Ms Shirin Tahir-Kheli, the special adviser to the US government on UN reforms, will be in Delhi this week, beginning Monday, and clearly of the 101 proposals in six different areas made by the High Level Panel, the one that will attract the most attention will be the question of the Security Council expansion – and India's status in the matter along with that of Japan, Germany and Brazil -- the so-called G 4.

It is instructive that on May 15 it was reported that the US had cautioned the G 4 that they may aspire for UNSC membership – but even if granted, this would be without the critical veto. The privileged status of the veto will remain the exclusive turf of the Permanent 5 -- the P 5 -- who are also the Nuclear five as recognized in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the N 5.

Ms Tahir-Kheli's visit is important for she will advise the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the matter and, to that extent, UN reforms apart, the resilience of the bilateral relationship with the USA will also be on the anvil.

The US has repeatedly stated that it supports the candidature of Japan alone among the G-4 about entering the UNSC and that it would prefer a consensus regarding other entrants -- a 'consensual' position that Washington shares with Beijing, even though both are diametrically opposed about Tokyo's candidature.

China has vehemently opposed Japan's inclusion at the high table of the UN and hence consensus on the issue will remain elusive. The US is averse to unambiguously supporting India's candidature when Pakistan is so viscerally opposed to such inclusion and hence there will be no major change in the Bush policy in this regard.

However, as Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran observed in Washington on Friday, India will not let the bilateral relationship be predicated on a single issue and that the reform of the UN – to which the US is committed goes beyond the expansion of the UNSC.

In short, despite the resolve of the G -4 to mobilize support for their inclusion which is unexceptionable, realpolitik will dictate otherwise and this reality cannot be refuted. But the additional reality that cannot be ignored is that the UNSC as it is structured today remains an anachronism and while those who are inside are opposed to any expansion or dilution of their special status, the power and relevance grid of the world has changed radically.

Currently, there are six nodes of criticality in the global system that is located within the overall context of globalization and related trade and economic interdependence and these include the USA, complemented by its strategic allies the European Union, and Japan, and the more autonomous powers Russia, China and India.

While there are noticeable asymmetries by way of individual military, economic and socio-political indicators, this is the new hexagon of global relevance and on current evidence it is almost inevitable that by 2050, the US, China and India will be the three major economies and will constitute the equivalent of a tri-polar world order.

Hence, there is an existential reality about India that has to be acknowledged and this is India's USP. Thus acquiring a certain relevance in the global economic matrix that has evolved from G 7 to G 8 to include Russia is axiomatic and working towards a G 10 that includes China and India is the more prudent direction to pursue.

In the strategic domain, it is pertinent that the global community is currently engaged at the UN in the last lap of the NPT Review Conference that concludes on May 27 and again India is not a member of this regime but has an abiding interest in the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

India's relevance in the global nuclear matrix was noted in May 1998 and it is a travesty that the NPT does not recognize the de facto reality of the global nuclear order since it has kept India, Pakistan and Israel -- the three other nuclear weapon states out of its purview.

Thus we have a make-believe global framework wherein the UNSC on one hand and the NPT on the other attempt to defy the logic of empiricism and irrefutable reality – the King Canute syndrome.

India has reiterated its commitment to contribute to global strategic stability and this was reflected in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's remarks on May 17 when he asserted that India is willing to shoulder ''its share of international obligations as a partner against proliferation provided our legitimate interests are safeguarded.''

In the same period, India has also adopted necessary legislation to bring its export control laws to global levels of stringency and this in turn should give a fillip to the strategic dialogue with the US.

Given India's holistic military profile and fledgling military-industrial base, it would not be invalid to suggest that by the end of this decade, the world will have four nodes of military relevance namely -- the US (complemented by the EU and Japan), Russia, China and India -- the equivalent of an M 4. One dimension of this was acknowledged in the December 2004 tsunami disaster.

Thus the G 10 and the M 4 will become representative of the global reality as opposed to the P5 and N 5 and it would be prudent for India to make itself more relevant in this framework as opposed to expending its diplomatic energies in resurrecting moribund organizations that are fast losing their salience.

It is encouraging that India has already signalled its willingness to join those structures that protect the collective interest without jeopardizing its own and the Container Security Initiative (CSI), where Delhi is cooperating with Washington, is case in point.

In like fashion, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) accords an opportunity for advancing India's credentials in managing regional turbulence and exigencies. Consequently, it would be prudent for India to calibrate its response to UN reforms per se and internalize the tenet that quiet and confident power indicators are inherently recognized by the peer group and that pique or petulance is unbecoming of what Delhi seeks.

