is the Islamic charities and they come from the Middle East. Religious parties like the MME also provide a lot of funding.

The linkages with other non-state actors – It has a symbiotic relationship with Taliban and Al Qaeda and it has established linkage with ISI. It is transnational nature, it cooperates with various groups and cross pollination of ideas is seen. The increase in suicide and roadside bombings could be techniques which were perfected in Iraq and Al Qaeda Pakistan terrorist groups also function in conjunction through a system of sub-contracting where all the acts committed by the Pakistani groups are attributed to the Al Qaeda and they maintain deniability in that sense.

Sources of weapons – In 2006 the NATO report by the Operation Madarasa in Panjmai district demonstrated the extent of Taliban logistics capability and clear involvement of the ISI. Taliban fired an estimates four lakh rounds of ammunition, 2000 rocket propelled grenades and 1000 mortar shells which cost approximately five million US dollars which arrived in Pajwai from Qetta.

The strategy, this is the last component of the paper. I am just going through the shifts of how the Taliban went through the process. From September 2001 to March 2002, the Taliban were largely forced to conduct defensive operations in coalition efforts to other Taliban and conduct such follow on missions as Operation Anaconda. The Taliban-led insurgency is said to have begun in Spring of 2002. The Taliban regrouped and began to conduct a series of attacks in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Kabul and other Afghan provinces. In Spring of 2002 the strategy marked an important shift and a wide variety of attacks occurred against the US and the coalition forces as well as Afghan and international civilets and they have increasingly relied on asymmetric techniques. They operate from rural areas, distribute propaganda material, threaten and intimidate the local population and conduct armed attacks, including ambushes and rage and increased used of IEDs. The shift in strategy could be, in 2003 the Taliban and its foreign affiliates shifted its strategy from targeting coalition forces to attacking Afghan civilians and personnel from NGOs and this shift occurred may be because there was an increase in the number of US forces and the shift was to a soft and an easy target. The Iraq war itself shifted the special forces replace the conventional forces and the counter-insurgency operation there came to a kind of standstill with the shift of forces to Iraq. The shift was evident, the insurgent attempt to destabilize the October elections. In 2004 attacks occurred throughout the country. In 2004 again a significant shift in the size of guerrilla units – from large upto a 100 fighters to smaller units started functioning. This helped to evade detection. In 2006 they are fighting a positional warfare and they launch smaller attacks

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on multiple fronts. The main goal of the Taliban offensive in the local population and the NATO led Afghan government to [unclear] moral legitimacy. This is the Tora Bora mountain region where the things occur and the state response has been aerial bombings, there have been PRTs which are not functional, the Pak-Afghanistan Peace Zirkas have not been able to function and the Afghanistan government's political reconciliation has been very limited. With this I would like to end and I would like to take more questions. Thank you.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** Thank you Ms D'Souza for a very precise and incisive analysis of the structure and strategy of Taliban. The next speaker is Mr Mordechai Kedar, his presentation is on Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen.

***Presentation by Mr Mordechai Kedar on Islamic Brotherhood***

Thank you very much Sir. If I would summarize it to describe the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the history of world, I most probably would do it as the century of the rise of Islam initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is the womb from which most, if not all of these organisations which we are talking about, come. The idea was planted as early as the 20s means 80 years ago and all what we see today in Islamic radicalisation is, in a way or another, the result of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is why I think this presentation might be considered as some kind of a keynote. I am not going to make it more longer than others. I would say flashlights on the organisation, on the ideals of the organisation because what we see today is a replica or the continuation of what this organisation created.

The background of the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was the British occupation. Of course they did not like the Brits not only in Egypt. Not only they did not like the British themselves occupying Egypt, the Egyptians those who are faithful to Islam did not like the cultural influence which the British tried to educate the Egyptians as they thought they did in other places in the world because this education which in British eyes was westernisation in adopting ideas from the west are totally against Islam. Those who are faithful to Islam got hit in the head 20 years before that i.e. in 1899 and 1900. In these two consecutive years, 107-108 years ago, two books were published in Egypt by a guy named Hasan Amin. This Amin called to liberate the women the [unclear]. For those Muslims in Egypt these books which of course were driven from the western way of looking at women and women's role in society were like a red cloth in front of an injured bull because the [unclear] and the other book [inaudible] the other women, signified the western culture infiltrating in the Islamic societies and changing the values of family, what women should wear, what they should do and how they should behave and this is among other things what pushed those Islamists to organise under the aegis of Hassan Al Banna in as early as 1927 in order to create this organisation of Ikhwal Al-Muslimeen, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Muslim Brothers, in order to fight the British occupation and the British influence on the local culture, especially concerning women. The third goal after getting rid of the British and getting rid of the culture is to re-implant the Islam as the law for the person, for the family, for the neighbourhood, for the society, for the State, and for the Umma for the nation. Islam is the solution to every problem which mankind faces on every possible level, at the personal level, at the family level, the society, the state and the Umma. So, what only we have to do is to teach, to teach the people in order to get them to return back to Islam. So this was, I would say, the first stage of the Muslim Brotherhood. The formation of the ideology against the others' culture and rebuilding the Islamic society from below to the top.

The second phase, and this is schematically divided but this phase did not start at a certain date, was since the British left they had their regime especially in Egypt after July 1952 when the officers took over and kicked out the king and now since those officers do not implement Islam and the Shariat on the population, those officers who are Muslims, who are Arabs now they replace the British and now the jihad should be waged against

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them because they are not implementing the Islamic law. This is why a man named Sayed Qutub, he preached for a jihad against the regime in Egypt. He was hung up in 1966 because he saw the Egyptian regime as bad as the British and because in spite they being Muslims they betrayed Islam by not implementing the shariat. Of course there are other problems not only by the regime, there are also problems with the local elite especially in Egypt because those elites writers, poets, journalists were in a way or another against Islam because they did not want to return to the 7<sup>th</sup> century, to the teachings of Mohammed the Prophet and the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to implement the Shariat which was created at the first century of Islam i.e. the 7<sup>th</sup> century of Christ. So the elite writers, journalists, poets, were also targeted by the Muslim Brotherhood lately. We remember especially the names of [inaudible] and Nadeem Afooz, the writer who was stabbed in the back and he died later.

