The thrice postponed Afghan parliamentary and provincial council elections are finally over. But, is the Bonn-mandated political process over? With the US intent on cutting down its troop levels in Afghanistan this year, is the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan also over? It is being said that the Bonn process has concluded with the September 18, 2005 elections. If so, then it is pertinent to examine the end-result of the four-year political process and the recently concluded elections. The three landmark events of the process—adoption of a new Constitution by the Loya Jirga in January 2004, the presidential election in October 2004 and the recently concluded September 18 parliamentary elections—pale into insignificance when compared with the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan. The elections have neatly brought out, and to an extent brought back, a complex mix of actors and forces that have defined the socio-political character of Afghan war for over a quarter of a century. The very fact that 2004-05 has been the worst for Afghanistan in terms of levels of violence, drug production and the Taliban onslaught, makes the whole political process and the ‘war on terror’ questionable. It is in the context of the enormous challenges that lie ahead in post-election Afghanistan that India needs to assess its options.

The 159 Million Dollar Elections

Is post-election Afghanistan any different from the pre-election one? It was a foregone conclusion that the new Afghan Parliament would be a motley mix of Islamists, former mujahideen1, drug barons, former Communists2, technocrats, academics, independents, women and the Taliban. The strange mix of candidates that have sprung up from the elections reflects the diversity of stakeholders in the Afghan polity. The victory of some Taliban candidates and their appointment in the Meshrano Jirga (the 102-member upper house) by President Karzai is a notable development.3

The biggest challenge before Presidnet Karzai and his backers is to secure parliamentary approval for his ministerial appoinments. President Karzai’s position in the domestic political calculus remains as precarious as ever. His government will, in all probability, remain dependent on his relationship with the diverse mujahideen factions that have come to dominate the new Afghan Parliament.4 The possibility of power realignments among the different factions to outmanoeuvre one another will continue to be the defining feature of post-election Afghan politics. The 12-party coalition or the National Understanding Front (the Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli) formerly led by the Tajik leader Muhammad Yunus Qanuni can become a political force for President Karzai to reckon with.5

The results of the elections6 make it amply clear that President Karzai may have to reshuffle his cabinet to accommodate some more mujahideen or factional commanders, or their proxy candidates, particularly from among the former Northern Alliance (NA). In effect, the technocrats and the independents in the current cabinet may be increasingly replaced by candidates representing the competing interests of various mujahideen factions. President Karzai’s inability to appoint a new interior minister since Ahmed Ali Jalali resigned on September 27, 2005 underlines his difficulties. He is all too aware of the fact that without cutting deals with the various Afghan factions, it would not be possible for Kabul to have even a minimal presence in the provinces. It is difficult to say to what extent Karzai’s attempt to drive divisions in the loosely knit NA, and to turn their inter-factional and intra-faction divides to his advantage in the run-up to the presidential election, has met with success.

However, President Karzai has definitely emerged as a rallying figure in the US and the UN-backed political structure in Kabul, both for the international community and the mujahideen leaders and commanders. It appears that President Karzai and the mujahideen will continue to remain in an inter-dependence mode for times to come. President Karzai will have to continue with his balancing act between the aspirations of the mujahideen and the Islamists on the one hand, and the urgent need to carry out the reforms process on the other.7 But do the Afghan people have the patience for it keeping in view the high level of corruption among the government officials and the slow pace of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts? The overall electoral process has undoubtedly thrown up new actors in the political set-up in Kabul, who are highly qualified West-oriented professionals and technocrats with no militia behind them. The constant friction between the conservative older mujahideen leadership and the reform-minded pro-West members in the government will continue to test President Karzai’s leadership as before. Therefore, the challenges ahead for Hamid Karzai, whose leadership itself is unique and unconventional in the Afghan context, will not be any different in postelection Afghanistan.

Bonn Process: Concluded or Failed?

The international focus on Afghanistan receded as the Iraq War unfolded. The basic objective of institution-building tapered off as the Bonn process itself failed to institutionalise. The fundamental spirit of the Bonn process was lost as all efforts were diverted towards securing Hamid Karzai’s position in Afghan politics prior to the US presidential elections, and in holding together diverse constituents of the provisional government led by him. As a result, Karzai did emerge as a central figure in the internationally-backed Bonn process, but it also led to the reestablishment and reemergence of the mujahideen leadership who have since been a hindrance to the process of reforms and institution-building.

The US failed to reconcile its interests in Afghanistan and the region with the objectives of the Bonn Agreement.8 Its continued dependence on the militia provided by various mujahideen factions, since the beginning of the Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, was bound to legitimise an overarching role for the mujahideen leadership in the Bonn process. The reworking of the US-mujahideen nexus to oust their common foe, the Taliban, made the Bonn process more of a US agenda than an Afghan one. All through the four years, mujahideen leaders and commanders have been resisting the idea of disarmament and demobilisation of their private armies. They have also been resisting the idea of anti-narcotics operations as they finance their militias through drug money. Simply put, they are against any idea which would lead to the dilution of their power. With the Afghan national army and police beset with many problems, President Karzai’s authority remains limited and dependent on foreign troops and the cooperation of the mujahideen factions.

