Events

The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.), Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, on “The Necessity of Military - Civil Fusion (MCF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030” was held on 27 August 2024. It was chaired by Dr. V.K. Saraswat, former Secretary, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), currently Member NITI Aayog. The External Discussants for the paper were Professor Hari Babu Srivastava, former DG DRDO, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) from Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Deputy Director General, Gp.Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute participated in the Seminar.

Executive Summary

The session deliberated on making India an atmanirbhar (self-reliance) drone hub @2030, emphasising military-civil drone technology development initiatives, challenges and the way forward. Key challenges include reliance on imports, lack of civil drone R&D ecosystem, gaps in defence UAV development programs and reducing import dependence of critical systems. Recommendations by the speaker included military-civil technology fusion (MCTF), designating an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for drone technology, launching civil drone R&D initiatives, fostering design capabilities, building testing infrastructure, creating indigenous content certification mechanism and formulating Indian standards among others, on which further discussion took place.

Detailed Report

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA opened the session by introducing Dr. V.K. Saraswat, Member of NITI Aayog, as the Chairperson. He highlighted India’s progress towards greater self-reliance, emphasising that this does not equate to self-sufficiency. Self-reliance, he explained, allows ample room for international collaboration. India has actively engaged with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and others. It is negotiating with global partners on the development of aero engines and other technologies.

Dr. V.K. Saraswat noted thatIndian industry’s efforts toward aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been limited, particularly in the development of those with strategic value. However, he acknowledged significant progress in civilian drone technology, with applications ranging from entertainment and agriculture to logistics. The core technology behind drones remains consistent, with variations primarily in payloads and command and control systems. In the civilian sector, however, the understanding of drone technology in India is limited, with only a few companies excelling in this area.

Furthermore, Dr. Saraswat underlined that due to lack of focus, the civilian sector has largely depended on import of critical components. There are also distinct differences in the requirements for civilian versus military applications. As future warfare is likely to involve large-scale deployment of unmanned systems, achieving self-reliance in UAV technology requires a mission-driven approach to develop all critical components.

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.) began his presentation by highlighting the critical role of the Semi-Conductor Laboratory (SCL) in Chandigarh in hand-holding of the drone startups, aimed at exploring the feasibility of developing chips to enhance security. He noted that his presentation addresses four key areas: military-civil drone policies, technology development, ecosystems and military-civil technology fusion (MCTF). He emphasised the need for significant reforms in the civilian drone sector, as well as some improvements in the defence sector.

According to Gp. Capt. Narang, while India has set the ambitious goal of becoming a global drone hub, the definition of what this entails remains unclear. He defines it as a “technology and innovation-driven, high-tech, high-value civil-military drone industry, where India is self-reliant in critical technologies, while also being a global leader in certain niche technologies.”

The growth of the Indian drone industry, he explained, will depend on proactive R&D, innovation and the creation of drone technologies. Additionally, the formulation of Indian standards, standardisation and trial-based certifications of emerging and enabling drone technologies will play a crucial role in achieving this vision. With standards for drones still evolving, India must adopt a proactive approach to formulate Indian standards to remain competitive in this sector.

Gp. Capt. Narang further elaborated on the contribution of civil drone policy initiatives, beginning with the Drone Rules 2021, which significantly transformed India’s drone sector by addressing operations, certification, training, and Production-Linked Incentives (PLI).  He also highlighted certain gaps and limitations in the drone policies. He observed India does not have a policy on certification by a drone technician. The PLI scheme supported drone manufacturing by domestic industry while simultaneously easing the import of drone components, which, in turn, made the industry reliant on imports. Although India has an airworthiness certification mechanism, there is no indication of whether products or components are indigenous. He also called for reforms in certification of drone batteries by citing an example where an Indian company developed innovative batteries, but the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) found it difficult to deviate from predefined standards to give them certification.

