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| Title | Date | Date Unique | Author | Body | Research Area | Topics | Thumb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The New US Agenda: Militarising Space | April 2005 | Ajey Lele |
Space science, like nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of preeminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theatre of war. The Bush Administration is preparing a shift in US policy to allow for protection of existing and futuristic space assets. Convinced by the logic of securing space to deter probable attack, the US Air Force has sought Presidential approval for a national security directive. The official view of the Air Force is that since the US depends so crucially on space capabilities, it must, remain prepared to confront adversaries on the high ground of space. Correspondingly, the Department of Defence (DoD) is outlining a new policy which may just stop short of putting weapons into outer space. However, according to a New York Times report,1 the Bush Administration is close to implementing a new space policy that could move the US closer to placing offensive and defensive weapons in space. If implemented, the Bush directive would be a radical departure from the one articulated by Clinton in 1996, which concentrated more towards peaceful uses of space technologies. From a military perspective, Clinton emphasised a less aggressive use of space. It involved spy satellites support for military operations, arms control and non-proliferation pacts. In contrast, the new policy is expected to not only call for militarising space but also talk of having free access in space for protecting US space assets. The global reaction has largely been one of concern and dismay. Many analysts feel that the US proposed space policy would pave the way for deployment of both defensive and offensive weapons in space. The Bush Administration, however will face opposition from its allies and potential enemies alike. Russia has already reacted very strongly to this proposal. Its senior counsellor in the Washington embassy stated, “We intend to work through diplomatic channels to urge the US not to move towards fielding weapons in space. But, if diplomacy fails then we will not hesitate to react possibly with force if the US successfully puts ‘combat weapons’ in the space.”2 Russia has voluntarily declared in the past that it will not be the first to weaponise space and thwart the US from its desire to pursuing any such plans. Also, the scientific community within the US, convinced that the move would be prohibitively expensive and could trigger an uncalled for arms race, has warned against putting weapons in space. Indeed, any future deployment of space weapons is expected to face financial, technological, political and diplomatic hurdles. On the domestic front, the Democrats are likely to resist any move towards space weaponisation as it would tantamount to overruling the Clinton policy. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Bush Administration is convinced about its space policies and will not hesitate to go the extra mile to achieve its desired objective. The US administration is of the opinion that new threats to its satellites have emerged since the space doctrine was last reviewed in 1996 and that its space assets must be protected at all costs. It has been argued that since significant changes have occurred over the last decade or so with some countries taking greater interest in space and in possession of technologies that can threaten US space systems, an updated space policy is the need of the hour. Both the Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) and the Afghanistan conflict proved to a great extent that space observations are an integral part of modern day conflict. Space is considered as the fourth dimension of the warfare. In both the wars, the US space-based assets had the asymmetric advantage over their enemy particularly in the arena of reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and navigation. Now, it appears that the Bush Administration wants to enhance this asymmetry further by putting offensive and defensive weapons into outer space. The base document for this forthcoming space directive is a January 2001 report of a national commission (headed by Donald Rumsfeld) on the use of space for national security needs, which has recommended that the military should ‘ensure that the president will have the option to deploy weapons in space’. In fact, Rumsfeld fears that ‘space could be the next Pearl Harbour for the US’. In 2002, after weighing the report of the Rumsfeld space commission, President Bush withdrew from the 30-year-old Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Russia, which banned space-based weapons. The ABM treaty barred the placement of not only missile defence components (such as radars) in space but also of space based weapons (such as conventional kinetic energy kill vehicles (KKVs) or space based lasers (SBLs) intended to intercept warheads or rockets. The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002 had sounded the alarm bells about its intent. Now Pentagon officials admit that the air force’s determination to field space weapons had also been accelerated by its failure to build an earth-based missile defence system after 22-years and nearly $100 billion in expenditure. Presently, it appears that the US is planning to take this bold initiative because it is aware that it can work this out within the gamut of existing UN treaties on this issue. It sees no need for new space arms-control agreements. The US is already party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits only stationing weapons of mass destruction in space and presently no treaty exists to deal with other methods of weaponising the space. Technically, the US cannot be faulted on their proposed space agenda. The militarisation of space is not a simple mission. It will require new weapons, new satellites, and more importantly hundreds of billions of dollars. The US has had space-based weapon systems on its drawing board for years, including miniature satellites that can attack other satellites, high-powered lasers, and even a space plane that can drop weapons from orbit. Some are expected to be ready for deployment in about 18 months. The space weapons debate began in earnest in the late 1960s, after the US and USSR tested their first anti-satellite systems in 1959 and 1968, respectively. Subsequently, the issue lost steam and particularly after the end of Cold War, it was expected that weaponisation of space would never become a reality. The recent demand by the US Air Force brings the issue back to centre-stage. It appears that the administration may be toying with an idea of making space the battleground of the future. The Bush Administration understands that no immediate threat to its space assets is in the offing from any nation-state. Also, no terrorist organisation is at present capable of posing a threat to the space assets. Clearly, US intentions of exploring the possibility of space weaponisation emerge out of its futuristic concerns. It is interesting to note that the Rumsfeld commission came into being much before 9/11. When Rumsfeld voiced an opinion that “space could be America’s next Pearl Harbour” he was referring to space as a soft underbelly of the US. Apart from Russia, the US is chary of China. Over the last few years, China has been diligently developing its space infrastructure with greater emphasis on indigenous technology and has emerged as a force to reckon with in ‘military space’. Reports indicate that China has completed ground tests for an advanced anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon called ‘Parasitic Satellite’. China is developing ASAT systems with both long and short-term strategic objectives. The long-term objectives are probably to break the US monopoly in this field. China understands that compared to the US, it lags far behind in terms of assets and technology in the space arena and hence the best way to challenge the sole space superpower is to possess offensive anti-space-based weapons. It is also in the process of building lasers to destroy satellites. China, quite clearly, is doing a balancing act on the space front. Overtly, it is spearheading an international movement to ban conventional weapons from space along with Russia and few other countries. At the same time, as reports suggest, it is discretely developing anti-space-based technology and formulating tactics in order to target American military assets.3 China understands the critical advantage the US had in the 1991 Gulf War as well as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the recent war in Iraq. China’s PLA feels that if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan theatre, then it can neutralise or destroy US space assets, and deny the Pentagon the asymmetric advantage in space. Russia, in contrast, even though it has a history of development of ASAT systems, continues to respect the ASAT weapon-testing moratorium which begun in 1983. However, if the need arises, Russia is capable of developing ASAT technologies within a short period of time. Although no new-dedicated ASAT programmes has been initiated by the US in the recent past, the Bush Administration is increasing funding for research and developments in related technologies. According to some reports, the Pentagon has already spent billions of dollars developing space weapons and preparing plans to deploy them.4 It appears that apart from the Chinese and Russian concerns, the US is convinced that weaker nations also may carry out surprise attacks in space to neutralise the big powers’ nuclear war-fighting advantages. Hence, the best way to secure US interests in space is a planned transition from space superiority to space dominance. The Bush Administration has made arrangements in the defence budget for space-based weapons to defend satellites, strike ground targets and defend against missile attacks. However, the major hurdle in getting the new space initiative off the ground would be convincing Congress to approve its enormous price tag, which is tentatively estimated at between $220 billion and one trillion dollars. If Bush manages to pass this hurdle successfully, then it could be the beginning of the biggest and costliest space arms race in the post-Cold War era. References/End notes
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North America & Strategic Technologies | Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons, Space Technology, United States of America (USA) | ||
| Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis | April 2005 | Sanjay K Jha |
Low intensity conflicts in India, despite a long history and a major threat to national security, have remained substantially under-researched. Though a number of books have been written on the various aspects of low intensity conflicts, one still finds gap in the scholarship, particularly in areas relating to its varied dimensions, factors that sustain them, extremist groups – their interests, leadership, mobilisation strategy, financial resources, and other dimension of state intervention, including the role of various security forces. Moreover, the lack of proper documentation, empirical studies and constraints of official confidentiality and secrecy have added to the complexity and resulted in simplified perspectives, generalisations and a reductionist approach in many cases. In this context, the present volume, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis, is a valuable contribution to the study of internal conflicts and their security implications. Written by a serving army officer, Lt. Col. Vivek Chadha, the book seeks to fill some of the gaps in our understanding through a generalisation of various kinds of anti-state conflicts in India under the rubric of low intensity conflicts (LICs). The book is derived from a research project under the auspices of the USI. Backed by the author’s own first hand experience, this comprehensive account of LICs in India from 1947 to the present, covers both definitional and historical facets, and various conflicts such as militancy in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, multiple insurgencies in the Northeast, the agitation for Gorkhaland and the Naxalite movement, as well as the various dimensions of state intervention. The author is aware of the complexities associated with the term LIC, which is a post-Vietnam American classification as well as the difficulty in its application to the Indian context. Therefore, in the very beginning, he makes it clear that LIC by itself does not signify any form of operation in particular and must be seen merely in the “perspective of classification of warfare, rather than as another definition, in an attempt to define a specific nature of warfare...This research is based on one such model in consonance with the author’s perception of the classification of warfare.” (p.22) The idea of classification of LICs into violent and non-violent, border skirmishes, ‘no war no peace’ scenario along the Line of Control (LOC) and Siachin, and the inclusion of even India’s struggle for independence into this category is indeed a broad one. Such classifications have been subject to intense debate within the academic community and scholars have attempted to re-define the term through their area of specialisation, individual experience, ideological orientation, national interest and understanding of the subject. Thus, we find differing perceptions and views on the delineation of the threshold of low, middle and high intensity operations, and the definition of and distinction between insurgency, terrorism and revolutionary warfare within the broad framework of LICs. For example, there are a number of books available in India that tend to classify all the LICs in the country under the prism of terrorism. The 9/11 incident and the subsequent discourse on terrorism have also influenced the prevailing understanding on the subject. Acknowledging that in security studies LICs probably are the widest and most varied in scope, the author has made an attempt to address some of these issues in the beginning itself when he makes it clear that it is a form of warfare and by itself does not signify any form of operations in particular. Hence, it must be seen merely in the perspective of classification of war from a military viewpoint. The classification of conflicts in the book also appears to be based on the author’s view that “LICs have generally remained a people-centric method of fighting rather than through the professionally trained use of firepower, technology and regular soldiers.” (p. 21) He further avers, “The form of conflicts that can take place under this category can vary from absolute non-violent struggles like subversion to bloody conflicts like limited wars short of an all out war, civil wars and revolutionary wars.” (p. 25) Such definition may not appear “reductionist” if the reader combines it with the aim behind the exercise, which is “to narrate the history of LICs in India with the ultimate objective of learning lessons both from the follies committed and successful policies adopted, which helped resolve conflicts to the satisfaction of both the parties.” (p. 16) And it is probably with this aim that the author has attempted a readymade reference material for both academic and policymakers. A brief background of the conflicts is of immense help to the reader to understand the present dynamics. While explaining the causes of LICs, the author warns against the danger of simplifications, i.e., employing stereotypes relating to causes of conflicts as common yardsticks. In this context, apart from causative factors, which have been grouped under four heads – political, social, economic and external – the attempt to look into the problem of governance assumes importance. The poor performance of civil administration and other institutions of governance in areas afflicted by violent conflicts and frequent breakdown of law and order probably allows conflicts, such as those prevailing in India’s Northeast, Jammu and Kashmir and Naxaliteaffected states, to find varying degrees of acceptance among the local population. Thus, despite his professional background, the author has gone beyond the simplistic law and order approach. The author mentions the degeneration in the role of groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) that has occurred over time. Such groups have become a threat for the people for whom they were purported to be attaining the professed goals such as ‘independence’ or ‘self-empowerment’. Despite the supposedly underlying causes of long-term neglect by successive governments and economic and social underdevelopment, these groups have acquired a raison d’etre, where their survival and stake in the underground economy appears to be the prime motive of their sustenance. This is true with almost all the groups currently active against the Indian state, and the author calls it a degeneration from ‘insurgency’ to ‘terrorism’. For example, he observes that, “the initial uprising in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989 was an expression of popular discontent and could, therefore, be categorised as an insurgency. However, with waning popular support for the insurgents, over time it has morphed into cross-border terrorism.” (p. 403) Similarly, writing about the emergence of ULFA in Assam, he notes that “(desire of) secession by majority Ahoms” and “greater political autonomy” (p. 21) were the two dimensions. ULFA organised itself between 1979 and 1988, and also weighed the chances of its success among the Assamese population in the wake of the ‘anti-foreigners’ movement under the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU). In its initial phase, the group adopted the strategy of playing a vigilante role, but “corruption and personal gain took over the (so called) cause” and “slowly the movement transformed from an insurgency into a terrorist movement with limited support.” (p. 243) This is further manifested in the case of militant Naga groups, which fund their activities through “regular taxation, smuggling and drug money.” (p. 301) One of the significant features of the book is that it also looks at LICs through the prism of tensions