The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Monday Morning Meeting on 13 April 2026, featuring a presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.).R. K. Narang (Retd.), Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA on “Drones in US-Israel-Iran War: Lessons for India.” The Session was moderated by Gp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas, Research Fellow at the Institute. Scholars of the Institute participated in the meeting.

Executive Summary

The session analysed the evolving character of the U.S-Israel and Iran conflict, focusing on the operational limits of technological superiority in contemporary warfare. It argued that despite clear asymmetry in air power and the achievement of air superiority by U.S. and Israeli forces, the persistence of losses and disruptions reflects the growing effectiveness of asymmetric tools, particularly drones. These systems have emerged as central instruments of modern conflict, capable of exploiting gaps in conventional air defence and targeting both military and civilian infrastructure. The discussion highlighted structural issues such as inadequate preparedness, intelligence gaps, and vulnerabilities of fixed assets, while contrasting U.S. and Israeli operational approaches. It further examined the shift towards soft-target warfare and the implications for states like India, emphasising the need for integrated, layered defence systems, indigenous capability development, and Military-Civil Technological Fusion (MCTF) in future conflict scenarios.

Detailed Report

Gp. Capt. Sukhbir Kaur Minhas made Introductory Remarks and invited Gp. Capt. Narang to make his presentation. Gp. Capt. Narang situated his analysis within the broader trajectory of U.S.- Israeli military operations against Iran, arguing that while conventional indicators suggested overwhelming air superiority in favour of the United States and Israel, the operational reality revealed significant asymmetries and vulnerabilities. He clarified the distinction between air superiority and air supremacy, emphasising that despite U.S. and Israeli dominance in the air domain, the persistence of losses demonstrated the limits of technological superiority in contested environments, particularly to unmanned systems. He underlined that Iran, despite facing a superior adversary, was able to withstand sustained military pressure, thereby raising questions about resilience, strategic depth, and the effectiveness of asymmetric responses.

The growing salience of unmanned systems and the associated challenges of unmanned traffic management (UTM) was the central theme of this discussion. Dr. Narang highlighted that the proliferation of drones has vitally altered the operational landscape, introducing complexities in airspace management and significantly increasing the vulnerability of both military and civilian (soft) targets. He argued that while traditional air defence systems are optimised for high-altitude, high-speed manned aircraft threats, they remain less effective against low-flying, slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles, thereby creating exploitable gaps in defence coverage. This asymmetry was evident in the ability of Iranian and proxy drone systems to penetrate U.S. and allied defences, causing both material damage and operational disruption.

The Speaker further examined specific operational episodes, including reported losses of advanced platforms such as F-15 and F-35 aircraft, as well as the disruption of U.S. special operations. These incidents were interpreted not as indicators of systemic failure but as evidence of evolving threat environments where even advanced military systems are susceptible to multi-domain challenges. Dr. Narang stressed that stealth technology, while still relevant, is no longer invulnerable due to the increasing integration of multi-sensor detection systems, including infrared capabilities. This demands a reassessment of platform survivability and sensor integration in future force planning.

A critical facet of the analysis concerned the differential performance between U.S. and Israeli forces. Dr. Narang argued that Israel’s relatively lower losses could be attributed to better operational practices, including asset dispersion, hardened shelters, and integrated defence systems. In contrast, U.S. deployments in the Gulf were characterised by vulnerabilities arising from static positioning, inadequate hardening of infrastructure, and a peacetime operational mindset. He also pointed to gaps in intelligence integration and inter-operability, suggesting that the US did not fully optimise capabilities with its regional partners, thereby limiting collective effectiveness.

The discussion also addressed Iran’s ability to develop the Shahed drone can be attributed to the ownership of drone technology by its military and its single minded approach on building domestic manufacturing of critical systems. This shift underscores a broader transformation in warfare where economic and civilian assets become integral to strategic contestation. He emphasised that for developing countries like India, this trend significantly amplifies vulnerability, as economic growth and infrastructure expansion inherently increase the number of potential targets.

Q&A Session

The presentation was followed by discussion moderated by Gp. Capt Sukhbir Kaur Minhas. Participants raised a series of questions on operational, technological, and structural issues relating to emerging drone warfare, air defence vulnerabilities, and India’s preparedness in this evolving threat environment.

Gp. Capt. Ajey Lele (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, asked a question regarding the adequacy of India’s counter-drone capability, particularly in terms of detection, tracking, identification, and neutralisation. Dr. Narang responded by outlining the layered requirements of effective counter-drone architecture, noting that while India has made incremental progress, significant gaps persist, especially in sensor coverage, integration, and real-time tracking. He highlighted the limited operationalisation of initiatives such as Digital Sky and pointed to deficiencies in both civil and military segments, particularly the absence of integrated command-and-control (C2) systems and insufficient medium and short range sensors and shooters to address swarm threats.

Another participant raised concerns about whether the proliferation of drone swarms signals a structural decline in the relevance of traditional manned aircraft, and what organisational reforms may be required in response. Dr.Narang acknowledged the transformative impact of unmanned systems but rejected the notion of obsolescence of manned platforms. Instead, he argued that the changing character of warfare necessitates structural reforms within India’s defence apparatus, particularly in clarifying technological ownership and streamlining decision-making. He identified fragmentation among the stakeholders and ambiguities on ownership as key impediments to timely capability development, advocating for a higher coordinating body to resolve institutional inefficiencies.

Participants also questioned the effectiveness of Israel’s integrated air and missile defence systems and whether such a model is replicable for India. In response, Dr. Narang emphasised that Israel’s success is context-specific, shaped by geography, scale, and operational depth. He noted that the extended flight time of incoming threats provides Israel with a temporal advantage for interception, whereas larger geographies such as the Gulf or India face greater coverage challenges. He also added that while the technological model is instructive, its direct replication without contextual adaptation would be analytically flawed.

A significant line of inquiry focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly in the context of expanding economic assets and urbanisation. Participants raised the possibility of involving private sector entities in deploying anti-drone systems, while also highlighting challenges related to autonomy, integration with national air defence networks, and resource allocation. Dr.Narang acknowledged the necessity of incorporating private sector capabilities but stressed that such integration must remain under a centralised command-and-control framework. He further emphasised the importance of military-civil technological fusion (MCTF) and selective delegation, cautioning against unregulated decentralisation of defence responsibilities.

Participants also raised questions regarding India’s capacity to absorb sustained attacks, especially in comparison to states like Iran, which have demonstrated higher tolerance for attrition. Participants argued that India’s expanding infrastructure base increases its vulnerability, necessitating a recalibration of defensive priorities. In response, Dr. Narang emphasised the need for a proactive, layered defence strategy focused on early interception and multi-layer interception approach for enhancing the effectiveness of threat neutralisation. He highlighted the importance of redundancy, platform-level integration of counter-drone systems, and indigenous capability development to ensure scalability during conflict.

In his concluding remarks, Gp. Capt. Narang reiterated that current efforts, including initiatives such as iDEX, remain inadequate and insufficiently integrated. He stressed that without a holistic approach anchored in institutional reform, technological integration, and indigenous innovation, India risks remaining underprepared for the evolving dynamics of drone-centric warfare. The discussion concluded with the recognition that future conflicts will be defined not only by advanced platforms but by the ability to integrate systems, anticipate asymmetric threats, and align organisational structures with technological realities.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Vinayak Rajpurohit, Intern, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA.