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| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Radical Islam in the West & South Asia post-26/11: An Exploratory Study | June 04, 2010 | Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Prof. Kalim Bahadur On June 4, 2010 Mr. Alok Mukhopadhyay, an Associate Fellow at IDSA presented his paper titled: “Radical Islam in the West & South Asia post – 26/11: An Exploratory Study.” He started the seminar by summarizing the main points of his paper, which were divided in four sections. The presentation was divided into sections titled: 1) Radical Islam rising in the US, 2) Rise and Fall of ‘Londonistan’, 3) Jihad Jane: New faces of Radical Islam in the West, and 4) Hyphenated identity or Hyper-Identity. In the section titled ‘radical Islam rising in the US’ it was noted that the nature of radicalism in the US was remarkably different from that in Europe. Fewer numbers and a higher level of prosperity of Muslim immigrants in the US has meant that Islamic Activism is much less in the US, in comparison to Europe which has a longer association with Muslim immigrants who came to Europe for blue collared jobs. The Rise and Fall of ‘Londonistan’, which is an uncomplimentary sobriquet given to radical Islamic activities in London and its mythical tolerance of these activities was mentioned to illuminate the fact that UK has been under a ‘severe’ terrorist threat since January 2010. ‘Jihad Jane: New faces of Radical Islam in the West’ in essence argues that many converts to Islam in the West have been radicalized and have been involved in militant activities, posing a new angle to Islamic radicalism which now seems to be influencing even converts who come from varied backgrounds. Hyphenated identity or Hyper-Identity, which refers to the plurality in the identity of the migrant youth population (examples, Pakistani-American, Turkish-German, etc.) has been an issue of concern lately. They are seen to be vulnerable to radicalization because of their inability to integrate into Western society for various reasons including prejudice and hence are facing an identity crisis. Mr. Mukhopadhyay pointed out that in the US Muslims becoming terrorists could be better explained by individual pathology than by rising Islamic militancy due to group dissatisfaction. It is believed that Europe has experienced relative success compared to the US in checking the proliferation of radicalism among sections of the Muslim youth by focusing more on monitoring and prediction of radical behavior which leads to early prevention of attacks. On the other hand, inadequate information about terrorist networks, especially in the Af-Pak region, has led the US to resort to drone attacks which has also led to collateral damage which in turn has increased America’s unpopularity among the Muslim community and has further fueled radical ideologies. The burgeoning international profile of India as an important country and Indians traveling all over the world for business and education has increased the risk of some young Indians being recruited by terrorist networks in many Western cities. The June 2007 terrorist incident in Glasgow was indeed a watershed moment when a young Indian professional was found to be a terrorist. Therefore Mr. Alok Mukhopadhyay stated that security and intelligence cooperation between Western countries and India would benefit India given aforementioned risks and the unstable security situation in South Asia, especially in the Af-Pak region. In the discussion that followed Mr. Mukhopadhyay’s presentation, many issues were discussed. The importance of transnational efforts to de-radicalize was emphasized by pointing out distinct differences in the way the US and Europe have been tackling radicalization. It was suggested that the US has a more nebulous policy towards de-radicalization unlike Europe. It was also suggested that this may be the case because of the relatively recent origins of radicalization within the US. It was noted that India’s de-radicalization policy has been fairly successful and that Western countries could study India’s de-radicalization methods to strengthen their own de-radicalization efforts. Although Pakistan has emerged as the hot bed for Islamic radicalization, it was noted that no visible steps of de-radicalization had been taken in Pakistan. It was also suggested that the term ‘radical Islam’ was problematic and a suitable alternative had to be found. Though there was a general consensus about the problematic nature of the term and the need to re-evaluate the terminology, the lack of a ready alternative led some participants to conclude that people had to compromise with the existing terminology until scholars come up with an acceptable terminology in the future. In the discussion it was suggested that America’s role in promoting extremism is an important feature that helps explain, at least to a degree, the existence of what has come to be known as Islamic extremism. Their support for the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is well known and documented. It was implied that Islamic extremism is a phenomenon which has developed into what it is today partly because of US support for extremism in the past decades. It was also stated during the discussion that there was a need to scrutinize, if not challenge, the extremist interpretations of Islam by the Islamic community worldwide. If the extremist groups could be theologically ‘defeated’, eradicating extremism from the minds of the affected sections of the people would become much easier. Finally, it was mentioned that integration becomes difficult and fault lines become wider during times of economic downturn when fewer resources have to be shared. This leads to a ‘clash of civilization’ scenario where one community is seen as encroaching upon the resources and culture of the host community. As an off shoot effect, many (not all) young Muslims have voluntarily decided to wear the hijab and burkha, or have decided to sport beards to assert their identities. On a brighter note, it was perhaps implied that economic recovery in the future may help ease the tensions between the migrant and host communities. Although an economic boom by itself would not help bridge differences, it may very well provide a fertile ground for the same. Report prepared by Prashant S. Hosur, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi |
