You are here
Events
| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Piracy in Somalia: Need to Address the Root Cause | July 17, 2009 | Ruchita Beri | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Arvind Gupta During the last one year Somalia has captured global attention, due to the surge in piracy off the Somali coast. Piracy off the Somali coast has had a severe commercial, global and regional impact. The piracy and the resultant dangers posed to international shipping has brought an array of naval deployments from various external actors, including, the United States, EU, Japan, China, South Africa and India. The pirate attacks have disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of Somalis and have had a negative impact on the economies of states neighbouring Somalia. Though piracy off the Somali coast is not a new phenomenon and has been going on since the beginning of the Somali civil war in the early 1990’s. The collapse of Said Barre’s government in 1991 ushered in a wave of illegal fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters. However, few years ago the incidence of piracy was quite limited. The statistics suggest that the incidence of piracy grew from less than five to thirty-five in 2005. In 2006 it declined to a mere ten incidents only to grow in 2007 to thirty-one pirate attacks. In 2008 the problem intensified with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reporting 134 acts of piracy. The pirates have been operating in small fast crafts and have used an array of firearms mainly from Yemen while attacking ships. Pirates are making full use of modern technologies such as mobile phones and Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and in some cases they have used mother ships to allow them a longer range. Currently, there are two main networks of pirates: one based in Puntland (north-eastern Somalia) comprising mainly members of the Majerteen clan, and others based in central Somalia, consisting primarily of members of the Habar Gidir clan. However, to an extent the two networks overlap and cooperate. Various factors have contributed to the rise of piracy off the Somali coast. These factors include: illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste, existence of busy sea lanes high rewards and ineffective security structure, Eritrea’s hostile relationship with Ethiopia and instability within Somalia. Several measures have been taken by the international community to prevent piracy. Since the beginning of 2008, the United Nations has issued several resolutions regarding piracy in Somali waters. The US is primarily involved through the deployment of its Naval and aerial units as part of the Combined Task Force CTF-151 under the command of US Navy Rear Admiral Terence Mcknight. In December 2008, France along with other states initiated Operation Atlanta - a joint naval and aerial operation to protect shipping off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. This year long operation involves 20 ships from Belgium, France, Britain, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Regional countries like Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been extensively involved in naval efforts. Apart from escorting the ships, Yemen is constructing, Global Maritime Distress Service Stations (GMDSS) in Hodeida and Aden. Similarly in a joint project with Italy Yemen is setting up a Vessel Tracking System (VTS) on a chain of bases along the coast that will considerably improve surveillance capabilities. Many Asian countries such as India, Japan, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia and Pakistan have dispatched their navies to the Gulf of Aden. However, Yemen remains the most consistent source of arms and military material to Somalia. Though the Yemeni government has introduced some curbs for arms sales in 2008. Thus, in finding a solution to the conflict in Somalia and consequently the piracy issue is for working towards reduction in tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The African Union (AU) and a panel of African elder statesmen in particular should gently push the two countries towards a dialogue. The international community should intensify its efforts in securing the AU’s early deployment of the African Standby force. Points in the Discussion:Need to develop a frame work of cooperation at the regional level to prevent piracy, because regional cooperation is important to strengthening anti-piracy efforts in Somalia. Efforts should be made to stem financial flows. Unfortunately most non- state actors supporting the pirates and the Islamists have followed the informal route of Hawala, creating logistical problems. Need to examine cultural linkages between pirates and Islamist groups. Report suggests more than 70 percent of Somalis support pirates. Conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also contributing to emergence of piracy in Somalia as well as in the region. Need to focus Yemeni people’s role in supplying arms and extending cooperation to Somali pirates. What isn’t the Yemeni government curbing support to Somali pirates? There is a need to set up central authority to resolve the problems of piracy. Need to focus UN resolution regarding piracy Need to examine Somali concerns regarding India’s support to prevent piracy in the African region. Emphasis should be given on China’s involvement in the region. Why does Eritrea support Islamist groups in Somalia? Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | Piracy, Somalia | ||
| Piracy, Maritime Terror and Policy Response | July 10, 2009 | Rajaram Panda | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Amb. Arjun Asrani In recent years, piracy and terrorism on high seas are posing serious threats to international security and economic development. With increasing interdependence, the use of sea route for transportation has become vital. In this paper, Dr. Panda addresses three main issues: piracy with focus on Somalia and the Gulf of Eden; terrorism impacting trade through Malacca Straits; and policy response of the countries whose trade is adversely affected by sea piracy and terrorism. According to Dr. Panda, there exists a very thin line between an act of terrorism and piracy, primarily because both acts are undertaken to achieve private ends. Still, there are certain factors which distinguish piracy from terrorism. In terms of ends, while piracy is usually driven by financial gains, terrorism is politically motivated. The line between the two, however, is still blurred because terrorists could acquire funding for their political ends through piracy – tactically piractical, but strategically terrorist. In terms of means, while pirates are usually associated with basic tactics (e.g, boarding, theft, use of force or violence), terrorists usually aim at achieving a strategic effect. Today, piracy and maritime terrorism are no longer considered discrete. In fact, there is a complex piracy-terrorism continuum. Dr. Panda states that both piracy and terrorism have made the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait region highly insecure. The Indian Ocean is home to many choke points, such as the Straits of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca, Lombok and the Sunda Straits. Any disruption in traffic flow through these points can result