The way the Muslim Brotherhood tried or succeeded in many cases to reach the masses is not for the media because the media was owned by the state and the state did not let them even to approach the media, never allowed to broadcast. They did not have TV, they did not have radio, they were not allowed to publish newspapers. How could they get to the population. So for them the mosque was the arena where they recruited the masses to the idea. For those who do not attend the mosque in this hall, I would like to let you hear a recording from an Egyptian mosque from a sermon given by Sheikh Abdul Hamid [inaudible] who is one of the most prominent speakers of the Muslim Brotherhood. I won't translate it but what I would like you to listen is the tenor, the music. He begins with citing a poem praising the Mohammed after one journalist wrote something not in favour of the Prophet. [recording from Egyptian mosque] It is clear how it raises his voice and it is a clear device how to create tension. Allah in Islam has 99 epithets. Now he comes to a phase when he starts a tennis game with the crowd asking them who is the creator, they answer Allah. Who is the redeemer, Allah. He won't repeat all 99 but listen to how he asked them...who is the first and who is the last [recording of the audio]... This is the device how they recruit the people by some kind of mass psychosis in the mosque. He manipulates the feelings of the people, he manipulates what they think and just imagine a crowd of thousand people coming out from this mosque they will do whatever they will be ordered. You know what, not all of them, half of them, not half, 10% is that enough. This is why this guy Abdul Hamid spent most of his life in jail only to prevent him from giving these sermons and recruiting these people. I bought this tape in a Muslim Brotherhood shop in Israel where they have a branch because of the idea of Muslim Brotherhood is all over the world, it is in Tunisia, it is in Syria, in Jordan, and in almost every Islamic state there is a group which follows this idea of getting rid of occupiers, Hamas in Palestine, we will talk about them tomorrow. In Egypt even they have organisations which came out from this organisation [inaudible] and Gama Islamia which Ayman Al Zawahiri was heading for a while and many other organisations which differ from each other but still suck the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

If we come to the current time, the third phase of Muslim Brotherhood idea organisation, we see a division between those who are going to the jihadi path like Al Qaeda which is also some kind of off spring of Ikhwan and may be many other, I think the Jammāt-e-Islamia also is some kind of Indonesian version of many of these ideas. The other path is the political path. You see today in the Egyptian parliament a very significant presence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Today they are something like 20% of the Egyptian parliament after Mubarak was forced by President Bush to allow free elections. Well, free elections in Egypt will have 80% of the Parliament by the Muslim Brotherhood but he loosened the grip in a way that the Muslim Brotherhood can take may be 20% and this is what they got. After all he did it in his ways and we can elaborate on this. So today there are taking part in the political life somehow adjusting themselves to a State which is illegitimate, the state is illegitimate but still adjusting itself to the rules of the game in order to occupy it from within, not from without, not by dismantling the state but taking it over from below. They are in the local authorities, they are very much influenced on

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the local authorities, they have thousands of NGOs which are living on a Zakat, means contributions from the people, they operate clinics especially for women by women, so women do not get any treatment by men, they provide food, they provide work and healthcare to others and they also have a hospital created by the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel. They have budgets. Now since they are in the government, they can fight for budgets and of course they are in the media and we cannot underestimate the role of the media in this field because besides the mosque the media is the second device how to spread the word especially today through Al Jazeera every week the Muslim Brotherhood has a one and half hour programme named Shariat al Hayat led usually by Sheikh Yusuf Kharadoi who is a Muslim Brotherhood man. He today is the Mufti of Qatar and every week he is on air live with no censorship and no restriction in Al Jazeera. From this pulpit he called to slaughter Americans in Iraq and many other things, so in a way or the other Al Jazeera is occupied also by the Muslim Brotherhood and thus this organisation has the most powerful and the most influential device to influence the Islamic world from Indonesia in the East all the way to Los Angeles in the West. To sum up, I think that the idea of Hasan Al Banna when he created the Muslim Brotherhood as early as 1927 is the most successful ideology which was launched through the 20<sup>th</sup> century. If you judge through the spaces where it went, the number of organisations which it created and the number of people who were killed because of this ideology. Thank you very much.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** Thank you Dr Kedar, a very interesting presentation on the tactics adopted by the Ikhwan al Muslimeen in influencing the people. The next speaker is Dr Arpita Anant on Jemaah Islamiyah. Jemaah Islamiyah is just Jamaat-e-Islami, in Indonesia it is called Jemaah Islamiyah.

***Presentation by Dr Arpita Anant, on Jemaah Islamiyah***

In the year 2006 a prominent leader of Jemaah Islamiyah Abu Bakr Bashir was released after two or three years of trial and he was implicated in the Bali bombings. After his release he said the Jemaah Islamiyah does not exist, it never existed. So this is in a way the story of an organisation whose leader says it does not exist and it is in that sense then recreated from what the security agencies in Indonesia and the other South East Asian countries have learnt from the people who have been arrested for carrying out a series of bombings in South East Asia and also a document that was recovered after the Bali bombings which is basically a sort of a general guide for the struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah. This is a 45 page text that was recovered.

The origins of Jemaah Islamiyah are in the year 1993. Abu Bakr Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, two of the Indonesian religious leaders who were associated with the Dar-ul-Islam movement in Indonesia that started after Indonesia's liberation from Dutch colonial rule. The Dar-ul-Islam movement basically was trying to make Indonesia into an Islamic state but Suharto's rule in the immediate aftermath and until 1998, Suharto's regime was very harsh on the Dar-ul-Islam movement and so the two leaders were initially arrested and they were released for a little while and they managed to escape to Malaysia. They went to a place called Johor where there was a large Indonesian community in exile, formed a base there and set up what they called as a pesantran, which is a school basically and it is in this school that they were getting students and trying to indoctrinate them to this whole idea of Dar-ul-Islam. Because they had moved to Malaysia, the idea that gradually came in was that this Islamic state should be there not only in Indonesia but should encompass all the South East Asian countries and especially countries like Thailand and Philippines where there is a sizeable Muslim population. So the ideology was not just an Islamic state in Indonesia but Islamic state all over South East Asia.

The organisation basically is hierarchical and network based organisation. There is a leadership which is very important so a lot of decisions about how the organisation would operate, what is the kind of ideology that would be taught to these recruits in the schools etc. is taken at a very central level but the actual operation is carried out by various

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networks and so it is a mix of centralisation and hierarchy. There are two basic divisions organisationally, one is the technical division and there is the territorial division. In the technical division there is an executive council, there is a consultative council, there is a religious council, and there is an internal discipline council. This technical group is basically meant for the leaders. The idea is to have people to assist the leadership, to have religious leaders who will tell the leadership how to go about propagating the idea of Jemaah Islamiyah and there is a religious council and an internal discipline council which will ensure how the leaders behave. Then there is a territorial component which is to look after the four main mantikis or divisions of Jemaah Islamiyah. The four divisions are the Mantiki-I which is in Malaysia, Singapore, Southern Thailand and Cambodia. The Mantiki-II which is basically Indonesia, Mantiki-III which is in Brunei, parts of Malaysia and Southern Philippines and Mantiki-IV in Australia and Irenjaya, now West Papua. Each of these Mantikis is in different geographical locations and also performs a specific function. For instance Mantiki-I would look after the training of students who were recruited through these schools. Mantiki-II, which is in Indonesia would basically look after all the planning of the various terrorist operations, bombings essentially. Mantiki-III which basically tracked the lower end of all the countries which is basically a maritime region so that would be the region that would be used for logistical purposes like transferring arms and those kinds of activities. Mantiki-IV which is in Australia and Western Papua is basically the smallest one and would be mainly used to get charities from the Indonesian community in these countries, in Australia mainly.