and contradictions which a plural civil society faces while consolidating its national identity. The author has identified certain common factors that have influenced LICs in the country. These are political opportunism, political neglect, corruption and social neglect. These factors may play a role in exacerbating the conflict. At varying stages in India’s post-independence history, political opportunism, the state’s understanding of a particular movement and electoral compulsions led to polarisation of ethnic and religious groups, which in turn led to the emergence of struggle. The author finds these factors playing an important role in the emergence and continuation of LICs. Thus, the author also highlights the limitations of the thesis that a ‘contrasting and conflicting’ ideology is the seed of any conflict. In a plural democratic society, this process becomes much more complex if we examine how this ideology is articulated and differences constructed in violent forms. The author contends that ideas can also be made to germinate artificially for political advantage by igniting flames of separatism in a plural society. This can be examined in the context of the movement for Khalistan in Punjab and the articulation of ethnic identities in the Northeast. This raises serious questions not only about identity and popular support but also about the character of the insurgent groups. For example, while describing the characteristics of militancy in Nagaland, he points out, “Militancy has become a business in the state, with much rivalry between militant groups in the extraction of the spoils of corruption and smuggling rather than ideological grounds.” The way militant groups act as hired criminals during elections in militancy-infested areas further strengthens the argument that ideology has hardly any role to play in such conflicts. This is evident in the case of Manipur. Chadha opines, “Allegations of politico-militant union in elections held in 2000, and literal use of the gun by the militants on hire to the ‘highest bidder’ have cast a shadow on future elections in the state (of Manipur) and the representative character of the elected members.” (p. 320) Thus, these militant movements also tend to undermine the existing democratic arrangements. Similar is the case of Tripura. Here, too, militancy “has become a business”, even though marginalisation of a section and lack of education among the local population adds complexity to the situation. Such trends are visible in other theatres of conflicts, including areas affected by Naxalite violence. Given India’s geo-politics and its porous borders, external factors have played an important role in exacerbating internal conflicts. The ‘foreign hand’, inimical as it is to India’s interest, has facilitated migration, movement of extremist groups, narco-terrorism and proliferation of light weapons. These have impinged on internal conflicts in varying degrees. This raises the question whether these conflicts could be called indigenous. Regarding LICs in India, the author says, “the near future promises the continuance of LIC in a variety of forms. These are likely to vary from limited conflicts on the LOC to insurgencies, which will emerge as the underprivileged classes are fast learning the art of using this cheap means of waging war against the state machinery.” However, he finds a downward trend in secessionist and revolutionary tendencies in some of the theatres. For example, in Jammu and Kashmir, the growing awareness of global ramifications of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, the changing geo-political scenario and India’s growing influence in political and economic affairs are likely to resolve the conflict in India’s favour, even though the solution is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. In the case of the Northeast, LICs are likely to be arrested because of the growing importance of the region in India’s relations with the ASEAN countries and the opening up of trade with Myanmar and Bangladesh. However, the projection in medium and long term will depend to a large extent on India’s ability to deal with its ethnic and religious diversity. Overall, this is a useful and timely volume that will not only contest the conventional wisdom relating to various aspects of conflict but has also identified areas for further research and policy review. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | |||
| The rise of fiscal terror | March 25, 2005 | Sudhir Saxena |
By targetting the IT industry, terrorists are revealing that the Indian economy may increasingly be their target The elimination of the Delhi based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) cell on 6 March 2005, could possibly indicate a new trend in Pakistan-based terror operations in India. Preliminary reports indicate that these terrorists were intending to strike against the Indian Military Academy (IMA) and the IT infrastructure especially in Bangalore using the network of the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). A couple of issues emerge from the episode. First, is this an indication of widening of the area of operations by the LeT and similar groups away from Jammu and Kashmir and North India to relatively un-touched peninsular India? Secondly, do the plans of the captured terrorist suggest a change in the nature of targets from tactical to strategic, indicating increasing complexity of conceptual planning and hence institutional involvement? Jammu and Kashmir is undergoing a rather harsh and prolonged winter snow fall season. Like the tsunami, unpredictable mother nature seems to have purged any possibility of an escalation of terrorist activity. Further, the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) process (agreed to in January 2004) has shrunk the political space for high-intensity, high-frequency terror operations. It is quite possible that the political and geo-climactic factors may have forced the terrorists to shift areas of operation southwards and if possible perform a repeat of the 12/13 attack on the Parliament. Though, there have been sporadic incidents involving J&K terrorist (like LeT) operating in areas like Hyderabad, the phenomenon could not be termed as wide spread, possibly due to logistical reasons. The planned future intentions of the LeT cell captured in Delhi may indicate just such a spread. The choice of targets certainly raises a new warning. It is known that the IT industry has been one of the success stories contributing to the growing vitality of the Indian economy. The amount of RDX captured (10.5 kgs along with detonators) provides clues to the nature and explosive power of the planned operation. However, a pertinent question needs to be answered - was blowing up few buildings of the Polaris company the only aim of the now failed operation, or was there a larger objective? A strike against a leading IT company and its aftermath would have no doubt lead to many tactical counter-operational and intelligence measures. But it would have also left a certain wariness in the investor market, particularly in the FDI sector, which is very sensitive about security of its assets give the experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and certain African locations. A planned strike at IMA, Dehradun is indicative of similar operations by the Zarqawi group in Iraq. As a first choice, the facts point towards the culprit state actor - Pakistan. The Delhi police has claimed that with the capture of Pakistani nationals along with incriminating documents, passports, the operation provides direct evidence of Pakistani involvement in country wide terrorist activity. Recent media reports also indicate a relative increase in the arrests of Pakistani spies in Delhi and other areas of strategic importance. The information being traded by these enemy agents cover a range of issues of national security importance including defence installations, industrial infrastructure, R&D institutions etc. It seems that despite the Indo-Pak dialogue, increasing people-to-people contact, cricket matches and CBMs, Pakistani intelligence agencies and/or Pakistan leadership does not intend to lose that vital strategic advantage gained through terror leverages mustered over the decades. From their point of view it sounds to be a logical and viable state-craft option. To extend the analysis, if one partially absolves Musharraf’s Pakistan of an all out covert war in the current context, involvement of a larger terrorist entity like the Al Qaeda with rogue Pakistani support seems to be the second probability. Traditionally, analysts have believed that India does not appear high on the Al Qaeda’s priority list. Possibly, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Gaza, West Bank and the USA remain the priority targets. An increasing pressure in North West Pakistan by the US and Pakistani agencies (under duress), may be forcing Al Qaeda hierarchy to look for other alternatives as an operational exigency. It is known that Nepal and Bangladesh have been comfortable hiding places for terrorists for some time now. However, Nepal with its current political crisis and Bangladesh with its