in grave and disastrous consequences. As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned – the sea route transiting it and Singapore is the busiest in the world – 25 percent of world trade passes through this route every year. The criticality of the Malacca Strait is further reinforced by the increase in global economic interdependence and the consequent increase in the volume of mercantile traffic transiting the Strait. Terrorism and piracy have begun to engage the global community, especially due to the rise in fundamentalist forces after 9/11 and 26/11 attacks in the US and Mumbai, respectively. The importance of container security to maritime terrorism was particularly felt after the US Navy’s discovery of a group of al-Qaeda terrorists hiding inside a well equipped shipping container in January 2002. While the US is engaged in its search for terrorists and their personification in al-Qaeda on land, the prospect of a terror ship used by the al-Qaeda terrorizing the maritime arena continues to threaten tranquility at sea. After the recent 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai, guarding sea lanes and territorial waters has become new priorities of naval forces of many countries. Piracy in the Malacca Straits has historically been an unresolved threat to ship owners and mariners who ply the 900 kilometer long sea lane. The geography of the Strait makes the region very susceptible to piracy. During 1991-2001, nearly 2375 incidents of piracy were registered across the world, with South and Southeast Asia registering the highest number of incidents. The Indian Ocean area too has been invaded with merchant vessels that are suspected to belong to terrorist organizations such as the LTTE and al-Qaeda. In fact, the LTTE is suspected to own an entire flotilla engaged in dubious maritime trade. As the checking mechanism in place is flawed and entangled in legal matters, such ships are considered safe for engaging in terrorist-related activities. The Indian Ocean region is notorious for narco-terrorism as well. It is also widely believed that oil leakage at sea might create havoc with the ecology in the maritime environment which would ultimately affect maritime security. The recent spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has generated a great deal of international media attention. Somalia’s modern pirates represent not only a very real menace to maritime security, but also a growing threat to international commerce. The sensational nature of their crimes, while drawing the ire of the international community, has also ensured that the Somali pirates remain shrouded in mystery. According to Dr. Panda, instances of piracy around the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates have increased in recent years basically because of the absence of an effective government in Somalia. In 2008, piracy off the Somalian coast has more than doubled. So far, over 60 ships have been attacked. Hijacking ships for ransom is a new model. By most estimates, the pirates took in around $30 million in 2008, although actual figures may be many times this amount. Kenya in fact claims that the pirates collected over $150 million in ransom in 2008 alone. The increased threat of maritime piracy has heightened the shipping industry’s financial concerns in the context of the current global economic recession. There is consensus in the international community that maritime terrorism and piracy ought to be addressed with urgency. The misuse of sophisticated technology by pirates and non-state actors calls for continuous up-gradation of technology to counter those engaged in terrorist activities. However, despite increased naval presence by major powers, patrolling one million square kilometres of open sea has so far proved to be a major challenge. The existing international law governing territorial waters also place legal constraints on countries capable of checking maritime terrorism. Though the UN has intervened to check the piracy menace, it has not been very effective. Still a number of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral security initiatives pursued so far have been able to become regionally successful in tackling maritime threats. Malaysia has embarked upon several regional maritime security initiatives, including the establishment of SEARCCT (Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism) and hosting the IBM’s regional piracy centre. Singapore, being the most vulnerable state to any major piracy attack or maritime terrorist act, gives utmost priority in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for navigation in regional waterways. There are other regional powers as well, like the US, Japan, China and India whose interests are intrinsically embedded with littoral states like Malaysia and Singapore. In view of the overreaching security and economic interests of all trading nations, a collective security mechanism involving littorals and extra-regional players to share the burden of policing the Malacca Straits through capacity-building, intelligence and sharing of financial resources, and technology transfers seems to be the sine qua non for any attempt to securing the SLOCs. It transpires that regional actors have their own agendas and compulsions to deal with issues of piracy and maritime terrorism. For example, Japan’s economic interests are so huge that bolstering SLOC security is of top most foreign policy priority at the moment. Elsewhere, domestic political interests may be a factor in determining a country’s approach towards regional maritime security cooperation. There may be countries like China with great power ambition which might propel them to enhance their maritime profile. Unless a coordinated approach among countries in the region is adopted, the coming decades might see a fierce battle in the maritime security ‘chess game’ that seems to be pregnant with unpredictable consequences in shaping the geopolitics of the region. Point raised during the discussion:
Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
East Asia | Maritime Security, Piracy, Somalia, Terrorism | ||
| Security Implications of Climate Change for India | April 16, 2008 | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Workshop |