As far as the membership goes, it started with 300-400 members in 1993, increased to something over a 1000 members and is now at about 900 members. This is significant because since the Bali bombings happened in 2002 there has been a crackdown on the suspected members of the Jemaah Islamiyah and despite that it retains these many numbers. That is the significance of this. The membership is largely from educated middle class men, may be high school education because the school education is offered in these pesantran as high school education. Most of it is urban, some of it is from areas which are not very well developed and continuation of the membership also is helped by the formation of a political group called the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia MMI by Abu Bakr Bashir. Some of the members are people in urban areas who had a history of being part of small street gangs and these are called the situational mujahideen by some reports.

The leadership of Jemaah Islamiyah has changed since 1993. As I mentioned earlier, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu bakr Bashir set up this organisation in 1993. Abdullah Sungkar passed away quite early so until 2000 Abu Bakr Bashir was the Amir, who is the head of the organisation. By about 2000 there were some people within the organisation who felt that Bashir was not radical enough and so there was this kind of tension within the organisation and there were some other leaders like Hambali and Abu Dujana who felt that the organisation should start engaging in terrorist activities. So from 1993 to 2000 there is not really much of terrorism that Jemaah Islamiyah engages in. It is these leaders like Hambali and Abu Dujana etc. decided that it is about time that Jemaah Islamiyah starts engaging in terrorist activities and then you have a spate of bombings starting with the Bali bombing. Since then also, even with leaders like Abu Dujana etc. there was some kind of a dissatisfaction within the group because they were also not seen to be very effective in that sense so there was another faction that emerged led by Nooruddin Tope and he is basically the person who has been very active in all the bombings since 2003 and 2004 in South East Asia, mainly in Indonesia. Most of these have been against western targets and some of it is also against the Christian groups in Indonesia.

The ideology that guides Jemaah Islamiyah was from Wahabism and Salafism essentially. I am not an expert on Islam so I cant say exactly, there are others here who will be able to speak about this much more, but about Salafism it is said that the salafist kind of an ideology does not necessarily feed into terrorism very easily. Salafi ideology is more

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about carrying out reforms, it is about getting back to a puritan form of Islam but it does not necessarily justify violence and would not move towards terrorism. So that is an issue that I will have to look further and if anybody here can help me with that that will be nice. Also more recently, and a colleague of mine here has written about, the Hizbud Tehrir, which is also a kind of a group that wants to go back to the roots of Islam but it is basically a very peaceful organisation has had some meetings in Indonesia and the Jemaah Islamiyah is known to have been part of those meetings. That means of course that this whole thing of violence might reduce is open to question but at least that is one of the strands that is coming out of this. The motives of the leadership are both local and global. Locally they want to have an Islamic state in Indonesia and across South East Asia. Globally they tie in to the Al Qaeda ideology of having an Islamic community the world over.

The resources that the Jemaah Islamiyah draws on are finances basically from charity, from hawala transactions and from front companies that were set up by the leaders which were export companies, companies that were exporting say oil to Afghanistan, exporting medicines etc. So the chemical components for the bombs that the terrorist would use would come from these companies. In terms of the resources the alliances that the Jemaah Islamiyah has with a whole cross section of terrorist groups in the region and these are groups within Indonesia there are many of them, there are groups across South East Asia like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayaf group and also the Al Qaeda and more towards India coming up to Burma the Rohingias have some terrorist groups and Jemaah Islamiyah is linked to that. In a way it is hard to say who is helping whom here. Al Qaeda for instance found it very useful to have an alliance with a group like Jemaah Islamiyah so that it would escape the war on terror in Afghanistan etc and escape to South East Asia and the Jemaah Islamiyah when it is short of resources can bank on Al Qaeda for finances and for weapons. So it is a mutually beneficial relationship.

In terms of strategy, there is no declared strategy excepting this document that I spoke to you about which contains the guidelines for the functioning of Jemaah Islamiyah says that one of the essential components of the working should be secrecy and so there is not really much available in terms of any kind of a strategy or also therefore in terms of a counter-strategy that the states are adopting because they are mainly following up on leads as and when the bombings happen and what is coming out of that is the information that is available. So the thing that comes out clearly is though the group has tremendous tactical and strategic patience, they wait, they watch, they do their surveys very thoroughly, they choose their areas and they may not cause too much damage but they are able to at least carry out those bombings. So, the authorities are not really in a position to prevent any of this. Also in terms of the network that I mentioned, the four Mantikis and below the Mantikis are the wakalas etc. So, ideally within a particular wakala, the operational aspects of it would be taken care of by a particular wakala even if the decision for a bombing has been taken at a higher level but in more recent years with Nooruddin's network coming up Nooruddin has sort of broken out of this mould, he does not stick to particular geographical locations, he picks up people from wherever they can help and he is able to motivate them to carry out some of these bombings. So that in a way makes counter strategy that much more problematic.

In terms of state responses to the Jemaah Islamiyah, States like Singapore, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia have been more forthright in countering Jemaah Islamiyah. They have got their internal security acts, they are getting help from the US in curbing the working of Jemaah Islamiyah or related organisations. Indonesia has been a little reluctant because it has a sizeable Muslim population, not all of which is supportive of the Jemaah Islamiyah but as I mentioned earlier there are about 900 members most of them are from Indonesia and the government fears alienating largely moderate Muslim population but if actions are taken then it is likely to alienate some more of them. So

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there is a very subtle kind of a response from Indonesia. I would like to just conclude by saying that there are a few key things that come out of studying a group like this. One is that the structure could be centralized as well as decentralised at one time. It could operate locally and globally. It could operate in urban areas but also draw on the ungoverned spaces and underdeveloped areas and also there is a very clear trans-national element. All of these I think have a significance both in theoretical terms in terms of why the big loose small wars and also in terms of counter strategy. At some stage may be not just this group but this would probably apply to all the other groups and this could be part of the analysis that we do from this.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** Thank you Dr Anant. I may remark here that as compared to Al Qaeda, Taliban, and the Ikhwan Al Muslimeen, very little is known in India about the Jemaah Islamiyah. Whenever there is a Bali bombing or something like that happens then we come to know that there is some organisation like Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia in South East Asia. Thank you very much. Now may I request Mr Alok Bansal to make his points as the Discussant.