politico-religious configuration of governance have invited increasing international scrutiny. Bangladesh has actually started responding to the Indian pressure to clean-up its territory of terrorist elements. This could be uncomfortable for the terrorist entities either residing in these countries or operating from their soil. It needs little elaboration that Pakistani agencies are also under ‘‘friendly’’ obligation to rehabilitate these old associates in a productive manner. In the past Al Qaeda had possibly left J&K to its junior partners like LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Hizbul and Harkat variants. However, under the present circumstances, the ‘‘big guys’’ may be deciding to drop-in and take charge of operations in India, though not directly. This may explain the strategic target selection by the terrorist captured in Delhi. It is known that Al Qaeda had developed an elaborate strategy of purging the US economy through various complicated ‘‘fiscal attacks’’ ranging from disrupting fund supplies to targeting banking infrastructure and stock market mechanism. Was something similar under planning in case of the LeT cadres operating out of Delhi? It does seems obvious that in both scenarios, the first beneficiary of such a wide planned terror act will be Pakistan. As a secondary effect, Al Qaeda gains will be at present limited to the larger jihadi success in the region. It is natural to be alarmist in threat assessment and probably safer as well, but given the past history of the involvement of Pakistan backed terror syndicates in attacking the Indian state and society, it is difficult to ignore the aforementioned possibilities. We may not have the colour code threat indicators as yet, but the terror bar seems to be showing spikes and presumably the Indian security establishment would have raised these concerns with Condoleezza Rice during her visit to Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) | ||
| Condi Rice visit to Delhi: Landmark in India-US Ties | March 24, 2005 | C Uday Bhaskar |
The just concluded visit to India (March 16) by Ms. Condi Rice, the US Secretary of State may be deemed a landmark pointing to a deeper strategic underpinning between the two countries notwithstanding the divergences that were expressed over issues such as Iran and the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan – which inadvertently received greater focus in the immediate aftermath of the Rice visit. While there is considerable symbolism in the fact that Ms. Rice chose to make Delhi the first stop in her whistle stop tour of Asia, her responses to the broad range of issues discussed with her Indian interlocutors indicate that the Bush 2 team is determined to take forward the content in the bi-lateral relationship that had been hinted at in the first term of the Bush administration. This is amply reflected in three areas that are of strategic importance to India and which till recently were in various stages of delay or procedural deadlock. While Ms. Rice conveyed Washington's concerns over the proposed Indian (and Pakistani) co-operation with Iran over the energy pipeline, she made an important observation by way of acknowledging India's growing energy requirements if it is to sustain its economic growth. She alluded to the need for an India-U.S 'energy dialogue' that would inter alia look at other options – the inference being that of nuclear energy. The US had suspended its support and co-operation in this field after the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) of 1974 and while this area has been identified in the NSSP (next steps in strategic partnership) agreed to between Mr. Bush and Mr. Vajpayee in January 2004, there has been little actual progress to-date. Ms. Rice indicated that phase two of the NSSP would now be embarked upon and the salience and strategic import of the US assisting India in the nuclear energy domain would by itself make this visit a landmark one. This initiative would call for considerable innovative interpretation of existing US non-proliferation norms and its multilateral commitments in this area but while these may be complex, they are not insurmountable if the White House is determined to stay the course. However there are other areas that are of equal relevance and these include the reference to greater US defence supplies that would also encompass technological and joint-production possibilities which is of long term significance for the Indian military establishment. Notwithstanding the standard reference to Indian and the US being the world's largest and oldest democracies, the Indian military inventory has little or no significant platform of US origin. While there have been historical reasons for such an occurrence, it is an existential reality that today the US is the most credible and technologically advanced military supplier in the world and the other suppliers relevant to India are Russia and Europe. The Indian defence establishment has to make a strategic choice regarding the manner in which its inventory profile will be nurtured for the next 30 years (the life cycle of major platforms such as aircraft, ships and artillery) keeping the nature of the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) in mind and the US is a logical and viable supplier. However Indian anxieties about the dependability index of the US will have to be assuaged and the deliberations during the Rice visit suggest that this aspect of the bi-lateral relationship will be taken forward by the professionals on both sides and that some major decisions will have to be taken in this regard. The third area that is of deep import is the acknowledgement of India's regional and global relevance as a node that contributes positively to stability and prosperity. India's economic growth rate, macro-fiscal indicators and the empathy with information technology and the new economy are familiar and have been noted but Ms. Rice also dwelt on India's noteworthy ability – particularly the Indian Navy - to respond to the December tsunami tragedy as an indicator of Delhi's increasing ability to contribute meaningfully to regional security and stability. This positive affirmation about India is in sharp contrast to the shrill response that was associated with Ms. Madeline Albright, a former US Secretary of State in the immediate aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests - and a pointer to the ground that has been covered in the India-US relationship. Thus the Rice visit to India is to be objectively assessed for its potential to advance those areas that may be deemed strategic from Delhi's point of view and each of them independently and together will have a direct co-relation with India's profile in the post 9-11 systemic. Managing major power bi-lateral relations calls for consistent prudence and the ability to distinguish what is immediate or tactical and those which have deeper resonances for the national interest. While divergences over Iran, F-16s and visa issues are more visible just now, they should not be allowed to deflect the potential of the Rice visit to strengthen the strategic convergences between the two nations. In identifying areas that are of deeper relevance to India, mention must also be made of Ms. Rice's assertion in Islamabad which she visited after Delhi. Predictably she praised General Musharraf for his role in supporting the US war against terrorism but also added a caveat when she noted: "We look forward to the evolution of a democratic path towards elections in 2007." India is not in position to either encourage or advise Pakistan's military rulers to return to the barracks even though this would be in the larger interests of the Pakistani people and regional stability and Ms. Rice's unambiguous comments have aroused considerable ferment in Pakistan's civil society and military establishment. And finally the AQ Khan issue also found mention in a manner that reflects the mood of the international community when Ms. Rice reiterated that "it is a network that we want to make certain that its tentacles are broken up as well." Whether it is the fundamental support to equitable democracy as a principle or the need to manage the emerging nuclear challenges and find a modus vivendi to the energy domain, there is a shared interest that binds India and the USA and the Rice visit served to illuminate these areas. The challenge in the next three will be to ensure that the Bush team remains focused on these issues. Confirmation of a visit by the US President to India within the year will give further impetus to the promising foundation laid by Ms. Rice in her first visit to the sub-continent and will make it truly 'landmark'. |
India-US Relations | |||
| Manmohan Doctrine and India's External Relations | March 16, 2005 | C Uday Bhaskar |