Gp. Capt. Narang pointed out that policy initiatives were focused on facilitating drone operation and not on development or the validation of indigenous drone technologies. Notably, the Ministry of Civil Aviation lacks policies, structures and mechanisms for atmanirbharta in civil drone technologies. Discussing development challenges, he emphasised the lack of focus of innovation hubs on addressing the technology gaps. Furthermore, civil drone development initiatives by the Department of Science and Technology, MeitY and others are not focused on developing specific drone technologies. Globally, civil aviation entities are leading development of enabling technologies and integration of drones into their national airspace; however, similar initiatives by Ministry of Civil Aviation/Directorate General of Civil Aviation are lacking.

Gp. Capt. Narang explained that a major limitation in India is the absence of an R&D vertical within the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In the private sector, investment in R&D is alarmingly low—that generally varies between 1 to 5 percent in most companies as compared to 10-20 % by global leaders—indicating a lack of focus on technological innovation. He stressed the need for greater demands on industry bodies and the private sector to drive meaningful technological progress.

Gp. Capt. Narang explained that India must also prioritise building an ecosystem for civilian drone test sites, as some Indian companies are currently forced to test their drones abroad. Accreditation remains a challenge for the Indian drone industry, and there is a pressing need to archive civil drone test data to facilitate the validation of technologies. Currently, drone education in India is limited, with only a few courses like the M.Tech program at IIT Kanpur and a handful of other universities offering specialised education. Strengthening higher education in the drone sector is essential to foster deep research in critical drone technologies within the country.

Focusing on the defence UAV sector, Gp. Capt. Narang mentioned that significant policy measures have been implemented, such as the MAKE-1, MAKE-2, and Indigenously Designed, Developed, and Manufactured (IDDM) categories in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Initiatives like iDEX and the Mehar Baba Competition have also played a key role in advancing technological development in the drone sector. Additionally, he recommended induction of test pilots and test engineers by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and industry to help them in bridging the gap between drone designs and user expectations in UAV programs and the broader development of aviation technologies.

On the issue of indigenous content (IC), Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised the need for an expert body dedicated to IC certification, which is currently lacking. India does not have a mechanism to identify indigenous content, and he stressed the importance of creating one. He drew attention towards the need for archiving indigenous designs and content within Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the DRDO. He recommended reforming the Development Cum Production Partner (DcPP) model to a Development Production and User (DPU) model, where the user becomes a partner in the process rather than merely a reviewer of technology.

Gp. Capt. Narang also suggested that platforms like GeM should include verticals for iDEX, Mehar Baba, or IDDM to promote indigenous technologies. Also, there is a need to standardise trial methodologies that are universally accepted, which would help reduce challenges faced by startups in the drone industry.

Gp. Capt. Narang further highlighted the long-standing lack of interest in developing drone engines, emphasising the urgent need to address this gap. According to him, internal combustion (IC) engines, in particular, remain a weak area for India, with challenges in commercialisation, as well as competing with global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in terms of quality and efficiency. Another issue is the increasing acquisition of promising Indian startups and talent by foreign companies and VCs, which calls for concerted efforts to prevent the loss of domestic talent and innovation.

Gp. Capt. Narang proposed the development of a mechanism to test the indigenous content (IC) of materials and software components for greater transparency and clarity. Moreover, he advocated for the creation of a National MCTF initiative, alongside a policy for aatmanirbharta in civil drone technology. He also called for designation of an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for civil UAV technology, a National UAV Technology Mission, and a National UAV Technology Fund to focus efforts in this critical domain. Additionally, there is a need for a Positive Indigenisation List across all ministries and the creation of civil drone testing corridors and sites.

Lastly, he proposed introducing an “IC 1” rating, in addition to L1 and T1 criteria, to recognise the highest levels of Indigenous Content in drone technology.

Prof. Hari Babu Shrivastava made several observations and recommendations, raising key questions such as what defines a “hub” and how the MCTF initiative would benefit society, industry, and the economy as a whole. He referenced a report by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, expressing concern that India’s indigenisation process may not keep pace with the country’s projected capabilities by 2030. He also noted that countries like Turkey and Iran have made significant advances in drone exports, emphasising the need for India to accelerate its efforts in this sector to remain competitive on the global stage.

Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) expressed concern that specific recommendations may not be effective if the mechanisms and processes for implementation remain unchanged. He also raised concerns on the draft of the Military Airworthiness Bill, pointing out that many issues stem from deep-rooted cultural challenges, such as a risk-averse mindset and siloed working practices. He noted that many countries are already ahead of India in drone technology, and instead of following the same path, India should think ahead and adopt a different approach.

For instance, he suggested that India should focus on collaborative robotics rather than UAVs. He emphasised the importance of understanding business models and advised companies to prioritise customer needs over their own preferences, highlighting the necessity of focusing on requirements engineering to align with real market demands.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Chinoy, in his remarks, posed the question of how drone technologies can be developed to meet the specific needs of infantry, particularly in terms of supply delivery and stock management. He also said that regarding engine testing, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) already has robust facilities, such as those used for the Kaveri engine. If India’s private sector develops its own engines, these testing facilities can be made available to support the testing and validation of their designs, encouraging collaboration between public and private sectors.

In his concluding remarks, Dr. Saraswat said that in India, the technological lag often leads organisations to import new technologies for commercial use, rather than focusing on developing their own innovations. This approach creates challenges in increasing indigenous content, especially in critical technologies. Indigenous content should be measured in terms of critical technology development, not merely by the percentage of cost of local components in a product.

Another issue is India’s reliance on foreign designs, which are re-engineered and manufactured locally, highlighting the need to strengthen domestic design capabilities. Additionally, India should aim to leapfrog technological advancements rather than merely trying to catch up with advanced technologies.

Report prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma, Research Analyst, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre.

Mr. Vishal Chandra, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, spoke on ‘India’s Engagement With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Three Years On’ at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 9 September 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Priyanka Singh, Associate Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

India’s approach towards Afghanistan has evolved pragmatically in response to shifting power dynamics in the country over the past decades. India’s commitment to developmental projects and humanitarian assistance has remained consistent, and its people-centric approach continues to foster ties with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups. These long-lasting ties with the Afghan people have endured, with India adapting to another power shift in Kabul in August 2021. Looking ahead, India needs to broaden its engagement, recognising that Afghanistan will remain a critical cog in the broader interplay of geopolitics and geoeconomics around it.

Detailed Report

The session began with moderator Dr. Priyanka Singh highlighting India’s historically fraught relationship with the Taliban, notably influenced by the execution of President Najibullah, who was an ally of India, in 1996, and the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC–814 in 1999. India had aligned itself with the Northern Alliance, opposing the Pakistan-backed Taliban’s rise to power in the late 1990s. Dr. Singh stated that these events, among others, have shaped India’s cautious approach towards engaging with the Taliban-led interim government. Over the past two years, diplomatic engagements with the Taliban have occurred, signalling that India is open to dialogue while ensuring that its national interests are safeguarded.

Mr. Vishal Chandra’s presentation revolved around India’s evolving approach towards a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan over the past three years. His presentation highlighted India’s continued humanitarian outreach and assistance to the people of Afghanistan; reflected upon the security landscape of Afghanistan, the state of India’s relations with an Islamist Kabul, and the level of bilateral trade; and India’s approach moving forward. The Speaker, Mr. Chandra, began his presentation by quoting Prime Minister Narendra Modi from his address delivered at the inauguration of the India-constructed Afghan Parliament building in Kabul in December 2015, where he emphasised the centuries-old ‘timeless relations’ between the peoples of the two countries. Mr. Chandra was of the opinion that the Prime Minister’s speech aptly captured the spirit of what is termed as “Indo-Afghan”. Elaborating on the point, he stated that “Indo-Afghan” is a much broader historical dynamic, and has its momentum, than the formal state-to-state “India–Afghanistan” relations. It has long guided India’s people-centric approach towards Afghanistan, particularly in times of political uncertainty and instability in the country, and is well-reflected in India’s current policy pronouncements.   

Reflecting upon the state of relations with Kabul, Mr. Chandra noted that the Taliban regime has variously signalled its interest in building ties with New Delhi. A working understanding of sorts on non-interference and non-threat appears to have been attempted over the past two years. He also referred to visits by Indian delegations to Kabul in June 2022 and March 2024, and the deployment of officials and staff at the Indian mission in Kabul in June 2022 to coordinate the delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghan people. He referred to the people of Afghanistan as India’s longest-standing partner in the country.