**Comments by Mr Alok Bansal**

Thank you Chair. I am not expert on terrorist organisations or non-state organisations but we all heard these four illuminating speakers and I would just make brief comments and put across my point of view. All the four organisations that were discussed are Islamic in their orientation and come from societies which are predominantly Islamic. For a long time I have had a hypothesis that in Islamic societies whenever there is no right of democratic dissent, the opposition to the regime invariably manifests from the ramparts of the mosques. Undoubtedly the absence of democracy in these societies which have not let to the germination of these extremist elements but definitely to their prospering and thriving. To that extent I tend to agree with the Neocon agenda that democratization of the Middle East is definitely a long term solution to the problems of the world. Be that as it may be I will now come to the individual papers per se. Al Qaeda and Taliban are today so closely interlinked that I think it may be worthwhile discussing the two issues together. But I have a question to the speakers who spoke on Al Qaeda and Taliban and that is that despite their ideological affinity, despite their tactical collaboration, there is an ideological difference between Al Qaeda and Taliban and unfortunately the West or even the Pakistani government which has been trying for too long to drive a wedge between Al Qaeda and Taliban as we are aware that for a long time the Pakistani government's strategy was to separate Al Qaeda from Taliban so that they could cultivate the Taliban for a future requirement whilst targeting the Al Qaeda and that difference originates from the Islamic ideologies which they propagate because as you all know Taliban follows deobandi brand of Islam whereas Al Qaeda is Wahabism as well as Salafism and there is one big difference, deobandis accept shrines and to that extent shrines are acceptable whereas wahabis do not accept any shrines. In fact they demolished Prophet Mohammed's stables and in fact one of the biggest concession that was granted after Ahmadinejad's visit to Saudi Arabia was that the Saudis have agreed that some of the graveyards of some of the Prophet's family members will be renovated and will be rehabilitated. This is a very big concession given by a Wahabi regime. This is a very major phenomenon because shrines in Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan etc. are dime a dozen and this major difference between Wahabis and deobandis somehow none of the Western regimes have tried to exploit or do anything about that. As far as the west is concerned Al Qaeda thrived and prospered under Western patronage during the Cold War era and as another book which has recently come out written by Adrian Levi and Catherine Scott-Jones again highlights that during the Cold War era west felt that anything that anyone did as long as it helped them in winning the war against the Soviets was acceptable and that is how they looked the other way when the nuclear proliferation went on in our neighbourhood and similarly they went on supporting Al Qaeda. Now, what the war in Afghanistan did as far as Al Qaeda was concerned was enabled its recruits to get battle hardened. It gave them the vital battle experience as well as

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exposed them to the sophisticated weaponry which the CIA flooded in Afghanistan. I think this weaponry and this exposure to the warfare actually transformed Al Qaeda from a rather small organisation into an organisation which the world sat and took notice of. Despite that I still feel that if post 9/11 US had concentrated on Afghanistan probably we could have localised or marginalised Taliban and eliminated Al Qaeda but jumping into Iraq before stabilizing Afghanistan I think US compromised one of the basic principles of war i.e. selection and maintenance of aim, I think, from one theatre you jump to another. One of the Pakistani academic recently made a statement which I tended to agree and she said that you can fight the terrorist by denying him space, but what the United States has done by jumping into Iraq is that it has expanded the space available to the terrorists. That needs to be cracked because how do you fight terrorist, you cannot eliminate him, you will have to fight him in the hearts and minds of the people or by denying him space, you have to deny him the sympathizers. By jumping from Afghanistan to Iraq and now targeting Iran you are actually expanding the space. Even if you wish to target all these countries it should have been done one by one, not all simultaneously thereby expanding the space for the terrorists for his recruits and for his support base.

There is no doubt that Al Qaeda poses a long term threat to India and I think the Indian establishment understands this and that is one of the reasons why I think India believes that both Al Qaeda and Taliban are a major threat to India because though Taliban does not threaten India but the organisations which have been allied with Taliban have been targeting Indian security forces in Kashmir etc. Shantie's paper mentioned that Al Qaeda is believed to be in Chitral some part of NWFP. The latest report also says that a sizeable number of Al Qaeda leadership has moved in what is Gilgit in Baltistan which is that a significant portion of the leadership has hidden in Gilgit in Baltistan away from the media gaze. You also mentioned that the ISI officials are still associated with Taliban. This is a very debatable question at a time when Pakistan has failed to drive a wedge between Taliban and Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda is targeting not only Musharraf but Pakistani army as an institution. I think post Lal Masjid there has been a transformation as far as Pakistan is concerned because prior to Lal Masjid it was only Musharraf and the leadership that was being targeted but post Lal Masjid you see Pakistani army being targeted by Al Qaeda as well as Taliban and the suicide bombers, I fail to understand how ISI could be supporting Taliban at this juncture. There may be some renegade elements within ISI but ISI as an institution supporting Taliban at this juncture is something which defies logic because ISI all said and done does not have a permanent cadre of army officers. The army officers who come to ISI are actually on temporary assignment from the army and ISI is not totally independent though some officials may act independently but ISI is totally not independent of the army though often it has taken actions which have been contrary to the Pakistani government. Similarly, in your paper while discussing the foreign jihadi fighters you have mentioned Pakistanis. While Pakistanis may be the largest number of foreigners fighting for Taliban, to include them in foreign jihadis I think the other things that you have said that they are salafis and all probably do not pertain to Pakistanis because Pakistani Pakhtoons must be as good as Afghan Pakhtoons and must be fighting with them and probably it would not be correct to classify them as foreign elements and the other factors which you have given, the actions which they do like salafists, doing some hard core jobs etc. that may not be relevant to Pakistanis because I think the bulk of the Pakistani fighters are pakhtoons. Similarly, you said bulk of the funding for the Taliban is coming from JuI and JuI has been supported by the government and I think this is another field where west can do a lot because JuI(F) as everybody knows has been propped up by the military regime and even now at this juncture when the military regime was in a corner JuI(F) had come out to bail it. So there is some amount of collusion between the JuI(F) and the Government and I think if the Western pressure is put on the government and JuI(F) this source of funding can be reduced.

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Regarding Muslim Brotherhood what Dr Kedar said that if a free election is allowed 80% of the Parliament would be filled by Muslim Brotherhood but the fact is that not allowing a genuine democracy in Egypt has actually given birth to this sort of an element because people in Egypt did not have a voice to express their dissent with the regime, this opposition to the regime has got channelized through the mosques because that is the only medium available to an oppressed nation where people cannot express their views freely in a free media. The only forum that is available is mosque and if you are doing to express your dissent within the mosques the agenda is going to be hijacked by the Mullah because the mosque is the forum. So I think if genuine democracy was allowed, this sort of a scenario would not have probably taken place. This is my personal view and I think democratic reforms even at this juncture would probably to some extent dissipate because I believe that vast majority of Egyptians are not really willing to go down Salafism back to the 8<sup>th</sup> century or 7<sup>th</sup> century AD.

Coming to JI, similar situation can be said both, in fact the JI group was proscribed during Suharto's time and Soeharto's regime was as authoritarian and I think it is at that point of time that the JI took seeds in the opposition to the regime. What is significant is the both Indonesia and Malaysia I think are culturally seeped into their pre-Islamic past and the populations are fairly moderate but it must be understood that if we don't check the spread of this fundamentalist ideology in Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest Islamic nation in the world and if an insurgency picks up momentum in this part of the world which is not only geographically inaccessible because of thick jungles and all and it will become much more difficult to control and I think the west and the world must take notice of this because even Malaysia is not an ideal democracy as we know. It is fairly repressive state as some of the ethnic Indians recently realized and I think that it is time that democratization of these countries must go ahead. These are some of the random thoughts of a person who is not really an expert on these issues. Thank you.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** I am sure the four presentations including the points raised by the discussant would have provoked you to ask questions. Please raise your hands. Comments should not be more than three minutes, questions can be as brief as possible.

