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Title	Date	Author	Time	Event	Body	Research Area	Topics	File attachments	Image
The Future of the Peace Process in Nepal	August 07, 2009	Nihar R. Nayak	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: K V Rajan Discussants: Ashok Mehta and Siddarth Varadarajan	South Asia	Nepal
Will Japan go Nuclear?	July 31, 2009	Reshmi Kazi	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Rajaram Panda Discussants: J Madan Mohan and Sitakanta Mishra The tremendous transformation in the strategic and security environment of Japan in the last decade has once again influenced the nuclearization debate in the country. North Korea’s second nuclear test followed by the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009 and the subsequent launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, has prompted widespread speculation on Japan’s principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament. The international community is worried whether Japan will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire a nuclear capability. In this paper, the author makes an effort to analyze circumstances under which Japan might consider crossing the nuclear Rubicon. An attempt is also been made to trace the nuclearization debate which has resurfaced in Japan periodically when the national interest seems is threatened. The Japanese position on the nuclear weapons option has been ambivalent. Japan has never made any official decision on whether or not to exercise the nuclear option. Still its pacifist constitution clearly deters the state from maintaining land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential. The right of state belligerency too has been denied in the Japanese constitution. The constitution’s stance on nuclear arms, however, remains ambiguous and it has led many pro-nuclear advocates to debate the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Although the Constitution may be interpreted to allow for possession of nuclear weapons, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 clearly emphasizes the essence of Japan’s policy in maintaining a peaceful, transparent nuclear programme. Besides, Japan has also adopted the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ expressing the policy of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This position was reiterated in 1976 when it ratified the NPT and committed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. However, though the validity of these principles has been upheld by successive cabinets, the degree of restraint that these principles place on Japan’s nuclear policy remains uncertain. Most importantly, they do not represent a legal restraint, because Diet resolutions are passed as an expression of the will of the chamber and are non-binding. Further, over the years, allegations have been made regarding the violation of the third principle of the three non-nuclear principles right from the Cold War period. Still, the support for a robust nuclear weapon policy has not gained enough momentum and Japan continues to remain committed to an anti-nuclear policy. The dynamic changes in the regional and security areas of Japan have deeply influenced the revival of the nuclear debate in Tokyo. Due to factors like the expanding nuclear programme of China and North Korea; the failure of the Six Party Talks; growing suspicion among the Japanese people over the credibility of the U.S nuclear umbrella; the increasing proximity of U.S.-China bilateral relations, etc., there has emerged an open debate within Japan about whether it should adopt the policy of nuclear disarmament. At present, many security analysts are of the view that Japan may go nuclear within the next ‘ten to fifteen years’. According to the author, Japan might compromise its principled stand on nuclear armament if the following scenarios unfold: the weakening of the US-Japan alliance; a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan; a war in the Korean Peninsula; a reunified nuclear Korea; a North Korean nuclear test; Chinese nuclear expansion; U.S. withdrawal from the region; possible breakdown of the NPT; rise of a new generation of nationalistic Japanese politicians; China’s response to a sudden collapse of North Korea. Although some of the above scenarios are extreme, they cannot be disregarded altogether by Japan. While explaining the implications for India, the author states that Japan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons will be a major setback for the NPT. States like India who are not part of the NPT because of its discriminatory nature will be demoralized to uphold the principles and obligations of the treaty which it has done so far. According to the author, in order to avoid nuclearization of Japan, a comprehensive and prioritized plan is required. As part of the plan, following measures should be adopted: the US must provide clear assurances of its security umbrella for Japan; efforts should be made for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue; measures should also be made to establish regional organizations for security and trade, facilitating greater cooperation and mitigating distrust among Asian countries; and above all, the U.S. and the other NPT members must take initiatives to strengthen the NPT regimes so that all countries feel secure in it including Japan. Points raised during discussion: If Japan decides to go nuclear, it has to deal with two main hurdles: i) it has to revise domestic laws and conventions related to Japan’s stance on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which is going to be quite complicated; ii) it also has to withdraw from the NPT, a step which will definitely be against Japan’s national interest. There has occurred an attitudinal shift in the current nuclear debate in Japan. Although the Japanese population is considered to be suffering from the so-called ‘nuclear allergy’, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has called for active discussion of possible nuclear weapons option. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which is projected to be the virtual winner of the upcoming August 30 general election in Japan, has also talked about a ‘radical revision’ of the Japan-U.S. Security alliance and advocated an independent security policy for Japan. Even if Japan decides to pursue the nuclear option, it will probably do so with the tacit support of the U.S. The U.S. will inevitably reduce its involvement in Asia over the longer term. It will eventually lead Japan to think seriously about its nuclear option for national security. Engagement in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan won’t make the U.S. compromise its security pact with Japan. It is true that Japan has not gone nuclear yet. However, the real question is how long Japan can prevent itself from going nuclear. In the near future, Japan will probably decide to keep its nuclear option ambiguous, as it will enhance its bargaining power with the West, particularly the U.S. Yukiya Amano of Japan is the new chief of the IAEA. His election will probably intensify the gap between Japan’s ardent support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on the one hand, and Japan’s aspiration to go nuclear for national security reasons on the other hand. In terms of method and theory, the paper could be expanded in scope. Instead of a one-dimensional approach, it should adopt a multidimensional approach in drawing the scenarios. In the paper, the author has identified the scenarios assuming that Japan will go nuclear in the near future. Instead, she should build scenarios keeping in mind different possibilities in terms of outcomes. Most of the scenarios drawn by the author are not realistic enough. The bilateral security arrangement between Japan and the U.S. is still going strong. China has been a security threat to Japan throughout its history. Contrary to assumptions made by security analysts regarding the nuclear