In pursuance of Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s 2018-19 budget announcement related to an “industry friendly Defence Production Policy 2018”, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) released a 14-page draft policy on March 21, 2018. The draft Defence Production Policy (DPrP) 2018, which was open for public comments for six working days till March 30, is intended to replace the earlier policy promulgated in 2011. The broad mission of the draft policy is to promote the Make in India initiative in the defence sector and create a world-class arms manufacturing base, fulfilling not only the larger goal of self-reliance but also the requirements of friendly foreign countries. The laudable mission notwithstanding, the draft policy suffers from a number of shortcomings, which, if left unaddressed, may limit its usefulness.

Draft Defence Production Policy 2018: Salient Features

The draft DPrP 2018 is ambitious and forward looking. Unlike the 2011 policy, the draft of the 2018 policy sets a clear vision, a set of objectives and strategies. Its vision is to put India “among the top five countries of the world in aerospace and defence industries,” though the timeframe within which this is to be achieved has not been articulated. The key objectives of the policy include development of a strong defence industry leading to higher self-reliance. Setting its sight on the need to reduce the current high import dependency, the draft policy identifies 13 sets of weapon systems/platforms (including fighters, helicopters, warships, missile systems, ammunition and explosives, land systems, and electronics) whose development and manufacture would commence latest by 2025. Other objectives include an increase in domestic arms sales to Rs 170,000 crore ($26 billion) by 2025, with around one-fifths of it –Rs 35,000 crore ($5.0 billion) – coming through exports. The policy also intends to make India a “global leader in cyberspace and AI [artificial intelligence] technologies.”

From the industry’s point of view, the DPrP’s attractiveness lies in the host of provisions and incentives it offers. The draft policy talks of further ease of doing business for the industry including the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs); pruning the existing list of items subject to industrial licence; increasing the FDI cap under automatic route from the current 49 to 74 per cent for certain niche technologies; streamlining the offset policy to attract investment and facilitate the speedy and transparent execution of offsets; rationalising the taxation system to support domestic manufacturing; providing financial assistance of up to Rs 3,000 crore each to Special Purpose Vehicles created for the development of two defence industry corridors that were recently announced, and up to Rs 100 crore each towards common testing facilities created by the industry; setting up of a corpus of Rs 1,000 crore to fund start-ups to meet specific defence R&D requirements; creating the ‘necessary mechanism’ to harness the potential of AI and Robotics for defence use; and creating an Intellectual Property Cell in DDP to facilitate the registration of intellectual property rights. Besides, the draft policy also talks of setting up an Aeronautical University on a 50:50 cost sharing basis between Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and the government; and the possibility of setting up an “autonomous National Aeronautical Commission, in line with Nuclear and Space commissions.”

How Realistic are the Draft DPrP’s Vision and Objectives?

Though the draft policy is quite supportive towards domestic arms manufacturing, it is nonetheless quite ambitious in its vision and objectives. To put the country among the top-five aerospace and defence manufacturing countries, as the draft policy’s vision states, would mean India joining the ranks of such countries as US, Russia, France, UK and China, which are presently the global leaders in arms production. To join such a coveted club would also mean some of the established Indian defence manufactures breaking into the club of top global arms producers. Can this happen in a realistic timeframe of say the next 10 years?

Suffice it to say that at present not a single Indian defence company figures in the list of top-10 global companies, though India is counted among the top-five military spenders in the world. As per the US-based Defense News’s list of top-100 defence companies in 2017, HAL, India’s biggest defence company, is placed at 35 and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), the second biggest Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU), at 59. For them to climb from their present rankings to the top 10 or 15 would be anything but easy, considering the huge turnover gap between Indian and major global companies as well as the pervasive technological backwardness of Indian entities.