Nuclear and Arms Control | ||||
| Securing Andaman and Nicobar islands | July 09, 2010 | Pushpita Das | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Admiral (Retd.) P S Das Paper SummaryIndia’s forward presence in the eastern Indian Ocean is enabled by the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The location and geography of these Islands impart them with immense strategic importance. The archipelago forms India’s southeast frontier. It is also nearer to Southeast Asia than to the Indian mainland (approximately 1200 km away). The 780 km linear extension of the island gives it an extensive north-south spread in the Bay of Bengal, ideal for generating domain awareness, which could be utilized for countering traditional and non-traditional threats. The propinquity of these islands to the busy shipping lanes, especially Malacca strait, not only provides India with an opportunity to play an important role in the security of the sea lines of communication, but also to use these islands as a transshipment hub, a bunkering facility or a duty free port. Proximity of the archipelago to the Southeast Asian countries enables India to foster friendly relations by engaging them through joint operations. It also helps India in keeping abreast of the political and military developments in its extended neighbourhood. At the same time, the physical distance and remoteness of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands from the Indian mainland contribute to their vulnerability to both conventional and non-conventional threats. At present, the probability of a conventional threat to the island chain from its immediate neighbours appears remote. However, a military threat to the islands could emanate in the form of a possible intervention in the Bay of Bengal by an extra regional power, especially China, given its dependence on sea borne supply lines in the Indian Ocean and the need to secure them both from non-state actors and potential adversaries such as the United States and India. Towards this end, China has been diligently developing port and other infrastructural facilities in the Indian Ocean littoral. While China and the littoral states have maintained that the infrastructure being established is purely for commercial use, utilization of these facilities by China during a conflict cannot be ruled out. And as part of its distant sea defence strategy, China now seeks to project its naval supremacy as far as West Asia and to the shipping lanes of the Pacific by deploying warships as escorts for its commercial vessels. Moreover, for tracking India’s capability and strengths in the Bay of Bengal, China has been allegedly engaged in gathering intelligence stealthily through various means. Existence of a Chinese naval fleet in the vicinity would also greatly limit the range and extent of Indian naval operations. However, currently what seem to be a cause of immediate concern are non-conventional threats like poaching, illegal settlements, gunrunning and use of A&N’s uninhabited islands as hideaways by terrorist groups and smugglers, and natural disasters. Poaching has emerged as the biggest problem for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of these islands as a magnet for poachers. Firstly, the fishing industry in the islands is underdeveloped. Secondly, the existence of isolated and uninhabited islands scattered far and wide serves as ideal hideaways for poachers. And finally, the existing policy of detaining the arrested poachers in a camp, and then repatriating them to their country in conformity with international law, has taken away the element of deterrence. Another security concern for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is the issue of illegal settlements. The trend of illegal Bangladeshi settlers has increased in the aftermath of the Tsunami Rehabilitation work. Dearth of labourers has meant that they are hired from the mainland but who continue to reside in the Island group permanently. The misuse of the Andaman Sea and various uninhabited islands of the archipelago for drug trafficking and gunrunning remains another issue of grave concern. Anti-smuggling operations have revealed that many islands of the archipelago are used as sanctuaries or trans-shipment bases by gunrunners, terrorists and insurgents. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are also prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcano eruptions. The Tsunami of 2004 bears testimony to the destruction of life and property caused by gigantic sea waves, especially to the Nicobar Islands. Following the India-China border in 1962 war, the security of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was reviewed and the Indian Navy was assigned the responsibility of defending the Island territory. This led to the establishment of a forward naval base, INS Jarawa, at Port Blair in 1964. In 1981, INS Jarawa was rechristened as FORTAN. In 2001, the Group of Ministers’ Report on ‘reforming the national security system’ recommended replacing FORTAN with a joint Andaman and Nicobar Command. Broadly, the functions of ANC can be divided into three categories - military, diplomatic and constabulary. The military role, especially