The next four weeks will be very eventful for advancing India's relations with the major powers as Delhi prepares to receive US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (March 16), Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (end-March) and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (early April). While there are distinctive issues that are specific to each of these bilateral relationships, the over-arching template as to how India will engage with the major powers and its overall external relations was provided in a landmark speech by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in end-February at the India Today Conclave in New Delhi. The major theme was the assertion of a renewed confidence about India and the manner in which it will recover its "lost space in the global economy and our economic status in the comity of nations". Linking India's current economic potential and abiding aspirations with the Nehruvian vision of free India's foreign policy as articulated in December 1947 wherein Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had cautioned that "ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy", Dr Singh provided the much-needed clarity regarding the determinants that ought to normatively underpin a nation's foreign policy. Noting that the global environment has never been "more conducive for India's economic development than it is today", the Prime Minister drew the axiomatic linkage with security and added that "the response of other countries to our national security concerns is being shaped by perceptions of business and economic opportunities." In their own way, the USA, China and Japan have emerged as major nodes of India's trade, technology and investment opportunities and, notwithstanding certain areas of divergence, with all these nations on specific security and strategic issues, the shared economic domain is too compelling to be ignored in how the bilateral ties evolve in the near future. And the inescapable reality is that India's bilateral relations with each of these states will have a non-linear impact on the relationship with the other two. In other words, the manner in which the Rice visit advances the India-US strand will have its own impact on India's ties with both China and Japan and vice versa. However it would be misleading to infer from the above that the Prime Minister's template is only about economics -- an area where his expertise is globally acknowledged -- both as the Finance Minister who steered India's hesitant liberalisation era and as the Governor of the Reserve Bank before that. A careful content-analysis of the speech would indicate that Dr Singh has made certain old and radical political and strategic assertions about India's orientation and relevance in the international comity. In keeping with his own persona, the assertions are confident and firm, albeit conveyed in a persuasive manner. Reiterating the resilience of India's multiple diversities and the manner in which the 'idea of India' has prevailed over the centuries, Dr Singh identifies openness, both in economic policies and in the social fabric as the cardinal values that need to be nurtured. Asserting that "the test of the vibrancy and resilience of a democracy is not just the ability to conduct elections and convene legislatures. It lies in a society's ability to communicate with itself and with the outside world through civilised modes of interaction. We are, like any real democracy, an argumentative society. The right to disagree and the freedom to debate is a hallmark of such societies." Dr Singh added an important caution for the domestic polity when he noted with concern the emergence of communalism and majoritarianism in the Indian body politic. The Achilles heel nature of these two trends and the extent to which they distort the societal ozone layer will be the litmus test for India, as Gujarat demonstrated in 2002. In what may be termed as a bold departure, the Prime Minister rejected any form of authoritarianism and welcomed the movement towards democracy in states like Afghanistan and their "long awaited tryst with peace." Referring to economies in transition and the manner in which the international community provides support for such transition, he introduced a new phrase into the political lexicon which may well become part of the Manmohan doctrine -- 'Societies in Transition.' Dr Singh suggested that developed democracies should assist such societies in their transition to becoming more open constituencies and the relevance for the southern Asian region with its many non-democratic regimes is self-evident. The inference that follows is not that India will export democracy to China -- that is a transition that the Chinese people and their leaders will have to steer -- but a signal that India can and will play a part in the transitions that are underway in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The convergence with the current Bush agenda that seeks to democratise the Greater Middle East is discernible but it is also evident that India will proceed in this endeavour in its own manner and not as part of any band-wagon. However, democratisation is not restricted to states but to the management of the global system as well and Dr Singh refers to seeking "the reform and democratisation of multilateral institutions" -- read the UN and its Security Council -- where the correspondence with Japan is clear. Yet another reiteration that is valuable is the commitment to universal nuclear disarmament that should dispel any perception that India has diluted its stand on this long term goal. India's profile as a responsible nuclear power has been high-lighted and these are areas that are relevant to all major powers against the backdrop of emerging nuclear challenges that were not envisaged by earlier regimes and agreements. The post-Cold War years resulted in a period of considerable turbulence and uncertainty as well-defined referents and paradigms were swept away and most nations, including India, groped for the appropriate framework or template to underpin their orientation and values by which they would deal with the external world. Dr Singh's February articulation will provide the core of what may later be defined as the Manmohan doctrine -- and the challenge will be in the next few weeks when these principles will be put into practice. |
Foreign Policy | |||
| Troubled Road to SAFTA | March 10, 2005 | Alok Bansal |
The proposal to reconvene the 13th SAARC Summit soon has rekindled the hopes of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) coming into force on schedule on 01 Jan 2006. It is a sad commentary on the regional economic cooperation that although the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been in existence for about 20 years, the intra regional trade is still languishing below five percent of the global trade of the member states. It is widely believed that all the seven states of the region will benefit immensely in the long run from the economic benefits of SAFTA. Removal of trade barriers and all other irritants hampering free trade in the SAARC region would result in a win-win situation for all, be it the governments, common people or businessmen. South Asian states have taken long to overcome their mutual suspicion and to relate to one another as a bloc. Inter-state hostility has lingered in the region while in other regions; the states have overcome far more complex hurdles to successfully activate regional trading blocs. The idea of South Asian Cooperation was mooted for the first time by then president of Bangladesh Gen Zia-ur-Rahman in May 1980. The SAARC was finally established at a summit held in Dhaka in December 1985. The first tentative steps towards economic cooperation within the region were taken in July 1991 when the Council of Ministers, in Male endorsed a Regional Study on Trade, Manufactures and Services. The SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) came into force on 7 December 1995, exactly a decade after the establishment of SAARC. In January 1996, SAARC commerce ministers reiterated commitment to accelerate the SAPTA process and set realisation of SAFTA as the goal. A report by a Group of Eminent Persons (EPG) titled SAARC: Vision Beyond the Year 2000 was submitted to the Tenth SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1998. The report envisaged a Free Trade Area by the year 2010, a Customs Union by 2015 and an Economic Union by 2020. However, after the Colombo Summit, the entire process came to a grinding halt mainly because of the rapid deterioration in Indo- Pak relations. It took four years to put the process back on the rails. A commitment was made at the Eleventh SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in 2002 for the creation of a South Asian Economic Union. Finally it was the Twelfth Summit at Islamabad, where the Framework Agreement for a South Asia Free Trade Area was signed. The agreement comes into effect on 01 January 2006 and requires all countries to reduce tariffs to 0-5%. The time schedule for reduction of tariffs is as follows :-
