Events

Chair: S K Bhutani
Discussants: Ved Marwah & Sudhir Sharma

Conversion of a religious place by terrorists into a heavily fortified safe sanctuary over a protracted period of time is a tactic largely restricted to Asia. Entrenched in this meticulously defended complex, terrorists challenge the might of the state.

This terrorist fortress is characterized by the presence of a large number of their followers. Such a situation is distinct from other scenarios where terrorists use religious places to take refuge while being chased by security forces, forcibly take innocent pilgrims as hostages or launch an attack on the assembled devotees.

Lal Masjid, a mosque complex, located in Islamabad, was being used by radical Islamist clerics and their supporters, to defy the Pakistani government and impose Islamist edicts. When the situation deteriorated, a siege was established around the Lal Masjid for over a week and finally on July 10, 2007, Pakistani army stormed it, after talks with the clergy failed. The operation was marked by fierce fighting and heavy loss of life, during which militants responded with rockets, machine gun fire and petrol bombs.

While militants occupying such hallowed precincts are in violation of international humanitarian law, security forces tasked to clear them out need to exercise utmost restraint, use minimum force, avoid collateral damage and uphold religious sentiments. Military operations launched to flush out terrorists from places of worship have far reaching political, social and religious ramifications.

While the Lal Masjid attracted its share of media coverage during the crisis, inexplicably a detailed analytical study of the episode is still awaited. This paper attempts to identify lessons at the macro level to deal with similar situations by using the storming of Lal Masjid as a case study.

Events Leading to the Siege

Following the September 11 attacks in the United States, Pakistan’s support to the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) was strongly opposed by the leadership of the Lal Masjid. In July 2005, Pakistani authorities attempted to raid the mosque in connection with the investigation into the London bombings, but the police were blocked by baton-wielding female students. Subsequently, the authorities apologized for the behaviour of the police. During 2006 and the first half of 2007, the mosque's increasingly aggressive students and leadership, supported by militants continued to challenge the authority of the government in Islamabad. They also launched an anti-vice campaign and instigated incidents such as kidnappings of alleged prostitutes, including Chinese, and burning films, following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By early April 2007, the mosque had set up a sharia court.

Talks reportedly broke down on the morning of July 10, 2007 over the militants' demand for an amnesty, leading to orders being issued to the army to flush them out. What pushed the government to undertake precipitous action was China's angry response to the killing of three Chinese workers on July 8 in Peshawar. Military intelligence reported that the militants who had carried out the killings were linked to the group in the Islamabad mosque. This coupled with the break-down of direct negotiations led to the final assault on July 10.

Analysis of Lal Masjid Episode

Reportedly, on July 8 Musharraf was presented with three options: launch an air strike, gas the compound to render the inmates unconscious or launch ground assault. The decision whether to assault a place of worship or continue with its siege, forcing the inmates into surrender is always a difficult one. Protagonists of the offensive option argue that such a siege may last a long time, even several months, as terrorists would have stocked adequate quantities of food material, water and other items of sustenance, inflaming religious passions and resulting in a mass uprising across the country. An assault on a religious place may be a relatively quicker alternative, but invariably leads to heavy loss of life and public alienation with attendant ramifications.

The Pakistan government was criticised for allowing the situation to deteriorate and being a mute spectator to the excesses committed by the Lal Masjid vigilantes. Each new episode was met with feeble government response or appeasement. There were also differences within the government about the approach to be followed in dealing with the issue.

Usually such a situation is misjudged in the initial stages due to an overwhelming desire to avoid taking firm action for fear of inflaming religious passions. Militarily, the best chances of success with minimum damage are right at the beginning, before the terrorists have had time to prepare extensive bunkers and stock up weapons and supplies. With operations of this kind, the battle is as much in the mind as on the ground. The more the operation drags on, the worse it is, as the initiative passes to the terrorists.