**Next Speaker:** I want to get back to what Shaul Shay said about Zawahiri being part of the salafi tradition and Osama being from the Wahabi tradition. Arpita made this point that the salafi thing is not leading to terrorism, I see in a footnote there is an ICG report which says why Salafism and terrorism mostly don't mix. If you could through some more light on that, that would be useful. Secondly, I think there is an Indian connection to the origins of Muslim Brotherhood. I think that was a transition. Maududi's ideas played into this. I thought I would mention that. So if you could elaborate on that as well that would be useful for us. Thank you.

Next Speaker: This is for Arpita, a small observation. I think this is a draft paper and there is a lot of scope to improve it, when we are talking about Jemaah, we have to talk about its connections with Al Qaeda not in terms of how the funds came. Basically anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan created lot of problem for all sorts of countries and for South East Asia as well. Lot of fighters came back after the Jihad was over. A lot of people who had gone from Indonesia from South East Asian countries they actually came back to the countries and it had a very prolific impact on the power that Jemaah had before. Jemaah is also a dissipated organisation a little here, a little there. The role Al Qaeda played in combining all these people together and making Jemmah as an organisation which is capable of challenging the State per se. This is one. The next one is about state response. I think when we talk about Malaysia being cooperative, Indonesia not being so cooperative we are actually looking at the thing from an American viewpoint. The Americans want their war on terror to be fought by different countries and they want Indonesia to fight Jemaah in the same way so that it does not clearly become a threat to American interests. Indonesia is a big country, it has concerns about its own interest.

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When Megawati Sukarnoputri said that I cannot be really strong enough to persecute the Jemaah Islamiyah because I have a large Muslim population is I think fair because the kind of backlash which nobody is actually talking about of war on terror but if you are persecuting your own people, the kind of backlash it will create, and then she was operating in a post-Suharto regime when there is lot of opposition and lot of dissent in all islands then I think that has to be factored into the analysis. When you talk about Singapore being very strict, Singapore does not have a problem. Thank you.

**Next Speaker:** Two observations, one is for Dr Kedar about Islamic Brotherhood. One is aware that these organisations have existed for the last 500 years all over the world which have gone by this name, Brotherhood of Islam, Islamic Brotherhood, Muslim Brotherhood, etc. They have existed at different times, different countries and different regions, and their activities have always been very very not sporadic but very very stealthy activities. Do they all trace the origin to the same group of people who started this about 450 years back which is known as the Brotherhood of Islam. My second question is for Arpita. You mentioned about reforms being carried out to take Islam towards in its pristine form. From what I know of the Hadids, Islam prohibits reforms, Islam prohibits enquiry, Islam prohibits dilution, what it does permit is purge and [unclear]. This to me is something like a contradiction – reforms towards taking Islam to a puritanical form. Thank you.

**Next Speaker:** I have two questions for Dr Kedar. First is the cassette that you have played is illuminating. But I think it is nothing new because the mesmerism of a demagogue is nothing new and nothing unique. In fact Charlie Chaplin in his famous film The Great Dictator has immortalized how Hitler used to give his speeches. So I think it is nothing unique. Do you mean anything that it is in the religious connotations within the speech, so it is unique. Second, I think Muslim Brotherhood itself is in a flux. Seeing it in the 1927 prism is not I think contemporary because Hasan Al Banna's grand nephew Tariq Ramadan he himself talks about some kind of peaceful coexistence and the Time magazine has described Tariq Ramadan as a great scholar of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Your comments please.

**Next Speaker:** My question is particularly to Shaul Shay. Sir you have talked about Al Qaeda and my question here is that it is a multinational kind of organisation and I just wanted to know whether it has a proposed structure or not. If surprisingly if any of the Al Qaeda leaders want to talk with the world, who is going to talk with who. How can we control it in a sense that we can control it in a regional level or local level or in a global level.

**Next Speaker:** I have a question for Dr D'Souza. It is a very informative paper that you presented. Could you tell us a little bit about what it means in terms of the strengths and the weaknesses of Taliban because you did mention they control certain parts of territory and so on and so forth but you mentioned at various points of time the way the unit size for example. Unit size always immediately has implications because it suggests either that the movement is getting stronger or weaker because when it gets stronger they tend to have larger units because they can move about fairly with larger units. When they become smaller that automatically means that the state forces are having success in terms of targeting those larger units. For example, the spurt in suicide bombings in Kabul could mean one of two things – either they have the reach to reach Kabul or that they have no other options, they cant meet the NATO forces on the battlefield and therefore they are trying other tactics and attacking softer targets. Between 2001 and now I keep hearing every year that they are going to have this massive summer offensive, which never materialized.

**Mr Krishnappa:** This is to our Israeli guests. Our Discussant, Commander Bansal, did mention and he seems to prefer democracy, as George Bush Junior believes, is the

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solution to all the world's problems, not only Islamism but everything else while he co-habits conveniently with many authoritarian regimes in West Asia and in the immediate neighbourhood. I am not talking about the hypocrisy of this but really I want to know the contrast between authoritarianism and democracy. Is this a real issue, is it driving the Islamisation and fundamentalism in the world today or that more fundamental issues of say what Ralph Peters wrote in Blood Borders. This is one of the other issues he talked about, the artificial divisions between ethnic communities which of West Asia is a principle cause for much of troubles that are present in that region. There are other or many multiple explanations of what is happening in this region. What is your take on this.

**Mr NS Sisodia:** I must apologise I am raising this issue without having heard the presentations and I am not sure whether this aspect has not been covered, I am sure it must have been covered but if it has not been, or even if it has been, the point that I wish to raise is that some of these movements or organisations have gathered momentum, acquired prominence, become more assertive in response to what is seen as Westernisation, modernization, globalization, the impact of a materialistic civilisation which is degrading the cultural values and affecting religious beliefs and younger generation corrupting them. There is a kind of therefore a backlash, a sense of insecurity about being inundated with the western civilization that leads to a kind of a response which is sometimes inexplicable but leads to hidden hostility. To the extent this is a contributory factor to the growth of these organisations, what sort of long term response can be thought of. There is of course the military solution which is also admitted to be a temporary solution but in the long term there has to be some strategy to allay these apprehensions, to see that there is reconciliation of this kind of divergence of belief and hostility. In that context are there any thoughts about what can be done. I raise this issue because this is a generic issue which affects Taliban, which affects certainly Al Qaeda, which affects Jemaah Islamiyah and certain other organisations, to some extent perhaps even Muslim Brotherhood.