The agreement has a provision for sensitive lists and the tariff reduction will not be applicable to the items in these lists. There will be different sensitive lists applicable to Least Developed States and other states. These will be reviewed regularly at intervals not exceeding four years to curtail them. The agreement provides for special treatment to Least Developed States and expects others to provide them with preferential tariffs during the process of Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP). The agreement recognizes that the Least Developed States will lose customs revenue due to the implementation of the TLP and has recommended establishment of a mechanism to compensate them for the loss. This mechanism and its rules and regulations are required to be established prior to the commencement of the TLP. The agreement also recommends the adoption of trade facilitation and other measures to support and complement SAFTA for mutual benefit. These include harmonisation of standards, simplification of custom clearance procedures, simplification of banking procedures for import financing, transit facilities for intra-SAARC trade, removal of barriers to intra SAARC investments, development of communication systems and transport infrastructure and simplification of procedures for business visas. The treaty is however, silent on the goals of establishing a Customs Union or Economic Union in South Asia. . Many critics feel that the schedule for implementation of SAFTA is extremely slow and the process envisaged in the Treaty may be overtaken by events at both bilateral and global levels. Bilaterally, the conclusion of various free trade agreements (latest being the Pak –Sri Lanka FTA) might make SAFTA redundant. Similarly at the global levels the lowering of tariffs consequent to WTO negotiations may make SAFTA superfluous. However, going by the past experience, the process can be derailed by any adverse political relationships between the countries of the region. It is therefore prudent to move cautiously. The agreement also leaves the Services – a major component of the regional economy, outside its scope. This is a major drawback, as the Services have become major drivers of the economies of the region and account for over 50 percent of the GDP in most of the countries. The treaty is also silent on liberalisation of investment in the region. The movement of capital can compensate the trade imbalance of Least Developed States and is therefore necessary for stimulating trade. There is no doubt that SAFTA is in the interest of the region but the political environment in the region makes any forecast of its outcome extremely hazardous. According to studies, by completely eliminating tariffs on all the products, under the SAFTA, the likely increase in intra-regional trade of SAARC would be substantial. The simulation results show that the complete removal of tariffs would enhance intra-regional trade by 1.6 times or 160 per cent. If the political events do not derail the process and SAFTA comes into force on 01 Jan 2006 it will be a major milestone but there is a lot of ground to be covered before SAFTA comes into force, The actions that need to be taken expeditiously are as follows:-
The SAFTA agreement however, is only the initial stage and the infrastructure of the region needs to be integrated to facilitate integration of trade. Cooperation in the field of Energy and strengthening of transportation, transit and communication links in the region are essential for fostering meaningful economic cooperation. |
South Asia | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) | ||
| Indo-Pak Peace Process: Keep the Process Afloat | March 10, 2005 | Ashok K. Behuria |
India-Pakistan interaction, in recent days, is fast losing its familiar flavour of distrust and bitterness. This is not to deny, however, that one can still identify the inertial sense of rancour, the propensity to misunderstand and misinterpret each other within the dialogic track that has completed one year. But, this time round, there is certainly a precipitate will on both the sides to engage each other, to diversify the nodes of interaction and to treat each track-one interaction as part of a ‘process’ not ‘event’, as the Indian Foreign Minister so aptly put during the course of the dialogue not long ago. Howsoever haltingly the process is hurtling along, the incremental advances are there for all to see, i.e., the willingness to re-open Srinagar-Muzafarabad bus-link after almost 58 years, the decision to revive the Munabao-Khokrapar rail-link and above all, the shedding of Indian inhibition on the gas-pipeline issue. The thorns remain however. The spoilers are getting impatient on the margins. The issue of Kashmir everybody knows can turn the applecart. The move to re-start the bus-link between the two parts of Kashmir has divided the public opinion in Pakistan. Excepting Benazir Bhutto’s Peoples’ Party, and of course, the ruling PML(Q), being touted as King’s party, no other political party or group welcomed the step. The Indian decision to climb down on the issue of use of Indian passport by Kashmiris travelling to the other side has been interpreted by them as an adroit move to scuttle the Kashmir issue. The chief commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen and the leader of the United Jehad Council, Syed Salahuddin even said that the Pakistani government was playing with the blood of the mujahideens fighting in Kashmir. The sacrifices of the freedom fighters are being wasted, said the spokesman of the right-wing Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur). Musharraf and his men have assured the people of Pakistan that the core interests of Pakistan — an allusion to the Kashmir issue and the safety of the strategic assets of Pakistan — shall be protected, even if the gates between the two Kashmirs were to open. Meanwhile, the Baglihar issue (the hydro-electric power-plant India is undertaking on river Chenab) has strayed out of the bilateral track. Pakistan has injected a third negotiator into the process by seeking the help of the World Bank to mediate between the two countries as the Bank had initially mediated and was a guarantor to the Indus Water Treaty between the two countries in 1960. India has requested continuation of bilateral negotiations over the issue but has taken no exception to Pakistan’s appeal to the World Bank. Pakistan has also brought in the issue of Kishenganga project on Neelum river in the Gurez valley, where India is seeking to divert the course of the river through a tunnel to the Wullar lake. The discussions on Kishenganga are going on. However, the India-Pakistan differences over Baglihar and Kishenganga have not affected the rhythm of the ongoing talks. The trajectory of the process of dialogue seems to be on a positive track even if many analysts, in the US (Stephen Cohen, George Weinbaum, Hussain Haqani, Ashley Tellis etc.) and Pakistan, have come out with their observations, recently in a conference organized by the US Institute of Peace, that there is no future for the India-Pakistan dialogue. The irreconcilable differences over Kashmir and the ideological divergences between the two state-systems will soon upset the process, they have concluded. The proliferation of tracks in the ongoing process of dialogue, however, suggest otherwise. The connect between the two Punjabs, the movement of retired soldiers, theatre groups, writers, poets, parliamentarians, students, political personalities, cine-stars and businessmen across the India-Pakistan borders, the effusive bonhomie between the people of India and Pakistan reveal the urge of the two people to come together in spite of their differences. They meet, argue inconclusively over Kashmir, convince each other about their mutually exclusive perceptions and depart with tears in their eyes, hoping against hope that such opportunities for fights would be there for all time to come. Is it because they feel that years of separation have failed to wipe out the bonds that unite them? Is it because they want to take maximum advantage of the thaw that has set in between India and Pakistan? Is this because there is a mutual realization of the human costs of protracted sense of bitterness? The leaders of the two countries will have to register this surge of goodwill between the two people, the spontaneous flow of empathy for one another across the borders. It is easier to provoke hatred than to inspire love. The negativity in India-Pakistan relationship, the inertia of the politics of partition, is mostly an elite construct. The elite has managed to sell this idea of hatred to the people in Pakistan quite successfully. As some Pakistani observers (Adeel Khan, Khaled Ahmed) have concluded, the people of Pakistan are more united in their hatred against India than their love for themselves. The official histories of both the states have sought to villainise each other. One is reminded of the observations of Vajpayee during his trip to Pakistan as foreign minister in 1978 that the leaders of India and Pakistan have to shape political opinion rather than fall victims to it. The constituency of hatred has to be quarantined and its impact on statecraft has to be identified and evaluated. At the same time, the leaders of the two countries will have to take their best step forward in each of the bilateral meets and shun the temptation to withdraw and reap political capital at the domestic level out of an exclusivist-moralist position. As the process shows signs of progress now, it is necessary to take the following points into account, to keep it afloat.