issue of North Korea provoking Japan to go nuclear, the North is still not considered such a big threat by most Japanese. Only the hawks in Japan offer the excuse of China and North Korea to discuss Japan’s nuclear option. Instead of offering ten different scenarios, most of which are not ‘realistic’ enough, the author should concentrate on four or five ‘most probable’ scenarios. The paper is very light with respect to the implications for India. The author needs to take into account the contributions of the strong anti-nuclear movements (especially the hibakusha movements) within Japan. In the paper, the author mentions that the constitution of Japan does not talk about nuclear weapons. However, Japan’s Defence White Paper 2008 interprets that the constitution bans possessions of WMDs, ICBMs and fighter bombers. The author needs to discuss the anti-nuclear culture within Japan. The paper needs to analyze the positions of major political parties (particularly the LDP and DPJ) over the nuclear issue in the last few decades, their stances on the same issue before and after the upcoming election in August. The author needs to categorize the scenarios into two parts: one, Japan going nuclear and the second, Japan maintaining an ambiguous position on the nuclear issue. As for public opinion, instead of concentrating on the present situation alone, the author should analyze public opinion on nuclear issues over the last two or three decades. The author needs to discuss in detail the domestic compulsions which are driving Japan’s path to nuclearization. Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	East Asia	Japan, Nuclear
Understanding Chinese Perceptions of India	July 31, 2009	Manjeet S Pardesi	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Rajiv Sikri Discussants: Srikanth Kondapalli and Rajeswari Rajagopalan The objective of this is paper is to understand the China’s strategic perception of India. To do so the author Manjeet S Pardesi divides the paper in two broad sections. In first he analyses the validity of the arguments of two prominent scholars who are of the view that there exists an asymmetry of mutual perceptions between India and China. The author then identifies problems in their arguments. In the second section he goes on to show that the Sino-Indian rivalry is not quite one sided and asymmetrical as often claimed and believed to be. It is asymmetric only to the extent that India regards China as its “principal rival”, and China regards India as its “strategic rival”. The author then puts forward four prominent themes which, according to him, shape China’s perception of India. He concludes by arguing that, contrary to popular belief, India has always been on the strategic radar of China and that its recent economic rise has only accentuated Chinese security concerns vis-à-vis India. The first section begins with Susan Shirk’s argument. According to Shirk the focus of Chinese strategic and military planning continues to be East Asia- in Taiwan Straits and in South China Sea rather than India. The Chinese don’t see India as any kind of strategic threat. The author points out three problems with Shirk’s one sided rivalry theory. First Shirk does not define what she means by the concept of rivalry. Consequently, she conflates the notions of “strategic rivalry” and “principal rivalry”. Second, she does not give adequate consideration to the assessment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including that of China’s military analysts and their perceptions of India. Thirdly, she does not attempt to adequately understand the nature of the Sino-Pakistani “entente cordiale” and the reasons behind China’s proliferation of strategic technologies to Pakistan. Based on these three points, the author argues that China is far more concerned about its security vis-à-vis India than argued by Shirk John W. Garver is the second scholar whose arguments are examined by the author in the paper. According to Garver China appears dismissive of any security challenge from India even as India perceives a serious threat from its northern neighbor. He supports his analysis based on two forms of evidence. Firstly he shows that China’s public Media and journals have systematically downplayed Indian threats to China’s security while opposite is the case with Indian Journals. And Secondly, he argues that the status quo – defined as the outcome of China’s invasion of Tibet, the outcome of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, and the Sino-Pakistani entente – all favor China. Consequently, China does not perceive a serious security threat from India. These arguments, according to Garver, point towards the existence of asymmetrical threat perception between India and China. The author is of the view that Garver’s analysis of Sino-Indian mutual perceptions by demonstrating “asymmetrical coverage” in foreign policy journals is inadequate to prove the existence of an asymmetry of threat perception between the two. After demonstrating that there exist flaws in the arguments which point towards the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between the two countries, the author comes out with his own findings. The author is of the view that today China’s emerging perception of India is guided and influenced by four prominent themes. They are namely strategic implications of India’s economic growth, Indo–U.S and Indo–Japanese strategic partnerships, India’s Look East strategy and India’s growing military power. In sum it is the author emphasizes that recent Chinese analyses of the rise of India’s growing economic strength, military capabilities, and diplomatic relationships has fundamentally led to a new image of India in China. While India was perceived in the context of the status of Tibet, Sino-Indian border issues, and the security situation in the subcontinent in the past, recent analyses of India regard it as a growing strategic player in Asia and beyond. This does not mean that the older issues have become unimportant. Instead, it means that the Chinese have begun to seriously acknowledge India’s growing strategic profile and its impact on the security architecture of Asia. Points Raised During Discussion While evaluating the Chinese perceptions of India, the roles of the institutional actors in the Chinese establishment are very important. The significant institutions in this regard are the Politbureau Standing Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Liberation Army and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. In China apart from the Realist and Neo-Realist School of thought on Sino-Indian relations, there is also a growth of Constructivist School of thought which looks at Sino-Indian relations from a “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” perspective. The author is advised to look into the arguments of more scholars before drawing a conclusion. Consulting one or two samples might lead to a wrong or one sided conclusion. The author needs to incorporate more official Chinese views to substantiate his arguments. Moreover, sources like the PLA Daily and Chinese language articles on the same topic should also be included in the paper to make the findings more authentic. While the author promises to bring out the Chinese perceptions of India based on a “Socio-Psychological process”, the arguments used are realist and neo-realist in nature. The author should include more Indian authors and their perceptions of China rather than giving emphasis to American authors. India’s stand on Tibet needs to be elaborated in the paper as it would be difficult to understand the Chinese perceptions of India without understanding it. The author has devoted almost half of his paper to refute the arguments of two scholars. Instead, he should focus more on the main theme of the paper. Prepared by Sandeep Anand, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	East Asia	India, India-China Relations, China