**Dr Arpita Anant:** In response to the Professor's question about the assessment, I will tie that up with your point about the concern that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population and if it gets radicalized then there are very serious implications and I think the two tie up because my point is that Jemaah Islamiyah is probably never going to be able to takeover states as it plans to, either Indonesia or the rest of the states and specifically in the case of Indonesia this is so because most of the population is moderate and also at the social level it is represented in the form of two organisations called the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Islam, I think those are the two organisations. Many Muslims there are members of these organisations and these are very moderate organisations. At the political level also, there are political parties that represent the interests of the people because Indonesia ultimately is a democracy and the popularity of the Khadisa party which is slightly more radical party is increasing but it is still not the predominant party in the Indonesian Parliament. So in my assessment that kind of a base that it would require to cause serious damage is not likely to happen in the near future.

On your point about the role of Al Qaeda in the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah. This is a point well taken. Just to add to that most of the training that happens at the Jemaah Islamiyah recruits its students from the schools, part of the indoctrination is done in Indonesia itself. Then they go to Pakistan for some time and the final training happens in Afghanistan. From 1993 to 2000 that is what has been happening. So, yes the role of Al Qaeda is extremely important. Since the beginning of the war on terror, that mutual benefit is what appears to be happening more. Initially it was like the Al Qaeda benefited from the Jemaah Islamiyah and now the Jemaah Islamiyah is benefiting from Al Qaeda.

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About state response, no dispute about that. Megawati Sukarnoputri has a very difficult role. It has a difficult task at hand. She has to operate according to the constraints of the society and I think the country has a right to take that stand.

About Islam and Puritanism, I said I am not an expert on Islam but I think the point that the Wahabis and the Salafis make is that there is so much corruption that has happened from the original form that they are trying to take it back to that original which is the pure form and I hope somebody else can say more about that. Thanks.

**Mr Mordechai Kedar:** The most important issue which was raised by Col. Bansal about democracy in the Middle East, democracy in Islam, democracy of societies. In one of the demonstrations which erupted after the publishing of the caricatures almost two years ago by the Danish newspaper, in one of the demonstrations people in London raised a big banner saying "Democracy is the cancer, Islam is the answer". Democracy in their eyes I would say is a cake but the ingredients of this cake create heavy allergy in these societies, why? Democracy is separating between state and the religion. This is unheard of in Islam because Islam has much to say about state and statehood and how the Hakim, how the ruler should behave. Islam does not know what is changing regime like free elections, liberalism in Islam. Islam does not know what is minority rights as long as they live under Islam. The usual example is Jews and Christians. Jews are tolerated by Islam because they are monotheistic. You can look what Islam says about Buddhism. The statues of Buddha in Bamiyan give you the answer. So just imagine living under Islamic regime in a democracy, it does not go together. Regarding women's rights, since when a woman has the right in Islam to choose her husband, never mind to use contraceptives, polygamy or bigamy, what we today are looking at women's rights is totally against Islam. So all these ingredients of the democratic cake are either totally or partially against verse of the Koran or the Hadif. So when you say about democracy in the Arab or Islamic world, it is a problem. They want freedom, yes. They want free elections, yes. But democracy is one man, one vote; in Islam it is one man, one vote, one time. You know why? Once they get to the government, they will never leave it. Just look at the Iranian constitution. According to the Iranian constitution, there could not be change of the regime even if theoretically tomorrow there are free elections in Iran and some liberal parties cannot be elected because their constitution prevents it. So this is why democracy in their eyes is one man, one vote, one time. So talking about bringing democracy to Islamic societies is a good slogan, nice cover for failing wars but still nothing too serious.

About this speech, I don't deny we Jews have longest experience with Germany of the 30s. We heard these things in German. For Jews it is very hard to hear even the sermon because it reminds them the speeches of [unclear] or Hitler even. So, yes they do use the same psychologic tools on how to recruit the people. I totally agree with you. About Tariq Ramadan, Tariq Ramadan is a great person especially if you read what he writes or publishes in English. But in order to complete the picture Tariq Ramadan you should read what he publishes in Arabic because in too many cases it is total contradiction between what he says in mosque or publishes to his Arab or Muslim readership and what he is saying to the Time Magazine or to Ken Livingstone, he says totally different things. In Islam there is a concept of Takaiah, takaiah means you may do things and say things in order to keep your head attached to your shoulders even if it is not correct, means it is okay to lie if you have to survive and this is well rooted in Islamic culture. So this is one way of takaiah to tell in English something and to tell something else in Arabic which is totally different.

I would like to say something about Salafism and Wahabism and extremism and all these -isms. They have much in common but still there are some aspects which are not in common. What do I mean by this. First of all, the first or the biggest confusion in the world today is between fundamentalism and radicalism. I am not so sure that I think

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people use them without discrimination. My own, and I emphasize, my own discrimination between radicalism and fundamentalism is about myself. I am a religious Jew, I pray three times a day, I eat [unclear] and I keep the Shabbat the Saturday. I am fundamentalist. But when I start imposing my views on others, my sons, my wife, my neighbours, my people, whoever, and I use force I become radical. To be fundamentalist when it is on yourself you can do whatever you like, when you start imposing your ideas on others, you become radical. This is my difference between radicalism and fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is okay when you implement it on yourself. So if you buy this terminology I will be happy, if not, it is okay also. Secondly, about Salafism. The word Salaf in Arabic means to go backwards, to go to the good people who lived in history and to follow them and to behave the same way they behaved. It came to Saudi Arabia especially eighty years ago at the beginning of the 20s, the first car with four wheels and an engine was brought to Saudi Arabia and they looked at it and they say, hey you cannot use it, you should not use from the religious point of view. Why? There is nowhere in the Islamic sources which says that Prophet Mohammed who is the ideal man rowed a wagon without a horse. So how possibly can we ride this wagon since it is not bound to a horse. Later they allowed it but the initial attitude to these innovations of modernism is salafism. It happened before in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the first printing machine was brought by Napoleon to Egypt and all of a sudden a machine comes out with pages printed in Arabic and no one is writing them by hand and this is a deed of a satan, a gin is inside this machine and they believed that if somebody reads those pamphlets on the wall he will be blind because he reads something which the satan wrote. They overcame it but this is the kind of salafic thinking, you derive everything from what was 1400 years ago at the beginning of Islam. The other question which is combined to this is whether the tools or the means which were used by Islam at time are legitimate today as well and especially the jihad. By the Jihad, they came all the way to the west to Spain and in the east all the way to Indonesia. Is this tool legitimate these days as well, according to the salafi way of looking at things or not, this is a debate inside Islam. So this is why salafi itself is not something which necessarily calls for war or to be violent but it can be implemented also in the violent aspects of Islam which we all saw at the 7<sup>th</sup> century. So this is why it has two faces in this regard.

**Mr Krishnappa:** This refers to your comments on Tariq Ramadan, it is intriguing that you said that. I did not read Arabic so I don't know. Very recently he wrote a piece in Time magazine as to how one must interpret Quran, reading Quran and he said much of it is in the context so we should understand the context. Since the context has changed, the text should not be interpreted in its puritan form. That essentially is a liberal thesis of interpreting Quran.