The policy objective of the US on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and political stability in Afghanistan has been an apparent failure. The fact that the Taliban and its allies are far from decimation; that much of the country is still controlled by extra-constitutional authorities; that the levels of violence and casualty have been the highest this year; and that Afghanistan remains the world’s largest illicit opium-poppy producer9 bear testimony to the failure of the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan. Ironically, despite all the dismal facts and statistics, the US role remains indispensable. The US policy towards the Taliban, which has been a mix of outright military action and reconciliation, has a strong bearing on the future of Afghanistan.

The Bonn process may have thus far failed in terms of institutionbuilding and reforms, but the significant role it played in providing a certain framework to the post-9/11 political process in Afghanistan cannot be missed. Compared to previous agreements and accords, the Bonn Agreement was able to ensure the involvement of the UN and the international community in re-building Afghanistan. But the key question, however, remains. What after the elections? What after the Bonn process? With no qualitative change in the situation in the last four years, and with US intent on lowering its presence in Afghanistan, there is a growing skepticism about the future of Afghanistan.

Keeping in view the necessity to build institutions of governance and to carry out reforms, it is imperative to devise a long-term plan under the aegis of the UN for the post-election Afghanistan. The peace and reconstruction process in Afghanistan needs continuity otherwise whatever little has been achieved in the last four years will be conclusively undone. It will be prudent for the international community and the US to realise the folly of re-abandoning Afghanistan.

Assessing India’s Constraints and Options

The challenges and constraints to India’s Afghan policy are immense. The strong element of unpredictability and uncertainty in Afghan politics calls for constant evaluation of India’s options in Afghanistan. The growing Indo-Afghan ties are commensurate with India’s geoeconomic interests both within and beyond the Indian Subcontinent. The perfectly timed visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Kabul on August 28-29, 2005, just three weeks before the crucial September 18 elections, and the areas of cooperation identified between the two countries, makes it amply clear that India is looking for a tangible and a long-term engagement in Afghanistan.

In fact, India’s engagement in Afghanistan has come a long way since the closure of its embassy in Kabul in September 1996 to the August 2005 visit of the Indian Prime Minister, the first in 29 years. Since the January 2002 Tokyo Conference for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India has committed an assistance of $550 million. India has been involved in training programmes and in humanitarian and infrastructure development projects in Afghanistan. India’s contribution in the training of Afghan diplomats, judges, police officers, doctors; developing Afghanistan’s civil aviation and transport sectors; construction of roads, dams, hospitals, educational institutions; and in establishing telecom and power transmission lines is a widely acclaimed fact.

Apart from the political uncertainty in Afghanistan and India’s own resource-limitations, the Indo-Afghan relationship is constrained by its geography and the Pakistan factor. Though India is among the leading donors to Afghanistan, clearly the largest in the region, the Indo-Afghan relationship is yet to realise its full potential. The fact that India does not have borders contiguous with Afghanistan puts India into a dependency mode. Pakistan’s refusal to provide overland transit facilities for Indian goods bound for Afghanistan and further to Iran and the Central Asian markets has led to India taking a longer and a circuitous sea route via Iran. Ironically, Pakistan allows Afghanistan to transport its goods bound for India. The delicate nature of the ongoing political process in Afghanistan and the fractious nature of Afghan polity, coupled with Pakistan’s intransigence in facilitating Indo-Afghan trade, are likely to test the resilience of Indo-Afghan ties.

The current challenge before India, given the above constraints, is how to sustain the growing momentum of its relationship with Afghanistan. Some of the viable options before India are:

• India needs to consolidate and build up on its four years of achievements in Afghanistan by not letting Manmohan Singh’s recent visit become a touch-and-go affair. If India is to reach out to Central Asia and the Gulf region, Indo-Afghan ties have to be high in the order of priority. India should not loose sight of the geostrategic significance of Afghanistan as its growing political and economic interests lie both within the subcontinent and the regions beyond.
• India should further broad-base its engagement in Afghanistan by promoting greater institutional cooperation between the two countries. Identifying new areas of cooperation and opening new vistas of joint ventures will have to be a continuing process. India needs to engage diverse groups within the civil society in Afghanistan, such as, political parties, intellectuals, NGOs, educational and research institutions, media groups, cultural organisations, businessmen and so on. Given the shared past and civilizational ties between the two countries, the idea of establishing an Indian Cultural Centre in Afghanistan and vice-versa can go a long way in reinvigorating the two countries’ relationship.
• With Afghanistan now having a newly elected parliament, regular interaction between the parliamentarians can go a long way strengthening the relations between the two governments. India can take the initiative by sending a parliamentary delegation to Kabul to interact with the newly elected Afghan parliamentarians and to subsequently invite them to India.
• Both bilateral and multilateral approaches are important in India’s contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
• Given the uncertainties of Indo-Pak ties, India needs to strengthen the infrastructure which facilitates its trade with Afghanistan via Iran. The construction of Zaranj-Delaram road is a crucial step in the same direction. It will be prudent if alternate routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, particularly via Iran, are developed and strengthened. Indo-Iranian ties are vital to facilitating trade not only with Afghanistan but also with the Gulf region and Central Asia. India should continue to explore ways of overcoming its geographical limitations by circumventing Pakistan.
• India needs to build bridges with all the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. India should balance its relationship with both the Pashtuns and the minority ethnic groups. The idea of engaging anti-India politico-military formations in Afghanistan should not be considered as untenable in the changed and changing scenario in Afghanistan.
• As Indo-Pak relationship impinges on the relations and the interests of all the three countries—India, Pakistan and Afghanistan—and the regions beyond, viable scope for cooperation between the three countries may be explored. To promote a strong sense of economic cooperation in the region, the political and economic interests of the respective countries will have to be accommodated.

