Events

Chair: Hari Prasad
Discussants: Arun Sahgal and Manpreet Sethi

Strategic doctrine is taken here to be implemented by a combine of war fighting land, air, naval and joint doctrines in conjunction with nuclear doctrine. While with respect to China, India has a doctrine of ‘dissuasive deterrence’, it is contended in this paper that with respect to Pakistan it has moved from a deterrent doctrine to a more proactive and offensive doctrine that potentially countenances compellence. This paper looks at India’s strategic doctrine with respect to Pakistan. The hypothesis of this paper is that there has been a movement in India’s war fighting doctrine from deterrence to also countenance compellence. The paper attempts to assess this by first establishing the nature of the change and then analyzing its implications with respect to Indian grand strategy, prospective political aims in conflict and likely effectiveness. The proposed direction of change forms its concluding recommendations.

From a defensive and reactive mindset of the earlier years that gave rise to criticism that India lacks a strategic culture, change in a compressed time period has been witnessed of late. These changes in nuclear and conventional doctrines are contrary to the logical expectation of the Nuclear Age necessitating deterrent doctrines. India is the status quo and stronger power in the regional India-Pakistan dyad. This should have logically led to a deterrent doctrine with a defensive bias, since India, not seeking any territorial gains at the expense of others, could be expected to be more interested in preserving its interests and position. This has not been entirely borne out and instead India has apparently acquired a more offensive strategic doctrine in relation to its western front.

At the structural level, the strategic cul de sac forced on India by Pakistan’s continuing proxy war is a reason for this change. Pakistan’s venturesome strategy has been attributed to the advent of the Nuclear Age dating to the covert acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan by the late eighties. In order to get Pakistan to forego its doctrine of sub conventional provocation, deterrence has its limitations. Instead, compellence, going beyond the coercive diplomacy of the Operation Parakram kind, may be necessary.

India’s straitened defence budgets through the nineties - brought on by liberalization – lead to a drawdown of the conventional deterrent. The ‘stability-instability paradox’ made its appearance with Pakistan choosing to engage India at the sub-conventional level. Stability at the upper nuclear and conventional level, led to instability at the sub conventional level. This climaxed in Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control in Kargil in 1999. It has been posited that there is space for conventional operations between sub conventional and nuclear war. India has therefore moved towards an offensive doctrine that can be characterized as one of ‘compellence’, when the land, sea, air and joint doctrines are taken conjointly with nuclear doctrine.

The prognosis of future Limited War is that it would be short duration, high intensity and from a ‘cold start’. It is expected that international pressures and need to limit costs would entail a short duration. To offset international pressures in the crisis management stage and for getting enemy defence under prepared, a ‘cold start’ has been deemed necessary. This would enable India to make military gains through surprise, by undercutting the mobilization differential that was earlier in favour of Pakistan.

India’s land warfare doctrine is essentially to create the conditions of launch of the major offensive by the strike corps. A salient ‘fire break’ between the pivot corps offensives in the first phase and the following strike corps deep offensives in the next phase can be discerned, even though these offensive operations are likely to be in a seamless sequence, not lending itself to breakdown in ‘phases’. This ‘fire break’ constitutes the crucial decision point in which India’s strategic, political and diplomatic might needs to be combined with the impending application of military force to ensure Pakistan complies with Indian aims. The launch of the strike corps would be equivalent of a failure of grand strategy for it would bring the nuclear factor unmistakably into the reckoning. Since offensive operations would have to reckon with the nuclear reaction threshold of Pakistan, a nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation comes under question. There is a case for move of nuclear doctrine to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation.

There is need for maximizing synergy between the politico-diplomatic and military prongs of strategy to coincide with the ‘firebreak’ between launch of pivot and strike corps offensives. To keep these a seamless continuum is to unleash a ‘doomsday machine’. Launch of strike corps offensives, unless it is as a counter offensive to Pakistani corps offensives as part of their ‘offensive defence’ doctrine, would be to enter an uncertain strategic realm. Therefore, a public shift from ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation is in order at the nuclear level. At the conventional level must be taken into cognizance the ‘firebreak’ between the offensives of the pivot and strike corps as the key exit point with war termination pressures being maximized by an orchestration of Indian war grand strategy to culminate at this juncture, if not prior to launch of cold start forces.