Fears of a public backlash kept the Pakistani government from acting earlier against the radicals within Lal Masjid. Reportedly, intelligence agencies indicated that it could get help from Taliban in Waziristan and other madrassas in the vicinity, leading to large scale turbulence. While the siege of the mosque led to anti-government sentiment to fester in militant and fundamentalist communities throughout Pakistan, the response of other terrorist groups was subdued. Overall, there was widespread opinion within Pakistan that firm action should have been taken against Lal Masjid extremists at an early stage.

The assault on the Lal Masjid by the army was launched within 72 hours of the situation being handed over to it. Once the army has been requisitioned to deal with the situation, there is a tendency to expect it to launch the operation at the earliest, largely premised on the assumption that any further delay will be indicative of a weak response. Deployment of the army is an escalatory step, bringing additional pressure on terrorists and should be given time to influence the negotiations’ process. Moreover, such an operation not only requires detailed and meticulous military planning but also extensive coordination with a host of agencies, including paramilitary forces, civil police and local administrative machinery. Since the situation has already been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the army has to be called out, it is imperative that adequate time is allowed for planning and preparation to the army.

Officials hastily revised their assessment of clearing the Lal Masjid which they initially predicted would take just four hours. The militants continued to resist for over 30 hours and inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces. It has been experienced that the army always complains about lack of information to plan operations against such targets. The situation was no different in the case of Lal Masjid.

Use of Minimum Force

After the Lal Masjid military action, concerns have been expressed that the army did not comply with the principle of use of minimum force. The number of casualties suffered by the Pakistani SSG is indicative of their intent to ensure compliance with the principles of use of minimum force and avoiding collateral damage. More the number of civilian casualties during military action on a religious place, more vehement is the criticism. While Lal Masjid operation was a fairly successful operation from the military’s perspective, there was muted appreciation of the military’s role, fearing a backlash in glorifying the army after assault on a mosque.

In such situations, totally different from normal law and order problems of mob control or violent demonstrations, it needs to be appreciated that the army is called out to act against highly motivated, lethally armed and well entrenched group of terrorists who have made elaborate preparations to ward off entry by the security forces into the complex. Minimum force has to be related to the terrorists’ numbers, weaponry and strength/layout of field fortifications. However, the army has to prevent or limit damage to the religious and historically important buildings by strictly controlling the application of fire power. Fire fighting teams need to be standby in case of fire incidents occurring due to exchange of fire or attempted arson by terrorists. It requires a very high degree of discipline, leadership, motivation and moral courage on the part of troops involved in the operation to exercise restraint in the face of danger and extreme provocation, with their colleagues dying around them.

Conclusion

It is apparent that terrorists are increasingly focusing on religious places to carry out their nefarious activities and will continue to do so. Therefore, it is imperative that rather than knee jerk reactions after a terrorist incident, long term measures are taken to deter the terrorists. The Indian security establishment could study the French system of keeping the places of worship under surveillance.

In situations where fundamentalists and terrorists take control of a religious place and challenge the authority of the state, the government needs to act decisively before the pot boils over. From the military perspective, tiring out terrorists to make them surrender by besieging the place of worship is a preferred option than direct assault in certain circumstances. Storming of religious places by the security forces invariably leads to collateral damage and loss of life, despite adhering to the principle of minimum use of force. This provides an opportunity to the terrorists to exploit the situation further, which can have grave religious and political ramifications.

The seminar was chaired by Ambassador S.K. Bhutani. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma and Ved Marwah were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Colonel Arvind Dutta and Dr. Pankaj Kumar Jha.

Major points highlighted in the discussion were:

• Air strike is unthinkable in such a situation. However, air power can be used to provide real time information to the security forces.
• Timely action is required in dealing with such situations, as storming religious places normally hurt the sentiments of the locals.
• The Pakistan government was fully aware of the situation, but it failed to take timely action.
• Rather than using the army in such operations, the police force trained to handle such situations should be employed.
• Assessment of public opinion is needed before carrying out such massive military operations against religious places.
• Theory of the relation between state and religion needs to be thoroughly analysed.