Hopefully, Ms Tahir-Kheli will become more aware of this mismatch between global strategic reality -- perceived and emergent – during her interaction with Indian interlocutors.

The immediate challenge ahead for the state parties to the NPT in the ongoing Review Conference, May 2-27, 2005 in New York, is how to salvage the tarnished image of the treaty. The efficacy of the treaty is under scrutiny primarily on three issues— disarmament, nonproliferation, and universality of compliance. The unraveling facts of over the last two years, related to various kinds of breaches of the NPT commitments by Libya, Iran and North Korea, add to further suspicion over the credibility of the treaty. While the critics believe that NPT has remained flawed ever since it came into force in 1970, the advocates of the NPT insist that it is still the most reliable tool to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, there is a sharp division between the NWS and NNWS within the NPT on issues such as the right of the NNWS to use nuclear technology for energy purposes, and growing role of nuclear weapons in the future security policies of nuclear weapon states.

It would be interesting to see how the ongoing RevCom would address the critical concerns as expressed in the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel, December 2, 2004, which says: “we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible.” The Director General of the IAEA has already talked about the need for amendment and reinforcement of the treaty. While advocating the raising of ‘the bar for inspection standards by establishing the additional protocol as the norm for verifying compliance’, he called on all the countries within and outside the NPT to ‘put a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.’

Underplaying the fact that the NPT lacks universal acceptance, two historical decisions were taken at the NPT Review Conference in 1995— first, to extend the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely, and second, the general agreement to reinforce the objectives to ensure universal adherence. In strategic parlance, the extension of the treaty successfully guaranteed and legitimised the nuclear weapons status of the P-5 states. The subsequent Review Conference of year 2000 was significant in that it agreed to a ‘13-point Action Plan’ in which there was ‘an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals’.

Before, speculating over the outcome of the ongoing RevCom, it is important to re-examine as to why despite repeated claims by its members to strengthen the treaty’s effectiveness, failures are more glaring than success. In reality, there remains a huge gap between the commitments made by the NPT signatory states and their actual willingness to execute the obligations. This gap can be referred to as ‘symptomatic non-compliance’, causing the inherent weaknesses of the NPT regime.

‘Symptomatic non-compliance’ can be analysed primarily in three different ways. First, the continuing pursuit of advancement and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by countries like America and China hardly augur well for any attempt at future comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. Second, the then super powers, U.S.A and former Soviet Union, themselves had either tacitly helped or overseen transfer of nuclear weapons technology to some countries during the Cold War for strategic and security reasons. The most glaring trajectory of permissive proliferation was witnessed in the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile collaborations. Third, the NPT signatories like Libya, Iran and North Korea manipulated the loopholes in the NPT. The larger picture emerging out of the disclosures from within the NPT states is the legacy of selective proliferation as perpetuated by major state actors of the world.

Article VI of the NPT provides that “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. But this provision does not prescribe any time frame. The nuclear policy approach in the existing nonproliferation regime is more related to the political and security leverage as attached by the P-5 states to the nuclear status of a state than to the real concern of them for global disarmament. The American abrogation of 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and its pursuit for Nuclear Posture Review— neither of these two indicate the elimination of nuclear weapons in near future. Under the 13-point Action Plan of 2000 Review Conference, it is worth recalling that the U.S.A as a party to the NPT had committed to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of international strategic stability. But later on the Bush administration called the ABM treaty irrelevant for its national security interest in the new international security dynamics. There is no guarantee that potential nuclear policy strategies of the US will not be at odds with its commitment to NPT.

Russia is also working on refinement of delivery systems including the submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Russian President has recently been quoted as saying that “We (Russia) will continue to consistently and successively build up the armed forces in general and its nuclear component.” He explained it further by saying: “I am sure that in the near future weapons will appear ... which other nuclear powers do not and will not possess.” (“Putin says Russia working on new nuclear systems”, Reuters, November 17, 2004). The Chinese drive for modernizing its force capabilities may also seriously undermine its role towards nuclear disarmament. Like China, the UK and France have shown little interest in joining any international arms reduction dialogue.