BackgroundClimate change and its consequences are being increasingly viewed as the foremost problem of the 21st century. Climate change challenges at the national, regional and global level are hugely demanding and interconnected and have obvious implications in terms of human security. Significantly and depending on the nature of the changes and other relevant factors, climate change could also lead to interstate and/or intrastate conflicts. In order to assess the role of climate related factors, particularly in the context of our region, and to provide greater clarity about the potential sources of instability/conflict in the future, IDSA organised a national workshop on climate change in September 2008. As a preparatory exercise, a run up workshop was organised on April 16, 2008. Climate change has multidisciplinary dimensions and as noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Report of 2007, it can accentuate conditions of resource scarcity and environmental degradation. In turn these could create fissures in the international system. The resultant challenges are shortages of water, food grains, and loss of biodiversity, collapse of ecosystems and frequent disasters and migration. The climate change debate and negotiations have been marked by north-south divide. The industrialised developed countries tend to securitise climate change so as to apply pressure on developing countries to cap greenhouse gas emissions. The developing countries, on the other hand, want the issue to be addressed principally from an economic and social perspective under the UN General Assembly and not the Security Council. What should be India’s approach? Does climate change create security problems for India? Will it become a critical driver in our relations with the neighbouring countries? Will there be implications of climate change for internal security? The scope of the workshop was to understand the geopolitical dimensions of climate change and implications for India and was framed to deliberate on how to intensify research work in order to influence debates in international fora and thus to protect our own legitimate interests. The SpeakersThe Director General IDSA Shri N.S. Sisodia in his opening remarks alluded to the risks associated with climate change which was attributed to man-made greenhouse gases. Evidence such as the 2003 European heat wave and other extreme weather events combined with scientific projections point to a future where competition for scarce resources is likely to increase and could impact inter-state relations. Dr. Nitin Desai in a special address considered the workshop by IDSA as timely and appropriate. He regarded the climate change issues more serious than the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 as physical impacts are more profound than oil shocks. Dealing with climate change may lead to reshaping of global politics and international relations. Forward proactive planning by all stakeholders was stressed upon by him. An important point that Dr Desai mentioned was that the developing countries need to strive for climate justice in a culture of compromise. The 1st session was chaired by Dr Nitin Desai. Shri Sujit Dutta, Senior Fellow IDSA structured his talk by first locating climate change issues as a security concern and then situating it in the larger body of security studies. He stressed that climate change challenges immediately raise national security concerns. He then traced the evolution of environmental security from the security studies perspective where resources, environmental stresses and state interests collide and shape the dynamics of international relations. He underlined the fact that long-term climate change studies assume significance both from the perspective of states relationship as well as the role of domestic pressure groups in shaping climate change policies. Wg. Cdr. Ajey Lele, Research Fellow IDSA spoke on climate projections, tactical and strategic ecological intelligence and the need to identify climatic hot spots. Professor Ashish Bose spoke on migrants and its growing impact on internal and external security. He highlighted the complexities and intricacies of data analysis and the need for focused and systematic studies. The selective ‘sons of soil’ slogan by some state (Maharashtra) was an emerging challenge as also immigration from Nepal and Bangladesh. The last presentation by Dr. P. Dasgupta on Economics and Climate Change focused on the imperatives for adapting climate change concerns vis-à-vis food, water and energy. She emphasised the inherent struggle between the developed and developing countries and the need to factor changes in production and consumption patterns. The three most important factors affecting relations with India’s neighbours and the rest of the world would be trade and trade related barriers, migration and the “common concerns” of sharing available food, water and energy resources. The second session on the specifics was chaired by Shri BG Verghese. Professor Abhijit Sen spoke about food security and emphasised the need to have appropriate food and water stocks. Dr. Uttam Sinha, Research Fellow IDSA, situated the issues of water in the security framework and showed how cooperation overrides confrontation. He stressed the value of securitizing an issue in terms of proportioning adequate attention and preventive response but also the need to desecuritise the issue before it enters the ‘threat-defence’ logic. Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal , Research Fellow IDSA in her presentation on energy and climate change exposed the over hype of reports of World Energy Outlook 2007 by International Energy Agency, which put the blame on India and China for growing carbon emissions, ignoring historic emissions. She argued for equal per capita emission as the norm. Dr. Monalisa Joshi, Research Assistant IDSA, in her presentation on health and human security showed how disease(s) will spread due to climate change. The Chair then summed up the session pointing to the urgent need to have greater efficiency in water use and innovative thinking applying scientific approaches. Cooperation, understanding of geography, technology and thinking and acting holistically, according to the Chair, were the keys to overcome the challenges of climate change. The last session on implications and next step was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA. Prof. Murari Lal gave a presentation on Monsoons and the decline in winter rains and 5 to 10 per cent increase in summer monsoons with uneven and more intense spreads. He also cautioned that one should not be carried away by hype perpetuated by vested interests of scientific community such as tipping point events in monsoons. Much work needs to be done on modelling in our context. Dr. A.P. Dhimri in his presentation on climate variability over western Himalayas in the winter alluded to the increase in extreme weather events in shorter time frames than in the past. He explained the complexities in study of snow, linkages of temperature and precipitation and land surface data. Commander Sunil Chauhan in his presentation on climate change and disasters emphasised that IPCC reports are insufficient and what is needed is regional models in an integrated risk management framework. There were purposeful discussions in all the Sessions. No clear consensus emerged on what issues needed to be securitized or whether securitizing the issue was the right approach. It was realised that one needs to understand the process and not blindly link issues to only climate change. For instance, flooding is a primary process and climate change is a secondary one impacting on floods. However there was consensus that the following tasks were necessary: Studies to refine negotiation strategies need to consolidate studies on climate change (national action plan as being attempted by Government of India is one that is awaited), migrants, water resources related studies and most importantly resources and environmental stresses related issues. It was also felt that the human security dimensions of climate change should also be examined. Next StepsDr Arvind Gupta while summing up the workshop said that there was a need to clearly establish the link between climate change and national security. Climate change has the effect of accentuating existing conflicts, as witnessed in Darfur. South Asian countries were linked with each other through glaciers, rivers, monsoons, land and in numerous other ways. The disappearance of the Himalayan glaciers will have huge impact on South Asia. Climate change and its impact could also become an issue in India’s bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries. Therefore, it was necessary to understand how our neighbours viewed climate change and its impact. Securitisation of climate change was happening whether one liked it or not. He also emphasised the need to review regional studies and make models with the existing knowledge for the use of policy makers. As regards the negotiation stands, IDSA needed to interact closely with the policy-making circles and offer its assistance in studying key issues of climate change and its impact on international relations. ParticipantsDr Nitin Desai IDSA TeamShri Narendra Sisodia Besides, representatives from the following organisations attended the workshop: The Energy Research Institute (TERI) |