during peace time, involves maintaining deterrence through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), ensuring physical presence in the area of interest, and conducting joint exercises. On the diplomatic level, ANC has been involved in initiatives like Milan, a biennial gathering of navies of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for the purpose of promoting regional cooperation and mutual understanding of maritime issues of common concern. Constabulary function for the ANC primarily involves enforcement of the rule of law at sea and conducting low intensity maritime operations to prevent poaching, illegal migration, narcotics and arms smuggling. Challenges to securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands come from a variety of factors. Prominent among them are a difficult topography, inadequate infrastructure and manpower, lack of coordination, inefficient intelligence and pervasive under-development. Concerted efforts are being made by the government to plug the infrastructural gaps for enhancing surveillance, air defence and coastal security. Assets and manpower are being strengthened. For example, plans are afoot for building two air bases at Shibpur and Campbell Bay after the airstrips there are lengthened and night operation facilities are provided to enable them to operate all types of aircraft round the clock. A proposal for establishing additional Coast Guard stations at Havelock and Ranggat has been forwarded. The marine police have completed vulnerability gap analysis and have proposed the augmentation of manpower and assets. Besides the development of infrastructure, grey areas that hamper the effective functioning of the security forces need to be addressed. Firstly, better coordination between various security agencies, especially between Coast Guard, police and forest department has to be ensured. A MDA among them should be created and the SOP needs to be standardized at the earliest. For the intelligence gathering process both HUMINT and TECHINT need to be made strong and fluent. Above all, a holistic development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has to be undertaken. Tourism can act as a catalyst for the development of the islands as a tourist hub. Discussion and Suggestions
Report prepared by Sana Hashmi, an Intern at IDSA. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | ||||
| Managed Chaos: The Fragility of the Chinese Miracle | March 29, 2010 | 1000-1200h | Book Discussion Forum |
By Shri Prem Shankar Jha Chair: Professor Kanti Bajpai
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| The Difficulty of Being Good: On the Subtle Art of Dharma | April 08, 2010 | 1500 - 1630 hrs | Book Discussion Forum |
Venue: Seminar Hall No. 1, IDSA Complex
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| Politics of Taliban Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan | April 23, 2010 | Vishal Chandra | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Ramesh V Phadke
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South Asia | |||
| Transformation of Conflict: An Analysis of “Op Sadbhavana” in Jammu and Kashmir | April 16, 2010 | Arpita Anant | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Prof. Amitabh Mattoo Dr. Arpita Anant’s paper notes that traditionally the Army defends the borders and, whenever called in, helps in counter-insurgency operations and provides aid to the victims of calamities. However, in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the Indian Army has extended its mandate to rebuild the lives of people devastated by terrorism. Operation Sadbhavana (meaning Goodwill), launched in 1998, is an unique attempt to apply the healing touch to win the hearts and minds (WHAM) of people by promoting development activities focuses on their basic needs. The author points out that the doctrine of sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army released in January 2007 gives a central place to WHAM in counter-insurgency operations. Such attempts, it is envisaged, would provide the healing touch during conflict and win over the alienated sections of people in the conflict zones. According to Dr. Anant, from 1998 to 2008, a total of Rs. 276.08 crore, allocated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), was spent on various multi-faceted activities under this operation. The Army has been running schools and orphanages, improving the living standard of the locals by constructing roads and bridges, installing hand pumps and electrifying villages and giving them free medical services. Excursion and education tours have also been organised during this period. Dr. Anant asserts that implementation of the projects under this initiative has had an extremely positive impact on the minds of the local population. Various educational schemes and women empowerment centres have helped in employment generation and transformed many lives. Numerous other community development and healthcare projects have helped in mitigating the hardships of the common man. The author’s tête-à-tête with the civil administration reveals that most of them were very candid in admitting that the Army brought schools, walking tracks/roads, small bridges and doctors in areas where the state government could not reach in the difficult years of the insurgency. However, a common refrain was that there is scope for improvement in coordination between the Army and civil administration. Dr. Anant’s interface with journalists reveals that although the initiative of the Army is very praiseworthy, real peace will come only with the resolution of the political problem. Some educationists believed that the Army’s initiatives are lacking involvement of the youth in the age group of 18 to 21 years who constitute 60 per cent of the population. Her discussions with