Changing Nature of Insurgency in Northeast and Role of Bangladesh	July 24, 2009	Anand Kumar	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Rajaram Panda Discussants: J N Roy and K Srinivasan The paper analyzes the ongoing insurgency in the North East and argues that the nature of insurgency in the region is changing due to the alliance between Islamist terror and local insurgent groups. Indian insurgent groups seem to be a tactical tool in the hands of the ISI to fulfill its long-term objectives. These outfits seem to be losing autonomy of action and act more at the behest of outside powers. The paper contends that Pakistan and its external intelligence agency the ISI have used Indian Insurgent Groups as a potent tool to penetrate North Eastern states and that the ISI wants to achieve its own objectives through these groups. ISI has been involved in funding, training and arming these rebel groups in order to keep India’s hand tied. Despite the independence of Bangladesh an interesting conformity has been seen in Pakistani and Bangladeshi discourses towards the North East. The meetings of Islamic parties in Bangladesh and closed door groups of their counterparts in Assam regularly talk of Greater Bangladesh. The active support to illegal migrants by BDR and Bangladeshi authorities is well known. The entry of Islamists has made the insurgency in the northeast far more complex. Now over a dozen Muslim extremist organizations exist in the North East with an estimated strength of 3,500 volunteers. Most have mushroomed in Assam. They are not indulging in violence but carrying out recruitment, sending youth for training to Bangladesh and Pakistan, dumping weapons and explosives and creating support structures along the border. Based on interrogations of arrested Muslim militants, a former chief minister tabled a report in the Assam assembly, revealing that large numbers of Muslim youth from Assam were being trained by the ISI and the DGFI (Bangladesh intelligence) to destabilize Assam and facilitate illegal immigration. Islamists have been a major tactical tool in the hands of forces inimical to India. HuJI had tried to present itself as a Messiah for the migrant Bangladeshi population with the start of the Bodo-Muslim clashes in Assam. Though, the ISI and the DGFI have astutely managed to cow down the indigenous population through the ULFA and the NDFB. The migratory pressure is likely to worsen the conflict. From August to October 2008, a series of clashes took place between Bodos and Muslims. Clashes also erupted between Rabhas and Muslims. The general assessment was that motives behind these attacks were anti-immigrant sentiment, which run deep in Assamese politics. But it was also felt that pressure on land and occupation was also an important issue. Bodos say that migrants have taken 37 per cent of tribal land and the government has given them pattas. The population of Bangladeshi migrants has also increased phenomenally. In the North East mobilization along communal lines is going on because of the activities of SIMI, Tablighi Jamaat and Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind. In fact, fourteen similar organizations supported the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF), an exclusivist Muslim formation which contested both national as well as state assembly elections. Though formed a few months before the assembly election, the AUDF bagged the third largest number of votes capturing 10 assembly seats. The lesson from Assam seems to be that despite a fragmented polity, there is sufficient consolidation of Muslim votes behind an unapologetically Muslim political outfit to ensure electoral victory despite a very high overall voter turnout. In its private confabulations, the party envisions itself as the political rallying point for Bangladeshi Muslims. The security implications of political Islam in a region with over 30 per cent Muslim population is dangerous for the future of the state. The risk lies in Assam becoming a Muslim majority state in the future. The ISI, DGFI and the Islamists are bound to exploit this in the days to come. The government’s hands are tied as the ISI has managed to activate smaller outfits like the DHD (J) to cause mayhem. They are not able to give adequate attention to these undercurrents which are taking place in pockets dominated by Bangladeshi migrants. This has made many security analysts believe that an Islamic fundamentalist upsurge would pose a much bigger challenge to the state than the three-decade-old insurgency spearheaded by the banned ULFA. It is possible that militancy in Assam may be hijacked by these elements and IIGs. It is also felt that a similar fate awaits all Northeastern states. For the time being, Islamists have chosen to use groups like the ULFA, NDFB and ATTF as a short term tactical tool in the fulfillment of their long-term objective. Discussion: One should focus on reliable sources for information. Sensitive topics should use tools of interrogation and interviews as data feeders. One has to be cautious that news agencies are susceptible to planted information and thus should be avoided. There is no linearity in the analysis and conclusions should take into account the diverse issues and responses of various actors. Ground realities need to be contextualized with the main argument of the paper. Need to take into account that SIMI and Tablighi Jamaat are not really active in the conflict areas. Any conclusions on the activities of SIMI need to be probed further. One needs to explore how ground realities in the North East are matching the intentions of the DGFI and the ISI. Meetings between North East insurgent groups and Islamic groups are leading to growing criminalization in the North East. One needs to explore the role of NGOs, who are increasingly being funded by Arab countries. One needs to look into the grievances of Muslims in the North East and explore the role of the DGFI in particular. The way the ISI works in Pakistan and DGFI in Bangladesh is remarkably different. The sources for the arguments need to be expanded. One needs to look into the political and ethnic dynamics in the North East before talking about the ISI’s role in the North East. Tablighi Jamaat should not be roped into the discussion as it is a Barelvi group and unlikely to be using radicalization as a tool. Joint Ventures/Meetings between other Northeastern groups and Islamic outfits need to be monitored closely. How sustainable would be the nexus between secessionist outfits and terrorist groups? The nature and objectives of the two are completely different. Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	South Asia	Bangladesh, Northeast India
Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War	July 17, 2009	Christopher Clary	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Brahma Chellaney Discussants: R R Subramanian and Sitakanta Mishra The main focus of this paper is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and for this purpose the secrecy of nuclear weapons is the most important aspect. However Clary presumes that even the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan may not have knowledge about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its placement plans. The paper seeks to collate, sort through, and organize the reams of publicly available information to provide a systematic assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus. It also attempts to examine the scenarios which are associated with various types of nuclear risks. After reviewing available evidence, the author concludes that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure. He examines three elements of Pakistan’s nuclear posture - that is peacetime, crisis and war and under these scenarios he probes the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The paper concludes by examining the policy implications that emerge from this analysis. The author examines in detail the scale and general disposition of Pakistan’s nuclear force, Pakistan’s nuclear command