Non-Traditional Security | Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) | |||
| Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement | July 10, 2009 | P. V. Ramana | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: A K Doval A Communist party, according to classical understanding, requires ‘three magic weapons’ to achieve its goal of capturing political power. These are: Party, i.e. a strong organisation; Army, i.e. a body of fighters; and United Front, i.e. alliances or linkages with groups that would facilitate its ultimate goal. United Front is of two types –– ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’. The Strategic United Front (SUF) is formed with various underground organisations of the CPI (Maoist), which are engaged in waging New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the Tactical United Front (TUF), through forming coalitions with persons and groups that are opposed to the state and its policies, on one issue or the other, the Maoists seek to fight the state through ‘peaceful’, political means, as well as broaden their support base. This paper seeks to understand the United Front tactics of the CPI (Maoist). According to the CPI (Maoist), “it is essential that we unite with such struggling organisations and build up broad struggles against the ruling classes”. In this light, this paper also seeks to examine the ‘urban activities’ of the CPI (Maoist). The TUF is a secret committee. It functions directly under the guidance of the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), which itself is a sub-set of the all-powerful and apex Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist). In 2002, the TUF activity took a firm shape with the formation of an outfit known as Forum against Imperialism and Globalisation (FAIG), which is a conglomerate of various revolutionary and mass organisations. The TUF serves the agenda of the Maoists in the following ways:
The activities of the CPI (Maoist) in urban areas –– cities and towns –– need to be understood because of the implications they hold. These activities should be understood together with TUF activities, because urban presence would give a fillip to TUF activities. The Maoists have also prepared an Urban Perspective Plan, which is a road map to the type of activities they would undertake in towns in order to enhance their support base. The Urban Movement has a defined role in the political strategy and military strategy of the CPI (Maoist). The Maoists contend that the urban movement should be conducted through various types of mass organisations; the wider the organisations, the better. These organisations are of different types –– secret revolutionary mass organisations, open and semi-open revolutionary mass organisations, open legal mass organisations which are not directly linked to the CPI (Maoist). The last of these would include Maoist-inspired cover organisations and legal, democratic organisations. Thus, the Tactical United Front and Urban Movement are extremely important elements of the CPI (Maoist). These are just about taking shape over the past three to four years. Being political and peaceful in nature, it is not surprising that TUF activities have not received adequate attention in the media. At the same time, because they are legitimate, over-ground, democratic activities, the state’s hands are tied-down. At best, it can keep a close watch on these organisations but cannot halt their activities. However, if it was possible on the part of the state to prove that outfits that are part of the Maoist-led TUF are, indeed, Maoist fronts or have direct linkages with them, it is then feasible to proscribe such organisations. Because these organisations mobilise, organise, propagate and indoctrinate the people to attract them towards over-ground activities (i.e. create a sympathiser base), and, perhaps, subsequently as part of the underground, the state should make every effort to expose these organisations and ban them. Moreover, if and when the Urban Movement catches on among the industrial workers, the state will have to deal with possible sabotage activities and industrial unrest. Besides, when the Urban Movement becomes strong, the state will then have to deal with urban terrorism. Points raised during the discussion
Prepared by M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist, Tactical United Front (TUF), Strategic United Front (SUF), New Democratic Revolution (NDR) | ||
| Politics of Assurances of Supply of Nuclear Fuel | July 03, 2009 | Rajiv Nayan | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: R Rajagopalan |
Nuclear and Arms Control | Nuclear | ||
| Impact of Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme on Combat Capability of the Police Forces in Naxalism-Affected States | June 26, 2009 | Om Shankar Jha | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Kalyan K Mitra The menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency has been a major challenge to India’s internal security. As part of its multi-pronged strategy to deal with the menace, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has taken special steps on the security front. Emphasis is also being laid on employing local State Police Forces (SPF) with assistance from Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) for improving the security environment. However, the security responses of various States to Naxal violence have not been effective, barring limited success in a few States. The failure of security forces to respond rapidly is often attributed to a lack of police combat capability in Naxalism- affected States. In order to address the long felt need for police capability building, the Centre as well as State Governments have initiated numerous measures in naxalism-affected States, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces, specialised training to SPFs in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare, providing better arms, ammunition, equipment, communication gadgets, bullet proof vehicles, land-mine proof vehicles, intelligence support, improved infrastructural and resource supports, etc. The Centre has also been implementing the ongoing modernisation of police forces scheme since 2000-01. The scheme has an annual budgetary allocation of Rs.1000 Crores for ten years. Almost eight financial years have passed since this scheme was launched. However, the SPF in most of the Naxal-affected States are still deficient in combat capabilities and unable to take on the Naxalites, as the Naxalite violence and the casualty figure of SPF are still on the rise. Accordingly this paper attempts to answer the following questions:
This paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of present MPF scheme on building police combat capability in Naxal-affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of the MPF scheme, the paper is focuses on the ongoing MPF scheme in various Naxal-affected states in general and the States of Bihar and Jharkhand in particular which are considered to have the least developed police capability including manpower, resources and training. Objective of the MPF Scheme
The focus of the scheme is on strengthening police infrastructure at the cutting edge level by way of construction of secure police stations, equipping police stations with required mobility, modern weaponry, communication equipment, forensic set-up and housing. Special Provisions for Naxal-Affected States through MPF
MHA claims that MPF Scheme has made a perceptible impact in all the States and provided much needed assistance and impetus to policing in the country. It has provided proper building for police station/out posts. Construction of houses for police personnel has boosted their morale. Availability of vehicles has improved police mobility and reduced response time. Modern weapons have boosted police power and morale particularly in Naxal affected areas thereby enhancing the performance and the satisfaction level of the State Police Forces. The “Police” and “law and order” are State subjects under Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. It is the prime responsibility of the State Governments to improve the functioning of their police force and to equip them adequately with the latest technology for meeting the emerging challenges to public order and internal security in the form of terrorism, Naxalism, insurgency, increase in crimes. The Central Government is supplementing the efforts of the State/Union Territory Governments in this regard. The MPF scheme is a significant initiative of the Central Government towards capacity building of SPF since 1969-70. The MPF scheme has been welcomed by police officers and men in all the States. It is especially helpful in resuscitating acutely deficient policing machinery in economically backward States. The regular police budget has been meagre due to a fiscal crunch in such states. But the scheme has suffered from undue delay in implementation in some of the States. Senior police officers of Bihar praise the scheme but feel that it has not been implemented properly and the State has not been able to reap the benefits of the scheme. The State still lacks basic policing infrastructure like housing, buildings, and vehicles since these have been neglected for long. Senior police officers of Jharkhand have however opined that the MPF scheme has enabled the State police in terms of arms/ammunition, equipment, communication, mobility and special equipment like bullet proof vehicles. Chhattisgarh police officers also feel that there little noticeable impact in the satisfaction level especially in residential buildings, family accommodation and mobility. Despite various problems the MPF scheme has achieved its objectives to some extent in terms of improving physical infrastructure, but a huge gap still exists between what is available and what is optimally required. MPF needs to be more user oriented rather than being thrust upon States. It should meet State Police’s aspirations based on their specific needs. Undue secretarial procedures and bureaucratic interference is proving burdensome to smooth implementation. Hence, the scheme needs to be given a fresh look for better implementation. Points raised during the discussions:
Prepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist | ||
| ‘New’ Radicals and ‘Old’ Islamists: Understanding the Politics of Religious Radicalization in Pakistan and its Implications | June 26, 2009 | Smruti S. Pattanaik | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Kalim Bahadur Pakistan has witnessed a significant shift in the politics of religion. Islam in the initial years after the creation of Pakistan was confined to constructing a national identity by defining the role of the state on religious grounds. However, the politics of religion now permeates society and shapes mass opinion. The religious political parties who portrayed themselves as harbingers of Islam now appear sidelined. The new radicals are trying to define the nature of the state and society. They have coerced the state to implement Sharia in some parts of the tribal areas, something the Islamic parties could not achieve in six decades. In the past few years radical groups have started questioning the legitimacy of Islamic political parties and their methods to usher in an Islamic revolution. It appears that the old Islamists represented mainly by the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat’ul Ulema Islami Pakistan, which were perceived as major political fronts for the Islamists in Pakistan, are gradually showing signs of political decline in terms of their influence and hold on the new generation of Islamists. Both these political parties were earlier at the vanguard of the Islamic movement in Pakistan. Whether it is the discourse on the place of religion in Pakistan’s polity or the methods to achieve an Islamic state, these two old Islamic political parties have played a major role. They have also colluded with the Pakistani political and military establishment to implement Pakistan’s policies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. These ‘old’ Islamists consider the State and its Western style democratic institutions as important instruments in achieving their objective to impose Islam. They have acted within the parameters of the state to consolidate the Islamic character of Pakistan. Despite their success in the 2002 elections, their subsequent electoral decline has given way to a new breed of radicals who are trying to occupy the political space. This new breed of Islamists initially functioned with the blessing of the religious political parties and the Pakistani establishment. Currently, the old Islamists have distanced themselves from the new radicals; however links between their cadres exist. Political Islam has become more contested between the new radicals and ‘old’ Islamists. Points raised by External Discussants
Q&A
Chair’s RemarksIn Punjab Barelvis are seeing a decline in numbers. Deobandis and Madrasas are growing. Deobandis and Barelvis continue to dispute mosque ownership. All Muslims need to be good to be Islamic. The Taliban want to kill everyone. Secularism means atheism for Pakistani Islamists. They are against women’s freedom. Ideologically they are cohesive. Islamists such as Khomeini, Qutb and Maududi used elections to gain power, but refused to hold them again. Prepared by Kartik Bommakanti, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South Asia | Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan | ||