The P-5 states have not only failed to give a time-bound treaty commitment for complete nuclear disarmament, they have also not taken appropriate steps to tame the proliferators. A.Q. Khan himself has admitted: “Many suppliers approached us with the details of the machinery and with figures and numbers of instruments and materials ... In the true sense of the word, they begged us to purchase their goods. ….. We purchased whatever we required.” (“Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan— The Father of the Islamic Bomb”, The Risk Report, Vol.1, No.6, July-August, 1995, Page. 5 http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/khan.html)

Khan has also explained that his long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset for his country. Subsequently, according to his own admission, middlemen, exporters, and businessmen from France, Holland and Germany flocked to Pakistan to offer price lists for high-technology goods and to learn what Pakistan needed. (William J Broad, David E. Sanger & Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Proliferation: How Dr. AQ Khan Created His Nuclear Network”, South Asia Tribune, Issue No 79, February 15-21, 2004). It is evident from Khan’s own admission as to how he was used by Pakistan to work through European intermediaries to obtain crucial nuclear weapons related supplies. The connections that Khan developed during that period were subsequently used for the long running nuclear black bazaar.

In the background of today’s debate over the complexity of nuclear proliferation network, one can hardly believe the acts of past proliferation as handiwork of mere middlemen or intermediaries. Expressing concern over the details emerging out of the allegedly erring NPT signatory states like Libya and Iran and their connections to the Khan-led network, Mohammed El Baradei, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has admitted that Khan had commercial contacts with at least 20 different countries and large companies.

Of course, Pakistan can be seen as a proliferation threat but as a non-member state is not bound by the NPT regime, the legal charges are largely nullified. However, Pakistan cannot be absolved for its past omissions and commissions. It is a well known fact now that for both state and non-state actors, Pakistan was the source of nuclear technology, material and expertise worldwide, until the nuclear exposé in 2003.

It is a secret, now being swept under the carpet, that European firms have recklessly supported the A.Q. Khan-led nuclear trade market to proliferate nuclear weapons equipments and know-how in different parts of the world. Whistleblowers raised an alarm when the Pakistani Commerce Ministry published a full-page newspaper advertisement with an application form in year 2000 to sell nuclear materials and equipments. Even, a nuclear sale pamphlet from KRL (Khan Research Laboratories) was found doing the rounds outside Pakistan. It is only since February 2004, after Khan’s confessions, links are now being investigated of his network with the nuclear programmes of North Korea, Iran and Libya.

But has adequate attention been paid to the role of European suppliers in the now-known- but-long-running nuclear proliferation network? Despite much praise by many for NPT and NSG, proliferation links in Europe apparently prospered well along the Khan’s international nuclear black bazaar.

Without rectifying the deficiencies carried from the past, the advocacy of old nonproliferation regimes, like the NPT, would lack strength, coherence and universality. The international community in fact requires the review of past proliferation records with of various states and non-state actors from an intra-systemic perspective. In fact, change is inexorable in any environment. If the international security system requires structural changes at institutional and policy levels, then the world community should also work towards evolving universally acceptable nonproliferation mechanisms. But that is also not easy in the current political environment.

Nuclear proliferation as an issue of international threat and challenge has also been endorsed in the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (‘A more secured world: Our shared responsibility’, December 2, 2004). It expresses the concern that some countries under the cover of the current NPT are seeking to covertly and illegally develop full-scale weapons programme. A second long-term concern as mentioned in the report is that at least 40 states possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would enable them to build nuclear weapons.

Does the NPT-regime effectively address the present changes in the international security realities? Has the time come to look for new initiatives to replace the older not-so-effective regimes to address the problem of proliferation in the absence of universally consensual mechanisms? The 2005 Review Conference clearly has major challenges before it and if these issues are not addressed meaningfully it could end up performing some rituals without moving forward.

What then could we expect from the discussions in the ongoing RevCom? The following is a brief list of expectations:

1. Difference of perceptions between the NWS and NNWS on the progress of ‘Disarmament’ efforts may persist as ever before.
2. Emphasis may be renewed on earlier ‘declarations’— “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” of 1995 and “13 Practical Steps” of 2000 Review Conferences.
3. Reiteration of call for signing the CTBT.
4. Reiteration of commitment by NWS towards Article VI of the NPT.
5. Effectiveness of the NPT would be measured in terms of compliance record of NNWS and the RevCom may call for improving compliance record by the NNWS.
6. Success of Libya would be lauded, while North Korean experience would be a matter of concern.
7. Iran would be urged to reconsider alternative routes to fulfill nuclear energy demands than insisting on self-sufficiency in fuel cycle capability.
8. A proposal may come up to include more explicitly the ‘non-state actors’ as one of the sources of supply under Article II.
9. Commitment to strengthen verification role of the IAEA, perhaps proposing Additional Protocol to be mandatory for NNWS under Article III of the NPT.
10. Amendment to Article IV and Article V may be proposed in accordance with the possible changes in Article II and Article III.
11. The concept of nuclear weapon free zones may be appreciated under Article VII.
12. Review of Article X may be proposed or at least inclusion of the ‘intent’ to do so in future. (It is a difficult proposition because none of the states would easily agree to surrender the ‘sovereign right’ to come out of any international treaty at any required point of time on national security concerns.)
13. Some of the key provisions of the UN Resolution 1540 may be included in a final declaration, i.e., calling for more stringent domestic export control laws and mechanisms.

