Events

Chairperson: Shri R Banerji
Discussants: Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Prof. Savita Pande

The paper titled “Foreign Policy Trends in Pakistan” concerns itself with the context set by 9/11, though its key objective was to analyse the most recent trends in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The central argument of the paper is that there is no consensus within Pakistan on the issue of relations with the United States and the rise of radical Islamist groups renders the evolution of such a consensus even more challenging.

Key Drivers of Pakistani Foreign Policy were identified as:

• Increasing American Intrusiveness
• Karzai’s Inclination to Patch up with Pakistan
• India’s Impatience with Pakistan’s Response to Terrorism
• Garnering Continued Strategic Support from China
• Magnifying the India Threat by leveraging its Water Crisis
• Ensuring Adequate Energy Supplies

Ms. Kumar argued that within Pakistani circles, mistrust of the US has increasingly less to do with Indo-US relations, but about the American presence in the region. Citing examples of this, she outlined its implications and consequent Pakistani reactions. She also examined the contradictions resulting from Pakistan’s policy objective of playing a central role in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan while simultaneously extending support to the Taliban, the nature of which was further substantiated.

In relation to India, it was suggested that the tenor of the Pakistani attitude has been largely self–congratulatory in light of resumption of talks. It was contended moreover that the expected gains from the current round of talks must not be over-estimated. Recent co-operation between Pakistan and China was evaluated and understood as being inconsistent with international opinion and certain US policy pronouncements. Conclusion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline deal was deemed yet another instance of safeguarding national interest despite oppositional American pressures.

The paper’s overall assessment was that the US is likely to remain a significant element around which foreign policy in Pakistan is shaped. The US continues to perceive Pakistan as a crucial player in the Afghan theatre, even as the latter has redoubled efforts to minimize the scope for active Indian participation. The argument was made in conclusion that dialogue for its own sake was certainly unlikely to resolve outstanding issues that cloud the Indo-Pakistani relationship.

External Discussants:

Prof. Kalim Bahadur: On certain very important issues, national consensus within Pakistan remains intact, for example the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Condemnation of deployment of non-state actors as instruments of policy was near non-existent in Pakistan. In the same vein, actions directed by these elements against India enjoyed the tacit support of the establishment. The drone strikes launched from Pakistani soil delegitimised Pakistan’s overt stance that such American actions were counter to its sovereignty. Pakistan’s continued perception of its relationship with China as a useful hedge against both India and the US was also understood as vital to its foreign policy stance.

Prof. Savita Pande: “Memory”, “external environment” and “state’s domestic composition” are determinants of foreign policy as argued by a recent academic work on the subject. At the institutional level, there is lack of a clear delineation of responsibilities within the Pakistani establishment vis-à-vis external relations. Such entities as Blackwater were functioning in Pakistan with, rather that in spite of, the consent of the Pakistani leadership. Speaking in favour of maintaining an analytical distinction between the Afgan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, Prof. Pande described the optimistic, pessimistic and pragmatist positions which are all currently in vogue in Pakistan on the matter of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban. China’s pursuit of its own interests in the Af-Pak theatre was briefly examined to draw out lessons for India, while on the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, India’s centrality to the viability and success of this project was postulated.

Internal Discussants

Dr. Behuria mentioned the importance of drawing an analytical distinction between objectives and drivers of foreign policy. Adding to the list of drivers on the domestic front, he drew attention to the significance of economic decline and political clout of the military in shaping the context for foreign policy design in Pakistan.

Once again separating drivers from relevant issues, Dr. Kalyanaraman addressed important shifts in the Afghan scenario and corresponding attempts by Pakistan to reposition itself. He further identified the past year or so as the more closely relevant frame of reference for purposes of arriving at helpful conclusions about new developments in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The future of Afghanistan was singled out as a potently useful prism to anticipate Pakistan’s relationship with the US, China, Iran and India.

Discussion

The need to explicitly comment on the extent to which foreign policy in Pakistan is influenced by the military was highlighted and it was suggested to consider ways in which greater civilian control over policy formulation would change its content and character. The author was suggested to give proposals on how the dialogue might be supplemented to attain key goals on the Indian side. It was advised that a considered assessment be made of greater Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, for reasons of achieving strategic depth, in terms of the backlash that this would have for the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s attempts to strike a balance between its relations with the US and China was identified as meriting close observation.

Chair’s Summary

The chair took the view that consensus on key national issues in Pakistan has not quite broken down nor has the influence of the military sustained any erosion. He acknowledged a role for Pakistan in containing the effects of American involvement in Afghanistan while coping with the extremist blowback that this might incur. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion.