On the changed security landscape in Afghanistan, Mr. Chandra remarked that from Herat in the west to Peshawar in the east, one finds only Pashtun Sunni Islamist groups—the Afghan Taliban; Haqqani network (both as a distinct entity and as part of the Taliban ‘emirate’); the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), mainly comprising of former elements from Pakistani and Afghan Taliban; and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban—collaborating, competing and warring to establish their power dominance and ideological hold in the region. He further noted that the underlying interlinkages, and convergences and divergences among them and their global and regional affiliates, point to a complex maze of resurgent Sunni Jihadist entities seeking to dominate and transform the social and political landscape in the region.

Mr. Chandra highlighted India’s pragmatic approach to Afghanistan, adapting to shifts in power and priorities. He pointed out the faultlines within the Taliban and their so-called ‘emirate’, which is marked by competing power centres. The Taliban chief, Hibatullah Akhundzada, governs from Kandahar, where there is an extreme concentration of power, while the Haqqani Network holds sway in Kabul. Additionally, prominent figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani (acting Taliban interior minister and leader of the Haqqani Network) and Mullah Yaqoob (acting Taliban defence minister and son of founder chief Mullah Omar) have questioned some of Akhundzada’s governing policies and decisions, including the restrictions imposed on girls’ education. Mr. Chandra informed that the Taliban have allowed women to work in select sectors, particularly health and education. However, it cannot be regarded as a major policy shift, for the Taliban had allowed women to work in these sectors earlier during their first regime in the late 1990s.

Mr. Chandra underscored India’s broad-based role in Afghanistan, spanning two decades of developmental projects and aid delivery. He informed that between 2002 and 2021, India committed USD 3 billion in aid and assistance, making India the largest regional development partner of Afghanistan. India’s reconstruction assistance was multi-sectoral: education, health services, transportation, telecommunications, civil aviation, agriculture, irrigation, power generation & transmission, industry, and rural development. After the power shift in Kabul in August 2021, India quickly resumed humanitarian aid and relief assistance, dispatching 50,000 metric tonnes of wheat, 50 tonnes of essential medicine, and 28 tonnes of disaster relief assistance. India has also supplied 1100 units of female hygiene kits for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime female rehabilitation centres in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chandra added that India continued to annually allocate a budget of Rs. 200 crore for ‘Aid to Afghanistan’ through the financial years 2022–23, 2023–24, and 2024-25. The annual trade between the two countries stood at USD 889.85 million in 2022–23 and USD 997.74 million in 2023–24. As per the World Bank’s latest data, India remains the second-largest export market for Afghan products.

He further informed that educational ties continue through initiatives like the 1,000 online annual scholarships for Afghan students in undergraduate and postgraduate courses offered by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. The New Delhi-based South Asian University, through a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation initiative, continues to give admission and provide scholarships to Afghan students in postgraduate and doctoral courses.

In his concluding observations, Mr. Chandra stated that India must step up its people-centric engagement with Afghanistan to deal with the long-term impact of the changed political and security landscape in the country. He also highlighted the fact that none of India’s projects or diplomatic properties were harmed by the Taliban, underscoring the Taliban’s intent to normalise relations with New Delhi. He argued that the Taliban regime may not come across as a relatable entity or authority, but an independent Taliban is preferable to one exiled and under Pakistan’s tutelage. He noted that India’s development assistance and capacity building programmes facilitated engagement with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns. This outreach helped counter anti-India propaganda by certain state and non-state actors. India needs to constantly monitor and assess the evolving ground situation in Afghanistan.

Looking ahead, Mr. Chandra argued that if the engagement is to expand, then developments in Afghanistan will have to be viewed in its social-political context, which has been upended multiple times over the past five decades, to better deal with its layered complexities.