| Locating Priorities in India-US Strategic Economic Engagement | June 19, 2009 | Cherian Samuel | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Santosh Kumar The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic relations between India and United States. Dr. Samuel advocates taking a strategic approach to current economic relations between the two countries. This approach is necessary because of somewhat unique nature of India-US economic relations which is increasingly being built on synergies in knowledge based industries and services. The paper attempts to analyse the various components that make up overall India-US economic relations and locate priorities that can be taken up for dialogue under the bilateral engagement process. According to Dr. Samuel currently both countries are going through a transition process to emerge as knowledge based economies. The ongoing transition process results into trade in goods and services based on intellectual property. Therefore it necessitates the governments to take more pro-active role since the rules of a global economy based on transaction in services are still being worked out. The new economy industries need support in terms of infrastructure, government policies and availability of capital to enable a viable ecosystem to develop. Highlighting India’s emergence as a global economic player, Dr. Samuel pointed out that trade with the US, both export and imports, have been on an upward trajectory since 2002. The United States remained India’s largest trading partner on combined trade in goods and services, totaling $61 billion in 2007. While imports came to $27 billion, exports totaled $34 billion. The good and services trade deficit was $7 billion in India’s favour in 2007. While exports to the US stood at $12 billion in 2002, it had doubled to $26 billion (12.7 per cent of India’s total exports) by 2008. Against this, imports from the US went up by four times from $4 billion in 2002 to $18 billion (8.4 per cent of total imports) in 2008. Dr. Samuel identifies future growth areas which includes defence equipment and technologies, and nuclear equipment and technologies. However, trade in both these areas is contingent on the easing of restraints on high technology and dual-use items which were imposed during the cold war era. Despite the existing restrictions on the export of dual use technologies and items to India, imports of high technology goods from the US rose from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion (45.8 per cent of total imports from the US) in 2007. Similarly exports of high technology goods from India also rose from $198 million to $708 million in 2007 before crossing the billion dollar-marks in 2008. Dr. Samuel points out that mechanisms such as the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) have met with only little success and the promised boost to bilateral trade is yet to materialize even after the civil nuclear agreement. Now there are clouds of suspicion over Obama administration’s continued commitment to the nuclear agreement. However as expected, defence trade between the two countries has gone up. Two defence deals have been concluded that for six Lockheed Martin Corp C-130J Super Hercules military transport planes and eight Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, worth in excess of $3 billion. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are also vying for the contract for multi-role fighter aircraft, estimated at $11 billion. India estimates that its military modernisation plans will entail the purchase of over $120 billion worth of defence equipment. Dr. Samuel points out a major obstacle that is the restraints imposed on technology transfer. It is in the interest of both India and United States to remove the obstacles inhibiting strategic trade. Trade in services has the most potential for growth. Imports of services from the US totalled $9.3 billion in 2007 while exports totalled $9 billion. Of this, exports of software services from India were in the region of $4 billion while imports of software services from the US stood at $193 million. However there are hindrances such as severe criticism of the provision of software services to US companies by Indian companies and complaints about rampant misuse of the H1B specialty visas. According to Dr. Samuel legislations such as Grassley and Durbin proposal in the Senate on visa reforms and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act signed by President Obama soon after assuming the presidency, effectively bar companies from recruiting workers through the H1B programme unless they fulfill stringent conditions. The recent bills have been construed as protectionist measures, which might lead to counter-measures. Even at a time of economic recession, Indian economy is expected to continue growing at a minimum of 5%. Markets such as India and China have provided as much as 75% of growth even if that translates only into 25% of sales at the moment. US companies have been major beneficiaries of the opening up of the Indian markets and the liberalization of the economy. At this juncture tit-for-tat approach would hurt both countries immeasurably. He opines the misuse of H1B visas can be countered through closer supervision. Outsourcing is an integral part of globalisation and denial of it may have harmful effects on mutual as well as global economic growth. While discussing investment positions in the two countries, Dr. Samuel pointed out that cumulative US investment in various sectors in India stood in the region of $13 billion at the end of 2007 of which 30% was in information technology services, and 21% in manufacturing. Finance and depository institutions together made up 24 % of the investment. However, Indian investment in the US has been more through the mechanism of mergers and acquisitions, with Indian companies acquiring over 83 companies in the US with a cumulative value of over $10 billion. The major deals of 2007 were Hindalco’s acquisition of Novelis for $6 billion, Rain Calcining’s acquisition of CII Carbon for $595 million, Wipro’s acquisition of Infocrossing for $568 million and FirstSource’s acquisition of MedAssist for $330 million. Dr. Samuel opines that the US and Indian economies are poised to help each other through the creation of an eco-system that transcends geographical boundaries through available technological means and promotes innovation and creativity, ultimately leading to wealth creation. The promotion of a culture of enterprise and innovation must be encouraged in India which would lead to the creation of intellectual property rather than merely using the IP created by others. Dr. Samuel suggested that to deal with the lack of venture capital investment currently, the two governments can adopt BIRD Foundation model of encouraging innovation as between Israel and the US where a bi-national fund has invested over $245 million in 740 projects, which have produced sales of over $8 billion. According to him this model can be replicated in other areas as well Dr. Samuel concluded that the unfolding strategic environment would play a large part in deciding the direction of India-US strategic trade despite insufficient strategic underpinnings to provide it a fillip. Policy actions are required to provide the conditions necessary for the creation of an eco-system conducive for the growth of an innovation-led economy. It would be a good strategy on the part of India to focus on removing the impediments to