The following points were raised during the discussion:

• It is difficult to make a sharp distinction between compellence and deterrence as the former is subsumed in the latter.
• India’s doctrine is not an offensive one, but is reactive and therefore lends itself to deterrence as against compellence.
• Better integration and jointness among the services is required to achieve war aims in future wars.

Prepared by by Dr. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: Arvind Gupta
Discussants: Bhaskar Roy and Sanjay Bharadwaj

“Terror Financing in Bangladesh” by Dr. Anand Kumar outlined key factors that contribute to terror financing in Bangladesh. Dr. Kumar’s primary argument was that sustenance and maintenance of terror organizations is often built on the edifice of a strong financial base and that terror cannot make much headway without finance.

The author at the outset drew attention to the issue of state accountability in dealing with terrorism as terrorist activities often emanated from domestic territorial space. He emphasized that intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and imposition of new financial controls were important levers to curb the functioning of terrorist groups. In this context, he argued that the Government of Bangladesh has made only half hearted attempts to contain terrorist activities in its soil.

The presentation focused on three aspects: the Beneficiary Groups and Institutions involved in terrorism; the sources of terror finance in Bangladesh; and, the responses of the Bangladesh Government and international institutions. Finally, the paper briefly touched upon the policy relevance of the findings.

Main Beneficiary Groups and Institutions

Dr. Kumar argued that the main beneficiaries of terror finance in Bangladesh have been Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Both organizations have maintained links with Islamic groups like Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Alhikma, Harkat ul Jihad etc. Money is used for recruitment and training purposes. Funding is also being channelled to build a large number of mosques and madarsas, which are playing an instrumental role in radicalizing society at the district and village levels.

Sources of Terror Financing

Some sources listed as potential feeders for financing terrorist activities, as argued by Dr. Kumar, were Islamic NGOs, Saudi charities, individuals, money laundering, fake currency, drugs and underworld. Dr. Kumar asserted that post 9/11, Islamic NGOs have increasingly become important in the fight against terrorism. In order to support the argument, he cited the steps taken by United States to halt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through Executive Order 13224 and related elements of the USA Patriot act. He argued that as oversight mechanisms were absent, no financial scrutiny of the Islamic charities is undertaken, which further complicates the problem of tackling terror financing. The Saudi Government’s patronage of charities such as International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was also brought to attention. He cited the example of Al Haramain, a Riyadh based Muslim Charity, which was opened in Cox Bazar in 1992 to help Rohingya refugees but continued to operate in Bangladesh uninterrupted despite it being banned by the United Sates and Saudi Arabia. The connection between Al Haramain and terrorism was revealed in 2002, when linkages were made between Al Haramain and its suspected links to terror funding and trafficking of women and children under the garb of providing Islamic education. As far as individual support is concerned, links to Bin Laden were cited. Dr. Kumar argued that funds were flowing into Bangladesh in the form of Hundi through Jessore, Chittagong and Dhaka. He added that Bangladesh in recent years has also become a major source of fake currency. Fake currency was being printed in Chapai Nawabgunj and then being dumped into India. The nexus between drugs and terror finance also became evident when in 2005, the National board of Revenue found that business companies in Bangladesh were smuggling heroine to U.K. and that profits accrued form trafficking in narcotics often went for funding Islamist groups.

Responses of Bangladesh Government and International Institutions

Policy to tackle terror financing was expedited after the series of bomb blasts in 2005. The BNP enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation (Amendment Act, 2004). However, political motivations have often been an impediment for sustained political action and an overt emphasis on NGOs let the real culprits go scot-free. The enactment of Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 also proved ineffective as it was full of operational loopholes. Similarly the dismal record of Bangladeshi Banks in checking terror finance was also brought to attention. The author argued that Bangladeshi banks have received approximately 236 suspicious transitions since the MLPA was enacted in 2002, but till date there has been no progress on the issue due to procedural problems.