The onset of the present peace process is likely to pay huge economic dividends and ensure stability in both the countries. Peace is the crying need of the hour. The leaders will have to realise that they hold the keys to peace and they owe it to their people. |
South Asia | India-Pakistan Relations | ||
| Till the Dragon spits fire | March 10, 2005 | Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay |
Putting an end to all speculations, protests from the media and other quarters and hectic Chinese diplomatic parleys in Brussels before the EU-China Summit in December 2004, the EU finally declared (December 8) that the arms embargo on China would not be lifted for the time being. The embargo, which was sanctioned against China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989, remained one of the most debatable issues before the summit. The EU however informed that there was a willingness within the Union to work towards the lifting of the ban. In fact, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao attached great importance to the existing embargo. On the eve of the summit, Jiabao, who led the Chinese delegation to Brussels, was categorical while commenting on the EU decision. He informed that the Chinese demand for lifting of embargo does not mean that China would like to purchase advanced weapons from Europe. However, he demanded that the lifting of the sanctions, ‘a legacy of the Cold War’ would put an end to the political discrimination against China. Chinese diplomats in Brussels had worked hard to get a decisive outcome on this issue from the summit. Wang Shaoxin, spokesperson at the Chinese Mission in Brussels, also reportedly told the EU officials that continuing the arms embargo would not be beneficial for future Sino-European cooperation. Similarly, on December 3, 2004, a Chinese Foreign Ministry press briefing underscored that although the lifting of the arms embargo would not be linked with any other issue, it would be impossible that bilateral relations would not be affected by maintaining such embargo. Chinese officials were seen to be pursuing this issue with the important European national governments with great care. Finally, a compromise was worked out in the shape of the joint statement at the end of the summit. The Chinese side welcomed it as a positive sign, as the EU confirmed in the joint statement its political will to continue to work towards lifting of the embargo. In return, China also expressed its commitment to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as soon as possible. The interest of the European Union in general and some specific nations in particular, in lifting the arms embargo on China, is quite comprehensible. Official statistics speak for themselves. In 2003, the EU sanctioned arms sales to China was worth €416 million, which was almost double of the approved sales in 2002 (€210 million). France, like in 2002 (€105 million), remained at the top of the list with the sanctioned amount of €171 million. While the debate of lifting the arms embargo on China is getting a transatlantic dimension, figures published in the EU Official Journal is certainly not comfortable for the EU. The record of the major EU nations in supplying arms to China, in reality has reduced the embargo to a misnomer. In addition, observers are of the opinion that the EU arms export policy lacks coherence and does not address the issue of transferring dual-use technology to China. The symbolic arms embargo, therefore, strengthens the Chinese and partially European argument that it is a legacy of Cold War and it unnecessarily brackets China with regimes in Zimbabwe and North Korea. One may also raise some pertinent facts that China is an important partner in EU Galileo project and as per latest figures, Sino-European trade has reached €122 billion till November 2004, why then the sanctions are still in place? The issue appears to have been well discussed at the European Union level and a EU agreement on lifting the arms embargo on China is already on the cards, notwithstanding the American displeasure. This was clearly visible in the announcement made by the European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, during the visit of Condoleezza Rice in Europe. But there was yet a dilemma on the EU side under whose presidency the decision would be ultimately taken? Those who are studying the issue minutely may recall that Jean Peter Balkenende, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, who held the EU presidency in the second half of 2004, did not specify after the EU-China Summit whether his successor from the smaller Benelux neighbour, Luxembourg, may lift the arms embargo in the first half of 2005. It could be argued that irrespective of the size and population of a member country holding the EU presidency, decisions at EU level are taken unanimously. But it should also be mentioned that every member country also aspires to take some path-breaking decisions during its presidency, which could also be projected later as its major achievements. However, given the gravity and political ramifications of the decision to end the arms embargo, it was interesting to observe that Britain, who will hold the next presidency from July 2005, put the responsibility of this unpleasant decision to one of the smallest European nations, Luxembourg. The statement of Jack Straw prior to his visit to Beijing in January 2005, that he believed that the embargo could be lifted during Luxembourg's current tenure, made the diplomatic calculations clearer. Britain would not like to be connected with such a controversial decision to end the fifteen-year old arms embargo, sanctioned on the ground of one of the most historic cases of human rights violations in present times. It is true that European Union collectively and its member nations individually have invested considerably in efforts aimed at improving human rights situation in China. At another level, the EU cannot also deceive itself by endorsing the Chinese argument that the human rights situation has improved remarkably since Tiananmen. The human rights record of China has been rather poor and violations are more discreet then ever before. The effect of sanctions has been negligible. It makes good sense at this juncture to engage China and persuade her to take democratic reforms in a graduated manner. But by progressively arming China, the EU may be losing its power to push China towards democracy. Acquiring more military-technological muscle may also contribute to the sense of insecurity in its neighbourhood. In fact, experts opine that there is lack of transatlantic understanding about the region. The EU must consider the ramifications of a further increased military cooperation with China in the Chinese neighbourhood. The questions remain: Will the cooperation augur well for the region and world at large or the European arms merchants may have to wait for the answer, till perhaps the Dragon spits fire? |
Nuclear and Arms Control | EU-China Summit | ||
| Defence outlay-modest increase but shades of gray | March 01, 2005 | C Uday Bhaskar |
The defence expenditure (DE) announced today is Rs. 83,000 crores and this is a modest increase of Rs 6,000 crores or 7.7% over last year’s budgeted estimate (BE). As a thumb-rule, this percentage is less than the amount required to stand still when general national inflation and the military deflator are taken into account. In the Indian context, a figure of about 10 to 12 percent would have ensured the same level of budget support for defence as the previous year at constant prices. However, this year’s figures reveal a very encouraging sign in that the revised estimate (RE) of the DE is the same as the BE, meaning thereby that the amount allocated at the beginning of the financial year has been actually spent or disbursed and not returned as unspent to the national exchequer. This reverses a trend that had set in during the NDA government years when large sums of money were returned--in one year (2002-03) to the tune of Rs 9,000 crores. Consequently there has been a backlog of inventory obsolescence in the three armed forces across the board for the last decade---a reality that was driven home in an undesirable manner during the Kargil War of 1999. It is noteworthy that in the financial year (FY) 2004-05 whereas Rs 77,000 was allocated at the BE stage, the RE as indicated today is the same, and all the money allocated has been spent. This would indicate that the defence modernization and acquisition plan is moving as per the budgetary schedule and, given the many constraints in the systemic procedures that characterize the Indian experience, this must be seen