Prepared by M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at IDSA.

Chair: R Rajagopalan
Discussants: Ashutosh Varshney & Sunil Chauhan

Climate change and security as a subject of enquiry is now being pursued by the IDSA in a comprehensive manner. Scholars from the non-traditional security cluster, since 2008, have been presenting papers and delivering talks on the topic. In April 2008 a run-up workshop was held on the security implications of climate change for India. A national workshop on security implications of climate change for India is planned on October 30, 2008. A working group under Dr Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA comprising nine IDSA scholars and three outside members (a climatologist, a disaster expert and an economist) has been formed for the purpose. It is intended that the draft report will be presented in the roundtable discussion. There has also been interaction with MEA officials on the various aspects of climate change.

Uttam Kumar Sinha who is working on the bilateral aspects of the climate change and also on international negotiations has recently authored a chapter in the re-launched IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008 titled “Asia and Climate Change”. His paper “Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position” in the fellows’ seminar was a logical movement from regional analysis to a global one.

The seminar was chaired by Ambassador R. Rajagopalan, who is a member of the IDSA Executive Council. The two external discussants were Prof C.K. Varshney, former Dean of School of Environmental Science, JNU, and former Chairman Environmental Research and Wetland Research Committee, Ministry of Environment and Forests, and Commander Sunil Chauhan, from the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India. The internal discussants were Vinod Kumar and Medha Bisht. The participant-level was high reflecting the interest in the topic and the growing concern over climate change. Over 20 scholars and members of IDSA attended the proceedings.

The paper by referring to the debate in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2007 explained how the issue of climate change is being “securitised” and how a counter argument is being built up to “desecuritise” it. India strongly criticized the “catastrophic scenarios” posited by the Stern Report and articulated a more “immediate and quantifiable threat from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resources for development and poverty eradication as well as competition for energy.” The author identified loosely structured blocks of states with their own mix of concerns and actions on climate change. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with concerns and fears of rising sea levels and large submergence of the coastlines think from an “ecological effectiveness” and finds a willing partner in EU. The second group is of OPEC and various industrialized countries that look at climate change from an economic angle. Such groups are seeking “economic effectiveness”. The third group is the developing countries echoing the north-south divide and articulating concerns from a “social justice and equity”. There is also the G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) which in the recently concluded G-8 summit challenged the economic dominance of the West and pivoted mostly around south-south cooperation.

At the heart of India’s position on climate change is the notion that it must be allowed to pollute on a per capita basis equally with the West. India has thus been propounding the “per capita emission” line. It is a strong unconditional position that immediately shifts the responsibility on to the shoulder of the developed countries to drastically cut emissions. It also allows India the space and time to grow at a sustained pace and strengthen its poverty alleviation and developmental programmes. But even more significant is the assurance that its per capita emissions will never exceed that of developing countries. It is a position of confidence and self belief in its economic policies, a challenge and a message to the developed world that it will not be pressurized in the negotiation process. While the per capita argument is quite justified for India, it also suggests a dogged resistance in its approach, a grandstanding of its newly acquired international status. But to be a serious player in global politics requires finely balancing self interest with certain global responsibilities and commitment (at least to be seen doing). This is not a moralistic position that India so pitifully pursued in the 1960s and suffered so seriously.

While the ‘per capita emission’ is being largely accepted including the UN, there is a certain perception that India’s position is one of extreme rigidity with no allowance for even a self determined gradual carbon emission reduction quota. India here is missing out on a positive leadership role. Another critical element of this leadership is to dehyphenate itself from China. India’s approach to climate change is based on energy security and sustainable development while the Chinese plan focused on emission reduction. China has overtaken the US in total emission, though its per capita pollution is lower than that of the US.