the Army reveal that Operation Sadbhavna had a positive impact on the relationship between the people and the Army. However, some Army officials did believe that the actual impact is only between 50 to 75 per cent of the desired targets. Dr. Anant’s conclusion is that Operation Sadbhavana has certainly been a successful effort. Although it adds to the responsibilities of the Army, it has certainly salvaged its image. The ease with which people were interacting with Army officials made this obvious. The unending list of demands, which ought to be fulfilled by the civil administration, also proved the same. She points out that the comfort level between the military and the people seemed higher in the Jammu region than in the Valley. Also, in some places people spoke highly of the Army officials they were interacting with and remembered some officers who had been posted out, indicating that personalities made all the difference. Dr. Anant’s paper suggests following measures for better results:
Discussion:
Report prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South Asia | |||
| India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials | April 16, 2010 | Rajaram Panda | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Prof. V. P. Dutt Dr. Rajaram Panda presented his paper titled India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials on Friday, April 16, 2010. The paper’s main focus was on maritime cooperation between India and Japan and more specifically on the strategic dimensions of this cooperation. Dr. Panda argued that the looming Chinese shadow is the rationale behind this cooperation. First, he defined what a ‘strategic partnership’ means, arguing that the canvas of a “strategic relationship” was much larger than mere “political relationship”. A strategic partnership includes “defence, economic, and security dimensions in the relationship.” Dr. Panda emphasized that there was a great convergence of interests between India and Japan in the maritime domain. He highlighted India’s unique geographical position, which makes its cooperation extremely critical for Japan in securing its sea lanes. Much of Japan’s international trade is dependent upon safety of its sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. He argued that security of Japan’s maritime and energy supplies prominently figured in its security calculus. Dr. Panda discussed two high-level important visits in detail: the first being Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit to Japan, and the other Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India, which he characterized as a landmark visit. During this visit, an Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was adopted. This plan delineated a host of issue-areas in which a meaningful strategic partnership could be built. However, he highlighted the Japanese stand on India’s nuclear programme as a major irritant in what is an otherwise cordial relationship. DiscussionAmb. Rajiv Sikri argued that the economic aspect of the strategic partnership should be part of this paper. He further argued that the China factor was an important factor shaping this strategic partnership, but it was not the only factor. There are other important factors also which require due focus. Besides, the importance of China factor will keep varying depending upon who is in power in Japan. The India-Japan relationship is not that undifferentiated as it is being considered. There are more nuances involved in it. He was of the view that the US-Japan alliance had not outlived its utility and should not be underestimated. As to the definition of strategic partnership, he said that India had very loose definition of the partnership. He further argued that a strategic partnership basically meant macro-level understanding, not micro. It should be dealt with on that level only. On the question of Japanese investment in India, he said that Japanese businessmen should understand how business was done in India. He argued that there was no point in Japanese businessmen constantly complaining about India’s business environment. They should follow the example of Korean businessmen and introspect how they have succeeded in India. Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari raised some fundamental questions. He asked: if Japan was considered to be a declining power then why there was a need for an India-Japan strategic partnership. Similarly, why have a strategic partnership with the United States if it is actually declining. If the argument behind these strategic partnerships is a rising China then one must ask as to why China would not be a responsible power. Expressing doubts about China’s rise as a responsible power reflects the influence of Western thinking. He also said that the sea lanes had never been disrupted since World War II, thus, the security of sea lanes is not the biggest issue. He argued that we should not be uncritical of Western wisdom, which had actually projected India as a maritime threat in the 1970s. He further argued that the strategic partnership between India and Japan was ambivalent and Japanese perception of India was changing very slowly. Incidentally, he said that there was a minority view in Japan that favoured India’s nuclear programme. Brigadier Rumel Dahiya argued that the geostrategic importance of Japan must be assessed while exploring any strategic partnership. Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan mentioned that the economic aspect needs to be probed more. He further argued that India-Japan defence cooperation has not been strong. He argued that we should also try to understand Japanese laws and constitution, which prevents Japan from participating in any collective security mechanism. Concluding the discussion, Professor V.P. Dutt said that he felt that Japan’s new foreign policy was dubious, ambiguous and uncertain. He was of the opinion that Japanese leaders were making very vague statements about their foreign policy and they themselves may not be very clear as to what they want. He raised a larger philosophical point – the Japanese public seems to have lost interest in foreign affairs. Now, the question is whether Japan will remain confused or it will become even more confused. Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Assistant, IDSA |