and control as well as role and importance of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). He elaborates how SPD sought to operationalize the deterrent after the 1998 nuclear tests and come to grips with the A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network even as it sought to ameliorate international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He also analyses the threats to the civilian nuclear apparatus in Pakistan. The author establishes a baseline that during peacetime, the system is reasonably secure, though the risk of “insider threats” is perhaps more pronounced than in other established nuclear weapons states. Describing the war time posture, the author discusses changes in nuclear risk factors in Pakistan. There is a corresponding increase in nuclear risk in the event of India-Pakistan crises. He points out three dangers associated with Pakistan nuclear arsenal during war time. First, there is a modest increase in the risk of an accident since Pakistan’s road infrastructure is poor and the traffic system is terrible. For the liquid-fueled missiles, the mobile platform would have to be accompanied by a highly flammable fuel. It appears likely that mobile launchers would be sent away from the forward edge of battle that means they would most likely be sharing the road with internally displaced people also moving away from combat. All of this contributes to the potential for accident in transport. Second, maintaining a communications link between the mobile launcher and the National Command Authority may prove difficult during an attack on command and control nodes. Third, there has been some concern about the security of mobile nuclear units, when they are away from the static and reinforced security provided at a fixed storage sites. Though Clary points out that this concern is overblown since any mobile launcher is likely to be accompanied by a large security team. He points out that a risky situation which is not completely under the control of central policymakers raises the most critical question, whether commanders of individual nuclear units either have the authority or the technical ability to launch weapons if they believe Pakistan’s nuclear redlines have been crossed. According to the author there is insufficient information today to definitively conclude one way or the other on this matter. In the last section, Clary examines how such a system would likely respond under the stresses of large-scale domestic instability or internal crisis. Distinguishing between different types of instability can assist with thinking about associated nuclear risks. He describes five different types of instability which can lead to associated nuclear risks. First, the most extreme form of risk would be the take over of Pakistan by radical Islamists, a scenario that Bruce Riedel has documented at length. Second, an internal coup within the Pakistani Army would result in Islamist officers overthrowing the more moderate current Army leadership. This is one route by which it can be imagined an Islamist Pakistan despite the fact there is no majority support for such a regime. Third, there might be an internal coup attempt or some sort of lower-level fracturing within the Pakistani officer corps. Lower-level officers of an Islamist bent, perhaps together or separately with ethnic Pashtuns, angered by support to the United States or Pakistan’s operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border might be able to launch a successful, localized mutiny. Fourth, Pakistan faces a sudden loss of territory to Islamic or separatist insurgents. Fifth, this is related to some sort of sudden, multifaceted state collapse. After describing these scenarios, Clary concludes that the current Pakistan command and control arrangement appears to be designed to confront the most plausible scenarios with regards to domestic instability in Pakistan. He suggests that the international community should continue efforts to stabilize Pakistan, in part so that scenarios that currently seem implausible, do not become more likely. Clary concludes his presentation by putting forward two recommendations, one to India and second to the United States. His recommendations appear to be guided by the concerns related to Pakistan’s reactions to Indian and American actions. He suggests Indian policy makers have a clear strategic vision on their broader strategic equations while making efforts to improve the accuracy of nuclear-capable missiles and programs to develop missile defenses. India must take into greater account Pakistan’s reactions to its technical developments and decisions. Clary also suggests to the United States that its officials must take into account Pakistan’s reactions to U.S. discussions about Islamabad’s nuclear stewardship. While acknowledging that US officials have taken the right tone, he points out that discussion about whether or not, there are U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario are remarkably unhelpful. Clary concludes his presentations on a cautious note that nuclear risks are shared risks and awareness of this interrelationship is one of the important consequences of the nuclear revolution. Points Raised during the discussion: It is difficult to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are in safe hands. Intent, motivation and capability of nuclear weapons are crucial factors which must be taken into consideration while discussing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its security. Sabotaging the nuclear installations in Pakistan may be possible. This danger cannot be ignored. Similarly dangers posed by a dirty bomb also exist. It is worth examining how Pakistan’s emergency response mechanism works. However the threat level should not be exaggerated. There is a need to identify grey areas in Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus. There should not be too much attention on Pakistan’s heavy water and natural uranium research reactor, Khushab. There could be a comparison between North Korea and Pakistan but Pakistan’s nuclear programme cannot be compared with Iran’s. Pakistan nuclear arsenal is India specific. The question remains how safe and secure is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has developed a code system which runs the risk of being decodified. It is important to understand that all is not well within the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in Pakistan. SPD is facing a lot of pressure to be staffed by politicians. The New establishment in Pakistan is planning to put its own people inside SPD. There is a power tussle within SPD. There is a poor security culture in Pakistan which is evident by the release of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. The situation in Pakistan cannot be brought under control. China factor has not been taken into consideration. The author should use interviews within Pakistan to obtain more data on the subject. It is very difficult to stop nuclear black marketing with laws and regulations. The paper should have mentioned the Special Forces Programme as well. The paper should highlight what are the fundamental problems in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a normal state, rather it is an abnormal state. There are fundamental challenges to Pakistan’s security, including radicalization both of society and even more importantly the military People implementing the Personal Reliability Programme in Pakistan seem to have a Jihadi mindset. In such a scenario personal reliability cannot work. Prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	Nuclear and Arms Control	Nuclear, Pakistan