Like the vision, the objectives of arms turnover and exports are also quite ambitious. At present, India’s arms production, as accounted for by the DPSUs and Ordnance Factories (OFs) – the two main players in the Indian defence production sector— is about Rs 56,000 crore (or $8.4 billion). In the past five years, the annual growth in defence production has been around seven per cent. To reach a turnover of Rs 170,000 crore ($26 billion) – a three-fold increase – by 2025 would require domestic production to grow by nearly 75 to 80 per cent per year, which is overly ambitious. The same is also true of arms exports, which recorded the highest turnover of Rs 2059 crore ($317 million) in 2015-16. To rise from that level to reach Rs 35,000 crore (a 17-fold increase) by 2025 is too much to ask for from an industry that has so far relied on technology imports for much of its production.

Draft DPrP 2018: The Challenges

Though the draft DPrP is a marked improvement over the 2011 policy, especially in terms of provisions and incentives for the industry, it still faces a number of challenges, which, if left unaddressed, may limit its usefulness. Though, unlike the previous policy, the draft 2018 policy has identified 13 different sets of items for indigenous production, these are mostly generic names and includes items which are under production or cleared for production in the near future. In other words, the policy does not identify any specific new projects by name that would have given the industry an indication of the likely business prospects. Without such an indication, the draft policy suffers from the same uncertainty that the previous policy faced. A simple step to mitigate this policy gap would have been to deduce a comprehensive production list from the approved Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), which projects the services’ equipment requirements over a 15-year time horizon. The deduced list could have further been divided into two broad categories: items to be produced based on domestic R&D, and items to be produced under licence. The policy would then have focused more on the former for building domestic capacity.

The second challenge that the draft policy suffers from is the structural distance of the DDP, the implementing agency of the policy, from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Acquisition Wing of the MoD (one may also add the users to the list) as far as domestic arms production is concerned. Since these stakeholders are more or less independent (though each agency’s action impinges on others and vitally on defence production and self-reliance), reconciling their varied interests has been a major challenge in the past. From the self-reliance point of view, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has so far attempted to reconcile the divergent interests of these stakeholders, mainly through the prioritised procurement categories that give preference to domestic industry over direct import. However, since the DPP has not dramatically improved India’s defence production capability, nor changed the culture of licence production, more needs to be done. The draft DPrP does not, however, provide a concrete solution beyond some cursory remarks that other stakeholders will play their due role.

Third, the draft policy, like its predecessor, does not fully address the private sector’s trust deficit with the government, even though the former is expected to play a major role under the Make in India initiative. Notwithstanding the various promises, including that of providing open competition in contracts, the private sector has a genuine reason to mistrust the policy in the making. The mistrust is largely due to the representation of senior MoD officials in the governing boards of the defence public sector companies, which often leads to the nomination of larger contracts in their favour. It is high time that the MoD appointed a dedicated additional secretary level official to allay such mistrust, and look after the private sector’s genuine interests.

Fourth, the DPrP does not address the issues of inefficiency and lack of accountability on the part of the DRDO, DPSUs and OFs, which, being the mainstay of Indian defence industry for the last several decades, are responsible for much of the indignity of the country’s poor track record in attaining self-reliance. Instead of suggesting some bold steps to reform these entities, the draft policy merely talks of the professionalization of OFs and “disinvestment of minority stakes in DPSUs.” Here, it is not clear what the draft policy means by disinvestment of minority stakes when the government has more than majority stakes in all the DPSUs. Even these cursory remarks are silent on DRDO, indicating further the DDP’s structural gap in commenting on organisations outside its administrative domain. Without improving the efficiency and governance of these entities, it is well-nigh impossible to achieve even a fraction of the targets set by the policy. It is high time that the government took a hard look and completely privatises the DPSUs and OFs besides laying down clear accountability norms for the DRDO.