Exactly fifty years back in 1955 leaders from 29 countries spanning Asia and Africa met in the town of Bandung on West Java in Indonesia from April 18 to 25 to deliberate on a new strategy they should adopt vis-à-vis the rest of the world to make their voice heard and to make their presence felt at a time when the world was in grips of the most intensive ideological warfare between those who ardently advocated communism and those opposed it as fervently led respectively by the former Soviet Union and the United States. That these ideological fights would end up as proxy wars in the newly liberated and yet to be liberated of countries of the South became crystal clear with the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. The American direct military intervention in Vietnam in 1954 after the French failed to subdue the spirited nationalist movement of that country further reinforced what had been suspected by some enlightened leaders such as India’s Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno. Simultaneously, vast majority of the in Africa were still reeling under the colonial rule where many were waging armed struggles.

Much of the economic power and military muscle was heavily concentrated in the West and, despite partial decolonization, their stranglehold on their former colonies was still very strong. Most of the countries in the South had very little option other than chose one of the pillars that dominated world politics.

This was the backdrop against which the Bandung Conference was held. Given the circumstances prevalent then, the primary focus of this Conference was anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. All the prominent and well-known leaders of that time attended the Conference such as, aside from Nehru and Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, prime minister of the Gold Coast (later Ghana), Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, Chou En Lai, premier of China, Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of Vietnam. Many other Asian and African nations, including Japan, sent representatives.

It was an attempt to carve a niche for the countries of the South and towards that end the Bandung Conference was instrumental in creating and advancing the concept of positive neutralism. While it was known that many newly independent countries like India had advocated to maintain neutrality by refusing to take sides with either of the ideological groupings of the West, positive neutralism was supposed to be different from being merely neutral. It meant to take active part in global politics for the promotion of decolonization and to get a better deal for the countries of the South. It was envisaged that the primary location to play that role would be the United Nations.

A major upshot of the movement that started at Bandung gradually encompassed other developing countries was the emergence in 1961 a new global movement called the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as the third alternative. Thus, the Bandung was instrumental in laying the foundation for NAM which became a significant force in the sixties and the seventies. NAM forced the adoption of resolutions at the United Nation for New International Economic Order and New International Information Order that led to the earmarking of considerable sums as aid by the developed to the developing nations. It is not as though NAM had such a smooth sailing forging the Third World solidarity. If the pro-U.S. 1965 military coup in Indonesia was the first blow, there were other developments that dented the credibility of NAM, for instance the a signing of a peace and friendship agreement between India and the Soviet Union in 1971, the emergence of dictatorship in Egypt, etc. Military coups and authoritarian regimes gaining access to power in many countries in Africa and Latin America further weakened the movement.

By the time the second round of the Cold War got underway starting from the emergence of the Indochina countries as communist defeating the U.S. in the mid-1970s, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1978, and a series of other developments in Africa and Southeast Asia, NAM, although had more than 100 nations as members, had become too amorphous and the principles for which it had been fighting for had become too vague and impractical.

The emergence of economic tigers in Asia, called the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), and many others abandoning the socialist path that the leading countries had been advocating created a serious ideological crisis for NAM. Successful economic policies these countries pursued underscored the significance of attracting direct investments from and opening up of the markets of the developed countries rather than harping on doles in the form of aid. The non-aligned movement included such diverse countries- rabidly anti-communist and pro-American like Singapore and Indonesia to communist zealot such as Vietnam and Cuba, that it became impossible to evolve a common agenda.

Whatever little residual relevance that the non-aligned movement had disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It was no more possible to use the earlier tactic of pitting one super power against the other to extract some political and economic mileage. With the discrediting of the communist ideology, anything even remotely connected to that ideology was distanced from. Market forces, liberalization, globalization, etc., became the new buzzwords. There was no common interest or political philosophy among the developing world except advancement of one’s interests in whatever way possible.