Piracy in Somalia: Need to Address the Root Cause	July 17, 2009	Ruchita Beri	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Arvind Gupta Discussants: Subodh Malakar and Patrick Hoenig During the last one year Somalia has captured global attention, due to the surge in piracy off the Somali coast. Piracy off the Somali coast has had a severe commercial, global and regional impact. The piracy and the resultant dangers posed to international shipping has brought an array of naval deployments from various external actors, including, the United States, EU, Japan, China, South Africa and India. The pirate attacks have disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of Somalis and have had a negative impact on the economies of states neighbouring Somalia. Though piracy off the Somali coast is not a new phenomenon and has been going on since the beginning of the Somali civil war in the early 1990’s. The collapse of Said Barre’s government in 1991 ushered in a wave of illegal fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters. However, few years ago the incidence of piracy was quite limited. The statistics suggest that the incidence of piracy grew from less than five to thirty-five in 2005. In 2006 it declined to a mere ten incidents only to grow in 2007 to thirty-one pirate attacks. In 2008 the problem intensified with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reporting 134 acts of piracy. The pirates have been operating in small fast crafts and have used an array of firearms mainly from Yemen while attacking ships. Pirates are making full use of modern technologies such as mobile phones and Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and in some cases they have used mother ships to allow them a longer range. Currently, there are two main networks of pirates: one based in Puntland (north-eastern Somalia) comprising mainly members of the Majerteen clan, and others based in central Somalia, consisting primarily of members of the Habar Gidir clan. However, to an extent the two networks overlap and cooperate. Various factors have contributed to the rise of piracy off the Somali coast. These factors include: illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste, existence of busy sea lanes high rewards and ineffective security structure, Eritrea’s hostile relationship with Ethiopia and instability within Somalia. Several measures have been taken by the international community to prevent piracy. Since the beginning of 2008, the United Nations has issued several resolutions regarding piracy in Somali waters. The US is primarily involved through the deployment of its Naval and aerial units as part of the Combined Task Force CTF-151 under the command of US Navy Rear Admiral Terence Mcknight. In December 2008, France along with other states initiated Operation Atlanta - a joint naval and aerial operation to protect shipping off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. This year long operation involves 20 ships from Belgium, France, Britain, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Regional countries like Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been extensively involved in naval efforts. Apart from escorting the ships, Yemen is constructing, Global Maritime Distress Service Stations (GMDSS) in Hodeida and Aden. Similarly in a joint project with Italy Yemen is setting up a Vessel Tracking System (VTS) on a chain of bases along the coast that will considerably improve surveillance capabilities. Many Asian countries such as India, Japan, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia and Pakistan have dispatched their navies to the Gulf of Aden. However, Yemen remains the most consistent source of arms and military material to Somalia. Though the Yemeni government has introduced some curbs for arms sales in 2008. Thus, in finding a solution to the conflict in Somalia and consequently the piracy issue is for working towards reduction in tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The African Union (AU) and a panel of African elder statesmen in particular should gently push the two countries towards a dialogue. The international community should intensify its efforts in securing the AU’s early deployment of the African Standby force. Points in the Discussion: Need to develop a frame work of cooperation at the regional level to prevent piracy, because regional cooperation is important to strengthening anti-piracy efforts in Somalia. Efforts should be made to stem financial flows. Unfortunately most non- state actors supporting the pirates and the Islamists have followed the informal route of Hawala, creating logistical problems. Need to examine cultural linkages between pirates and Islamist groups. Report suggests more than 70 percent of Somalis support pirates. Conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also contributing to emergence of piracy in Somalia as well as in the region. Need to focus Yemeni people’s role in supplying arms and extending cooperation to Somali pirates. What isn’t the Yemeni government curbing support to Somali pirates? There is a need to set up central authority to resolve the problems of piracy. Need to focus UN resolution regarding piracy Need to examine Somali concerns regarding India’s support to prevent piracy in the African region. Emphasis should be given on China’s involvement in the region. Why does Eritrea support Islamist groups in Somalia? Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN	Piracy, Somalia
Piracy, Maritime Terror and Policy Response	July 10, 2009	Rajaram Panda	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Amb. Arjun Asrani Discussants: Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra In recent years, piracy and terrorism on high seas are posing serious threats to international security and economic development. With increasing interdependence, the use of sea route for transportation has become vital. In this paper, Dr. Panda addresses three main issues: piracy with focus on Somalia and the Gulf of Eden; terrorism impacting trade through Malacca Straits; and policy response of the countries whose trade is adversely affected by sea piracy and terrorism. According to Dr. Panda, there exists a very thin line between an act of terrorism and piracy, primarily because both acts are undertaken to achieve private ends. Still, there are certain factors which distinguish piracy from terrorism. In terms of ends, while piracy is usually driven by financial gains, terrorism is politically motivated. The line between the two, however, is still blurred because terrorists could acquire funding for their political ends through piracy – tactically piractical, but strategically terrorist. In terms of means, while pirates are usually associated with basic tactics (e.g, boarding, theft, use of force or violence), terrorists usually aim at achieving a strategic effect. Today, piracy and maritime terrorism are no longer considered discrete. In fact, there is a complex piracy-terrorism continuum. Dr. Panda states that both piracy and terrorism have made the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait region highly insecure. The Indian Ocean is home to many choke points, such as the Straits of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca, Lombok and the Sunda Straits. Any disruption in traffic flow through these points can result in grave and disastrous consequences. As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned – the sea route transiting it and Singapore is the busiest in the world – 25 percent of world trade passes through this route every year. The criticality of the Malacca Strait is further reinforced by the increase in global economic interdependence and the consequent increase in the volume of mercantile traffic transiting the Strait. Terrorism and piracy have begun to engage the global community, especially due to the rise in fundamentalist forces after 9/11 and 26/11 attacks in the US and Mumbai, respectively. The importance of container security to maritime terrorism was particularly felt after the US Navy’s discovery of a group of al-Qaeda terrorists hiding inside a well equipped shipping container in January 2002. While the US is engaged in its search for terrorists and their personification in al-Qaeda on land, the prospect of a terror ship used by the al-Qaeda