President Karzai had categorically stated during Manmohan Singh’s visit that peace between India and Pakistan is vital for regional security and economic cooperation. During the joint news conference, President Karzai had emphasised, “Afghanistan is very happy to see a dialogue for better relations between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan is directly affected by friendship between the two countries. The improvement of relations between India and Pakistan are such a necessity for the people of this whole region that overtakes every other consideration”.10 Aware of the fact that Pakistan’s cooperation is imperative for any regional effort to root out terrorism, Karzai further remarked that, “India, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to join hands to fight this global menace”.11

However, given Pakistan’s internal political dynamics, it is unlikely that it will or will be able to completely renounce its support for the Taliban and other extremist forces in Afghanistan. Despite the US pressure, Pakistan has not yet given up its policy of exporting, promoting and supporting terrorism in order to further its political agenda against both its eastern and western neighbours. The Taliban rule and events of 9/11 have made it clear that a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan is not only in the interest of India, but also crucial for regional and international security.

India as the world’s largest democracy is playing an important role in supporting democracy, institution-building and in consolidating the achievements of the four-year Bonn process in Afghanistan. In South Asia, India is the only credible country which is in a position to rollback terrorism and religious extremism epitomised by the Taliban movement, in cooperation with the international community. In fact, India’s role in the economic revival of Afghanistan and in promoting regional economic cooperation is an essential prerequisite.

However, much also depends on the US’ future policy in Afghanistan. The inability of the US to address the paradoxes of its ‘war on terror’ has thus far left the political climate in Afghanistan more uncertain and fluid. The persistent divide between the US’ regional agenda and the interest of Afghanistan does not bode well for the latter. US withdrawal from Afghanistan would inevitably lead to a full comeback of those very forces against whom it had resolved to wage war after 9/11. In that sense, the consequences of re-abandoning Afghanistan at this critical juncture will be disastrous. As for India, it will have to wade through the complex maze of Afghan and subcontinental politics, enmeshed with the interests of extraregional powers and actors, to pursue its expanding economic and political interests. For now, growing Indo-Afghan relationship is a reality.

References/End Notes

• 1. Often referred to as ‘warlords’ or ‘regional strongmen’.
• 2. Former communist General Noor-ul-haq Alomi from Kandahar; former interior minister in the Soviet -backed communist government in the 1980s, Syed Muhammad Gulabzoi from Khost; former deputy minister, Babrak Shinwari from Nangarhar; former advisor to President Najibullah, Kabir Ranjbar from Kabul are among the important former communists who won the elections.
• 3. The notable among the former members of the Taliban who won seats in the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house) are ex-commander Haji Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi from Zabul, ex-provincial governor Mawlavi Mohammad Islam Mohammadi from Samangan and a senior former security official Hanif Shah Al-Hussein from Khost. As for the Meshrano Jirga (the upper house), Arsala Rahmani, the deputy minister for religious affairs in the former Taliban Government from Paktiya Province, is among the 34 members recently appointed by President Karzai. Other important appointees to the Meshrano Jirga are the former defence minister and leader of the Tajik militia, Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim from Panjshir; Sebghatullah Mojadeddi from Kabul; and Sher Muhammad Akhund, the governor of Helmand Province.
• 4. The notable among the former mujahideen leaders and commanders elected to the Wolesi Jirga are Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf of Ittehad-e-Islami (renamed as Tanzime Dawat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan), Haji Mohammad Mohaqqiq and Mohammad Yonus Qanuni from Kabul; Padshah Khan Zadran from Paktiya; Haji Hazarat Ali from Nangarhar; Pir Sayed Ishaq Gailani of Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Afghanistan from Paktika; and Burhan-ud Din Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami from Badakhshan.
• 5. Muhammad Yunus Qanuni has stepped down as the leader of the National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli after being elected as the Chairman of the Wolesi Jirga or the lower house of the Afghan national assembly on December 21, 2005. Former Afghan president and Jamiat-e-Islami leader Burhan-ud Din Rabbani, who withdrew his candidacy for the chairmanship of the Wolesi Jirga in favour of Qanuni, is likely to be the new opposition leader. See “Qanuni Steps Down From Opposition Leadship” at http://www.azadiradio.org/ en/news/2005/12/13385C33-584A-4E7F-93B7-2DE69EB99647.ASP
• 6. The complete details of the election process and the final certified results of the elections to the Wolesi Jirga (the Lower House), the Provisional Councils and the Meshrano Jirga (the Upper House) are available at http://www.jemb.org/
• 7. Also see Vishal Chandra, “Warlords and Karzai’s Balancing Act”, Strategic Analysis, 29(1), January-March 2005. pp. 155-161.
• 8. The Bonn Agreement, formally known as Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, was signed on December 5, 2001. The four Afghan groups invited to the Bonn Conference (Nov 27-Dec 05, 2001) were – Peshawar Group, the Northern Alliance, Rome Group and the Cyprus Group, each representing varying background and political interests. The text of the Agreement is available at http:// www. u n a m a - a f g . o r g / d o c s / _ n o n U N % 2 0 D o c s / _ I n t e r n a t i o n - Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm. Also at http://www.uno.de/frieden/ afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm
• 9. For further details see Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes and the Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan in November 2004, at http://www.unodc.org/ pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf
• 10. Yousuf Azimy, “Karzai Says Better India-Pakistani Ties Vital”, at http:// www.swissinfo.org/sen/swissinfo.html?siteSect=143&sid= 6042952&cKey= 1125227124000.
• 11. Makia Monir and Zubair Babakarkhail, “New Delhi Assures Kabul of All-Out Support Against Terrorism”, at http://www.pajhwok.com/en/news/ viewStory.asp?lng=eng&id=6553

Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (Penguin Books, New York, 2005), pp. 386.

Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004), pp. 270.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 2002), pp. 222.

G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton University Press, Princeton N. J., 2001), pp. 293.

I – Imperial Power as a Problem Statement

The term ‘Empire’ and its conceptualisation thereof have been debated by scholars for long. The debate continues till date and is likely to be so in the foreseeable future, till at least a satisfactory explanation emanates from it. While the Marxist-Leninist school of thought, contextualising it under various stages of evolution of society, explains it as the highest form of capitalism, eventually leading to the withering away of the state system and bringing in a classless society, liberals and others have found it difficult to explain the broad contours of imperialism. In the absence of a generally agreed definition, contemporary scholarship, especially in the West, tends to explain the term by taking into account relative economic, political and military capabilities of a particular state vis-à-vis others. Inherent ambiguities in such efforts invariably lead to coinage of many other terms like ‘superpower’, ‘hyperpower’, ‘hegemon’, ‘colossus’, or ‘primacy’. Problems in definitions and approximate calculus of power notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship in the West has been pondering over the nature and direction of American power and its implications for the rest of the world.

With the end of the Cold War, the US established its global supremacy. Although military efforts by states around the world, including the US, witnessed drastic reductions in practically every sector of activity, the overall outcome has resulted in the growing power gap between the only superpower and the rest. On the eve of the 21st century, the US had amassed so much of power and such unprecedented levels of global reach, that it was already referred to be the undisputed ‘colossus’ for the next several decades. Yet, at the very beginning of the dawn, a globally active non-state actor – Al Qaida – proved how vulnerable America could be.

The debate about the nature and likely future direction of American power has, in recent times, preoccupied the minds of scholars. While some have compared and contrasted current American power with the imperial powers in the past and come to near conclusions about the superiority of the former in many respects, others have argued that such massive accumulation of power in one country could lead to unbridled brazenness directly or indirectly on the global community and could even lead to serious internal vacuum, implications of which could be disastrous for both the US and the world at large.

Is the US a real Empire? If so, what are its broad features? Does the US behave like an Empire? If so, what are the evidences and resultant implications of such behaviour? Is the world with such an Empire desirable or will the world be better off without it? These are some of the many fundamental questions that scholars and thinkers have been contemplating for quite some time. The quest to find reasonable answers to such trivial queries seems insatiable. Yet, recent scholarship has tried to offer some tentative explanations as well as a few suggestive pointers to such questions. As the complex universe of ‘Empire Project’ blends both subjective and objective determinants, a review of even a few critical studies becomes all the more important.

An attempt has been made here to review four significant works on aspects of Imperial power and more specifically of the power of the US. All four scholars are well known in their fields of activity. Niall Ferguson is currently a Professor of International History at Harvard University and has at least a dozen well acclaimed books to his credit, most of which display precisely distilled arguments based on important historical evidences. Professor Ferguson’s latest book, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, examines the pros and cons of American imperialism. Deepak Lal is the James S. Coleman Professor of International Studies at the UCLA. As a seasoned development economist with long years of advisory experience with many international agencies as well as various governments, his book, In Praise of Empire: Globalisation and Order explores the twin themes of empires and globalisation and discusses the place of the US in the current global order. Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. serves as the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He, like the previous two, needs no introduction. His book, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone, argues that ‘hard power’ must be blended with ‘soft power’ for a super power like the US to advance and realize its national interests. G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. Professor Ikenberry’s scholastic work, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars applies institutional theory of order formation and examines the problem of order in a global context and more importantly, the role of the US in it after the Cold War, especially in the later part of his book.

II – The Grand US Empire Project

The US today is in many ways like an Imperial power. It is vastly wealthy. The might of its wealth is self-evident. It is militarily peerless, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Half a trillion dollar devoted to military efforts by the US in 2004-05 says it all. It has a huge cultural reach. Its reach is evident from the fact that even the farthest corner of or the smallest state in the world at least subconsciously thinks about it while taking any major decision. In a span of just four years, Americans have intervened militarily against three states in the Balkans, Southern Asia, and the Middle East. As both Ferguson and Nye Jr. argue that whatever the rationale, each US incursion has led to a change of political regime, military occupation, and an attempt at institutional transformation euphemistically described as nation-building. Yet by comparison with other empires, it often struggles to impose its will beyond its shores. Reasons for this are many. Its successes in exporting American institutions and values to foreign lands have been outnumbered by its utter failures.