Questions and Comments

The presentation was followed by comments and questions from the floor, focussing on India’s national interests in Afghanistan; prospects of Indian investment in Afghanistan’s mineral resources and access to Afghan and Central Asian markets; and Taliban’s regional diplomacy. The approach of Central Asian Republics, particularly that of Tajikistan, and China’s growing engagement with the Taliban regime were also discussed.

The Speaker, Mr. Chandra, responded to the questions and comments from the MP-IDSA scholars.

Report prepared by Ms Puspa Kumari, Intern, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey, Associate Fellow, spoke on “An Overview of China’s Cognitive Warfare Capabilities” at the Monday Morning Meeting. The session was chaired by Dr. M.S. Prathibha, Associate Fellow and was followed by insightful remarks by the Director General MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other scholars.

Executive Summary

Research about cognitive warfare is increasing in China. Through cognitive operations, China aims to control brains of the target population primarily by means of digital platforms, thereby influencing the decision making of the target country. As China aims to increase its diplomatic clout and geopolitical standing, Chinese military scholars are vigorously researching on means and ways to develop cognitive warfare capabilities. Given the increasing applications of non-kinetic warfare in contemporary times, China is building its cognitive operation capabilities considering it as the highest form of non-kinetic warfare. Taiwan and Hong Kong remain two important testing grounds of China’s cognitive warfare capabilities.

Detailed Report

The session began with brief introductory remarks by Dr. Prathibha. She noted that Chinese researchers and academics for a longtime have been interested in warfare capabilities in the cognitive domain that can be used in warfare and have been closely studying the United States’ (US) cognitive warfare capabilities since the 1990s. Highlighting that cognitive warfare is often confused with information warfare and psychological warfare, she contended that both China and the US make a distinction among these concepts and apply them accordingly. Cognitive warfare is primarily understood as attempts to affect the cognition of the enemy and make them take actions that are not in their interests.

Dr. Darbey’s presentation consisted of two parts. In the first part he explained the concept of cognitive warfare. He noted information, cyber, and psychological warfare are subsets of cognitive warfare. For instance, information warfare is the attack and destruction of the adversary’s information system and gaining advantage over the enemy’s information system. On the other hand, cyberwarfare deals with attacks on the physical network of a particular organization to disrupt their activities. However, cognitive warfare targets the brain and combines cyber, information, psychological and social engineering capabilities of mind that alter the adversary’s cognitive process and exploit their mental biases.

Elaborating on the difference, Dr. Darbey noted that the key difference between cognitive, information and psychological warfare is that unlike the other forms of warfare, cognitive warfare operates on weaponisation of neuroscience that intends to control the brain through environmental stimulation. Also, cyber and information technologies make cognitive warfare very fast and powerful. He highlighted that subjects such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology, artificial intelligence, nano technology, biotechnology and information technology are part of cognitive science.

He observed that the initiator decides the plan and strategy about cognitive warfare according to the interest and goal they want to achieve. Accordingly, there are three kinds of cognitive warfare; First is the strategic cognitive warfare which is a long-term systematic influence operation carried out on the cognition of the targeted group to subvert or control the politico-economic system, military power or ideological orientation of a country. The second is campaign cognitive warfare which is undertaken for a medium time period, targeting the social cognition of the population to primarily disrupt the social solidarity of the enemy country. Finally, there is tactical cognitive warfare which is a short-term attack on the target population to mislead and manipulate political views. Further, the implementation of cognitive warfare is a five-step process; first is intelligence collection, second is target analysis, third is decision-making, fourth is information design and the last is evaluation.

Moving to the second part of his presentation, that is, China’s cognitive warfare capabilities, Dr. Darbey contended that this is a new domain for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its capabilities are at a nascent stage compared to that of the other major powers like the US and Russia. He argued that the PLA intends to use  cognitive warfare as an invisible hand to control the opponent’s will as Chinese researchers talk about four tactics to control the adversary’s mind, that is, perception manipulation, changing the historical memory and imposing new values on the target population, changing the line of thought and finally deconstructing symbols and challenging identity. Also, it is noteworthy that while earlier writings in PLA focussed on using cognitive warfare capabilities only to affect adversaries’ decision-making during war, present scholarship has turned towards discussing ways to utilise cognitive warfare capabilities in peacetime.