By the time the golden jubilee of the Bandung Conference was celebrated in April 2005, people had virtually forgotten about the non-aligned movement. One might wonder why such a big show was put up by Indonesia and what was expected to be achieved. It has been obvious that what has been touted as inevitable the process of globalization is and the wonders it has been doing in promoting the prosperity and development of the developing world, certain basic concerns linger on. No doubt some countries have benefited from globalization but vast majority of people has remained poor and has not seen the fruits of this prosperity. Income disparities are growing within most of the developing countries as also between the developed and developing nations as well. There could not be a better country than Indonesia that can understand the ravages of globalization as witnessed in the aftermath of the 1997-98 financial crisis that hit the Asia Pacific region. It is yet to recover from the debilitating effects it has had on its economy which pushed more than 70 million people below the poverty line literally overnight. If China’s recent breakneck speed growth is showcased as a miracle, there is a downside to it in terms of massive environmental degradation, indiscriminate use of resources in an unproductive way, and social dislocation by way population movement seeking employment. Developed world is relocating all those polluting and less value-added industries to the developing countries in the name of economic development.

Therefore, the current Bandung summit can be a good opportunity to have a serious introspection and to draw a new political agenda for the developing countries to not only strike a better deal vis-à-vis the North but also renew their own cooperation. Moreover, there is a host of other issues that can only be tackled with the cooperation several countries. For instance, terrorism, drug pedaling, gunrunning, human trafficking, etc., are impinging on these countries. Similarly, no one can be expected to resolve a number of recurring problems such as poverty and inter-ethnic hostilities in Africa. There are also several diseases like AIDS, SARS, avian flu, etc., that require greater cooperation and coordination among the developing countries in order to fight them.

So far there are no indications that an institutional mechanism might be set up by those that attended the recent summit meeting but that may become inevitable if some of the above mentioned problems afflicting these are to be addressed.

The move by the European Union (EU) to lift the 15-year old arms embargo on China seems at present to have been set aside till the end of 2005. An informal meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers on April 15 at Gymnich, Luxembourg under the present Luxembourg presidency concluded to take no decision regarding the embargo. The press release issued after the meeting is a carefully drafted document. Essentially the press statement seems to please everyone. It attempts to project the unity of the 25 member nations of the EU on this issue; on the other hand it does not want to offend China and depicts her as “an increasingly indispensable actor on the international scene.” It does not mention the Anti-Secession Law against Taiwan passed by the Chinese National People’s Congress on March 14, or the tensions in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations because of the demonstrations staged by Chinese students against Japanese establishments in China. The statement also says that “discussions on this topic will continue both within the EU and with our partners.” Again it is not mentioned with which partners the discussions would get the priority, since the EU has already strategic partnerships with China, India and Japan in the Asian continent. However, it is quite obvious that decision with the senior partner across the Atlantic, the US, would be given utmost importance. Tough postures of the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and warnings by the US Congress to impose embargo on the EU should the latter lift the sanctions on China, seem to have strongly influenced the EU decision.

Nevertheless, internal politics of the European Union as well as national politics within the member nations have also had its bearings on the EU decision. In order to advance their trade interests, France and Germany have, for some time, become strong advocates of lifting the post-1989 arms embargo on China. However, at a time when all the attention is focused on two major European events namely the British parliamentary elections and the EU Constitution ratification referendum in France, debate within Germany on the arms embargo decision certainly deserves consideration. Unlike France and Britain, differences within the partners of the German ruling coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens in this matter have come to the fore.

The stance taken by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder is already well known. In conformity with his standpoint he has made six visits to China during his incumbency. On the occasion of his last visit to Asia in October 2004, the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, commented (October 15, 2004) “For a long time, Schröder’s interest in Asia could be summed up in three words: China, China, China. The continent’s other giant, India failed to create any sort of glow on his radar screen.” This assessment was also shared by Schröder himself at a meeting in Delhi where he said that the German economy ought to seek opportunities primarily not only in China and Japan but in India as well.

