India’s BRICS Test: Can New Delhi Hold a Fractured Bloc Together?

India’s BRICS presidency is facing a test. Two key ministerial-level meetings, the BRICS deputy foreign ministers’ meeting in April and the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in May 2026, reportedly struggled to produce a consensus statement, exposing widening divergences within the grouping. Significantly, the eventual Chair’s Statement acknowledged “differing views” among members, underlining the depth of the internal divergences India must now manage.[1]

The episode reflects a broader challenge confronting New Delhi. India assumed the BRICS chairmanship at a moment when the grouping is simultaneously expanding in geopolitical weight and fragmenting internally. The inclusion of new members following the BRICS Johannesburg Summit 2023 has strengthened BRICS’ claim to represent the Global South and marked the grouping’s most significant institutional enlargement since its creation.

At the same time, expansion introduced sharper regional rivalries, competing strategic priorities and growing ideological divergences.[2] In addition, the broader international environment has become increasingly unstable in recent years, marked by intensifying great-power competition, disruptions in global supply chains and rising protectionist economic policies. The United States–Israel war on Iran, a BRICS member, has further deepened the geopolitical uncertainty.

India’s BRICS presidency therefore comes at a moment when the grouping faces mounting pressure to preserve both relevance and cohesion. The central question, hence, is no longer whether India can replicate the diplomatic success of its 2023 G20 presidency. Rather, it is whether New Delhi can prevent BRICS from losing coherence altogether. The challenge before India is not to eliminate internal differences, which are likely to grow as the grouping expands, but to manage them effectively enough to preserve functional cooperation.

Restoring Political Cohesion

In multilateral diplomacy, symbolism often precedes substance—a summit attended by all major leaders signals credibility and continued relevance, even when disagreements persist. Conversely, visible absences reinforce perceptions of fragmentation and institutional decline.

Following the inability of ministerial consultations to produce unified political messaging, the summit itself will become an important test of whether BRICS can still project collective relevance despite widening internal divisions. For India, ensuring participation from core members such as Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa will be essential to reaffirm the grouping’s foundational structure. Equally significant would be the joint presence of geopolitical rivals such as Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Even limited convergence at the summit level would show that BRICS can still bring geopolitical rivals to the same diplomatic platform.

Though it couldn’t produce consensus, the recent BRICS meetings in New Delhi suggest that key members remain invested in preserving the grouping despite widening geopolitical tensions.[3] Achieving broader participation at the summit level, however, will require sustained diplomatic outreach and the strategic use of bilateral engagements on the margins. If India succeeds in ensuring full representation, it would already have cleared a major hurdle in reinforcing BRICS’ relevance.

Avoiding Ideological Polarisation

BRICS has long articulated a non-Western perspective in global governance. However, there is a growing risk that the grouping could gradually evolve into an overtly anti-Western bloc. Debates surrounding de-dollarisation, sanctions and alternative payment mechanisms have increasingly reinforced such perceptions internationally, even as BRICS members continue to differ over the pace and scope of these reforms. If such perceptions deepen, BRICS may find it more difficult to maintain internal cohesion and broader international legitimacy, especially given the diverse strategic interests of its members.

Previous BRICS summits and statements by member countries have exposed broader differences regarding the grouping’s geopolitical identity, particularly over how strongly it should position itself against the West during periods of international crisis. While some members increasingly view BRICS as a strategic counterweight to Western influence, others, including India, continue to approach the grouping through the lens of strategic autonomy and issue-based cooperation. The 16^th BRICS Summit declaration’s emphasis on local-currency settlements and reforms in global financial governance further reflected the evolving debates within the grouping.[4]

India’s balancing act is therefore becoming more complicated. China, in particular, increasingly sees BRICS as part of a broader effort to reshape global power balances and reduce Western dominance in international institutions.[5] India has traditionally preferred a more flexible form of multi-polarity. Managing these competing orientations without allowing BRICS to become overtly polarised will be one of the defining diplomatic challenges of India’s presidency. By emphasising flexibility and strategic autonomy, India can help preserve BRICS as a coalition of shared interests rather than a confrontational ideological bloc. Yet preventing fragmentation requires more than diplomatic management; it requires redefining the grouping around functional cooperation rather than geopolitical alignment.

Recasting BRICS as a ‘Shock Absorber’

The most constructive path forward lies in returning BRICS to its original purpose: managing global instability through practical cooperation. In its earlier phase, the grouping focused primarily on financial stability, institutional reform and inclusive growth rather than geopolitical positioning.[6] Recent crises have reinforced the continued relevance of this approach. The pandemic exposed major gaps in global health coordination, the Russia–Ukraine conflict disrupted food and fertiliser supply chains, and tensions in West Asia highlighted vulnerabilities in energy security and maritime trade routes.

In practice, BRICS has struggled to respond to these crises collectively. Precisely because strategic consensus within BRICS is becoming harder to achieve, India may need to redirect the grouping towards issue-based cooperation in areas where member interests still converge. India’s presidency therefore offers an opportunity to reposition BRICS as a functional “shock absorber” for the Global South, focused on resilience, crisis mitigation and practical outcomes rather than ideological posturing. Notably, this approach closely aligns with the priorities outlined by India’s presidency.[7]

Energy Security

Energy security should be a central priority. The recent instability around the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea shipping corridors has reinforced how regional conflicts can rapidly disrupt global energy markets, increase insurance costs and expose the vulnerability of import-dependent economies across the Global South.[8]

The Chair’s statement stressed the importance of “diversified energy sources”, “resilient energy supply chains”, and “just, inclusive and equitable energy transitions”.[9] Strengthening institutions such as the New Development Bank, which has increasingly expanded local-currency financing initiatives, could support investments in strategic reserves, logistics and alternative supply pathways. Reinforcing proposals such as a BRICS reinsurance facility and strengthening cross-border payment cooperation could further stabilise trade flows during periods of uncertainty.