East Asia | ||||
| Maoist Mass Organisations and Mass Movement | April 23, 2010 | P. V. Ramana | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya, SM According to Dr. P.V. Ramana, in order to succeed in its revolutionary agenda of the armed overthrow of the state, a Communist group requires three magic weapons – strong Party, strong Army and United Front. The last of these involves the ‘mobilization of people’. His paper focuses exclusively on Maoist Mass Organisations or Front Organisations. The author explains that the Maoists have several mass organisations, at the State level as well as at the All India level (AIMOS), which are primarily of three types: 1) Underground Revolutionary: these are built clandestinely and conduct secret propaganda. 2) Open or semi-open Revolutionary: these directly serve the people’s war as long as there is room for undertaking open revolutionary activities. 3) Mass organisations not directly linked to CPI (Maoist): these are broad-based, not directly linked to the Maoist parent outfit, and function under cover with a limited set of activities as its mandate. This type can be further subdivided into three broad categories: (a) fractional work, (b) party-formed cover organisations, and (c) legal democratic organisations. Dr. Ramana elucidates the utilities of Mass Organisations for the Maoists as: One, they spread the ideology of the outfit among the people in the areas of their operation. Two, they serve as a recruiting base, or catchments, for the underground. Three, to watch for the future leadership of the outfit emerge from among the ranks of the Mass Organisations. He quotes the example of Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishenji and Naveen who were leaders of the Radical Students Union in Andhra Pradesh and Delhi, respectively. Four, members of Mass Organisations are drafted into the ‘people’s militia’, or the Base Force. Five, Mass Organisations would enable the Maoists to be ‘heard and seen.’ Dr. Ramana asserts that the availability of a large number of people as members of mass organisations has enabled the Maoists to create vast numbers of cadres for the people’s militia in the rural and tribal hinterland, who have participated in all the large-scale synchronized attacks on multiple targets in different parts of the country in Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal, beginning with the Koraput raid of February 6, 2004, and acquired a new proficiency and vigour in the Jehanabad Jail Break in Bihar on November 13, 2005. Dr. Ramana points out that the entire work of the Mass Organisations is guided and supervised by a committee appointed by the apex and all-powerful Central Committee. This committee is known as the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), formed for the first time in 2001. The purpose of SUCOMO is to provide direction on the issues that need to be taken-up by the Mass Organisations and to provide coordination at the all-India level for State-level Mass Organisations and All India Mass Organisations (AIMOs). In the next section of the paper, the author cites two cases from Andhra Pradesh where Mass Organisations got defunct after being quite active and popular for a while. Highlighting the case of Singareni Karmika Samkhya (SIKASA), the author mentions that SIKASA took up various issues that mattered for the people dependent upon the Singareni Collieries. These included mine safety, better working conditions and wages, exploitation of miners, rampant alcoholism, goondaism and exploitation by contractors. To implement its directives, the tool it used was “terror”. However, towards the latter half of the 1990s, the downfall of SIKASA commenced. The reasons included: the collieries accumulated losses of Rs. 1,250 crore and was referred to the BFIR; severe police crackdown commenced; and liberalisation policies came into force. Highlighting the case of the Andhra Pradesh Radical Students Union (APRSU), Dr. Ramana mentions that in the initial years APRSU went through a prolonged debate on whether its mandate should be to limit itself to addressing students’ problems alone, or to make it a part of the New Democratic Revolution and help build and lead the agrarian revolution in the villages. The latter view prevailed. The various issues taken-up by APRSU during the period of its active functioning, either when it was underground or worked openly, included: opposing detention system in schools, better facilities in welfare hostels, scholarships for students, reservation for the underprivileged in educational institutions, Karamchedu dalit massacre by upper caste landlords, opposing New Education Policy, protest marches against alleged fake encounters, etc. Nevertheless, towards the beginning of the mid-1990s, the downfall of APRSU commenced and now it is defunct. While the leadership loss contributed significantly to the slow demise of the APRSU, new ‘economic opportunities’ which threw open several avenues for the angry youth also played an important role in failing to attract students towards the Maoist-fold. According to Dr. Ramana, among all the states in the country, Mass organisations are most active and vibrant in the Bastar region in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. In the Dandakaranya region the Mass Organisations in operation