In the recent debate Chancellor Schröder by persistently promoting the line to lift the embargo, has positioned himself not only against his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) but also against Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister and the leader of the junior coalition partner, the Greens. Commenting upon a possible discussion on the arms export embargo in the Lower House of the German Parliament (Bundestag), Schröder insisted in an interview on March 31st to the German weekly, Die Zeit, that irrespective of any voting in the Bundestag, the final authority of foreign policy making lies with the federal government. This kind of stance by Schröder is often termed by the German opposition as Alleingang (go-it-alone policy). Informed quarters may compare such strong individualistic positioning as typical of Schröder. Just one week after Schröder’s interview to Die Zeit, the difference between the Chancellor and his own Foreign Minister came out into the open. Joschka Fischer in an interview on April 6 to the same weekly pronounced that he, his party and the parliamentary faction have a sceptical stand in this respect. Here it must be mentioned that Joschka Fischer in his speech to the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March this year depicted the human rights situation in China as a source of concern. He insisted on rapid results in specific areas of deficit as far as the Chinese human rights situation is concerned. It is quite natural that the divergences in public on this matter have become a delight for the German opposition Christian Democrats. The 169th Plenary Session of Bundestag on April 14 witnessed a stormy debate on this issue. During the debate both the main blocs in the Bundestag have opposed each other citing their respective past and present stances vis-à-vis China. Joschka Fischer, cornered by the opposition, did not give any concrete answer whether he was for or against the arms embargo, but concluded that he had to work towards a European consensus-building on this issue.

It is apparent that the issue of EU arms embargo is shelved for the time being. A revised and stricter version of EU Arms Export Code of Conduct is expected which would attempt to address this issue of observance of human rights and other criteria by the recipient nations. Lifting the embargo on arms export to China might coincide with some other developments like the enforcement of a new EU Arms Export Code of Conduct and the Chinese ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In the meantime, France and Germany at the official level would persist in lifting the embargo citing various reasons like the need to oppose the ‘containment’ of China and simultaneously averting a possible clash with the US, integrating China into the international system, etc. Joschka Fischer’s interview in the German daily Handelsblatt (April 17) is remarkable. In this interview he says that one of the greatest challenges would be to integrate rising world powers like China and India into the world system, so that they do not feel dejected. Fischer’s concern about China is quite understandable, but citing India as a case in point is a bit mystifying. Equating China with India in the context of integration into the international community seems to be simplistic. Fischer could have been more specific about the scale of integration into the international community and the respective places of India and China therein. Official enthusiasm shown by Germany to lift the arms embargo on China appears to be based on the reciprocal support of China to the German membership of the UN Security Council. But it must be remembered that Germany, Japan, India and Brazil have already formed the Group of Four (G 4). At the last 59th UN General Assembly in September 2004, all the four countries in a joint statement pledged to support each other’s candidature for UNSC membership. In order to realise their aspiration, the G4 understandably has to go a long way as it needs the nod of the P5. Comparing the largest democracy at this juncture with a nation which still does not have a multi-party electoral system may undermine the cohesion of the G4 and act as weapons for other regional competitors which are serious enough to prevent the entry of the G4 into the UN Security Council. Being politically, economically and strategically the most important European nation, Germany’s stand on specific issues carries weight at the level of EU and globally as well. Observance of Human rights in any part of the world is one of the most important pillars of German foreign policy. Most pertinently, Germany has been criticising the human rights situation in China at various international fora, but has also engaged China in a “Dialogue on Constitutional State” (Rechtsstaatdialog). German Foreign Ministry has also been maintaining close contacts with the Chinese political activists and cyber-dissidents. But the recent disagreement within the ruling coalition in Germany shows the need for a cohesive China Policy that would deal with specific issues like human rights or environment protection not episodically but over a specific time frame.

At the level of EU it emerges that till the end of 2005 the arms embargo against China is not likely to be lifted. Austria and Finland, two smaller members are scheduled to hold the EU presidencies respectively in 2006. Given recent history, Chinese diplomatic persuasion of the EU majors and the presidencies would continue to have a favourable effect. But the US measures on EU would have to be taken into account. Therefore, the possible scenario is that for a positive outcome, China has to wait till 2007 when Germany would hold the first half of EU presidency. However, in between the EU itself is expected to go through the litmus test on its existence, i.e., the EU constitution ratification referenda in various West European nations. Negative voting on this issue in any member nation might set the whole European integration process in a reverse gear. Moreover, Germany will go for national polls in the autumn of 2006. Therefore, in the European agenda lifting the arms embargo on China would not be as important as it has turned out to be in the last few months. On the contrary, consensus-building on the issue of arms embargo would become less significant than the issue of importing textiles from China. Already thirteen members of the EU have been exerting pressure on Brussels to protect indigenous European manufacturing units. Nicolas Schmit, the Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, identifies the subject as an ”extremely thorny dossier”. Keeping in mind that common trade is one of the most important elements in the first pillar of the EU, it would be interesting to observe which topic would get EU priority in the coming days, textiles or the arms embargo.