India’s other position on climate change is that it does not considers it a “threat” and particularly not in the sense of considering military options as a response. India’s stress on “collaborative action at the global level both through mitigation and adaptation in accordance with the common and differentiated responsibilities of the different countries” points to its faith in the UNFCCC as the agency for carrying out negotiations. So clearly for India an effective climate regime with equitable burden sharing can help tackle the adverse impacts and linking climate change with security is far-fetched and unnecessarily alarmist. Climate change is a concern but India would rather be worried about freer and fairer trade particularly of agricultural products and correcting the distorted trade practices of powerful countries.

The geopolitics and domestic political considerations will remain critical determinants to the negotiation process leading to 2012. The changing power equation and a predominant shift towards Asia will see new groupings and alignments that will impact the existing climate change regimes. In the coming years, the spotlight will increasingly fall on India, China and also the US, the chief protagonists in the emission targets. Since the new agreement needs to be concluded by the end of 2009 (Copenhagen Summit) so as to give countries adequate time for ratification, the politics will intensify. For India, however much it digs to its position, pressures will come from different directions on different interlinked issues. Before the G8 summit, India braced itself from the US on imposition of tariff barriers against exported goods from India that are seen as products with large carbon footprints, such as iron and steel. The Japanese at the recently concluded Accra Climate Change Summit took the issue of “sectoral approaches” with India, in order to establish “international energy efficiency standards” for polluting industries across the world. Has India given itself limited space for negotiations thereby constricting its ability to manoeuvre? If India is interested in world emissions, its own emissions are important. There lies the challenge and the dilemma. India has long experience in negotiation on climate change and has been at the forefront of the debate ever since Mahatma Gandhi made the ‘greed and need’ connection. India will have to reconfigure its position. ‘Greed’ and ‘poverty’ are powerful arguments in the climate change debate but will not help clinch the emission issue. It has to be seen whether India will reconfigure its position. Of equal interest will be to observe whether other regimes, groupings and alliances will challenge the Kyoto Protocol. At the end it is not about the sacrosanct nature of the Kyoto Protocol or which other regime should come into existence. The challenge is to be proactive, innovative and find solutions to the problems.

Professor C.K. Varshney commented the real issue was that of the extra carbon in the natural cycle due to fossil fuel use. Much more scientific work needs to be done. As far as India’s position, he felt that it only served the purpose of short- term. In the long- term we need to focus more on issues of energy intensity and efficiency. He reminded that we often are too much human centric and neglect loss of biodiversity, which in any case will not permit the current lifestyles. There was a discussion on the geopolitics and security aspect. Some members from the audience felt that it is the “politics” and not “geopolitics”. Cdr Sunil Chauhan mentioned that in a globalised world contiguous borders are not relevant any longer and thus the term “geopolitics” is in order. Medha Bisht mentioned that we need to take into account the environmental, human and social costs of big infrastructure projects such as dams as they can be counter productive.

There was also an exciting discussion on the referent object. While the author had taken it as climate, Vinod Kumar felt that it should be survival. While others felt that the nation-state is the ultimate referent even from the human security perspective.

Professor C.K. Varshney also elaborated on the uncertainties and dangers of geological sequestration of carbon. He mentioned that land-to-plant forests are also limited and too much reliance on aforestation thus has its own limits. Elaborating on Gandhian thought, he mentioned that it in no way, means to go backward in the past, but instead to find alternative solution, which necessarily may not be technology driven. What economic model India is following was also discussed. Some felt that we are blindly aping the West and we need to see how vulnerable we are internally due to the weather beaten economic path we are opting for. Enormous ecological challenges and social stresses are evident in the future.

The paper generated considerable discussion and well overshot the defined time. Importantly it did not drift from the core feature of the paper. The chairman in agreement with the speaker summed up the proceedings by mentioning how important the topic is and how critically important it is for India to be proactive and not only posturing and grandstanding.

Prepared by P.K. Gautam, Research Fellow at IDSA and Co-ordinator of Non-Traditional Security cluster.

A delegation of the International Committee of the Labour Party of Norway visited IDSA on September 10, 2008. The visiting delegation was headed by Mr. Olav Akselsen, Member and Speaker of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Parliament of Norway. The focus of the interactive session was India’s Foreign Policy, India’s stance on Climate Change and India’s relations with Africa.

