Publishers: IDSA and Shipra

ISBN: 81-7541-224-0

Rs 1250

US $ 80

About the Book

The Iraq war in 2003 raised fundamental questions on the practice of 'might is right' and the principle of cooperation and multilateralism in addressing perceived global security challenges. It also placed the United Nations at a critical juncture or, "a fork in the road" as referred to by UNSG Kolf Annan.

This book is a collection of high-quality papers presented by academicians, diplomats and UN officials who had deliberated on this issue in January 2004.

About the Author

K Santhanam former Director of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Tasneem Meenai, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

C Uday Bhaskar, Officiating Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Uttam K Sinha, Associate Fellow, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Contents

List of Acronyms
Introduction

United Nations, Multilateralism and International Security
---- K.C. Pant

United Nations and the Changing Security Agenda
---- Louise Frechette

Relevance and Efficacy of the United Nations
---- George Fernandes

Current Challenges to Multilateralismand the United Nations

A View from Brazil
---- Celso Amorim

A Sri Lankan Perspective
---- Tyronne Fernando

A Russian Perspective
---- Yuri V. Fedotov

A Japanese Perspective
---- Yasushi Akashi

A European Perspective
---- Geoffrey Van Orden

India's Approach to Multilateralism
---- J.N. Dixit

Return to Multilateralism: The United States and the World
---- Stephen Schlesinger

Iraq War and World Order
---- Ramesh Thakur

World Strategic Order: Unipolar, Multipolar or Multilateral
---- Pascal Boniface

Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Management

Afghanistan at the Crossroads
---- Amin Saikal

Armed Action in Sri Lanka
---- Lakshman Kadirgamar

Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Management in Timor-Leste
---- Kamalesh Sharma

Conflict Resolution in Africa
---- Greg Mills

Recent Case Studies on Post-Conflict Management
---- Roger Moran

International Cooperation in Tackling Terrorism, Drugs and Organised Crime

Terrorism and Transnational Crime: An Indian Perspective
---- S.K. Datta

Terrorist Outlook for : The New Security Environment
---- Rohan Gunaratna

UN Convention against Organised Crime: Expectations and Dilemmas
---- Vincenzo Ruggiero

International Cooperation in Tackling Terrorism, Drugs and Organised Crime: The Asia-Pacific Experience
---- John McFarlane

International Cooperation in Tackling Terrorism:The Middle East
---- Ely Karmon

International Cooperation against Drug Trafficking in Central Asia
---- Niklas L.P. Swanström and Maral Madi

International Cooperation in Tackling Terrorism: A European Response
---- Hans-Georg Wieck

Security Cooperation in Central Asian Region: State-building Processes and External Influence
---- Anara Tabyshalieva and Erica Marat

United Nations and Weapons of Mass Destruction

A UN Perspective
---- Randy Rydell

An Indian Perspective
---- G. Balachandran

A Russian Perspective
---- Y. M. Kozhokin

The North Korean Nuclear Case
---- Haksoon Paik

UNMOVIC: Lessons and Legacy
---- Trevor Findlay and Ben Mines

UN Non-Proliferation Regimes: New Challenges and Responses
---- Han Hua

Prospects of Strengthening and Restructuring Multilateral Institutions and the United Nations

Strengthening and Restructuring Multilateral Institutions:A Perspective
---- B.S. Prakash

Crisis in Multilateralism: A Japanese Viewpoint
---- Kazutoshi Aikawa

Unilateralism versus Multilateralism: Challenges and Prospects
---- Ruan Zongze

Preemption or Partnership? The Future of International Security
---- Karl F. Inderfurth

Reform of the United Nations
---- V.S. Mani

Lessons of UN Global Conferences: A Restructured United Nations System for a Hegemonic -World Order
--- Michael G. Schechter

Multilateralism and the Role of Small States
--- Barry Desker

Strengthening the UN: Futile Attempt orvFeasible Alternative?
--- Tobias Debiel

Annexure

Contributors

Index

In a predictable policy statement, the US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Andrew Sammel, remarked at the just concluded NPT Review Conference that India should eventually sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. He asserted: “The situation in South Asia (also) poses unique challenges. Let me reiterate that the United States remains committed to NPT universality.” But at the same time he also highlighted the fact that neither India nor Pakistan may join the Treaty for the foreseeable future. What he did not state was as to how the issue of NPT’s ‘universality’ could cater for its ‘effectiveness’, which, unfortunately, now remains highly doubtful.

As stipulated in the NPT, legitimate nuclear commerce remains restricted only amongst the ‘few’ due to the technology control regimes. Moreover, the emergence of amorphous entities and ‘private’ nuclear networks and their links to the nuclear programmes in Iran, Libya and North Korea raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of the NPT and its stated aims. Additionally, the verification regime also seems to have lost its effectiveness, if not completely failed. Unfortunately, debates within the NPT Rev Con have completely failed to address some of these concerns. Even worse, the 2005 NPT Rev Con has closed without any agreed set of decisions because of the politics and diametrically opposed positions of various actors — a reflection of the fact that the NPT is on its way to oblivion.