as a positive indicator. But the real challenge is to ensure that this trend is sustained, and this is where some shades of gray are discernible from the Chidambaram budget. From the preliminary figures currently available, it appears that the capital outlay of the DE which caters to the modernization and acquisition has reduced marginally though there is an apparent increase in the total outlay. There is an interesting pattern embedded in these statistics. The capital outlay of the DE ranged from Rs 16,207 to Rs 14,953 to Rs 16,863 crores in the last three years of the NDA regime and many major acquisition programs were kept on hold. It was only in the last year that pending deals were finalized such as for the Sukhoi and AJT (advanced jet trainer) and the aircraft carrier Gorshkov, among other military inventory items. Hence the capital outlay of the DE in FY 2004-05 jumped by almost 100 % from Rs 16,863 crores to Rs 33,483 crores. However this year (2005-06), while the capital outlay has increased marginally by 2.66 % from Rs 33,483 crores to Rs 34,375 crores, but, more significantly, the share of the three services---the army, navy and the air force---as a whole has shrunk by about Rs 500 crores from Rs 31,490 crore in the last fiscal to Rs 31,001 crore this year. The inference that follows is that some of the big ticket items that have been mooted such as a new generation of combat aircraft, for instance, would not receive adequate budgetary support this year. The larger challenge for the Indian DE is the inability to reduce numbers and stabilize the total revenue component of the budget, which is traditionally between 55 and 65 percent of the total DE. The revenue component caters to the standing costs of the overall military edifice and with a one million plus army, which over the years has been drawn into low intensity conflict (LIC) and internal security (IS) duties, it is evident that the army which is the lead-service cannot reduce numbers dramatically. Hence the army is unable to arrive at the right balance between its standing costs and the need to have a steady technological up-grade, that is be able to absorb the Revolution in Military Affairs---the RMA. Currently there is also need to find resources to cater for the Assured Career Progression (ACP) scheme, which in itself is very commendable as a long-delayed human resource measure to redress promotion imbalances. When this scheme is implemented in total, the impact on the recurring revenue budget will need to be added, which in turn will add to the existing imbalance between capital and revenue for the army. The overall preliminary analysis of the defence outlay at this stage is that it is just about satisfactory at the tactical level, that is on an annual basis. But there is a need to carry out a more holistic strategic review of the country’s military and defence profile and ensure that the status quo that has accreted over the years is redressed in a manner that is deemed appropriate wherein the technological edge of the military machine is retained and jointness advanced, even while ensuring that the ‘izzat’ of the man behind the machine is respected in the long run. Squaring this circle is the perennial challenge for liberal democracies and it remains to be seen how the UPA government will innovate over the next four years. |
Defence Economics & Industry | Defence Budget | ||
| China : Reactions to Iraq Elections | February 15, 2005 | Raviprasad Narayanan |
China has not issued any official statement on the recently concluded elections in Iraq. However, in a Press Conference on February1, 2005, to a question on the elections, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan said that:
Earlier in November 2004, at the special conference on Iraq hosted by Egypt, which brought together representatives of over 20 countries and regional and international organizations, including Iraq's neighbouring countries, the G-8, China, the United Nations and the European Union, the Permanent Representative of the PRC at the United Nations Wang Guangya stated that:
The official media as reflected by commentaries and opinions on Iraq do identify four challenges faced by the newly elected Iraqi government, namely: the challenge posed by anti-US insurgents; the arduous task of reconstruction; the increasing schisms amongst religious groupings (sects); and, the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq. From the perspective of the Chinese media, anti-US insurgents target US-led coalition troops and Iraqi security forces, governmental officials, foreigners and even the common people who support the interim government. These armed insurgents representing various organizations have launched attacks, explosions and suicide bomb attacks against targets. In reconstructing Iraq, the task gets complicated owing to the shortage of oil supply due to the severely damaged oil infrastructure in addition to the uninterrupted attacks and sabotage by anti-US insurgents. These economic losses are officially estimated at several billion US dollars. This goes a long way in disproving the US’ assumptions prior to the war that oil exports are sufficient to restore Iraq’s economy. China has been participating in the process of Iraq's reconstruction by training diplomats and professionals in the fields of economic management and energy development. Referring to public opinion polls held in the US, Europe and even Iraq, the Chinese media highlights the point that most Iraqis are disgusted with the presence of US-led coalition troops in their country though many of them also oppose anti-US insurgents. A majority of Iraqis, the People’s Daily felt, hopes for the early withdrawal of foreign troops from their country. The Chinese media emphasised the fact that the recently concluded elections were held under the continued presence of foreign troops. These elections, while determining Iraq's future state system, the nature of state power and the redistribution of political power, received universal attention from Iraq's neighbours, the Arab world and the international community. While China emphasizes the role and importance of the United Nations in any solution to the crisis, it repeatedly calls for the maintenance of Iraq’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Implicit in China’s calls for the establishment of a “broad representative authority” to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Iraqi people are the concerns it has for the security and stability of the entire region. It could well be argued from a Chinese perspective, that the Iraq crisis reflects the confusion and dilemma of the United Nations in preventing superpowers (read US) from acting alone. In a commentary that appeared in the People’s Daily prior to the elections in Iraq, and one that perhaps reflected China’s concerns regarding the presence of US troops in Iraq, it was mentioned that the elections were “…[A}merica's utmost effort at retrieving its image and creating conditions for its troops withdrawal from Iraq as soon as possible.” The same commentary also added that Iraq’s general election “is part of the "Greater Mid-east Plan" for the United States to carry out its democratic reform in the Middle East.” For many Chinese commentators and opinion makers, since the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001, the United States has restrained Arab countries and the Islamic world by the twin tactics of "counter-terrorism lineation" and "political reform". Over the past three years and more, through the two wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and the three general elections in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, the United States has sounded the “winds of change” for it to begin transforming the political domains of the Middle East. This “democratization process,” it is felt strongly, will pave the way for Washington to strengthen its military presence in the Middle East and its strategy of political influence. It can be inferred that for China, Iraq's future should be determined by the Iraqi people and that the independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of the country should not be issues that complicate the existing situation. While security concerns regarding Iraq demand a comprehensive political solution and efforts have to be made to improve the same, these should fall within the framework of the development of the political process in the country. On the role of the United Nations, China believes that the Iraq issue should be solved within the framework of the UN Charter and hopes the UN can have an important role in Iraq's reconstruction. |
East Asia | Elections, Iraq, China |