In many respects, this American predominance shares the same aspirations and ambitions as the last British Empire. Despite originating in a revolt against British imperialism, the US inherited many of its begetter’s defining characteristics. Styling itself as an “empire of liberty,” the fledgling Republic embarked on an astonishingly rapid colonisation of the central belt of the North American continent. If anything, the independent Americans expropriated indigenous peoples even more ruthlessly than they had as British subjects. However, as Ferguson argues, the differences between the British and American empires became more apparent as the US sought to extend its influence overseas. Its experiment with overt imperialism after 1898 had distinctly mixed results, ending unhappily in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, with the notable exceptions of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. The grand American project of ‘expanding liberty’ is continuing till date. If President Bush’s speech to the Republican Party Convention, spelt out in the New York Times on September 2, 2004 and myriads of many such avowals convey anything, it is “the story of America is the story of expanding liberty”. Putting in noble terms, “merica is not an Imperial Power”, yet crudely put, “it is a liberating power”, both Ferguson and Nye Jr. suggest that the differences in the meaning are starkly distinctive – the notion of expanding liberty is almost equated to Uncle Sam’s tyranny on the vanquished.

The US has invaded and occupied many countries over the past two centuries. Yet in terms of their economic and political institutions, relatively few of these have evolved into anything remotely resembling miniature Americas or even shown to have followed the basics of democracy. Will things go any better in Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq? And can President Bush live up to his implied threats to deal sooner or later with the other members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea – to say nothing of Cuba, Libya, and Syria, which were added to the list of ‘rogue states’ in May 2002, or Burma and Zimbabwe, also singled out for presidential opprobrium in November 2003? At the moment, simply imposing order in Iraq is proving difficult enough, even with British and Polish assistance. The Grand American ‘roadmap’ after years of noble efforts still seems like a chimera.

The half-hearted and at times foolhardy adventures at several places seem to exemplify the limits of American power. But how does one explain these limits? Ferguson, Nye Jr. and Ikenberry have explored these limits at length in their respective works. By most conventional measures of power— economic, military, and cultural—there has never been an empire mightier than the US today. Its recent difficulties in achieving its foreign policy goals cannot simply be blamed on the Bush Administration’s alleged diplomatic ineptitude, as argued by Lal. Rather, one needs fundamentally to rethink what one means by power. Often the very concept gets confused with that of other quite different things—wealth, weaponry, and a winning way with “soft power.” It is, in fact, perfectly possible to have a great deal of all these things, yet to have only limited power.

At least three fundamental deficits together explain why the US has been a less effective imperial power than its British predecessor. Ferguson says that they are its economic deficit, its manpower deficit, and – the most serious of the three – its attention deficit. The US has gone from being a net international creditor to being the world’s biggest debtor: its net international liabilities are now equivalent to around a quarter of its gross domestic product. America’s reliance on foreign capital is a balancing act on a very high wire. One plausible and troubling scenario is that foreign expectations could shift, leading to simultaneous pressure on the exchange rate and bond prices, with higher yields threatening American growth via mortgage rates and the housing market. But then, if Dick Cheney’s explanation, “Reagan proved that deficits do not matter”, is taken seriously, then something somewhere is definitely wrong in Uncle Sam’s thinking. Equally troubling is America’s manpower deficit. There is undoubtedly something perplexing about the apparent shortage of American combateffective troops at a time when the American prison population exceeds 2 million – 14 times the number of American troops in Iraq. Of the three deficits, however, it is the third that may prove the most difficult to overcome – namely, the attention deficit that seems to be inherent in the American political system and that already threatens to call a premature halt to reconstruction in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not intended as a term of abuse. The problem is systemic; it is the way the political process militates against farsighted leadership. Perhaps going back to understand the basics of ‘power’ and ‘morality’ and institutionalising both, could offer some help, as suggested by Ikenberry.

Does imperial denial matter? Ferguson argues that it does. Successful empire is seldom solely based on coercion; there must be some economic dividends for the ruled as well as the rulers, if only to buy the loyalty of local elites, and these dividends need to be sustained for a significant length of time. The trouble with an empire in denial, as argued by Ferguson, is that it tends to make two mistakes when it chooses to intervene in the affairs of lesser states. The first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the non-military aspects of the project. The second, and the more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame. At the moment, the US would seem to be making these mistakes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These two points help explain why this vastly powerful economy, with its extraordinary military capability, has had such a disappointing record when it has sought to bring about changes of political regime abroad.

III – Strategic Retreat or Engagement in a Global Village

Traditional, non-traditional or transnational threats such as war, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and organised crime – to say nothing of disease pandemics, climate change, and water shortages – put a premium on cooperation, not competition, between states. Lal and Ferguson have dealt with these at length. The attractions of unilateralism are undeniable, since demanding allies can be more irksome than invisible foes, but a solo strategy offers little prospect of victory against any of these challenges; the successful prosecution of the “wars” against all of them depends as much on multilateral institutions as does the continuation of international free trade, as argued by all the authors. A great empire cannot live in splendid isolation. The isolationist strategy that the US followed during the initial phase of its civilization does not seem viable in today’s international conditions. In fact, American success after both the Second World War and the Cold War was closely linked to the creation, nurturing and extension of international institutions that at once limited and yet legitimised American power. The Kansas farmer’s observation, “I think we are trying to run the business of the world too much” is fine but its broad contours, if weaved into the mainstream thinking, could certainly spell disaster both for the US and others. On the other hand, a judicious combination of realist and liberal-institutional traditions forming the core of American grand strategy could well be contemplated by the American scholarship.

