The role of Indonesia in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes has been limited to being part of the ASEAN team since the country is not one of the active claimants. Jakarta has tried to sidestep its maritime row with Beijing by emphasizing the lack of a “territorial dispute’ between the two countries. The article analyzes the role and position of Indonesia in the SCS disputes and argues that despite Indonesia’s reluctance to be an active or direct claimant state, developments in recent years have dragged her into the disputes and she will remain involved until a mutually acceptable solution is achieved in the overarching problem of the SCS.

The article aims to trace the surveying and mapping of China during the 252-year period, prior to 1960 in order to connect it with the evolution of the Sino-Indian boundary. What emerges is that the Manchu was dependent on foreigners for the first modern maps of China made to scale with longitude/latitude lines. Through these maps no territorial claim against India had been made.

What led to the Sino-Indian militarized confrontations in 1959? I argue that Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai became a victim of changed perceptions in China. As long as China’s external and internal environment was relatively secure, India was seen as a potential ally, and Sino-Indian relations thrived. As external and internal pressures on China mounted, India’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama’s flight from China and the territorial dispute was perceived by China as reactionary.

China’s great power ambition and actions have been fuelled by its spectacular economic growth and military modernization. The need to sustain the economy and energy flow makes the East and South China seas vital to it. Its vulnerabilities also lie on its seaboard. To dominate the maritime spaces, it needs to own the contiguous airspace as well. The prescient Chinese leadership has transformed its Air Force into a strategic instrument of power, to protect its economic lifelines, geo-political interests and regional dominance.