Last but not the least, the draft DPrP faces stiff budgetary constraints that may not allow the policy’s promised investments to fructify in a time bound manner. In all, the draft policy talks of investments worth over Rs 77,000 crore by 2025—–which includes nearly Rs 70,000 crore as additional investment to increase domestic production. In all likelihood, these investments will come largely from the defence budget, either directly or indirectly. To accommodate such a large investment, the defence budget has to provide an extra Rs 11,000 crore or so per year for next six to seven years. However, this may not be feasible, given the huge resource crunch that the defence ministry is presently going through and which is likely to continue for the next several years. The present fund crunch is such that the MoD is finding it difficult even to service its own financial commitments. The DPrP has to therefore think of some innovative means, such as corporate bonds, disinvestment proceeds, and monetisation of some defence assets, if it wants to keep its investment promises.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Free and fair elections are the backbone of a democratic system of governance, and they are often celebrated as the “festival of democracy”. Election campaigns of political parties and candidates employ a wide variety of strategies and tactics to influence voters. The digital era has added a whole new flavour, be it the eye-catching colossal digital campaigns or instances of foreign governments interfering in the electoral process. Last year, the Presidential elections in both the US and France were controversial due to hacking incidents and data leaks at the campaigns of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and En Marche, respectively. In general, cyber means of intervention appear to be becoming an inevitable part of the electoral process. The Cambridge Analytica incident proves that India is no exception to this trend. During the next general elections in 2019, the Election Commission of India has an uphill task to thwart both external interference and the abuse of social media platforms to influence voter behaviour.

While there is a long history of external interference in elections both through covert and overt means, digital platforms add a new dimension. News and online content over digital platforms can spread at lightning speed, without paying heed to the credibility or authenticity of the source. Moreover, social media platforms generate vast amounts of data related to the socio-economic conditions, purchasing behaviour, interests, hobbies, and political inclinations or orientations of the users. These details are captured and treasured for commercial purposes. Business analytics feed on this data to generate business intelligence and derive monetary benefits for informed decision making. Present day electoral campaigns are also data driven and they are well-funded to let the campaigners harness data for their own political advantage. Data analytics tools can harvest data from user profiles and sift through the trove to support research, augment targeted campaigns and help political parties in assessing and evaluating their performance. These have been quite effective in targeting swing voters and behaviour forecasting.

As the popularity of social media platforms hits new heights, Facebook and Twitter in particular have been under the scanner of both intelligence agencies and election watchdogs. With close to 2.2 billion active users (by the end of 2017), Facebook alone sits on a stockpile of data which could be used to drive election campaigns towards any preferred outcome. Data in itself is worthless, but data science and the corresponding analytical tools turn it into a goldmine for both businesses and political strategists in the digital age.

Cambridge Analytica, the London-based political consultancy firm presently under the scanner, has an eight-year-old association with Indian elections. It undertook an in-depth electorate analysis for the Bihar Assembly Election in 2010 and, as per the case study details on its website, “the client (political party) achieved a landslide victory, with over 90 percent of total seats targeted by Cambridge Analytica being won.”1 This was carried out through Ovleno Business Intelligence, which is an Indian affiliate of Cambridge Analytica’s parent firm Strategic Communications Laboratories. The firm had hit media headlines for its association with Donald Trump’s election campaign, which it has referred to as “A Full-Scale Data-Driven Digital Campaign”. Bringing together the expertise of data scientists, researchers, strategists and content writers in three integrated teams (research, data science, and digital marketing), Cambridge Analytica’s campaign helped Trump win the elections.2 The above case studies, mentioned in the Cambridge Analytica website, are prime examples of the vital role data science has begun to play especially in devising techniques to change voter behaviour in the targeted population or audience.