terrorizing the maritime arena continues to threaten tranquility at sea. After the recent 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai, guarding sea lanes and territorial waters has become new priorities of naval forces of many countries. Piracy in the Malacca Straits has historically been an unresolved threat to ship owners and mariners who ply the 900 kilometer long sea lane. The geography of the Strait makes the region very susceptible to piracy. During 1991-2001, nearly 2375 incidents of piracy were registered across the world, with South and Southeast Asia registering the highest number of incidents. The Indian Ocean area too has been invaded with merchant vessels that are suspected to belong to terrorist organizations such as the LTTE and al-Qaeda. In fact, the LTTE is suspected to own an entire flotilla engaged in dubious maritime trade. As the checking mechanism in place is flawed and entangled in legal matters, such ships are considered safe for engaging in terrorist-related activities. The Indian Ocean region is notorious for narco-terrorism as well. It is also widely believed that oil leakage at sea might create havoc with the ecology in the maritime environment which would ultimately affect maritime security. The recent spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has generated a great deal of international media attention. Somalia’s modern pirates represent not only a very real menace to maritime security, but also a growing threat to international commerce. The sensational nature of their crimes, while drawing the ire of the international community, has also ensured that the Somali pirates remain shrouded in mystery. According to Dr. Panda, instances of piracy around the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates have increased in recent years basically because of the absence of an effective government in Somalia. In 2008, piracy off the Somalian coast has more than doubled. So far, over 60 ships have been attacked. Hijacking ships for ransom is a new model. By most estimates, the pirates took in around $30 million in 2008, although actual figures may be many times this amount. Kenya in fact claims that the pirates collected over $150 million in ransom in 2008 alone. The increased threat of maritime piracy has heightened the shipping industry’s financial concerns in the context of the current global economic recession. There is consensus in the international community that maritime terrorism and piracy ought to be addressed with urgency. The misuse of sophisticated technology by pirates and non-state actors calls for continuous up-gradation of technology to counter those engaged in terrorist activities. However, despite increased naval presence by major powers, patrolling one million square kilometres of open sea has so far proved to be a major challenge. The existing international law governing territorial waters also place legal constraints on countries capable of checking maritime terrorism. Though the UN has intervened to check the piracy menace, it has not been very effective. Still a number of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral security initiatives pursued so far have been able to become regionally successful in tackling maritime threats. Malaysia has embarked upon several regional maritime security initiatives, including the establishment of SEARCCT (Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism) and hosting the IBM’s regional piracy centre. Singapore, being the most vulnerable state to any major piracy attack or maritime terrorist act, gives utmost priority in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for navigation in regional waterways. There are other regional powers as well, like the US, Japan, China and India whose interests are intrinsically embedded with littoral states like Malaysia and Singapore. In view of the overreaching security and economic interests of all trading nations, a collective security mechanism involving littorals and extra-regional players to share the burden of policing the Malacca Straits through capacity-building, intelligence and sharing of financial resources, and technology transfers seems to be the sine qua non for any attempt to securing the SLOCs. It transpires that regional actors have their own agendas and compulsions to deal with issues of piracy and maritime terrorism. For example, Japan’s economic interests are so huge that bolstering SLOC security is of top most foreign policy priority at the moment. Elsewhere, domestic political interests may be a factor in determining a country’s approach towards regional maritime security cooperation. There may be countries like China with great power ambition which might propel them to enhance their maritime profile. Unless a coordinated approach among countries in the region is adopted, the coming decades might see a fierce battle in the maritime security ‘chess game’ that seems to be pregnant with unpredictable consequences in shaping the geopolitics of the region. Point raised during the discussion: The issues of piracy and terrorism should be dealt with separately. At the same time, a clear distinction between the two terms should also be made. The author needs to update some of the data he has provided in the paper. Although in case of policy response, the author basically concentrated on the Japanese government’s policy, the title of the paper does not indicate a case study of that country. While the paper gives a lot of information on piracy, maritime terrorism does not seem to be given so much importance. It is necessary to take into account how state failure led to poor governance in Somalia. The paper needs to address extensively the issue of capacity building to deal with piracy and maritime terrorism. The author needs to take into account the following differences between piracy and terrorism: i)While terrorism has a political goal, piracy does not; ii) Terrorism is basically land based while piracy is sea based; iii) Terrorists basically target state apparatus, but pirates do not involve in such activities. The author has mentioned that terrorists may use piracy as a means to acquire money. This point needs to be elaborated. Whether piracy leads to statelessness in Somalia or vice versa needs to be analyzed. The author also needs to analyze why the Malacca Strait is less prone to piracy than Gulf of Aden. Analysis needs to be made on the legal constraints in resolving piracy and maritime issues. The author needs to take into account the military solution to piracy. The author talked about the linkage between the Al-Shabab, a Muslim terrorist group and Somali pirates. But such a linkage is yet to be confirmed. Although it has been mentioned that pirates do not usually have a political agenda, some pirates in Nigeria do have political goals, i.e., to bring about reforms in Nigeria. The author needs to elaborate the policy difference between various agencies and governments in dealing with piracy. Since the author has extensively talked about piracy in Somalia, he should consider making it a case study in the paper. The LTTE case is dominant in the paper. So much emphasis on that terrorist group is not necessary as it can no longer be considered a significant terrorist group. China’s growing naval presence needs to be taken into account. The author should extensively deal with the steps China has taken in response to piracy. The author needs to elaborate upon how money gets transferred from pirates to terrorists, and if there actually exists a linkage between piracy and terrorism. Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	East Asia	Maritime Security, Piracy, Somalia, Terrorism