The author further argued that pressure from the United States has proved ineffective in triggering a behavioural change within Bangladesh. However, he also noted the renewed interest of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of terror financing in Bangladesh since 2001. In 2005, Government of Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the suppression for the financing of terrorism. The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering is another key forum where Bangladesh is engaging to get transparency into the system of terror finance.

The author concluded by stating that the issue of terror finance was a daunting challenge facing the government and political will needed to be strengthened in order to tackle the issue in a holistic manner.

Some of the points raised during the discussion were:

• One should be careful of classifying all charities as sources for terror finance. Classification of Madarsas is also needed.
• Domestic, regional and international issues responsible for terror financing should also be analysed.
• Causes of terrorism are generally found in the lack of development in Bangladesh, which is perhaps becoming an important catalyst for recruiting people.
• One needs to revisit pre 1971 years of undivided Pakistan to seek linkages between Pakistan and terrorism in Bangladesh. ISI links to terror financing should also be explored.
• Sources on linkages between terror financing and their sources should be more diversified.

The seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta, LBSC Chair, IDSA. Mr. Bhaskar Roy and Prof. Sanjay Bharadwaj were the external discussants; and Dr. Uttam Sinha and Capt. Alok Bansal were internal discussants

Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

IDSA organized a round table on the subject of bioterrorism on February 6, 2009. The main speaker at the event was Prof. Dean Wilkening, Director, Science Programme at Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University.

In his presentation Prof. Dean pointed out that biological weapons would be suitable for the new brand of terrorism, which comprises mostly of religious, nihilist, and millenarian groups. These groups were less constrained than their predecessors in terms of means and ends. Certain biological agents could be more lethal than chemical agents. The use of highly effective aerial methods of disseminating biological agents results in a high psychological impact. Some of the factors influencing the consequences of air- borne release of biological agents were delineated -- deposition in lower respiratory tract, atmospheric transport, agent characteristics and protection measures.

Past incidents of bioterrorism, in particular the case of Aum Shinrikiyo, were discussed at length. It was also mentioned that while non-state actors might encounter hurdles in acquiring and using biological agents, state sponsored acts of biological terrorism are more possible.

Prof. Wilkening shared the information gathered after a simulation exercise that was conducted to ascertain the number of people who would be affected by exposure to biological agents. It was found out that the spectrum of biological threat is very broad. With a band of possibility of attacks, the number of people affected might range from 100 to one million (contingent on the infectious dosage and the agent characteristics, etc). One of the important findings of this study was that uncertainty with regards to biological agents, their use, and effects is far greater than that of any other weapon. This makes them most suitable weapons of terror.

While discussing the various strategies of coping with bioterrorism, four major elements were brought out. These were diplomacy, deterrence, pre-emption/counterforce, and defence. The element of defence was further divided into active and passive components, with elements of safety for covert delivery of biological agents forming part of active defence and measures for civil defence a part of passive defense. The various stages of biodefense that were outlined included pre-attack vaccination, agent detection and identification, post-attack medical response and post-attack decontamination. It was brought out that the guiding philosophy for US biodefence is to focus on programmes and activities with public health benefits. The biodefence timeline in US policy comprises of various stages. Detection and identification within 24 hours of the outbreak of disease, providing medical logistics in the first 48 hours, prophylaxis campaign spread over the next 2 days and finally the last stage of decontamination comprising of 4 to 6 days.

The problem of differentiating between deliberate and natural outbreak of disease was discussed in detail. Prof. Wilkening talked about bioforensics. This is an upcoming science, used extensively by centres like NBACC's National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC). Bioforensic analysis of evidence is conducted from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a “biological fingerprint” to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack.

Towards the end of the meeting the need to develop simulation models that pertains to the Indian context was articulated. For institutes that focus on security and strategic studies, there would be significant interest in exploring the non-public health aspects related to bioterrorism. In addition, the necessity to enhance inter-agency cooperation in India and tap existing talent in the field of biological weaponry and related issues to develop a better understanding of the subject was highlighted.

Prepared by Dr. Monalisa Joshi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.