Facebook has played a central role in this entire episode. In a statement, Facebook has accepted that in 2015 a research app for psychologists with the name “thisisyourdigitallife”, developed by a psychology professor at Cambridge University, was used for commercial purposes by Cambridge Analytica and other firms in violation of its platform policies. The app, meant for personality prediction, had around 270,000 downloads. Users revealed content related to their likes, preferences, and their own social circles according to their privacy settings.3 The access to Facebook content, in technical terms, was legitimate and through proper channels but the information was passed on to third parties likes Cambridge Analytica and Eunoia Technologies, which exploited it for commercial gains. However, Cambridge Analytica has outright denied allegations of using Facebook data as part of the services rendered to the Trump presidential campaign and while working on the Brexit referendum in the UK.4

As of January 2018, with 250 million users, India is the largest user-base for Facebook. It is also an important tool for the government to take forward its flagship programmes to the wider populace. Facebook is one of the top contenders for partnering with the government’s societal development and digital inclusion plans. The Election Commission of India had also partnered with Facebook in 2017, launching a nationwide voter registration campaign.5 Indian users, paying little regard to the privacy terms and condition of social media platforms, uninhibitedly share images, pictures and other content, and are extremely vulnerable to the tools, techniques and campaigns devised for influencing both commercial and political behaviour. Against this backdrop, the government’s concerns have been raised by Cambridge Analytica’s alleged mining of data from the profiles of 50 million US Facebook users without their consent.6 If such an incident were to occur in India, it would constitute a serious violation of the IT Act. Not just in India, Cambridge Analytica is also at loggerheads with the Electoral Commission in the UK over its alleged role in the BREXIT vote and in Europe for violating EU privacy laws in collusion with Facebook.

Although Facebook has tendered an assurance of data security on its platform for the upcoming elections in India (2019) and Brazil (October 2018), the incident has caused severe damage to its reputation even as a development partner for governments in digital inclusion or other societal benefits plans. As the stakes in elections go up, political parties are unlikely to shy away from leveraging the technical expertise of data analytical firms like Cambridge Analytica fed with expansive data sets harvested from prominent social media platforms.

Data is being extensively harvested and harnessed for commercial purposes, targeted marketing campaigns and to influence consumer choices. It is ethically and legally controversial when information derived without the consent of the users or through dubious means is leveraged to influence political choices. Flourishing in the void of effective legal and regulatory regimes, such incidents seriously undermine the trust of people in the democratic process. To an extent, users understanding the perils of sharing unwanted details or content on social media platforms and aware of their privacy settings is pertinent for containing such instances of abuse. For India, as a functioning democracy, the Cambridge Analytica episode highlights the need to expedite the process of developing a data protection framework and probably amend the IT Act in accordance with the changing realities of cyberspace. The earlier this is realised, the better it would be for the healthy functioning of our democratic systems and processes.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Case Studies - India”, Cambridge Analytica Political, available at https://ca-political.com/casestudies/casestudyindia, accessed 23 March, 2018.
• 2. “Case Studies – Donald J. Trump for President”, Cambridge Analytica Political, available at https://ca-political.com/casestudies, accessed 23 March, 2018.
• 3. Paul Grewal, “Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from Facebook”, Facebook Newsroom, March 16, 2018, available at https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytica/, accessed 25 March, 2018.
• 4. Cambridge Analytica, “Cambridge Analytica responds to false allegations in the media”, available at https://ca-commercial.com/news/cambridge-analytica-responds-false-allegations-media, accessed 25 March, 2018.
• 5. “Election Commission of India partners with Facebook to launch first nationwide voter registration reminder”, Facebook, June 27, 2017, available at https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/election-commission-of-india-partners-with-facebook-to-launch-first-nationwide-v/1672618862758040/, accessed 23 March, 2018.
• 6. Prashant Jha, “In eye of Facebook ‘data breach’ storm, Cambridge Analytica in talks with Cong, BJP for 2019”, Hindustan Times, March 19, 2018, available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/suspended-by-facebook-over-data-breach-cambridge-analytica-in-talks-with-congress-bjp-for-2019/story-g7J9rodV24lgCK7Xqu5eaO.html, accessed 23 March, 2018.

