Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Pakistan- Afghanistan Conflict: Implications for the Region” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 20 April 2026. The Session was moderated by Dr. Ashok Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has reached a critical breaking point, moving far away from the strategic partnership many expected after the Taliban returned to power. The main cause of this friction is the rise of the Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP). While Pakistan blames the Taliban for providing safe havens to militants, Afghanistan denies these accusations, creating a cycle of blame game that has stalled any real cooperation. This impasse escalated into high-intensity hostilities by early 2026. The standoff proves that current military and diplomatic tactics aren’t working, largely because there is no clear strategy for dealing with the various armed groups operating in the region.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Ashok Behuria provided a concise overview of the evolving tensions in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, situating them within the intensification of Tehreek -e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks within Pakistan. He noted that Pakistan attributes these attacks to elements based in Afghanistan, a claim rejected by Kabul, which treats them as an internal issue. He emphasised that this reflects a broader tendency to externalise domestic security challenges. Dr. Behuria assessed that the Taliban’s return on 15 August 2021 marked a key turning point, though developments diverged from expectations of strategic alignment with Pakistan. Instead, the Taliban’s ideological proximity to the TTP has intensified Pakistan’s internal security concerns. Noting the sustained frequency of TTP attacks, largely concentrated in border regions, he pointed out that while major urban centres and core economic infrastructure have remained relatively insulated, the persistence of low-intensity violence continues to pose a significant challenge. He emphasised that the trajectory of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations reflect a complex interplay between internal insecurity and external diplomatic friction, warranting closer analytical attention.

Dr. Ashish Shukla, began his presentation by characterising Pakistan–Afghanistan relations as historically complex and often contentious, tracing their origins to Afghanistan’s initial opposition to Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1947. He noted that during the Afghan jihad, Pakistan emerged as the principal conduit for US–Saudi support and assumed a central role in shaping the conflict. In the post-Soviet phase, while maintaining links with multiple factions, Pakistan extended decisive backing to the Mullah Omar-led Taliban, thereby securing what has often been described as “strategic depth.” However, Dr. Shukla emphasised that the post-9/11 period marked a significant shift, as Pakistan formally aligned with the US-led War on Terror while continuing to maintain covert ties with the Taliban. He assessed that this dual-track approach reflected Pakistan’s attempt to balance external pressures with its regional strategic objectives, particularly the pursuit of a compliant regime in Kabul to offset internal vulnerabilities and advance its broader geopolitical interests.

Dr. Shukla further observed that the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 fundamentally altered this dynamic. While Pakistan initially perceived the development as a strategic gain, it soon encountered resistance from the Taliban leadership, which asserted greater autonomy and refused to adhere to Pakistan’s expectations. He highlighted that the growing presence and operational capacity of the TTP in Afghanistan has since emerged as a central point of friction, with Pakistan alleging cross-border sanctuaries and the Taliban dismissing these claims as internal matters. Citing estimates of thousands of TTP fighters operating from Afghan provinces such as Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika, he underscored the increasing frequency and intensity of attacks within Pakistan, including over a thousand incidents in 2025 alone. Dr. Shukla also pointed to Pakistan’s escalating response, ranging from diplomatic pressure and refugee deportations to cross-border military strikes, particularly in late 2025 and early 2026, which were met with strong Afghan retaliation and international concern over civilian casualties. He concluded that the relationship has entered a phase of heightened volatility, marked by mutual accusations, retaliatory actions, and the absence of a sustainable conflict-resolution mechanism.

Dr. Shukla further examined the escalation of hostilities through official statements and military developments, highlighting the sharp rhetoric emerging from the Afghan side. He noted that in an interview with Tolo News on 24 February, Abdul Hamid Khorasani, a Panjshir-based commander aligned with the Taliban, warned that suicide bomber units were positioned within Pakistan and could be activated at any time, even claiming that Pakistan could be overrun if ordered by the Taliban leadership. This was followed by remarks from Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid in an interview with Al Arabiya English on 25 February, where he asserted that Pakistan would face a military response, while also alleging significant civilian casualties from Pakistani airstrikes. Dr. Shukla analysed that these developments were accompanied by reciprocal military actions, including cross-border firing and Pakistan’s launch of Operation Ghazab lil-Haq, involving coordinated airstrikes across multiple Afghan cities such as Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, and Nangarhar. He noted that Afghan forces responded with counter-operations under Operation Radd al-Zulm.

Dr. Shukla assessed that the conflict witnessed further escalation through successive strikes in March 2026, including Pakistan’s targeting of sites such as Bagram and Kandahar, and a particularly controversial strike on a treatment facility in Kabul, which, according to Afghan and international reports, resulted in significant civilian casualties and drew condemnation from global actors, including human rights organisations and India. He noted that despite temporary pauses in hostilities during Eid, facilitated by external actors such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, military operations resumed shortly thereafter, indicating the fragility of de-escalation efforts. He further highlighted China’s emerging diplomatic role, including its support for ceasefire efforts and facilitation of dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani representatives in Urumqi, signalling Beijing’s strategic interest in regional stability. Concluding his assessment, Dr. Shukla argued that Pakistan’s declaration of open confrontation with Afghanistan marks an unprecedented phase in bilateral relations. While officially seeking the expulsion or handover of TTP elements, he suggested that Pakistan’s broader objectives include pressuring the Taliban to restrain anti-Pakistan militancy and countering perceived India–Afghanistan proximity. However, he cautioned that despite Pakistan’s superior conventional military capabilities, Afghanistan’s experience with asymmetric warfare, combined with the potential alignment of the Taliban and TTP, poses a significant challenge, leaving the long-term trajectory of the conflict uncertain.

Questions and Answers

On the question of whether the situation would have differed under Imran Khan, Dr. Ashish Shukla suggested that a variation in approach was possible given his relatively conciliatory stance towards the Taliban, although ultimate authority rests with Pakistan’s security establishment. On China’s role, he assessed that Beijing is acting cautiously, seeking to mediate without antagonising either side, particularly in light of its security concerns in Xinjiang. Addressing queries on the nature of the TTP, he clarified that the group does not represent the Afghan state but shares ideological affinities with the Taliban, which partly explains Kabul’s reluctance to act against it. He further noted that the TTP draws support primarily from Pakistan’s Pashtun regions, where longstanding grievances, governance deficits, and discontent with state-led operations persist.

On questions related to the group’s operational resilience and ideological orientation, Dr. Shukla highlighted that the TTP has evolved into a complex formation with overlapping influences, including elements linked to other extremist groups such as ISKP. He emphasised that while Pakistan retains certain levers, including trade access and border management, its overall negotiating capacity remains limited, and coercive measures have not produced decisive outcomes. Responding to queries on regional dynamics, he pointed to the continued salience of the India factor in Pakistan’s strategic thinking, alongside the complicating role of Baloch insurgent groups. He concluded that these intersecting dynamics contribute to a protracted and volatile security environment, with no immediate pathway to resolution.

The Report has been prepared by Ms. Sneha M, Research Analyst, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.