All empires devote a large chunk of financial resources for both internal and external stability. Without hefty investment in enforcing the rule of law, countries like Afghanistan and Iraq will stagnate and perhaps disintegrate. More importantly, nation-building with democratic values at the core is always a long arduous road that needs not only long-term involvement but also periodic assessment, as argued by Ikenberry and Lal. Afghanistan and Iraq being two important test cases for the grand American democracy project have thus far shown very little signs of assimilating alien ideas. Unless the US is prepared to radically alter its attitudes towards low-intensity conflict, it will have little option but to cooperate with the more generous Europeans. Unilateralism, like isolation, is not so splendid after all. Indeed, it is seldom a realistic option for an empire. The danger is that great-power cooperation could simply break down, not because of rivalry between the US and the European Union but because both lack the will to act beyond their own borders. The internal problems of these huge and complex entities may simply distract them from the problems of failed states and rogue regimes. In brief, as Nye Jr. argues, empires do desire to have complete control over the areas they dominate but seldom do they care to at least understand the nuances of long historical and local culture of their subjects. The distinctly modern ideas that flow from them rarely transform, although impinging in some segments, the local culture. The dual process of cultural imposition from outside power and the consequent process of assimilation within the society takes many a decade.

The paradox of globalisation is that, as the world becomes more integrated, so power becomes more diffuse. As Lal and Nye Jr. suggest, thanks to the dynamism of international capitalism, all but the poorest people in the world have significantly more purchasing power than their grandfathers dared dream of. The means of production were never more productive or – as China and India achieve their belated economic takeoffs – more widely shared. Thanks to the spread of democracy, a majority of people in the world now have markedly more political power. The democratic means of election were never more widely accepted as the optimal form of government. The means of education too are accessible in most countries to much larger shares of the population than was the case two or three generations ago; more people than ever can harness their own brainpower. All these changes mean that the old monopolies on which power was traditionally based—monopolies on wealth, political office, and knowledge—have in large measure been broken up. Unfortunately, thanks to the proliferation of modern means of destruction, the power to inflict violence has also become more unevenly diffused.

IV – Emperor’s Liberal Dilemma

Critics of the great empires in general and the American imperial power in particular have singled out almost all the problems associated with imperialism, many of which have been expressed in the works of Ikenberry and Nye Jr. The list is endless as well as often so subjectively intertwined that even the imperial power itself becomes clueless about its duties. Take, for example, the case of exporting democratic values of an imperial power beyond its shores. Exporting democracy is a classic case of imperial dilemma. It has had success in the cases of Germany and Japan, yet its failure cases are too numerous to mention here. More than the willingness of the exporter, it is the willingness of the importer, the degree of which roughly weighs the success or failure of such projects. Would Iraq and Afghanistan, having long historical aversion to democratic traditions be prepared to embrace democracy? The answer seems as philosophically confusing as the query itself. What then does the imperial power do? Should it stop exporting democratic values, which as a desirable concept needs diffusion especially in the traditional societies? If so, how to undertake such difficult projects and taste success? Both the case for promotion of democracy and that too by an imperial power invariably invite criticism for obvious reasons.

Ferguson says that the world needs an effective liberal empire and that the US is the best candidate for the job. Economic globalisation is working. The rapid growth of per capita incomes in the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, means that international inequality is finally narrowing. But there are parts of the world where legal and political institutions are in a condition of such collapse or corruption that their inhabitants are effectively cut off from any hope of prosperity. And there are states that, through either weakness or malice, encourage terrorist organisations committed to wrecking a liberal world order. The number of such states, despite best efforts, is indeed increasing.

The US has good reasons to play the role of liberal empire, both from the point of view of its own security and out of straightforward altruism. In many ways too it is uniquely well equipped to play it, as observed by Ferguson. Yet for all its colossal economic, military, and cultural power, the US still looks unlikely to be an effective liberal empire without some profound changes in its economic structure, its social makeup, and its political culture. Most importantly, as Ikenberry and Nye Jr. suggest, all Americans should ask themselves whether they themselves are willing to change at least in the mental and socio-spiritual realms in order to gain more legitimacy from the societies that they wish to transform? Whatever they choose to call their position in the world – hegemony, primacy, predominance, or leadership – Americans should recognise the functional resemblance between Anglophone power present and past and should try to do a better rather than a worse job of policing an unruly world than their British predecessors. In learning from the history of other empires, Americans will learn not arrogance but precisely that humility which, as a candidate for the presidency, George W. Bush once recommended to his countrymen. And finally, the question Americans must ask themselves is just how transient they wish their predominance to be. Although the barbarians have already knocked at the gates and even threatened to inflict the worst damage, relative imperial endurance or decline seems more likely to come from within than without.