In Chinese tradition, dynastic bloodline has never been the criterion to determine the line of succession. It is the capable ministers and victorious generals who were bestowed the ‘mandate of heaven’ (tianming) to rule China. Hundreds of rulers earned the legendary title of Huang di – the ‘first Yellow Emperor’ who founded China on the rich flood plains of the Yellow River (Huang He). Few wielded more power than Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the founding emperors of China’s Communist Dynasty. Now, Xi Jinping has made history with the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s Parliament – a rubber stamp body –voting to abolish the 10-year presidential term limit, thus enabling him to lead China for several years more.

Mao, as the First Generation leader, ruled China for nearly three decades till his death in 1976. Deng succeeded Mao, albeit after a brief power struggle, and remained at the helm for almost two decades. To avoid a repeat of the aftermath of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, Deng incorporated a provision in the Party constitution in 1982 to limit the tenure of the President. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as the Third and Fourth Generation Leaders respectively, served two- five years terms each, adopting a collective leadership style.

Xi, the son of Xi Zhongxun – a revolutionary and Mao’s compatriot – joined the Party in 1974 at the age of 21. He burst on the political scene as a graft fighting Governor of Fujian in 1999. Xi was a consensus candidate to take on the mantle of the Fifth Generation leadership in 2012. Given the smooth transition of power for the third consecutive time, coupled with his low profile (then he was better known as the husband of popular folk singer Peng Liyuan), speculation was rife that Xi will abide by the constitutional rule that his immediate predecessors had abided by. However, he played his hand differently to emerge as the most powerful leader after Mao and promising to usher China into the ‘New Era’.

Xi bends the curve to forge ‘Generation Rule’

While commencing his first term in 2013, Xi had stated that “to forge iron, you ought to be strong”. He then set about systematically consolidating his position by strengthening his hold on the twin levers of power: the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). He wasted no time in assuming the triple titles of: General Secretary of the CPC, the most powerful appointment; Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body; and, the Presidency, the least important of the three. Incidentally, Jiang Zemin had held on to the Chairmanship of the CMC for almost two years after handing over the reins to Hu Jintao, thus creating dual power centres.

Xi unleashed an unbridled campaign to clean up the system as corruption had got deeply engrained in the Party culture. Some of the stalwarts who were either punished or removed for corruption or other violations included Zhou Yongkang, member of the apex Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and Bo Xilai, member Politburo and Party Secretary of Chongqing. Besides, more than 40 PLA Generals were netted in the anti-graft operations. These included Generals Guo Boxing and Caihu, Vice Chairmen in the CMC and recently General Fang Fenghui, former Chief of General Staff and member of the CMC. The anti-corruption campaign has also proved handy for Xi to purge potential political rivals.

Concurrently, Xi initiated radical military reforms with a dual aim; to prepare the defence forces for their future role and reinforce the Party’s firm control over PLA. The reforms process started in 2013 during the Third Plenum of the Party Congress with the establishment of the National Security Commission with Xi as its Chairman. In the reorganized CMC, the role of the President as the ‘Commander in Chief’ enables Xi to exercise direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operational Center’. By ordering a series of reshuffles in the PLA hierarchy, Xi ensured that his loyalists occupied key positions. To reaffirm the role of the military, Xi visited Gutian, a town in Fujian Province, on 30 October 2014 and reiterated what Mao had legislated at the same venue in December 1929; “PLA remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”.

At the time of the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi was holding over a dozen titles, and was referred to, in a lighter vein, as ‘Chairman of all’. During the Party Congress, Xi further cemented his authority by enshrining his “Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” in the Constitution. His eponymous political ideology proposes an alternate to liberal democracy and serves as a philosophy around which the CPC can coalesce. In a clear departure from the well-established tradition followed since the last three decades, no one was chosen as the ‘Sixth Generation’ leader, a successor to be groomed to take over from Xi after he completes his second five year term in 2023. This set a new precedence, giving rise to speculation that Xi was planning for a third term.