In his brief introduction, the Chair, Mr. Sujit Dutta, Senior Fellow, IDSA described the history of IDSA and its unique role in shaping the strategic, security and foreign policy discourse in India. Mr. Akselsen on his part gave a brief history of the Labour Party and presented an overview of Norwegian foreign policy, particularly its International Development programme. He said NATO is extremely important for Norwegian security. On global issues, Mr. Akselsen highlighted that global warming is a major Norwegian concern. Norway supports the Post-Kyoto agreement and looks forward to the outcome of the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change in May 2009. However, he also said that the richest countries must bear the maximum burden of global warming. In this regard, he suggested that an International Joint Mechanism Plan may be worked upon. On the reform of the United Nations, he mentioned that the UN and specifically the UN Security Council do not reflect the present reality and India must play a major role in the UN.

Mr. Sujit Dutta gave a presentation on Indian foreign policy. He said that after the Cold War India’s foreign relations have been diversified and its foreign policy agenda has taken on board new issues such as energy, climate change, terrorism, UN reform, etc. He described the evolution of Indian foreign policy after the Cold War and depicted it as multi-directional. On the Indian neighbourhood, he said that most of the country’s neighbours have been going through political turmoil, be it Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. It is a serious challenge for Indian foreign policy makers and strategic community to actualise the goal of a stable neighbourhood. On India-China relations, he said that there are unresolved issues in the bilateral relations such as the Tibetan refugees in India, unresolved border and China’s role in the Indian neighbourhood. However, China has begun to take into account the rise of India and also wishes to engage India constructively in many areas.

Dr. Arvind Gupta, the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA, dealt with the issue of India’s stance on Climate Change. He underscored that India aims at an inclusive growth pattern and follows the distributive model. As a developing country, India needs an annual growth of 8 to 10 per cent to pull its vast masses out of poverty. Sustained economic growth requires energy supplies at affordable prices. Therefore, India should not be equated with the industrialised nations. He also highlighted that India’s contribution to the global per capita carbon emission is the lowest and India’s energy efficiency is almost at par with rich countries like Germany. Dr. Gupta pointed out that India cannot accept legally binding emission cut quotas, but reiterated the commitment given by the Indian Prime Minister that the country’s per capita emission would never go beyond the per capita average emission of developed countries.

Ms. Ruchita Beri, Research Officer at IDSA, provided a historical background of India’s relations with Africa. She informed the delegation that India’s relations with Africa dates back to the pre-independence years and the civil disobedience movement started by Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa. Till date, African leaders like Sam Nujoma and Nelson Mandela remember and respect the Indian model of non-violence. At present, Ms. Beri, added, there is a two million-strong Indian Diaspora in the African continent and this contributes to the strong bonds between India and Africa. In recent years economic considerations have assumed high priority in India’s Africa policy. India’s relations with Africa are not exploitative, but based on mutual benefit and understanding. Energy is emerging as an important component of co-operation. India is trying its best to provide technical-economic assistance to African countries and build a mutually beneficial relationship. Developing human resources and other capacities in Africa, she concluded, is a focus of India’s foreign policy.

Q & A Session

Questions to Mr. Akselsen

• What is the Norwegian position on South Ossetia and its perspective on the rearmament of Russia?
• China is becoming an important player in international politics. What is the Norwegian take on the integration of China into the international system?
• How does Norway see developments in the Caucasus regarding the US-EU sponsored Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil (AMBO) pipeline? Is there a tension between Russia and Norway on this issue?

Answers

• Norway has been concerned about the recent developments in Russia. However, it believes in engaging Russia through institutions like the EU and NATO. South Ossetia dispute should be solved according to international law.
• China is important for international development. While Norway is increasingly open towards fostering civil society tie ups, it is also working towards initiating a human rights dialogue with China.
• Norway has better technology than Russia to explore oil in the Arctic and other offshore areas.