**Mr Mordechai Kedar:** No, this is how it was always. The Quran was always not what it says but what it was interpreted. But since there were many people who interpreted it, according to many different ways of thinking and many different environments, every environment and every man and in every time interprets the Quran according to his interests, to his givens and to what the regime imposes on him. So this is well known for centuries that the Quran is not what it is, the Quran actually is what it is interpreted. He did not invent it.

**Mr Krishnappa:** My question to you is, is there no way that someone like you can accommodate a multilayered understanding of this of course read geographically for example in your own neighbourhood take Hezbollah its treatment of women is not as harsh as in many other places in the immediate neighbourhood and many of them are western educated, operate like any other girl or boy working for television stations reporting the news like any other CNN, some of them are too western.

**Dr Shantie D'Souza:** I will answer Prof. Rajagopalan's question about the strengths and weakness of the Taliban. During the Operation Enduring Freedom they were pushed out

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of the territory and Operation Anaconda and all these operations kept occurring. So in a sense they lost their physical infrastructure, they lost their supporters and they were based in Pakistan. The shift of US policy makers to war in Iraq itself was one of the turning points and the special forces who were based in that region were pulled out and replaced by conventional troops. So the Taliban regrouped in the Spring of 2002 where you had spring offensive. From then it progressively increased and it had various attacks but in between there was a slight change in the US policy of sending more troops and NATO started getting involved. So the troop numbers increased and again the Taliban shifted to smaller groups. That was around 2004 and it started attacking the soft targets out of desperation. Around 2006 with greater support with foreign elements with Pakistani state support, it fought positional warfare in the provinces of Uruzgan, Hermon, Kandahar, and it held territory in 2006. They had pitched conventional battles according to media reports. In 2006 again there was a change in tide. The attacks occurred in such a way that there were pirate victories between international forces and Taliban. Suppose Busakala was taken by Taliban in February 2007, now an operation occurred and regained territory but since they do not hold to the territory, the Taliban are back again. So, the Taliban have support base in this region and they were back in that sense. That was one of the strengths of the movement. It did not have to gather in large numbers, it could do with just occupying by night because basically Taliban are farmers by day and Taliban by night. They have the flag staged at night when the NATO forces don't go out so this is the kind of a scenario where you cannot say whether the size itself talks of strength or weakness of the movement. I think the greatest essence is of time. It depends on how long the international troops are going to stay there. If they are going to withdraw they say in 72 hours the Taliban will be back. Taliban says the Americans have watches but we have all the time. So they are just waiting for time so they are using the strategy from conventional in 2006 and in 2007 to guerrilla tactics, asymmetric warfare, suicide bombing. Suicide bombing, I don't think it is really a sign of desperation, it is a sign of reach the movement has with other groups. I used the word Taliban led insurgency, it has lot of supporters it has Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The foreign elements are carrying out the suicide bombing and the foreign elements are playing a major role now. You see the divisions emerging between the leadership but at the ground level there is a lot of support between the foreign elements and they are actually bolstering the insurgency, carrying the insurgency forward giving an extreme face to the Taliban movement which the local people are not very happy about but they cant do much because now it is mostly run by the foreign elements. That is the linkage Al Qaeda and Taliban, it has not been disrupted. The brigade 0.55 which was there in 1996 is playing a role and their foreign support in the Pushtoon heartland and as the Director rightly pointed out modernisation is resisted by the Pushtoon forces in the region. They don't like the Western presence. So this is not creating a very very win win situation, it is actually a 50-50 situation, if the troops withdraw and if the Afghan government does not get a greater legitimacy in terms of involvement in the reconstruction, rebuilding of Afghanistan then things could change drastically for everybody.

**Mr Shaul Shay:** I will start following the previous speaker regarding the differences between Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is important to understand that Taliban is a local organisation. Their goals are dealing with Afghanistan and part of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is a global one. Al Qaeda is ready to cooperate with any Islamic party worldwide as long as it is according to its interests. I will combine it with another question regarding the structure of Al Qaeda. In the beginning Al Qaeda was what we used to call a vertical organisation, hierarchical. They could operate in this way as long as they were able to operate as an overt organisation in Sudan and in Afghanistan during the Taliban era. Now, they turn to be a horizontal organisation and the long investment of more than a decade in global infrastructures it is like a cancer, I mean the cancer has started at one point when it is already everywhere it is not necessary to coordinate it anymore. I mean, there is a centre of gravity somewhere between Pakistan and Afghanistan but in most of the cases it is not more than an origin of inspiration. I mean they don't need to get any

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orders to conduct the London bombing or the bombings in Turkey or in Bali. Of course there is also pure Al Qaeda activities but I believe that they keep their independent capabilities for the next big operation. I don't know when it will happen but 2008 is a big year, the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the organisation. How to contact Bin Laden I will not tell you if I will know I will do it myself, it is worth 50 million dollars so it is better to keep it for me. Regarding the question of democracy, I will try to answer from my point of view one of the most efficient leaders Hasan Al Turabi, the spiritual leader in Sudan. He was interviewed by one of the American newspapers shortly after the elections in Algeria in 1991. He said look you in the west always blame us, the Islamists, that we are against democracy and you don't understand because we are the first in favour of democracy but you have to take into consideration two things. First, in every Muslim country that they will conduct real democratic elections, not that the leader is receiving 99.8%, like real elections in Algeria, the Islamic movement will win and the second point is that from the moment that the Islamic movement will be in power you have nothing to do with democracy because what is democracy? It is an ideology that was created by human beings. We have the Sharia, it includes anyway all the good parts of any system and of course it is superior, so this is the problem. From my point of view and unfortunately if you look at the experience regarding democracy it works. Turabi's assumption is functioning. I think that regarding most of the Muslim communities in the world, the democracy is not a solution, democracy is a problem.

Regarding your question what is a solution I think that the solution is in the hands of the Muslim world, not of the west, not of the rest of the world. First of all they understand the significance of Islam. Second, for most of the existing regimes in the Muslim world, it is a question of to be or not to be. So they will do their best to prevent the radical Islam from coming to power. I think the best thing to do is just to let them do the job and not try to force them for democracy because in this neighbourhood it is weakening the existing regime encouraging the radical Islam and at the end the result is worse than a non-democratic Muslim state. Regarding what are the damages that such a radical Islamic movements can cause. You can put it on a scale. In Iran in 1979 they came to power and what is the damage you can calculate today. They are still in power. I mean if we are looking at the historical experience, radical Islamic movement lost power only by external military intervention and they lost power temporarily because for instance in Afghanistan the coalition defeated the Taliban but we heard here that they are on the way back, it is question of time when the coalition forces will leave I believe that the existing regime in Afghanistan will not exist for long. For instance in Somalia the Union of the Islamic gained power in June till December, in December Ethiopia invaded Somalia so they were defeated. But in all the places that they came to power, including for instance in Gaza Strip, how they are leaving the position that they are holding.