As regards India’s position vis-à-vis the NPT, it flows from its long standing normative approach to the treaty being inherently discriminatory in terms of setting different ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ between the five nuclear ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. In addition to this, New Delhi had an implicit (later explicit) national interest of protecting its nuclear ‘weapon’ option — an option embedded in its civilian programme. Therefore, India had to resist the constraints upon its indigenous nuclear research activities which could impinge upon its efforts to protect the nuclear ‘option’. As a result, India had rejected the NPT, a position, which continues till date.

Due to this, the issue of nonproliferation has remained a major contentious issue between New Delhi and the P-5, particularly the United States. This divide deepened in 1996 when India rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and argued that it would not sign the treaty in its present form ‘not now, nor later’.

But after the 1998 nuclear tests in Pokhran, New Delhi appears to have aligned itself with the nonproliferation interests of the rest of the world. Despite sanctions imposed by USA in 1998, the Jaswant-Talbott talks, President Clinton’s visit to India, the visit of India’s Prime Minister to Washington, all contributed to the strengthening of Indo-US bilateral ties, and hence, a better understanding of India’s security concerns in the US today than at any point in recent history. The ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)’ between India and the US thus has focused more towards facilitating broader bilateral cooperation on issues related to nuclear energy, space and high technology transfers.

Ironically, post- 9/11, there is a likelihood that Washington’s approach to combating proliferation may once again come into conflict with New Delhi’s own interest of securing further nuclear cooperation in the sphere of civilian nuclear technology. As it appears from the NPT Rev Con debates, Washington’s efforts have been towards establishing more effective controls over ‘critical’ technologies. Towards this end, it proposes universal adoption of IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would eventually provide IAEA with intrusive inspection rights within states’ territory to inspect and monitor compliance. Universal adherence of IAEA’s Additional Protocol ironically, has been perceived as a first step towards improving enforcement of safeguards. Once this is achieved, the US also plans to propose the formation of a special committee of the IAEA’s board members to look into ways and means to further enhance verification and safeguards.

It also appears that the NSG members are likely to make acceptance of the Additional Protocol a mandatory condition for nuclear transactions. Secondly, the NWS, spearheaded by the US, are now promoting the view that Articles II, III and IV are interrelated and that Article IV is subordinate to Articles II and III. If this argument is extended further, it means that the IAEA would have to limit itself to ensuring compliance with the NPT first rather than promoting the cause of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This seems to go against the spirit of Article IV which calls on the NWS to share civilian nuclear technology, implying that the NWS are in non-compliance with the Article.

Clearly, such universal application of NPT-type safeguards, or even adherence to the Additional Protocol as a pre-condition for nuclear commerce would affect India’s case for nuclear electricity since it is highly unlikely that New Delhi would accept NPT-type safeguards. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has recently stated that the “circumstances were ‘not ripe’ for India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty right now.” He added that, “India has consistently taken the position that the NPT is unequal and discriminatory and that it will not sign the treaty. The pressure on New Delhi to sign it mounted after the May 1998 nuclear tests but there has been no change in India's position on the issue.”

But at the same time, it also needs to be highlighted that India remains committed to the nuclear nonproliferation regime in its true spirit. To address the threats emerging out of pilferage of WMD to the ‘rogues/terrorists’, New Delhi recently approved a parliament Bill on the ‘WMD and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities)’. Among other things, the Bill is clear in one respect that New Delhi remains committed to its longstanding nonproliferation concerns. It states: “India's policy has always been not to assist, encourage or induce any other country to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices” and adds that “India also remains committed to prevent non-state actors and terrorists from acquiring WMD and their means of delivery.” The bill reiterates India’s commitment “not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or transfer control over such weapons or explosive devices, and not in any way assist, encourage or induce any other country to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This is what is also stipulated in Article I of the NPT. The adoption of the Bill, therefore, is as good as adhering to the provisions of the NPT.

India ought to have an interest in the discussions at the NPT Rev Con to the extent that they have an influence on construction and operation of nuclear power reactors to meet India’s energy requirements. India’s reactor plans have, in the past, witnessed considerable delays in commissioning and some outside observers have expressed doubts on its ability to achieve the current targets.

While there is a demand, there is also a huge supplier base. Major European nuclear firms Framatome and KWU would perhaps like to enter India with their LEU – light water PWRs. However, rigid nonproliferation concerns compounded with strict NSG provisions impede their efforts as well. It is in this context that States like the US will have to shed their orthodoxy.