During the 19th Party Congress, Xi unveiled his ‘China Dream’ (fuxing),whichenvisions a powerful and prosperous China entering a ‘New Era”. To this end, he outlined the twin centenary objectives: China to become a fully modern economy and achieve social modernization by 2035; and acquire the status of ‘great modern socialist country’ by the middle of this Century. He propounded the policy ‘striving for achievement’ (fanfa youwei), advocating a greater Chinese leadership role in global affairs to shape the new world order. This marked an abandonment of Deng’s strategy of maintaining a low profile, never taking a leadership role and biding for time till China completes its peaceful rise.

Post the Party Congress, Xi surreptitiously engineered the process to do away with the two-term Presidential limit, although the appointment is of ceremonial nature to facilitate the discharge of political functions. In January 2018, some 200 senior officials of the Communist Party Central Committee gathered behind closed doors to abolish the Presidential term limit so that Xi could hold on to power indefinitely. The decision was kept under wraps and abruptly announced just before the commencement of the NPC annual session. As expected, the controversial constitutional amendment to abolish the limit set on the presidential term was passed with an overwhelming majority by the NPC on 11 March 2018 at the Great Hall of People, thus enabling Xi to continue to retain power for life.

China Set for a Long March to Enter ‘New Era’

When China started to integrate into the ‘global economic order’, the West began to believe that the PRC would bind itself to the rule based system and evolve into a market economy. It was further assumed that, as Chinese people grew wealthier, they will yearn for democratic freedom thus paving the way for political reforms. Xi was expected to initiate far reaching economic and political reforms. However, this turned out to be an illusion.

There are a few reasons that explain the CCP’s decision to empower Xi indefinitely. Firstly, the process of China’s emergence as a global power remains a work in progress and is expected to continue for the next few decades. Secondly, the Chinese economy is in a state of transition from low technology manufacturing to advanced digitally enabled products. Thirdly, Xi’s pet project, the ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ which envisages an investment of US $ 1 trillion abroad, and is perceived to be vital for sustaining China’s pace of economic growth and creating a strategic web to expand the Dragon’s influence, requires leadership continuity. Fourthly, Xi’s on-going anti-corruption drive demands a strong person at the helm.

China’s political system is authoritarian and leaves no space for dissent. Hence, despite Xi’s political coup and underlying fears of oppressive measures, large scale protests are unlikely. Moreover, the public at large perceives Mao to have made China great, Deng rich, and Xi to be building a strong nation. For the time being, the major concerns of the Chinese people are economic, i.e., jobs, prosperity and quality of life; politics is certainly not a key issue.

According to retired Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces, Xi’s elevation as a lifelong Emperor will lend China a short term advantage by way of consistency of policies and clear strategic direction vis-a vis the democracies where leaders and policies change frequently. However, in the long run, dictatorial regimes are prone to political instability, especially during transitions of power; China itself being a case in point. Another fact could be the rise of China’s middle class over a period of time which would consist of people with varied experiences and independent mindseta who could possibly seek greater political freedom.

Global polity is often surprised by the Communist leadership, primarily due to a lack of understanding of Chinese history, culture and a system shrouded in secrecy. All Chinese regimes since the demise of the Qing Monarchy have consolidated national sovereignty and pursued power through all available means. Most commentators who got Xi wrong claim that not much was known about him before he came to power. The lateLee Kuan Yew, when expressing his opinion about Xi Jinping, had stated that he has the soul of iron and does not let past suffering weigh upon him. He had compared Xi with the likes of Nelson Mandela. According to Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, Xi is a man of extraordinary intellect, is self-confident and has a well-defined world view.

Xi began his second term by exhorting the two million strong PLA to be combat ready by focussing on how to win wars. In his recent speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi stated that while he would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue he will not compromise on sovereignty. During his interaction with the delegates of the current NPC, he warned officials to shed ‘pillow talk’ and refrain from indulging in corruption. If the above statements are any indication, the world can expect Xi to be internally oppressive and externally assertive in pursuit of his ‘China Dream’, which could intensify the ensuing ‘great power rivalry’

China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well for India. The I962 War and the stand-offs in 1967 and 1987 occurred during the Mao and Deng eras. And the recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have taken place during Xi’s rule. India will have to be well prepared to counter Chinese intimidation and aggressive behaviour. This will require decoding Xi’s strategic design and exploit windows of opportunities to enhance cooperation and reduce confrontation. The formulation of a holistic China policy driven by India’s long term core interests is no more an option, but an imperative.

Xi rides the Dragon which is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is aware of the consequences of his policies going awry. There is scepticism about China’s ability to maintain its pace of economic growth, given the signs of slow down. Xi has offered the China model based on ‘neo authoritarianism’, where political stability and economic development trump democracy and individual rights, as an alternate to the Western liberal democratic capitalist model. China’s long march to enter the ‘New Era’ will come at a price as it retracts into Mao era centralisation.,

According to the Chinese 11th Century Classic ‘The General Mirror for the Aid of Government’ (Cu Chi Tang Qian), “Anyone who is able to prevent violence and remove harm from the people so that men’s lives are protected, who can reward good and punish evil and thus avoid disaster – such a man be called an emperor.” Xi is known to have deep insights in Chinese history. He has taken a tough call fraught with tremendous risk but with the conviction that he has it in him to be in the league of Mao and Deng, although, as a princeling, he may not belong to the same tribe.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

The three-day visit by King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein of Jordan to India starting February 27, 2018 is testimony that India’s "Think West" policy, like its "Act East" initiative, is progressively getting robust and vigorous. The Jordanian King’s visit, only his second to India, that too after more than a decade, takes place within a few weeks of Prime Minister Modi’s transit through Amman to Palestine. King Abdullah’s visit comes on the heels of the highly productive and successful visit of Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and Prime Minister Modi’s significant visits to four countries of West Asia, which, in addition to Jordan, included Palestine (the first ever visit by an Indian prime minister), the United Arab Emirates and Oman. All this activity in February 2018 took place in the wake of a hugely rewarding and substantive six-day visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the second by an Israeli prime minister to India since diplomatic relations were established between the two countries 26 years ago. Modi himself had undertaken the first ever and path-breaking visit by an Indian prime minister to Israel in July 2017.

Background

India and Jordan established diplomatic relations in 1950 after India became a Republic, although the first bilateral agreement on cooperation and friendly relations was entered into soon after Indian independence in 1947. The exchange of bilateral visits at high political and senior official levels declined significantly after King Abdullah’s productive visit in 2006. The relationship has failed to realize the huge, untapped potential.

Recent years have, however, witnessed a decisive impetus to the bilateral partnership. The first ever visit by an Indian Head of State to Jordan took place in 2015. This provided a huge impetus to bilateral engagement in a wide range of areas. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Jordan in early February 2018 occurred 30 years after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Amman in 1988. King Abdullah had described Prime Minister Modi’s brief transit visit to Amman earlier this month as the beginning of a new chapter in bilateral ties. It is a measure of his conviction in the promise of this engagement that the King has decided to pay a visit to India within 20 days of his meeting with Modi in Jordan.

The visit by King Abdullah II during which he is expected to be accompanied by several Ministers and a high powered business delegation is likely to provide a shot in the arm to the relationship between India and Jordan. It is expected that discussions during the visit will focus on a wide variety of issues and Agreements will be signed in several significant areas including trade, investment, tourism, cultural exchanges, and intelligence and security cooperation.

Political Ties

Both India and Jordan face the common threat of terrorism and extremism. It has been reported that Prime Minister Modi and King Abdullah II will address an event themed on measures against radicalisation of youth. This reflects their conviction that the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism cannot be dealt with by force alone but that a counter-ideology of amity, concord and harmony is urgently needed. Both countries share the view that nations must coordinate their positions to fight against the misuse of religion by groups and countries for inciting hatred and justifying terrorism. King Abdullah has established himself as a staunch opponent of Takfiri ideology - the so-called radical practice of declaring one’s enemies to be infidels – which has earned him wide respect and support around the world. He has recently launched the Aqaba process to promote deradicalisation in which India is an active participant.