June 2, 2005 will go down as a red lettered day in the history of Maldives. On this day, the Maldivian parliament voted to allow multi-party democracy for the first time in the tiny atoll nation that has been ruled by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom since 1978. The parliament unanimously approved a resolution to allow political parties to seek recognition and contest elections, ending the no-party system in the nation. The motion was moved on the basis of a request from President Gayoom to review its earlier decision not to allow political parties in the country. The main opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) termed this to be a revolution and stated that they looked forward to an exciting political future. However, the passing of the resolution was not without its own attendant drama. On the morning of the parliamentary debate, the authorities arrested four key dissidents on allegations of plotting to disrupt the proceedings in Parliament, raising fears that the government may scuttle the proposed reforms again. The four were released immediately after the vote.

The fact that the government allowed Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) leader Mohamed Nasheed – popularly called as Anni – to return to Male on April 30 had indicated the government’s commitment to the establishment of multiparty democracy. Though the government had vacillated in the past on the question of democratic reforms, it soon realised that the establishment of multiparty democracy was an idea whose time had come. For its part, the MDP has been quick to claim credit for the development and stated that it was due to its pressure that the resolution was passed. Earlier in May President Gayoom, when he arrived for a meeting at the United Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, was confronted by protesters including volunteers from ‘Friends of Maldives,’ a group based in Salisbury. The protestors shouted slogans about the need for improved human rights and an end to torture and political oppression in the Maldives.

The past two years have been tumultuous; political dissent has been building up and often found expression in sudden bursts of violence. 2004 was an especially landmark year for the Maldives. The smallest state of South Asia was not only hit by tsunami that derailed the fastest growing economy in the region, but it also faced many political tremors. Political dissent, which had surfaced in late 2003, continued to change the political landscape. In the face of protests from the opposition, President Gayoom declared a state of emergency in August 2004, arresting many pro-democracy activists and using tear gas to disperse thousands of protesters who rallied in a rare show of dissent in the capital Male, which houses approximately one third of the island nation’s population. The tsunami that struck Maldives diffused to some extent the animus that had been generated between the supporters and opponents of President Gayoom. The elections that took place on January 2005, clearly demonstrated that a significant section of society was opposed to the policies of the government and was clamouring for a multiparty democracy. Faced with international pressure and demands from dissidents in exile, President Gayoom promised democratic reforms after these elections. It would however be useful to recollect the salient developments that took place in the nation during the last two years, which ultimately led to the introduction of multiparty elections.

The democracy movement in Maldives has its genesis in the events of September 2003 when the death of a detainee in Maafushi Island prison provoked rioting, which was brutally suppressed by the security forces resulting in the death of three more inmates. Consequent unrest led to widespread protests against the government in the capital, the first ever during President Gayoom’s tenure of over 25 years. A number of government buildings were attacked. Large numbers of demonstrators were arrested and an investigation was ordered into the deaths of the prisoners. The police commissioner and the Deputy Head of the National security Service (NSS), Brigadier Adam Zahir, was removed.

President Gayoom was re-elected by the Majlis for a sixth five-year term in September 2003 and was ratified in a national referendum receiving 90.3 per cent of the votes. In November 2003 President Gayoom dismissed from cabinet the Attorney General Dr Mohamed Munavvar and the Minister of Planning and National Development Ibrahim Hussain Zaki. The two were allegedly removed for supporting reformers attempting to register a political party. In November 2003 MDP, which had been prevented from registering as a political party in Maldives, was established abroad by London and Colombo based dissidents. Some clerics also extended support to this group. In February, 2004 activists of MDP were arrested in Male to prevent a planned march by opposition activists.

Elections were held in May 2004 for a People’s Special Majlis (constitutional assembly) with the purpose of amending the constitution. Voters chose 42 members out of 120 independent candidates, as political parties are not recognised. The President nominated another eight members to the council. The People’s Special Majlis also included members of the People’s Majlis and the Council of Ministers. In early June President Gayoom announced his agenda for constitutional reforms, which would allow political parties, limiting the term of the President to two five-year tenures, more powers for the Parliament, creating the post of Prime Minister and separating the judiciary, legislature and executive. He also suggested that women should be allowed to stand for the presidency and agreed to renounce the right to appoint eight members of the People’s Majlis. The People’s Special Majlis, which was sworn in on 15 June and convened on 19 July, was immediately suspended as 24 members walked out and raised anti government slogans. The dissidents continued to carry out protest marches and meetings unchallenged till early August 2004.

On August 11, 2004, a Wahabi cleric Farid was arrested on charges of unauthorised preaching. Some of his supporters followed him from the court to the NSS headquarters. MDP leaders and Islamic fundamentalists soon joined them, and together they organized a vigil outside the NSS headquarters for the release of the political prisoners. Despite repeated appeals to disperse, the crowd continued to swell and speeches became more anti-government. By the night of August 12, 2004, the crowd had soared to about 4000, which is more than five per cent of the population of Male and had started demanding removal of hardliner ministers and the resignation of the President. It is alleged by the government that some clerics at the meeting called the tourist resorts as unIslamic and demanded their closure. The attempt by the crowd to storm the NSS headquarters led to the stabbing of some policemen and the arrest of 200 anti government activists. The Government termed the demonstrations as a ‘coup attempt’ and imposed an indefinite state of emergency on August 13, 2004. Armoured Personnel Carriers were deployed and telephone and Internet services were temporarily suspended. The opposition MDP accused the government of ‘ruthlessly suppressing dissent’. An EU fact finding team invited by the President expressed concern about the continuing detention without charges of the alleged protestors and the ongoing state of emergency. By early September most people had been released while about 60 continued in detention, which included the former Attorny-General Dr Mohamed Munavvar and some members of the People’s Special Majlis. On September 1, 2004 amidst international criticism for suppression of the August demonstrations, President Gayoom relinquished the Defence and Finance portfolios.