On India’s part, New Delhi will also have to do some finetuning of its nuclear laws, rules and regulations to enable joint ventures to be ushered into existence with the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) holding equity along with European firms.

Sensitivity with respect to plutonium generated in such power reactors could also be addressed satisfactorily by shipping spent fuel back to the LEU-supplying country since India does not need plutonium for its programme.

India believes that with the growing globalization efforts there would be more and more global interdependence in terms of nuclear energy. In this context, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s speech at the Golden Jubilee function of the Department of Atomic Energy on October 23, 2004 should provide the terms for India’s cooperation with the rest of the world:

“India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies. We will also ensure the safeguarding of those technologies that we already possess. We will remain faithful to this approach, as we have been for the last several decades. We have done so despite the well-known glaring examples of proliferation which have directly affected our security interests.

The limitations of the present non-proliferation regime should not be further accentuated by artificial restrictions on genuine peaceful nuclear applications. Technology denial and closing avenues for international cooperation in such an important field is tantamount to the denial of developmental benefits to millions of people, whose lives can be transformed by the utilization of nuclear energy and relevant technologies.

The need of the hour therefore is to move away from an exclusivist approach and to create a more inclusive framework based on principles of equality.”

As the Karakoram Highway reopened on May 2, 2005, for traffic between China and Pakistan, the area surrounding it continues to be tense. The Northern Areas (NA) of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir continues to be in turmoil since the assassination of Shia leader Aga Ziauddin by gunmen in Gilgit in January this year. In a case that was clearly indicative of rising sectarian intolerance, fifteen people were killed by the rampaging mobs before some modicum of governance was restored. A large number of government buildings were set on fire and a number of officials and their families were attacked. Troops had to be deployed to restore law and order and a façade of normalcy is being maintained but violence keeps erupting from time to time. In a stark reminder of the situation, the Inspector General of Police, the highest ranking police officer was assassinated along with his bodyguards, on March 23, while travelling between Gilgit and Hunza.

NA is a sparsely populated mountainous region with an area of 28,000 square miles that makes it more than six times the size of Azad Kashmir. More than one million population (562,000 according to 1981 census) comprises numerous ethnic groups and tribes. Gilgit-Baltistan, as this it is often referred to in local literature, acceded to Pakistan when the British Commander of Gilgit Scouts, Major Brown declared accession to Pakistan on November 4, 1947. The region was named ‘The Northern Areas of Pakistan’ and put under the direct control of Islamabad; separate from Pakistan-Administrated Azad Kashmir. The Karakoram Highway linking China to Pakistan passes through it and reportedly generates trade worth billions of dollars. The region, however, has become the stage for violent protests by the impoverished population, which believes that their unique ethno-cultural and religious identity is being threatened. The alienation of the populace is increasing and besides ethnicity has a strong sectarian undertone. The acts of violence in Gilgit and surrounding areas are due to the absence of any genuine democratic and constitutional mechanism to resolve the problems. People have been demanding their democratic rights for a long time. The Northern Areas Legislative Council created in 1994, has remained a dysfunctional consultative forum, presided over by the Minister for Kashmir Affairs, who is also the de-facto Chief Executive of the region.

Poor economic conditions and lack of educational facilities have made the region a hub of communal strife. The basic dynamics of sectarianism in this region resembles the rest of Pakistan. External involvement, from other Islamic countries, a weak judicial system, proliferation of small arms, mushrooming of sectarian madaris and the state's use of religious groups for internal and external policy objectives are cited as the major reasons for the current sectarian situation in Pakistan. Ironically, the impoverished parents have no option but to send their children to madaris - the ubiquitous nurseries of religious extremism. As a result, the region produces more ulemas (religious scholars) than Punjab or Sindh.

Due to their limited understanding of Islam and aversion towards science and technology, the ulema unknowingly and often intentionally instigate communal hatred that leads to violence. The region contains a high percentage of Shia, some tribal in their ethnic origin and many Ismaili — a sect led by the Aga Khan and considered heretics by hard-line Islamists. From being a completely Ismaili (a Shia sub sect) region, it has been injected with external population. Consequently, there have been competition of sorts between the big sects, and clerics from other parts of the country have introduced the Twelver Shia (official religion of Iran) and Sunni faiths. Presently this is an area where geographic and linguistic boundaries often coincide with the sectarian identities. Different valleys speak different languages and follow different denominations. Last year differences over contents of Urdu and Islamiyat textbooks forced the closure of schools and it took more than a year to resolve the row and reopen the schools.