are: DAKMS: The organisation started its activities in 1981 in Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh. A person who is at least 16 years of age and is a resident of the village is eligible to become a member of the particular village unit of DAKMS. However, landlords, lumpen elements and those suspected to be linked to the police are not granted membership of the unit. The objective in forming DAKMS was to protect the self-respect of the tribal (adivasi) populace, declare Dandakaranya as a ‘liberated area’, prevent religious conversions, fight for the rights of the tribal populace over the land, fight against privatization and the entry of multi-national corporations (MNCs), to fight for better wages and working conditions of the labour involved in collecting kendu leaf (similar to beedi leaf), bamboo fellers, and so on. KAMS: It is one of the most active mass organisations that operates in the Dandakaranya region and fights for the rights of tribal women. All women who are above 16 years of age are eligible to become members of the village unit in which they are resident. AKCS: It was founded in 1997 to fight for the rights of students and for solving their problems. Some of the issues taken-up by the organisation included effective implementation of mid-day meal scheme in schools, provide text books free of cost, grant scholarships, etc. KABS: It was founded in 1998, in the Konta and Basuguda areas of Dantewada district (South Bastar). All children between the ages of five and 15 are eligible to become members of KABS. The underlying motive behind forming this organisation seems to be ‘to catch them young’. Dr. Ramana concluded his presentation by assessing that on a broader national scale, the Maoists do not have a ‘mass base’, contrary to the impression that is created, which is essentially because recurring and frequent acts of ‘violence’ widely dispersed in different parts of the country attract publicity and visibility. The author, nevertheless, warns that it should be noted with concern that even the miniscule support they had built over the years has sufficient ‘nuisance value’ for the Indian state. Discussion
Report prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi |
Terrorism & Internal Security | |||
| Space Assets and India’s Capability (Specific to Satellite Communication for Defence Forces up to 2020 and Beyond) | February 26, 2010 | Deepak Sharma | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Colonel Deepak Sharma treated the subject from the larger point of view of national security. He argued that space assets constitute a sub-set in the broader structure of national security, and highlighted the important role they play in military defence. According to him, imagery, navigation, signals intelligence, telecommunication, early warning and meteorology are the key satellite functions that are vital in military operations. Besides, on a strategic planning level, satellite communication would also be crucial to maintain and sustain troops deployed outside. After introducing the theme and its relevance in general, Sharma defined what he means by space system. He argued that space system meant both a satellite and its ground station(s), with trained and technically competent manpower attached to them. After this he produced various tables, graphs and charts giving a break-up of country-wise and function-wise statistics, and budgetary estimates of various countries. According to the statistics provided by him, more than half of the satellites orbiting around the earth are for communication purposes. Also, the United States dominates commercial and military space. In this section, he undertook case studies of American, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani space programmes and provided a comparative perspective. As for an Indian military space programme, he argued that “sufficient space capability exists with India to meet the requirements of its defence forces.” He argued that the Indian armed forces should demand for dedicated satellite facilities only when ISRO is unable to fulfill their requirements. He made a case for one competent and qualified agency in each service Headquarters for space systems that should be fully responsible to conceptualize, plan and implement the project in totality. He recommended that Indian space strategy should be region-focused as its strategic concerns are basically regional. Aspiring for global reach through satellites is neither reasonable nor fesible for India. As to the question of security of space assets, he argued that much of the fear is misplaced. Identifying an enemy’s satellites orbiting around the earth and, then, damaging or destroying them is not that easy, technologically. He advised that instead of being over anxious about the safety and security of satellites in space, the somewhat neglected aspect of security of space assets on the ground requires greater attention because the operation of satellites depends upon space centres on the ground. Col. Deepak Sharma’s presentation was followed by a very fruitful discussion. Mr. Yadvendra Singh argued that the effective use of space military technology by the United States in recent wars has prompted other countries to develop this technology. He pointed out that the United States heavily used commercial satellites for military communications in the Gulf Wars. Thus, using commercial satellites for military purpose is also a part of strategy. He also pointed out that the consequences would be grave if satellite systems were to collapse even for a single day. The damage incurred by such a failure would be 100 times more than in a war. He said that sharing of space and allocating coordinates will be a major issue in international politics in future because countries cannot place their satellites in orbit arbitrarily. Notwithstanding the fact that India started its space odyssey relatively late, its progress in space science has been impressive. Further, he said that Chinese business acumen and hard-bargaining have benefited its space programme a lot. Likewise, the Indian space programme can also take advantage of the worldwide recession and exploit the opportunities presented by it. Col. Navjot Singh averred that Deepak Sharma has performed a commendable job by highlighting the significance of ground space assets. He said that Sharma’s presentation has given ample food for thought. He highlighted the need of adequate laws for the safety and security of space assets and penalization of violators. Dr. Pankaj Jha raised several meaningful questions. He wanted to know what India was doing to tackle its vulnerabilities? What international agreements were there to assuage vulnerabilities? What was the international position on debris in space? The other internal discussant Mr. Kartik Bommakanti raised an important methodological issue of academic citation and validation. Air Commodore (Retd.) R.V. Phadke said that Sharma’s paper has done yeoman service to the IDSA as the institution was ‘technologically challenged’ and had shown relatively less interest in such studies. He noted that this was the first time that India’s capabilities were discussed; otherwise the general trend has been to highlight deficiencies only. The Chair, Dr. Arvind Gupta, wound up the session. In his remarks, he emphasized the point that the services would have to explain why they need dedicated satellites. He reiterated the point that our space and strategic community should start deliberating about rules of space sharing as it would be an important issue in times to come. Besides, the issue of debris has also the potential of becoming an important issue in international politics. India should not be caught in a NPT-like situation. Therefore, he insisted that there should be a national space policy. Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh |
Military Affairs | |||
| Sustaining Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare | March 12, 2010 | K C Dixit | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Ashok Mehata Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta stated at the very outset that India fought its last conventional war in 1971. Since then, it has been fighting only sub-conventional wars. However, the real spurt to sub-conventional wars that India has been fighting came in the 1980s with the surge of Sikh and then Kashmiri militancy. As for the term ‘sub-conventional war’, he said that it simply denotes to anti-terrorist or counter-insurgency operations. He argued that India would continue to fight this mode of warfare for one or two generations more at least. Therefore, he argued, the study done by Col. K. C. Dixit was very relevant from the academic as well as policy points of view. Colonel K.C. Dixit, a Research Fellow at IDSA, examined in his paper the issue of how to keep soldiers’ (in Army tradition the word ‘soldier’ is generically applied to officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks) motivation high in the difficult conditions of sub-conventional war. What makes his paper really noteworthy is that it is based on an extensive field trip and personal interviews conducted by him. He went to Jammu and Kashmir in December 2009 and visited army units where he interviewed 880 soldiers. The interviewees were classified in three categories: officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks. He asked them 36 questions, which were wide ranging and covered the entire gamut of a soldier’s life. On the basis of responses given to his questions, he arrived at certain conclusions. He began by putting forward a simplified version of the definitional aspects of motivation. Then, he dwelt into the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare, juxtaposing it with conventional warfare. He then elaborated upon the factors affecting motivation in sub-conventional warfare. He recounted the absence of cooperation from the side of civil authority, media propaganda, lack of intelligence resulting in difficulty in identifying militants, pressing demand for quick reaction, problem with soldiers adapting to a new environment, problem of command and control, insistence on use of minimum force, unsatisfactory living conditions, pressures from human rights organizations, as prominent factors affecting motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare. After analyzing factors affecting motivation, he brought forward his conclusion that the conditions necessary to keep Indian soldiers motivated are far from being satisfactory. Here, he made some recommendations to improve the level of motivation among soldiers. His recommendations covered areas like training, organizational set up, judicious involvement and participation on the part of soldiers at various levels in decision-making, unit cohesion, making tasks challenging, exciting and meaningful, media management, the handling of junior leadership, delegation of powers, and many others. He finished his presentation by making a passionate plea for improving and sustaining motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare. The discussants were unanimous on the fact that the study done by Colonel K.C. Dixit was of immense significance and would surely help improve the working conditions of the Indian Armed Forces and increase their efficiency. However, they and other scholars present during the session made some valid methodological points, which needed to be addressed. Col. K.C. Dixit accepted these points and assured that he would accommodate them in the subsequent and final draft. Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh. |
Military Affairs |