Security Implications of Climate Change for India	April 16, 2008		1030 to 1300 hrs	Workshop	Background Climate change and its consequences are being increasingly viewed as the foremost problem of the 21st century. Climate change challenges at the national, regional and global level are hugely demanding and interconnected and have obvious implications in terms of human security. Significantly and depending on the nature of the changes and other relevant factors, climate change could also lead to interstate and/or intrastate conflicts. In order to assess the role of climate related factors, particularly in the context of our region, and to provide greater clarity about the potential sources of instability/conflict in the future, IDSA organised a national workshop on climate change in September 2008. As a preparatory exercise, a run up workshop was organised on April 16, 2008. Climate change has multidisciplinary dimensions and as noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Report of 2007, it can accentuate conditions of resource scarcity and environmental degradation. In turn these could create fissures in the international system. The resultant challenges are shortages of water, food grains, and loss of biodiversity, collapse of ecosystems and frequent disasters and migration. The climate change debate and negotiations have been marked by north-south divide. The industrialised developed countries tend to securitise climate change so as to apply pressure on developing countries to cap greenhouse gas emissions. The developing countries, on the other hand, want the issue to be addressed principally from an economic and social perspective under the UN General Assembly and not the Security Council. What should be India’s approach? Does climate change create security problems for India? Will it become a critical driver in our relations with the neighbouring countries? Will there be implications of climate change for internal security? The scope of the workshop was to understand the geopolitical dimensions of climate change and implications for India and was framed to deliberate on how to intensify research work in order to influence debates in international fora and thus to protect our own legitimate interests. The Speakers The Director General IDSA Shri N.S. Sisodia in his opening remarks alluded to the risks associated with climate change which was attributed to man-made greenhouse gases. Evidence such as the 2003 European heat wave and other extreme weather events combined with scientific projections point to a future where competition for scarce resources is likely to increase and could impact inter-state relations. Dr. Nitin Desai in a special address considered the workshop by IDSA as timely and appropriate. He regarded the climate change issues more serious than the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 as physical impacts are more profound than oil shocks. Dealing with climate change may lead to reshaping of global politics and international relations. Forward proactive planning by all stakeholders was stressed upon by him. An important point that Dr Desai mentioned was that the developing countries need to strive for climate justice in a culture of compromise. The 1st session was chaired by Dr Nitin Desai. Shri Sujit Dutta, Senior Fellow IDSA structured his talk by first locating climate change issues as a security concern and then situating it in the larger body of security studies. He stressed that climate change challenges immediately raise national security concerns. He then traced the evolution of environmental security from the security studies perspective where resources, environmental stresses and state interests collide and shape the dynamics of international relations. He underlined the fact that long-term climate change studies assume significance both from the perspective of states relationship as well as the role of domestic pressure groups in shaping climate change policies. Wg. Cdr. Ajey Lele, Research Fellow IDSA spoke on climate projections, tactical and strategic ecological intelligence and the need to identify climatic hot spots. Professor Ashish Bose spoke on migrants and its growing impact on internal and external security. He highlighted the complexities and intricacies of data analysis and the need for focused and systematic studies. The selective ‘sons of soil’ slogan by some state (Maharashtra) was an emerging challenge as also immigration from Nepal and Bangladesh. The last presentation by Dr. P. Dasgupta on Economics and Climate Change focused on the imperatives for adapting climate change concerns vis-à-vis food, water and energy. She emphasised the inherent struggle between the developed and developing countries and the need to factor changes in production and consumption patterns. The three most important factors affecting relations with India’s neighbours and the rest of the world would be trade and trade related barriers, migration and the “common concerns” of sharing available food, water and energy resources. The second session on the specifics was chaired by Shri BG Verghese. Professor Abhijit Sen spoke about food security and emphasised the need to have appropriate food and water stocks. Dr. Uttam Sinha, Research Fellow IDSA, situated the issues of water in the security framework and showed how cooperation overrides confrontation. He stressed the value of securitizing an issue in terms of proportioning adequate attention and preventive response but also the need to desecuritise the issue before it enters the ‘threat-defence’ logic. Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal , Research Fellow IDSA in her presentation on energy and climate change exposed the over hype of reports of World Energy Outlook 2007 by International Energy Agency, which put the blame on India and China for growing carbon emissions, ignoring historic emissions. She argued for equal per capita emission as the norm. Dr. Monalisa Joshi, Research Assistant IDSA, in her presentation on health and human security showed how disease(s) will spread due to climate change. The Chair then summed up the session pointing to the urgent need to have greater efficiency in water use and innovative thinking applying scientific approaches. Cooperation, understanding of geography, technology and thinking and acting holistically, according to the Chair, were the keys to overcome the challenges of climate change. The last session on implications and next step was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA. Prof. Murari Lal gave a presentation on Monsoons and the decline in winter rains and 5 to 10 per cent increase in summer monsoons with uneven and more intense spreads. He also cautioned that one should not be carried away by hype perpetuated by vested interests of scientific community such as tipping point events in monsoons. Much work needs to be done on modelling in our context. Dr. A.P. Dhimri in his presentation on climate variability over western Himalayas in the winter alluded to the increase in extreme weather events in shorter time frames than in the past. He explained the complexities in study of snow, linkages of temperature and precipitation and land surface data. Commander Sunil Chauhan in his presentation on climate change and disasters emphasised that IPCC reports are insufficient and what is needed is regional models in an integrated risk management framework. There were purposeful discussions in all the Sessions. No clear consensus emerged on what issues needed to be securitized or whether securitizing the issue was the right approach. It was realised that one needs to understand the process and not blindly link issues to only climate change. For instance, flooding is a primary process and climate change is a secondary one impacting on floods. However there was consensus that the following tasks were necessary: Studies to refine negotiation strategies need to consolidate studies on climate change (national action plan as being attempted by Government of India is one that is awaited), migrants, water resources related studies and most importantly resources and environmental stresses related issues. It was also felt that the human security dimensions of climate change should also be examined. Next Steps Dr Arvind Gupta while summing up the workshop said that there was a need to clearly