its services trade with the United States, which is relatively neglected despite its sizeable contribution to the bilateral trade pie. It should be impressed upon the US that the current moves towards protectionism are a detrimental step. There should be greater dialogue on easing the difficulties faced by entrepreneurs and service providers in travelling between the two countries as well as starting and sustaining businesses. A part of stimulus package in both the countries can be used to create public private venture capital funds to provide seed capital to start-ups in the new economy. In India returning professionals from the United States should be considered a resource, and a publicly accessible database should be created to enable greater networking. Government schemes to encourage entrepreneurship should be given greater publicity and lesser bureaucratic formalities. Dr. Samuel stated that the present time provides opportunity to turn the liberal-humanist rhetoric in the relationship into reality, given the similar ethos of the two ruling parties in both these democracies. Points raised during discussions
Prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
North American | India, India-Africa Relations, Economic Relations, United States of America (USA) | ||
| Interaction with the Delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway | June 17, 2009 | Round Table |
In his introductory remarks, the Director General of IDSA welcomed the delegation and elaborated upon the overall security situation in South Asia. Ambassador Leikvoll at the outset described that Indo-Norwegian relationship is based on competence and knowledge. Commenting upon the institutional level tie-up with the IDSA and Norwegian research institutions, he was hopeful for an excellent common future. On regional security he commented that India is situated in a very complex region. Captain Alok Bansal (Member, Indian Navy at IDSA) made a presentation on the on-going military operations in the Swat Valley, sectarian cleavages in Pakistan, the challenge of growing Talibanisation, Pakistan’s poor economic indicators and finally the problem of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as a result of excessive use of force by Pakistani security forces. He noted that earlier there had been no serious attempt by the Pakistani army to combat the Taliban, but at present the Pakistani security forces have been using conventional forces and arms against its own population. On Afghanistan, he emphasised that it was a mistake to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, and in a tribal society like Afghanistan inviting any Taliban leader for a dialogue would enhance his legitimacy in the eyes of his own clan. Similarly he opined that any discussion of an exit strategy for Afghanistan would strengthen the Taliban. On Sri Lanka, Captain Bansal briefed the Norwegian delegation about the security situation after the LTTE has been militarily decimated but cautioned about the activities of the networked Tamil diaspora throughout the world. Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA, highlighted India’s perceptions and views of its immediate security environment. Depicting Pakistan’s security situation as a prolonged chaos, he stated that the situation in Pakistan has not only been a threat for India’s internal security but for international security as well. On Afghanistan, he opined that historically Afghanistan had always been a buffer state, therefore the neutrality of Afghanistan should be re-established and the international community should underwrite Afghanistan’s security. Depicting India’s role in Afghanistan as quiet and positive so far, he proposed that India must initiate dialogue with concerned countries on Afghanistan. Dr. Gupta highlighted that the US would have to prioritise between Iran’s nuclear programme and seeking Iran’s cooperation to stabilise Afghanistan. Mr Leikvoll described the security condition in Afghanistan as a stalemate and Army operations in Pakistan as weak. He also stressed on a broader regional approach including Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan. He underscored that India’s role in Afghanistan has so far been appreciated but India must increase its influence in Afghanistan. Regarding Sri Lanka, he recounted the recent demonstrations staged by Tamil expatriate organisations against the Norwegian establishment and the Sri Lankan embassy in Oslo. Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh made a presentation on Myanmar, highlighting the internal challenges within and the strategic necessity for India to engage the ruling military junta. He explained the enormous strategic importance of Myanmar, given its location at the tri-junction of East, South and South East Asia. Dr. Singh noted the substantial strategic and economic investments by China in Myanmar in recent years, which have been a concern for India. Nevertheless he noted that the Myanmarese junta is fairly independent in its pursuit of foreign policy interests. He made the observation that the neighbouring states of Myanmar have a greater stake in the stability of the state and are unlikely to impose sanctions. However, the West especially the US and the EU, have been vociferously critical about the human rights situation in Myanmar but the sanctions against Myanmar have been unsuccessful. The Norwegian delegation also admitted that sanctions against Myanmar have not worked and a more nuanced policy has to be formulated. Prepared by Kartik Bommakanti and Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay |
Nuclear and Arms Control | |||||
| India and the Non-Proliferation Regime: Looking Beyond the Nuclear Deal | September 12, 2008 | A. Vinod Kumar | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: G Balachandran The India-United States civil nuclear cooperation agreement, announced through the July 18, 2005 joint statement, besides opening the doors for global nuclear commerce, is seen as a means to facilitate India’s greater integration with the global non-proliferation regime. India was always credited to be an adherent of the regime’s norms, but was deemed an outsider owing to its non-membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is seen as the cornerstone of the regime. Through the nuclear agreement, the U.S. had volunteered to assist this assimilation process, the latest development being the India-specific exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The emergent global nuclear order and the NPTAs a Cold War arrangement, the NPT sustained one of the most established international bargains whereby states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while existing nuclear weapon states committed to eventually give them up. However, in the past four decades, the Treaty had attained the tag of being a system with unfulfilled objectives outnumbering its achieved goals, and failures accumulating as each of its articles were being violated with impunity. The Treaty was no longer seen to have the capability to address newer security threats arising out of a post 9/11 world, influenced by non-state actors and an increasing number of threshold states. What looked more portentous was the imbalance a non-state actor would inflict on the non-proliferation regime and the NPT, which were equipped only to handle