BRICS countries collectively account for more than 40 per cent of global oil production, around 35 per cent of world GDP in purchasing power parity terms, and a substantial share of global grain and fertiliser exports. This concentration of resources gives the grouping the capacity, not merely the rhetoric, to shape resilience mechanisms during periods of global disruption.

Public Health Cooperation

Public health cooperation must form a parallel pillar of BRICS’ effort to build collective resilience across the Global South. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed deep inequities in access to vaccines, medical data and essential supplies, while revealing the absence of coordinated crisis-response mechanisms for many developing countries.[10] Delayed vaccine access, fragmented supply chains and dependence on a few producers demonstrated how health emergencies can rapidly become broader economic and political shocks.

The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting discussed expanding cooperation in digital health, vaccine research, integrated early warning systems and traditional medicine.[11] India, drawing on its experience in digital public infrastructure, is well placed to lead efforts towards a BRICS-wide digital health network integrating surveillance, telemedicine, and health data sharing. Such an initiative would help position BRICS as a crisis-mitigation platform that can reduce vulnerabilities and improve collective preparedness across the developing world.

Food Security and Supply Chains

Food security offers BRICS an opportunity to demonstrate functional relevance despite broader geopolitical divisions. The disruption of Black Sea grain exports following the Russia–Ukraine conflict exposed how regional conflicts can rapidly transmit inflationary shocks across the developing world, particularly in import-dependent economies vulnerable to food and fertiliser shortages.

In this context, BRICS could position itself as a ‘shock absorber’ for the Global South by developing mechanisms that reduce exposure to external supply disruptions. Beyond the proposed BRICS Grain Exchange, the grouping could explore coordination of emergency grain reserves, local-currency settlement mechanisms for agricultural trade, and a shared platform for monitoring and distributing fertiliser supplies. Such measures would not replace global markets but could provide developing countries with greater resilience during crises marked by export restrictions, sanctions, or logistical disruptions.

If implemented pragmatically, these initiatives would allow BRICS to move beyond declaratory politics and demonstrate its value as a stabilising platform capable of cushioning economic shocks affecting the wider Global South.

Global Governance and the Global South

Another important dimension of India’s presidency will be managing BRICS’ expanding ambitions in global governance reform. The ministerial statement repeatedly called for a “more just, equitable and representative international order”, alongside greater representation for developing countries in institutions such as the UN Security Council, IMF and World Bank.

For many BRICS members, the grouping increasingly serves as a platform to amplify the Global South’s voice amid perceptions that existing international institutions remain disproportionately shaped by post-war power structures. Yet translating that shared rhetoric into coordinated policy remains difficult given the differing strategic priorities within the bloc. India’s challenge will therefore be to ensure that BRICS remains focused on practical institutional reform rather than rhetorical confrontation. Maintaining that distinction will be essential if the grouping is to preserve legitimacy among a wider range of developing countries.

A Test of Practical Leadership

India’s presidency will require a calibrated diplomatic strategy focused less on ideological alignment and more on keeping the grouping functional. New Delhi’s immediate priority will be to prevent geopolitical disagreements from paralysing summit outcomes and weakening BRICS’ credibility. India’s longstanding emphasis on strategic autonomy may also help it bridge differences between members who advocate a stronger anti-Western posture and those who favour more flexible multilateral engagement. A few visible initiatives in areas such as health coordination, supply chain resilience, and energy security would further help shift the grouping away from divisive geopolitical rhetoric towards practical cooperation.

The inability of two major ministerial meetings to produce unified political messaging has already revealed the scale of the challenge confronting India’s BRICS presidency. At the same time, it underlines a broader reality: strategic consensus within BRICS is becoming harder to sustain as the grouping expands and geopolitical tensions deepen. India is therefore unlikely to succeed in imposing political uniformity across the bloc. Its more realistic objective will be to sustain enough cooperation to prevent fragmentation from turning into institutional paralysis.

India’s presidency will ultimately be judged less by whether it can eliminate internal divisions within BRICS and more by whether it can keep the grouping operational despite them. If New Delhi can secure broad participation, prevent ideological polarisation from dominating the agenda and advance practical cooperation in areas such as energy, health and food security, it would reinforce BRICS’ continued relevance in an increasingly uncertain international environment. More broadly, India’s presidency will show whether an increasingly fragmented BRICS can still coordinate around shared interests despite deepening geopolitical tensions.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

[1] “Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15 May 2026.

[2] Gustavo de Carvalho, Steven Gruzd and Yu-Shan Wu, “The BRICS Expanded: Shaped by – Or Shaping – the Global Order?”, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 32, Nos 1–2, pp. 1–8.

[3] “Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, no. 1.

[4] “Kazan Declaration”, XVI BRICS Summit, Kazan, Russia, 23 October 2024.

[5] Marcos Degaut, “China and the Building of a New–and Illiberal–World Order through BRICS”, CEBRI Journal, January–March 2025.

[6] “Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders”, Yekaterinburg, Russia, 16 June 2009; “2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement”, Brasilia, Brazil, 15 April 2010; “Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, New Delhi, March 29, 2012”, BRICS Think Tanks Council, December 2012.

[7] “Theme & Priorities”, BRICS India 2026.

[8] “Strait of Hormuz Disruptions: Implications for Global Trade and Development”, UN Trade and Development, 10 March 2026.

[9] “Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, no. 1.

[10] Rajeesh Kumar, “WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 Vaccine Equity”, Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), 12 July 2021.

[11] “Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, no. 1.