With regard to the theoretical basis of China’s cognitive warfare, Dr. Darbey noted that it is based on Sun Tzu’s Art of War and I Ching: Book of Changes. These two texts have been the basis of the ‘Three Warfare Doctrine’ adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2005. Notably, the doctrine mentions cognitive warfare. Further, in 2010 when the document was revisited, the amended version instructed that the PLA members will have to train in three warfares, that is, develop a discursive power where the CCP will have the power to influence the target audience, control narratives and improve one’s own version of facts.

Elaborating on PLA’s approach to cognitive warfare, he observed that Chinese military scholars contend that PLA’s offensive potential is greater than originally assessed. At present PLA has been using intimidation and disinformation as part of its cognitive warfare and key PLA units directly under the Central Military Commission including PLA Information Support Force are responsible for cognitive warfare operations. Similarly, within the government, the State Security Department, Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for cognitive warfare.

Dr. Darbey concluded his presentation by stating that China’s cognitive warfare projects are still in the initial stages as Beijing is in the process of developing its ‘Network Information System’ by means of its newly established PLA Information Support Force (PLA ISF) which will be able to acquire, transmit and assess massive amounts of data required to conduct cognitive warfare. Further, as Beijing aims to expand its domain of cognitive warfare, the study of metaverse will play a key role in strengthening China’s cognitive warfare capabilities.

Following the presentation, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director-General, MP-IDSA, observed that cognitive warfare has been employed for generations and is becoming increasingly relevant in the present era, characterized by a world that has imploded, globalized, and interconnected through unparalleled data flows. As we progress towards artificial intelligence, the complexity will continue to escalate. Referring to Japan's cognitive warfare against its own citizens, he contended that it remains one of the most exemplary instances of cognitive warfare, perpetrated not by an adversary but by one's own system. Amb. Chinoy noted that America also used cognitive warfare against China to bring about change in their political system. He concluded his remarks by highlighting that currently a lot of cognitive warfare is at play, especially as being witnessed in the Ukraine and Gaza War.

Q & A Session

As the floor was opened for questions scholars queried about the possible parameters that are used to assess the success and failure of cognitive influence operations in Hong Kong and Taiwan; lessons China was adopting from the Ukraine war and how technology controls could affect China’s cognitive warfare capabilities. Scholars also queried about the difference between cognitive and psychological warfare, means to identify cognitive warfare and counter measures that can be used to combat such operations.

Report was prepared by Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA.

Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia,” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important player in the West Asian region. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been shaped by a number of factors including its perception of national security, regional stability, geopolitical developments in its neighbourhood and its ambition to play a leadership role in the region. It has established strategic partnerships and alliances with important regional and global powers in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As the situation in the West Asian region continues to remain tense, it has adopted a more pragmatic and cautious approach in its foreign policy.

Detailed Report

In her introductory remarks, Dr. Saraswat observed that the Gulf States are emerging as key power brokers in the Arab world. She reflected on Saudi Arabia’s target of achieving Vision 2030 goals and its navigating through the regional order which saw changes from a ‘militaristic turn’ of intervention against the Houthis in Yemen, and involvement in Syria to a preference for de-escalation with key players including Turkey and Iran, and normalisation efforts with Israel, which have been complicated by the ongoing Israel-Palestine war. Further, Dr. Saraswat also commented on the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s interactions with external powers and increasing engagement of the Gulf States with China.

In his presentation, Dr. Pradhan highlighted that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile. The region suffered significantly during the Arab unrest with protests and regime changes. The region has always remained prone to external intervention. But recently, the Abraham Accords and Saudi-Iran rapprochement have been positive developments with potential for further cooperation. The Israel-Hamas War and the involvement of Houthis and Hezbollah have further complicated the regional situation. The whole region has become even more volatile since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War and its spillover effect in the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, involvement of Iran, Lebanon and the neighbourhood along with significant involvement of Hamas, Houthis and Hezbollah.