Questions to IDSA panellists

• What is the Indian position on WTO trade negotiations and the possibility of future agreements?
• There have been a lot of talk in the Western media on the resistance of the South to the linkage of labour standards and the social clause with trade issues in the WTO. What is the Indian stand?
• India’s policy in Myanmar has been criticised for its pro-active diplomacy. What is the Indian policy?
• Would the general elections in 2009 in any way affect the broad contours of Indian foreign policy?

Answers

• The issue concerning India in WTO essentially revolves around questions regarding agricultural subsidies. India needs the world market for exports, and if agriculture is subsidised in the West, it is detrimental to the interests of developing countries. A working solution towards opening world markets must be worked upon.
• The social clause issue is important to India because of the growing concerns on child labour issues, which is linked to the livelihood of millions. India’s policy shifts are contingent upon internal constraints, which are distinct to developing countries.
• Though the government is implementing progressive policies like providing training and education, developed countries should understand that the labour realities in developing countries are a complicated mix. Issues relating to child labour are survival issues for many in India. India’s position therefore on the social clause would be driven by certain ground realities that it confronts.
• India is not in favour of isolating Myanmar and believes that it can bring about change through proactive engagement. Though Western countries have taken a stand of isolating the Myanmar regime, India is not in favour of such an approach since Myanmar is strategically important for India. India aims to engage Myanmar not only bilaterally but also through regional institutions.

Prepared by Dr. Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at IDSA, and Alok Mukhopadhyay, Associate Fellow at IDSA.

Chair: Thomas Mathew
Discussants: Prem Chand & Subimal Bhattacharjee

The central premises of the paper presenter were that governements were neglecting the current threats on the Internet not out negligance but because these threats were too diffuse and inchoate. This prevented a appropriate and timely response from the state to this threat. There was a tendency to approach these threats as law and order problem , or technology problem, whereas they are of a much higher order, and could impact on national security.

There were two parts to the equation of securing cyberspace. One was premised on the definition that “Cyberspace is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures to work.”. Over the years, ensuring the security and integrity of the networks that connect critical infrastructure has become of paramount importance since crucial sectors such as the financial, energy, transportation and telecommunications sectors are connected through cyber networks. This applies to India as well with core areas of the Indian economy, from the financial markets to the banking sector, to telecommunications are networked, and other areas such as energy distribution and transportation are headed in that direction.

A second part of the equation, but one that has proved to be problematic when it comes to implementation, has been securing the Internet, the vast network of networks, which has now become synonymous with cyberspace. Users of the Internet, an estimated 1.5 billion of the world’s population, vary from individuals to corporations to governments, all of whom use the same pipes for the transmission of some or all of their data and communications.

The rise in the Internet population has meant that while the threats and vulnerabilities inherent to the Internet and Cyberspace might have remained more or less the same as before, the probability of disruption has grown apace with the rise in the number of users. At the same time, the nature of the Internet, with all the characteristics of a “global commons” means that no nation can unilaterally take on the responsibility of defending or policing networks owned variously by nation states, commercial companies and individuals. In fact, cyberspace is characterised by blurred boundaries; there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military, state and non-state, and foreign and domestic as in other domains. It is those same characteristics that make it an ideal medium for committing malafide activities which can have repercussions for national and international security.

Characteristics of the Internet

It is akin to a Global Commons where no nation can unilaterally take on the responsibility of defending or policing networks owned variously by nation states, commercial companies and individuals; it has blurred boundaries where there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military, state and non-state, and foreign and domestic and: the architecture of the Internetas it has evolved is that of an open all-inclusive, decentralised environment. Part of the problem is that the Internet’s organic evolution meant that security was not a consideration and trying to bring ina secure internet environment is like bolting the stable door after the horses have bolted.