During her visit to India in 2006 accompanying King Abdullah II, Queen Rania had described India as the "rising star of Asia" and Jordan's "natural partner". On India's role in the Middle East, she had stated that the region "yearns for India to play a greater role", and added that "India has an important role because you have always had contact with us and understand our sensitivities." Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi supplemented this suggestion when he asserted during his December 2017 visit to New Delhi that Jordan would like India to be more pro-active and steadfast in promoting peace and stability in the region. An authoritative voice in the Jordanian establishment has argued that Jordan "needs India to exert its high offices and help us with all its moral, political and economic weight." This refrain for India to play a more decisive and resolute role to bring peace and stability to West Asia has risen further in recent years, not only from Jordan but from several other countries from different sides of the divide.

According to informed sources, one of the most significant Agreements to be signed between the two countries during King Abdullah’s visit will be in the area of security and defence. In addition to joint exercises, training and intelligence sharing, the Pact is also likely to include capacity building, cyber security, supply and maintenance of defence equipment and hardware.

Economic Relations

India is Jordan's fourth largest trade partner after Iraq, Saudi Arabia and China. Bilateral trade totalled USD 2.2 billion in 2014-15. India exported 1.4 billion worth of goods to Jordan, and imported 857 million. Since 2012-13, the balance of trade has been in India’s favour. Trade volume over the last two years has declined on account of weak international performance. A target of USD five billion has been set for 2025.

Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) and Indian Farmers Fertilisers Cooperative (IFFCO) established a joint venture project worth USD 860 million for manufacturing Phosphoric Acid. This was jointly inaugurated by King Abdullah II and then President Pranab Mukherjee during the latter’s visit to Jordan in 2015. Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (MMTC) India Ltd signed an MOU with JPMC on cooperation in the fertilizer sector in June 2015. As of January 2016, Indians owned around 25 textile mills in Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan at a total investment of USD 300 million. These mills employ over 10,000 people. ICT, renewable energy, financial/banking services, leather, automobile, higher education, tourism, Bollywood, pharmaceuticals and construction sectors present good potential for increased trade and investment.

Conclusion

During his visit to India in December, 2017, the Jordanian Foreign Minister contended that the Middle East is facing tremendous challenges which are impacting global security. He said that terrorism, lack of employment opportunity, weak governance, conflicts and civil war are depriving the region and its people of their right to live in peace and prosperity. India and Jordan can collaborate effectively to mitigate the adverse impact of these negative developments.

Political, security and economic developments in West Asia over the last few years are helping the two countries re-discover each other. The rapidly transforming political and security dynamics in the Middle East with US President Donald Trump cozying up to Saudi Arabia and coming out openly in support of Israel while making threatening pronouncements about jettisoning the nuclear deal with Iran have introduced major uncertainties in the region. The Shia-Sunni divide between Iran and some Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia and the Israel-Iran rift have forced countries to look around for reliable and trustworthy partners. Under these circumstances, India, which is one of the few countries that maintains strong and vibrant ties with Washington DC, Riyadh and Tel Aviv as well as with Tehran, Abu Dhabi and Moscow, has emerged as a partner of choice for several countries in the region. Jordan is one of the few countries in West Asia that maintains diplomatic relations with Israel and has cordial relations with the West as well as its neighbours. India and Jordan can be termed as natural allies as both countries are peaceful, stable and are witnessing rapid economic growth and have similar positions on regional and global affairs.

King Abdullah II’s forthcoming visit to India represents an opportunity to catapult the relationship to the next higher level in strategic, security, political, energy, trade, investment and economic cooperation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.