The gravity of the situation is best exemplified by the recent sacking of three police officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police (SP) for refusing to join duty in Gilgit. If the senior police officers prefer sacking to serving in the region, the fete of other government officials can be well imagined. In the past, the government officials, including those of Army, Northern Light Infantry and police, have been identified and murdered while travelling in buses in areas falling under the control of rival sectarian militia. Casualties due to bomb explosions, ambuscades and sniper firing in Nultar have become a daily routine and so is the blockade of the Karakoram Highway (KKH). The area around Karakoram Highway from Gilgit to China border is dominated by the Shia militants where as the area South West of Gilgit up to Manshera is under the influence of Sunni extremists. Some of them have sympathies for Uighur nationalists in Sinkiang and may be inclined to attack Chinese vehicles passing through the Highway. Any attack on the Chinese vehicles or assassination of Chinese personnel on or around the Highway may cause Pakistan a huge embarrassment and generate adverse publicity for trade through Karakoram Highway.

The agenda of the NPT Rev Con, currently underway in New York, has now been finalized. Moreover, the Chairman of the Rev Con, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil has also been able to finalize upon the three Main Committees (MC) and the three Subsidiary Bodies (SB). These three subsidiary bodies will look into three important issues: practical steps towards disarmament (SB1), regional issues including the issue of Middle East (SB2) and the issue of withdrawal from the NPT (SB3). Although, it is not yet final, it is believed that SB1, SB2 and SB3 would be headed by members of the NAC, the European States and the NAM states, respectively.

Among other things, it is now clear, that the review would be conducted only in the light of the decisions of previous Rev Cons, particularly the decisions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Rev Con.

To recall, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 only in the backdrop of two other negotiations. First, the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which had then started in 1994 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva, and secondly, the ‘Shannon Committee’ which was formed to negotiate a fissile material production ban. At the same time, progress on these two treaties was also linked to the extension of the NPT which was then due in 1995. The NPT was extended indefinitely on May 11, 1995.

This extension was, however, not ‘unconditional’. It was part of a larger bargain between the P-5 and the NAM countries wherein, the former had pledged to assess effective implementation of the NPT on the basis of ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament’. It was clear that this would mean a P-5 commitment under Article VI to pursue in good faith ‘negotiations on effective measures relating to disarmament’.

The 1995 Conference had for the first time identified three specific measures as an important commitment to the implementation of Article VI. These were: (a) negotiations on a CTBT no later that 1996, (b) conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning production of fissile materials, and (c) determined pursuit by nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce and further eliminate these weapons.

In addition, in the area of ‘peaceful uses of nuclear energy’, the 1995 Conference had reiterated the ‘right’ of NNWS to ‘develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy’ consistent with Articles I, II and III of the NPT. Contrary to what is being argued today by the US, it should be noted that this Conference had called for a ‘preferential’ treatment in nuclear cooperation for the NNWS parties to the treaty. It was against these yardsticks that the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995.

The 2000 Rev Con further reiterated the 1995 commitments. Indeed, this conference went a step further in identifying the ‘tangibles’: the ‘13-practical’steps which were floated by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) states formed in 1998 comprising of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. These ‘13-practical-steps’ or the ‘Action Plan’ included the signing of the CTBT, FMCT, along with efforts to reduce and further eliminate nuclear weapons. These were also identified as the areas on which future progress towards meeting Article VI was possible.

Five years after the 2000 NPT Rev Con, new rationales for retaining nuclear weapons have been discovered. The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 clearly stated that nuclear weapons would constitute an important component of the US military doctrine. Moreover, the US has stated that it would view the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) to be an important step towards disarmament. This treaty was signed by the Russian and US presidents at the Moscow Summit on May 24, 2002 wherein both sides agreed to reduce the levels of their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200. However, it should be understood in the context of the treaty that ‘reduction of strategic forces’ is actually decreasing the ‘status of readiness’ of strategic weapons. Perhaps this is what the US meant when it submitted its Working Paper in appreciation to its disarmament commitment!

It is, therefore, clearly evident that the promises made by the NWS at the 1995 Indefinite Extension of the NPT and the 2000 Rev Con have been abrogated. Prior to this, the ABM treaty was unilaterally abrogated. Moreover, the entry-into-force of the CTBT is blocked due to US non-ratification of the treaty. Development of the National Missile Defence (NMD) is also in progress. The US approach to Article VI, therefore, contradicts the NAM/NNWS perceptions, and indeed is in contradiction to the 1995 NPT Rev Con and the ‘13-point’ Action Plan which sets tangibles for the review of Article VI. Britain, which fortunately had committed to the ‘13-point’Action Plan in 2000, has also reversed its position after 9/11.

This attitude of the two key NWS towards disarmament, therefore, would come in conflict with the NAM/NAC approach towards meeting the Article VI obligations. As mentioned earlier, the 13-point Action Plan was conceived as an incremental process through which disarmament commitments could be accounted for, something which was regarded as ‘irreversible’. Any backtracking on these practical steps would then certainly be viewed as a lack of commitment on the part of NWS. Moreover, it would also represent non-compliance with NPT commitments by the NWS and also raise doubts about the overall review process and the future of the NPT.