Internet War

This has led to Internet War or I-War which can be described as a low-intensity war where actors unkown are exploiting “the ubiquitous low security” internet infrastructure to target users with malware that compromises their systems and networks. These attacks take advantages of the bugs and vulnerabilities in software, systems and networks and are perpetrated though the machinations of a hacker-criminal network-state nexus.

The Hacker-Criminal Network-State nexus

Criminal networks have, over the years, professionalised the business of discovering and exploiting weaknesses in software that allow them to undertake a variety of actions ranging from taking control of those computers, accessing information on those computers or rendering them unusable. Whilst hackers provide the technical expertise, existing international criminal networks have learnt how to squeeze the maximum out of these compromised computers, and have turnovers estimated in the billions of dollars. Whilst this would remain at the level of criminal activity, it has acquired dangerous proportions and impinges on national security when a state-criminal network-hacker nexus builds up. There is enough circumstantial evidence to show that some states have turned a blind eye to cyber-space centred criminal and illegal activities, perceiving certain advantages to be had from building up such a capacity. The means, motivation and objectives and approaches to I-War are examined in greater detail in two case studies.

International Responses to I-War

While I-War might seem to be blown out of proportion when compared to the actual disruption it causes at present, it provides sufficient indication that the threats of the future are vastly different from that envisioned by national security planners. The blurred boundaries and the anonymity provided by cyber-space make it difficult to pin responsibility for such attacks, which, going by current trends, will be perpetrated by individuals, networks, communities and organisations, with the state acting as facilitator, and nationalistic fervour providing the motivation.

Governments have found it hard put to grapple with the complex issues of I-War, though some are increasingly cognizant of its implications for national security. Among the possible measures that can be taken are the following: i)international treaties and agreements that clearly spell out what constitutes legal and illegal activities on the Internet should be worked out; ii)states such as Russia and China should be encouraged to ensure that international norms of behaviour are followed and iii) The CERT mechanism that provides a useful interface between government, private sector and individuals should be implemented in countries where they don’t yet exist, and there should be better co-ordination and sharing of information among existing CERTs .

Conclusion

Whilst analysts have been tom-tomming the impending arrival of cyberwar with vivid imagery of the collapse of critical infrastructure, the ongoing battle in the Internet space is much less noticeable but has equally important ramifications for national security. The means, the motivation and the actors have come together in a combination that presages ever increasing I-War. It is for those at the receiving end to take urgent remedial action which does not mean responding in kind, but by addressing the technical and legal lacunae in cyberspace that allows criminal elements to flourish, and illegal activities to go unpunished. This should be done in consultation with all stake holders including national governments, private sector companies and information infrastructure providers. While this would not end the problem completely, it would mitigate it somewhat, and might prevent other countries from going down the route of I-War.

Discussion

Among the points that came up in the discussion that followed the presentation were the following:

• Ensuring Information Security is a 21st century nightmare.
• Failure of the defences and the increasing profits from such practices has led to an increase in cyber crime.
• Network Security id dead. The need is to address Applications security…only 9% of software vulnerabilities are being addressed
• The need is to divert focus on the question as to what the next level of security should be. More research is required in the domain of information warfare weapons and the issue of leakages in the war room.
• Economic security is as important as national security.
• It is premature to link the subject of cyber threat to nationalism.
• As a country India has a fair lead in the realm of information technology.
• EMP or the electro magnetic pulse is an alternative to nuclear capability.
• The information structures both at the national and global level should be studied.
• Ten years back the American literature dominated the subject of cyber security. Gradually however other countries have also shown interest in the same.
• There is practically no international mechanism for cooperation in this area except for the World Summit of UN Secretary General.
• Individual is increasingly getting linked with national security.
• A great deal of academic work needs to be done in the field of cyber security to facilitate better understanding and comprehend the threat.
• Cyber threat would be a potent one in the twenty first century be it national security, education or health.
• India’s security domains are attacked by China on an everyday basis.
• Treaties and multinational forums should be fostered to reduce and ultimately eliminate the threat.
• In this regard the IT Act of the year 2007 had many deficiencies which require attention.