Is radical Islam the answer to modernisation, westernisation, I think yes. This is the response of not just the radical Islam or the fundamental Islam, or both, it is the response of the Islam. We have to take into consideration the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century Islam was the leading cultural, military, political power in the world. Since then the feeling of the Muslims in the world is that they are withdrawing all the time and of course the main threat is the Western civilisation from the crusaders, through the Napoleon and Enduring Freedom if you want. They are looking it as one continuous process and they feel that they are going to lose and therefore the more radical elements believe that the only solution to this challenge is the jihad. Then they developed these theories.

One word about moderate, or radical or Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi movements. From my point of view they are two sides of the same coin. Everywhere when you try to analyse how the jihadi movement emerged, I will give you an example, for instance in London when they investigated the terror cells that bombed the subway on July 7, the starting point is the infrastructure that is legitimate and the heart of it is the mosque and the charities and the cultural activities and on this financial base the jihadi elements are

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growing and it is very difficult to deal with jihadi part of the problem without dealing with so called moderate or dollar infrastructure. It is the same everywhere including in Israel.

The last point regarding Jemmah Islamiyah, I think it is necessary to understand that so far it is a unique phenomenon. This is as far as I know the only regional organisation. Their goal is to create at the first stage the regional kalifet of South East Asia. I think that the links with Al Qaeda at least at the early years of the organisation were very significant. Actually Hambali belonged both to the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Al Qaeda. He was the liaison officer. I mean for instance in the Bali bombing the Jemmah Islamia provided intelligence about the targets, the suicide bombers. They had a problem with so called engineer to prepare the explosive devices. So Hambali was in charge to send two experts that came to Bali, trained the local Jemmah Islamiyah guys how to operate it and then they left and they conducted the operation. We still see the same type of cooperation not only in Indonesia but now it is more in the Philippines with Abu Sayaf organisation that is a close ally of Al Qaeda and therefore it is necessary to look at it as a quite a dangerous phenomenon because they are linked to operations not only in the South East Asia but elsewhere in the world and it is a kind of a new player. In most of the airports or such places people from Indonesia or Philippines are not suspected normally. They know it and their intention to use it as well also.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** Thank you. We have come to the end. I will just make one or two points. We are discussing democracy and Islam, the three leading ideologues of the modern Islamic revivalist movement i.e. Moulana Abul Maududi, Sayyed qutub and Ayatollah Khomeini. One belong to Shia Islam and two belong to Sunni Islam. All the three agreed that democracy is not a part of Islam. To be frank enough Moulana Moudidi had written that there are three enemies of Islam – democracy, secularism, socialism. This is the exact quotation. Secularism he equates with atheism. Socialism is also atheism according to him and democracy also. All three agreed that women cannot have the same rights as men. They cannot have the right to rule the country, they are not even liked to participate in the governance. Recently when the elections in Pakistan are announced there were several areas in Pakistan who announced that women will not be allowed to vote. There were decisions by the communities, by the men to this respect. It also creates sometimes ridiculous situations. Briefly in 1964 Ayub Khan was contesting the election as President in Pakistan. The opposition parties had set up the sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah the founder of Pakistan as the Presidential candidate it was expected that Moulana Moudidi, Jamaat Islami will not support the sister of Jinnah, they will support the General, but to everybody's surprise he decided to support Fatima Jinnah. He has written a very thick book trying to explain why women should not participate in the governance of the country. Here he was saying that he would support Fatima Jinnah. Typically like a Mullah he tried to justify it by saying that it was a lesser evil to support women than to support a General. Politicians were laughing at him, everybody made fun of him. Unfortunately he happen to be in prison at that time, he had sent the decision. The same is true of Ayatollah Khomeini. He supports the [unclear], which is the rule of the Mullah ruled by the [unclear] who lays down the rules. So, all the three of them agree that democracy is not a part of Islam. All the three also agree that power should be captured by force of arms, forcibly. Sayyed Qutub, Moulana Maudidi and Ayatollah Khomeini and this justification for violence helps to inspire the terrorists. All terrorists everywhere in the world are fighting in the name of Islam to have an Islamic state by force of arms. So, this is a very unfortunate thing but this is a fact of life.

About the cassette, this is a very well known thing in India. All the religious leaders belonging to any religion Islam, Hinduism or Christianity, they are very flamboyant speakers. They will speak such emotionally that they will create an artificial atmosphere particularly during Moharam, Muslims condone the death of the grandson of Prophet Mohammed the Shia speaker will give such an emotional speech in such a beautiful urdu

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that even if you are not a Muslim or you don't know much about the whole episode you will also feel very sad about the whole thing. So, they create that type of an atmosphere and I think this is common to religions everywhere in the world.

Lastly one of the reason for the modern and fundamentalist movement or the rise of the revivalist radical Islam is the excesses of western civilisation during the imperialist and colonial era and also the incursions that the western culture had in the Muslim countries but what is the solution to this. This is the solution provided by the three ideologues that I have referred to. That is all I wanted to say. It is quite a long discussion.

**Next Speaker:** I have some difficulty with the tone that Islam is determined to be non-democratic precisely because I understand that the Quran has a system of interpretation and the question is to find the right interpreter, the right leader and this is why I agree that the solution is within Islam and not elsewhere. But I would object to this type of thinking that it is pre-determined that Islam must be non-democratic. I think that if there would be a divine intervention and they send a messenger that will re-interpret Islam in a liberal way this is a possibility. I would not bet on it. Until then we have to fight them but to say there are [unclear] I think is premature knowing that Islam has a great tradition, has a great culture.

**Mr Alok Bansal:** I think in the past when the [inaudible] who actually interpreted Quran according to context, and the kalifs actually supported them and that was the time when the fundamentalists were put behind bars and the moderates were in power. Subsequently when the kalif had changed the [unclear] were all persecuted and put behind the bars. So Islam has a history where people have actually come up with a revivalist ideas and have interpreted Quran in the light of...

**Mr Mordechai Kedar:** This is why Islamists have a good name for those moderates, they call them [unclear] means the wise people of the rulers, of the Sultan. This is some kind of denigrating [unclear], you interpret the Quran according to the king who tells you what to do.

**Mr Kalim Bahadur:** What I was saying that what these three ideologues have said. During 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century apologist of Islam they tried to say everything is in Islam, Socialism is in Islam, Communism is in Islam, Democracy is in Islam, they tried to prove it that Prophet Mohammed used to consult a large number of people and therefore it constituted a kind of a consultative assembly and therefore it was a democracy like anything modern. Is that the factual position, probably it is doubtful but he might have consulted people when he was ruling. Even in a municipality you need some consultation so he might have but you cant equate it with the modern democratic system. The condemnation is of modern democratic systems where participation of the people is there. What he very rightly point out fundamentalists have said, even the Jamaat-e-Islami leader in Pakistan says we will capture power by this election system and then we will establish our own Islamic system. This is the threat, the threat is that the modern democratic system is used by the revivalist militants one time and they see to it that you don't have democracy again. Thank you, I am very grateful to all of you for your cooperation, a very interesting discussion.

**End of Session II**