establish the link between climate change and national security. Climate change has the effect of accentuating existing conflicts, as witnessed in Darfur. South Asian countries were linked with each other through glaciers, rivers, monsoons, land and in numerous other ways. The disappearance of the Himalayan glaciers will have huge impact on South Asia. Climate change and its impact could also become an issue in India’s bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries. Therefore, it was necessary to understand how our neighbours viewed climate change and its impact. Securitisation of climate change was happening whether one liked it or not. He also emphasised the need to review regional studies and make models with the existing knowledge for the use of policy makers. As regards the negotiation stands, IDSA needed to interact closely with the policy-making circles and offer its assistance in studying key issues of climate change and its impact on international relations. Participants Dr Nitin Desai Prof Ashish Bose, Institute of Economic Growth Shri BG Verghese, Centre for Policy Research Prof Abhijit Sen, Member Planning Commission Dr. Purnamita Dasgupta, Institute of Economic Growth Dr Murari Lal, Advisor at Reliance Energy Ltd Dr. Alok Dhimri, JNU Cdr. Sunil Chauhan, USI IDSA Team Shri Narendra Sisodia Dr Arvind Gupta Shri Sujit Dutta Col. PK Gautam Wg. Cdr. Ajey Lele Ms Shebonti Ray Dadwal Dr Uttam Sinha Dr Monalisa Joshi Priyadarshini Singh Besides, representatives from the following organisations attended the workshop: The Energy Research Institute (TERI) DIPAC Army HQ Ecological Cell Directorate of Perspective Planning, Ministry of Defence HQ IDS Net Assessment India Meteorology Department National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS)	Non-Traditional Security	Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement	July 10, 2009	P. V. Ramana	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: A K Doval Discussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi A Communist party, according to classical understanding, requires ‘three magic weapons’ to achieve its goal of capturing political power. These are: Party, i.e. a strong organisation; Army, i.e. a body of fighters; and United Front, i.e. alliances or linkages with groups that would facilitate its ultimate goal. United Front is of two types –– ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’. The Strategic United Front (SUF) is formed with various underground organisations of the CPI (Maoist), which are engaged in waging New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the Tactical United Front (TUF), through forming coalitions with persons and groups that are opposed to the state and its policies, on one issue or the other, the Maoists seek to fight the state through ‘peaceful’, political means, as well as broaden their support base. This paper seeks to understand the United Front tactics of the CPI (Maoist). According to the CPI (Maoist), “it is essential that we unite with such struggling organisations and build up broad struggles against the ruling classes”. In this light, this paper also seeks to examine the ‘urban activities’ of the CPI (Maoist). The TUF is a secret committee. It functions directly under the guidance of the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), which itself is a sub-set of the all-powerful and apex Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist). In 2002, the TUF activity took a firm shape with the formation of an outfit known as Forum against Imperialism and Globalisation (FAIG), which is a conglomerate of various revolutionary and mass organisations. The TUF serves the agenda of the Maoists in the following ways: To consolidate various ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles and bring them on to one platform on the basis of a common working understanding; To expand the reach of the Maoists to various sections of the society by building contacts with them; To expand over-ground cadre strength, thoroughly indoctrinate them, and then completely incorporate them into organisational work, especially in urban areas; Poach partners for potential leaders and ideologues; Serves as a good cover from the long arm of the state; Essentially being a political activity, it reinforces the military activities, i.e. armed struggle. The activities of the CPI (Maoist) in urban areas –– cities and towns –– need to be understood because of the implications they hold. These activities should be understood together with TUF activities, because urban presence would give a fillip to TUF activities. The Maoists have also prepared an Urban Perspective Plan, which is a road map to the type of activities they would undertake in towns in order to enhance their support base. The Urban Movement has a defined role in the political strategy and military strategy of the CPI (Maoist). The Maoists contend that the urban movement should be conducted through various types of mass organisations; the wider the organisations, the better. These organisations are of different types –– secret revolutionary mass organisations, open and semi-open revolutionary mass organisations, open legal mass organisations which are not directly linked to the CPI (Maoist). The last of these would include Maoist-inspired cover organisations and legal, democratic organisations. Thus, the Tactical United Front and Urban Movement are extremely important elements of the CPI (Maoist). These are just about taking shape over the past three to four years. Being political and peaceful in nature, it is not surprising that TUF activities have not received adequate attention in the media. At the same time, because they are legitimate, over-ground, democratic activities, the state’s hands are tied-down. At best, it can keep a close watch on these organisations but cannot halt their activities. However, if it was possible on the part of the state to prove that outfits that are part of the Maoist-led TUF are, indeed, Maoist fronts or have direct linkages with them, it is then feasible to proscribe such organisations. Because these organisations mobilise, organise, propagate and indoctrinate the people to attract them towards over-ground activities (i.e. create a sympathiser base), and, perhaps, subsequently as part of the underground, the state should make every effort to expose these organisations and ban them. Moreover, if and when the Urban Movement catches on among the industrial workers, the state will have to deal with possible sabotage activities and industrial unrest. Besides, when the Urban Movement becomes strong, the state will then have to deal with urban terrorism. Points raised during the discussion Tactical United Front and Urban Movement require immediate attention at the policy making level. The Maoists’ ideology appealed a lot during Charu Majumdar’s days, but at the organisational level the group was weak. Front organisations are a platform to express dissent in a democracy. Thickly forested areas are the ideal guerrilla zone. Maoists are targeting the unorganised sector. There is need for strengthening intelligence. Moving towards urban centres is an indication of the failure of the Maoist movement. There is lack of political will in dealing with the Maoist insurgency. State police do not have the capacity to deal with Maoist violence; time might come for the Army to intervene. Naxalism is a rural phenomenon. Urban areas will become major sources of finance for the Maoists. Prepared by M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.	Terrorism & Internal Security	Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist, Tactical United Front (TUF), Strategic United Front (SUF), New Democratic Revolution (NDR)
Politics of Assurances of Supply of Nuclear Fuel	July 03, 2009	Rajiv Nayan	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: R Rajagopalan Discussants: G Balachandran and R R Subramanian	Nuclear and Arms Control	Nuclear

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