the proliferation problem arising from states. Forty years later, the Treaty might pride on its record of restricting new weapons states to three or four. But as of today, the instances of non-compliance and likelihood of more threshold states emerging on the scene have increased, partly due to the security deficit created by current geo-politics. India’s rendezvous with the non-proliferation regimeFrom its early days of disarmament activism, India had envisioned a third world leadership role for itself in the evolving non-proliferation regime, and vociferously advocated the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons technology. In the early 1960s, as a member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), India influenced the debate for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and argued for a credible bargain whereby weapon powers would give up their arsenals while ensuring that others refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. But when the grand bargain became discriminatory, India decided to stay away from the NPT. India’s decision to conduct a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion experiment was seen as the first challenge to the non-proliferation regime, which invoked new mechanisms like the NSG to add to what the Zangger Committee had already initiated. India and the NPT: Towards Convergence or Drifting Apart?The genesis of India’s confrontation with the NPT can be traced to the political power play enacted during the negotiations for the Treaty. Even before Ireland submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly, India had launched its campaign calling for steps to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and exhorted weapon states to take the initiative, failing which non-nuclear nations would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. India was upset that the Irish draft talked of prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons, but imposed no restriction on its continued manufacture and maintenance. Later, India joined seven nations in the ENDC to submit a resolution (GA 2028 [XX]) with five principles of which the key ones were: - The Treaty should be void of any loopholes for countries to proliferate; - It should embody an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations; - It should be a step towards complete disarmament. The Other ChallengesThough India could be prodded to think of campaigning for reforms in the NPT, there are other areas like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), on which India would have serious reservations in its current form. CTBT: India had vociferously argued for a test-ban, along with a fissile production cut-off, as part of its campaign to stop the production and development of nuclear weapons during the initial NPT debate. This was in consonance with its 1954 proposal calling for end to nuclear weapons testing. At the 1996 Conference on Disarmament, India, along with members of G-21, proposed a Programme of Action for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020. However, during the CTBT negotiations, weapon states refused to agree to any commitment on disarmament and pushed for a test ban while insisting on the Entry into Force clause (XIV), which required India along with specified countries to join the Treaty before it became operational. FMCT: A key element of the July 2005 joint statement was India’s cooperation in negotiations for concluding a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). India had strongly advocated a fissile production cut off in the NPT debate, but later on resisted an FMCT owing to its potential impact on its own nuclear weapons programme. Differences over issues like time-bound disarmament had led to stalemate in negotiations. After initial opposition arguing that an FMCT would curtail its nuclear weapons programme, India announced in 1998 its willingness to participate in the negotiations. There are some issues to be factored in India’s policy towards FMCT: (a) Does India have sufficient fissile material for its credible deterrent? (2) If not, can it be mobilised before the Treaty is ratified? (3) Would the Treaty benefit disarmament or would it be used to curtail the strategic capability of countries like India? MTCR: Another commitment of similar character was compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Though India has updated its national controls lists with that of MTCR Annex, it is still treated as an outsider by the MTCR community for its defiance in pursuing its guided missile development programme. However, the merit in India’s case is that it had managed to develop its missile systems indigenously and also resisted transfer of missile systems to another country. ConclusionWith the nuclear deal and NSG waiver, India is moving towards greater integration with the non-proliferation regime. By doing so, it would join ranks with the United States in evolving a new nuclear security order. However, the more India’s proximity with global non-proliferation objectives, the more would be the policy challenges on crucial issues connected with anti-proliferation. Irrespective of the success and acceptability of a new order, the instruments of the old order would continue to hold significance in nuclear politics. As an active member of the non-proliferation regime, India would have to initiate a dialogue with these instruments to ensure that its bonding with the regime is sustained. The NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, despite its many shortcomings. Being a near-universal mechanism, the Treaty would continue to hold its primacy in global nuclear affairs. Though India managed to resist calls for membership all these years, its stakes and responsibilities would increase with its weapon power status and greater access to nuclear commerce. On the other hand, India has to realise that the driving spirit that motivated it to advocate the NPT and CTBT are still relevant. For decades, Indians have seen NPT as discriminatory so much so that even a rethink is now seen as blasphemous. DiscussionA. Vinod Kumar presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran, Visiting Fellow at IDSA. Discussants in this seminar were Dr. R. R. Subramanian, former Senior Research Associate at IDSA and a renowned strategic analyst and Mr. K. C. Singh, IFS (Retd.). Mr. Sujit Dutta, Senior Fellow at IDSA and Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Research Officer at IDSA, also offered special comments as Discussants. Important points flagged during the discussion were:
Prepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh, Research Assistant at IDSA. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | India, Nuclear Weapons, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India-US Relations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) |
A delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, visited IDSA on June 17, 2009. Mr. Atle Leikvoll, Deputy Secretary General, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the delegation from Oslo. The delegation was accompanied by the Norwegian Ambassador to India, Her Excellency Ann Ollestad. The topic of the interactive session was regional security in South Asia with particular focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.