In December 2004, Gayoom’s government charged four dissidents — including former planning minister Ibrahim Zaki — with coup for attempting to overthrow the president. A conviction could mean a life sentence for all four accused. The Majlis elections scheduled on non-party basis were postponed initially to December 2004 and when the tsunami hit the islands to January 22, 2005. The special Majlis, which had been tasked to develop a new constitution, has virtually remained in suspended animation since its inauguration on July 19, 2004.

In the January elections held on non-party basis, 70 per cent of the 156,766 eligible voters cast their votes. All the 20 atolls and the capital Male elected two legislators each. MDP claimed that it won 18 of the 42 seats, with pro-government candidates winning 22 and independents two. But the government claims that at least 30 candidates are pro-government, and only eight are pro-MDP. The figures cannot be reconciled because all candidates officially ran as independents, although most voters know their political leanings. The election of a large number of opposition candidates especially from Male has increased the pressure on President Gayoom. The fact that the opposition members represent the constituencies with most number of electorates and in terms of electorates represented the combined opposition members probably represent more electorates than the government members, put the President in a tight spot.

In the past, reforms and the promised transition to multiparty democracy had progressed slowly in fits and starts. As the existing political system favours the status quo, the opposition had tried to depict President Gayoom as a despot, who was not willing change lest he loses power. But with the passage of the parliamentary resolution clearing the way for multiparty democracy, he has proved them wrong. Three political parties including the ruling party have been accorded the pre-registration status and are expected to be recognized as political parties by end August. The parties are the MDP led by Mohamed Nasheed, Maldives Peoples Party of Gayoom supporters and Islamic Democratic Party (IDP) led by former police sergeant Umar Naseer. By clearing the way for multiparty democracy, Gayoom has shown that he was always committed to reforms and the establishment of multiparty democracy was now an irreversible process. He has stated that he expected the reform process to be completed this year so that the country could begin 2006 with a new constitution.

The July 2005 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington has been eventful as far as nuclear issues are concerned. The joint statement, various speeches, briefings, and interactions have given a new direction to the nuclear policies and postures of both India and the United States (US). Of course, much heat has also been generated in both the countries. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some clarity to the heated debate. Is it a sell out/ surrender to the US or a big victory?

On the surface, it may appear to some that the nuclear weapon state status has once again eluded India, but in reality, there are impressive strides in that direction. Although, the US can influence other NPT countries, still it alone cannot amend the NPT to designate India as a nuclear weapon country. Moreover, in May 2005, the US had to face a tough time in the NPT Review Conference. Hopefully, in future, the legal hurdle may also be overcome with other countries.

India struggled to get a new designation—for itself and for other nuclear countries as well. This new category—responsible state with advanced nuclear technology—has jointly been coined by India and the predominant power of the contemporary international system, US. In the paragraph in which President George Bush appreciates India for its strong commitment to checking the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), he mentions: “As a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire same benefits and advantages as other such states.”

The account of the Indian Prime Minister in the joint statement is equally relevant. He states: “...India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)...”

So far, the literature on the subject does not have any precedence of such a category. The Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty alludes to countries that figured in Table 1 of IAEA’s December 1995 edition of “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World”. There are 44 countries listed in it with nuclear reactors.

Moreover, no non-nuclear weapon state has been given the privilege of separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes by IAEA or the existing non-proliferation regime. This privilege lies only with the five NPT defined nuclear weapon countries. Only nuclear weapon countries can submit the list of separated civil nuclear facilities.

That the existing NPT categorisation of nuclear weapon states has been replaced by a new designation and definition through the joint statement has been comprehended quickly by the Western media. The Economist has called the new designation as an ‘euphemism’ for bomb holding countries. In the US, except for a few non-proliferation hardliners, other strategists, long reconciled to the Indian bomb, seem to have accepted the new designation.

However, in India, the realisation of the significance of the designation has taken time to sink in. The struggle for the nuclear weapon country status was to overcome the restriction on the supply of dual-use and high technology—not for some superficial international prestige. If other US allies and countries follow what the US has done, India’s real objective for getting the designation will easily be fulfilled. The relevant supplier countries are sending positive signals. Even the UK has fallen in line. The UK advanced technology industry will support a liberal approach to India on this matter. We can easily recollect how the UK had worked with the US administration to supply spare parts of Sea King helicopters when the US had imposed sanctions on India for the 1998 series of nuclear tests.

The assurance of the Indian PM in the joint statement that it would sign and adhere to ‘an additional protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities’ also invited apprehension and criticism from some segments inside India. It is true that the additional protocol is designed to be very intrusive, but nuclear weapon countries have signed different and highly diluted additional protocols with IAEA.

The deal must, therefore, be seen with cautious optimism. This is a partial victory. The real challenges are ahead when negotiations for the real contents of the joint statement start. The Indian strategic community must orient itself for the future. The next phase of debate must start to safeguard our national security, technology and energy-related interests in the coming months/years.