Dr. Pradhan noted that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional powers has been a pivotal determinant in the regional order in West Asia. After decades of hostility, both the countries signed an agreement in March 2023 that restored their diplomatic ties. However, both states have serious differences when it comes to regional security in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia vouches for a Western security architecture in the Gulf. On the contrary, Iran believes that the regional security framework of the region should be controlled by the regional players only and perceives the American military presence in the West Asian region as a threat. He also stated that Turkiye and Israel, the two other major non-Arab players in the region also have a major influence in the region.

Dr. Pradhan outlined that when it came to the Israel-Palestine issue, Riyadh’s position has undergone a significant change over the decades. The Saudi-Israeli talks to explore the normalisation of relations between them is an indication of Saudi Arabia’s changing perception towards Israel. However, since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War, Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel until an independent Palestinian state is established. Saudi Arabia supports the Arab Peace Initiative which proposes a two-state solution with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.

Yemen has always been a major concern for Saudi Arabia since it has a long and porous border and the former has also mostly been a very unstable state with presence of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Houthi capture of Sana’a was a red line for the Kingdom since Riyadh believes that the group is backed by Iran. Thus, Houthis presence on the Saudi-Yemeni border is an obvious national security threat for the Saudis. Houthis have launched several attacks on Saudi Arabia including sensitive infrastructure such as airports and oil installations.

Dr. Pradhan noted that Saudi Arabia’s position towards Bashar Al- Assad in Syria has also undergone a change. There has been a gradual course correction in recent years with the intent of engaging with the Assad regime and bringing Syria back to the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia has adopted mediation as a foreign policy tool. The Kingdom has mediated between different factions in Palestine, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan and for prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine.

There has been a significant change in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy thinking since Mohammed bin Salman became the Crown Prince. The Kingdom has been making efforts to improve its global image by undertaking a number of social reforms including improvement in the human rights situation.

Dr. Pradhan argued that when it comes to Saudi-US relations, there have been many ups and downs. Bilateral ties have been interdependent and strategic in nature, with defence and security being given a significant focus. But Biden Administration’s stopping of arms supply to Riyadh at a time when the Kingdom was fighting a war against the Houthis became a major irritant for Saudi Arabia. He outlined that when the oil prices were crashing, in the middle of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries were severely hit by the loss of revenues. The OPEC and non-OPEC oil-producing countries came together to form the OPEC+. As a major non-OPEC oil producer, Russia also played a big role in the oil market and forged close cooperation with Saudi Arabia.  This energy cooperation between the Russia and Saudi Arabia was perceived as having the potential to change the global oil market and growing Saudi-Russia cooperation. Saudi Arabia maintains a neutral position in the Russia-Ukraine War.

Dr. Pradhan stated that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China is also growing significantly. Saudi-China ties are mainly propelled by bilateral trade and energy as China is a key importer of Saudi crude. There is a mutual convergence of interests between the two countries, as Saudi Arabia has expressed its support for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China has expressed its support for Saudi Vision 2023.

With reference to India-Saudi Arabia bilateral relations, Dr. Pradhan stated that both countries are strategic partners and are moving beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship. Total bilateral trade between the two stands at approximately US$ 45 billion and Saudi Arabia is also a source of energy for India. West Asia is India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ and Saudi Arabia is an important country in India’s ‘Think West’ policy. Both the countries have a convergence of interests in fighting terrorism, extremism and piracy. The signing of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to further enhance connectivity between the two countries.

Dr. Pradhan concluded by stating that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile and tense; and thus Saudi Arabia has recalibrated its approach accordingly. It is gradually adopting a more accommodative and pragmatic foreign policy approach in recent years than ever in the past.

Questions and Comments

Scholars at MP-IDSA engaged in a question and answer session that focused on US-Saudi relations, Russia’s support to the Houthis, China-Saudi Arabia collaboration to produce military drones, prospects of the IMEC project, potential of India-Saudi defence cooperation and the Saudi policy towards the Syrian Crisis. Dr. Pradhan provided insightful responses to the questions and comments from the floor.

Report was prepared by Ms. Sandra Sajeev D Costa, Intern, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.