Report prepared by Kalyani Unkule, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Speaker: Hon. Sujata Koirala, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nepal

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Participants
Ladies and Gentlemen:

1. First of all, I would like to thank the institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for providing me with this opportunity to share my views with such an enlightened and important audience. I see around me here my trusted friends, and a galaxy of intellectuals. I feel honoured and proud to be amongst you all this afternoon.

2. I do not think it necessary here to reiterate and highlight the age-old ties between Nepal and India which are characterized by cordiality, goodwill, mutual trust and cooperation. Our bilateral relations are multifaceted in nature and scope. They encompass political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions, and many more. Besides, exchange of high-level visits and interactions among the leaders have further deepened, widened and heightened our relations. Exchanges and interactions between our peoples are the defining character of our bilateral ties.

3. If compared with its immediate neighbours, Nepal is small in size, population and economy. However, due to its geographical location between India and China and the resources it possesses, Nepal is geo-strategically important in South Asia, and beyond.

4. As Nepal has been facing the problem of unemployment, illiteracy and poverty, compounded by a decade-long insurgency, it is in dire need of international support in the priority areas. Such areas include restoration of damaged physical infrastructures, maintenance of fiscal balance, undertaking balanced economic development, creation of income generation activities, implementation of poverty alleviation programmes, and so on. In this context, we highly value the economic and financial assistance rendered by the Government of India since the early 1950’s. It has greatly contributed to the development of infrastructure, education, health, agriculture and other important sectors. India’s support has greatly supplemented to our efforts of nation building.

5. Investment is another area of our priority in which India has the largest share. The Government of Nepal encourages public and private sector of India to invest in Nepal in the sectors mutually agreed upon. Hydro-power, tourism, trade, and road connectivity and other infrastructure are main areas with greater potentials for long-term cooperation. Cooperation in these areas may also help reduce Nepal’s huge trade deficit with India in the days to come.

6. Nepal and India have unique relationship. We share open border which presents both opportunities and challenges. It has facilitated the movements of our peoples across the border to undertake activities for livelihood and sustenance. On the other hand, misuse of the open border by criminals has become one of the main challenges for both Nepal and India. Therefore, it has now become imperative to check such transnational crimes. I believe that these problems are not insurmountable. It is my strong conviction that constant vigilance by local administration along the border points and sharing of intelligence and developing counter intelligence mechanism between the existing security agencies of both countries needs to be intensified, reactivated and modernized.

7. Nepal and India have more than two dozens of bilateral mechanisms dealing with specific issues of mutual concern from political to sectoral expert level. They are meeting off and on, and charted out courses of action to resolve existing problems. But their decisions are not properly implemented. I believe that the main cause of frustration among the peoples on both sides arise from the non-implementation of these decisions. This has helped only to add anger of the people towards the governments of both countries. Therefore, implementation of the decisions taken, and the agreements and Memoranda of Understanding signed should be implemented in an effective and efficient manner with due sense of urgency by both countries.

8. Let me now come to the internal situation of Nepal. I know that you are quite aware of, and closely following, the political developments in Nepal. There is a deadlock among the major political parties on the issues of drafting new constitution and making the peace process conclusive. It is a fact that we could not complete these national issues within the stipulated time frame. But, I am happy to inform you that the tenure of the Constituent Assembly has been extended till May next year, with a broad consensus among all the political parties. We have taken it as a manifestation of the serious commitment of Nepal’s political parties to draft the constitution and bring the peace process to its logical conclusion. The present Government is working hard to realize these common objectives.

9. It is also a reality that there is still divergence of views among the parties supporting the government and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN)- Maoist in the opposition, about the procedures for drafting the constitution. The UCPN-Maoist wants first to form the government under its leadership, before moving ahead with the drafting of new constitution. On the other hand, the parties supporting the government want the UCPN- Maoist to fulfill its commitments made under various agreements and understandings in the peace process. The present government is ready to accommodate legitimate demands of the Maoists as per the rules and regulations of the country, which were set with the support of the Maoists themselves. The Government in turn expects the Maoists to be flexible as well. The present political uncertainty in Nepal is the result of inflexibility and rigidity on their part. They are still very adamant, uncompromising, and insisting on irrational demands against their own commitments. Our people are still suffering from Maoists’ atrocities, including forceful seizure of properties, targeted attacks, extortions, and other many unlawful activities. Fear still persists among the people. We have been calling upon the Maoists to become more flexible, comprising, and realistic. At this moment, I proudly recall the sterling job done by Girijababu, my late father, to bring the Maoist party into the mainstream of Nepalese politics, to hold elections for Constituent Assembly and to transform the county into a Republic.

10. Nepal is facing a number of serious problems. They include drafting a new constitution acceptable to all major stakeholders, maintaining law and order, meeting the requirements and legitimate aspirations of the people, and giving continuity to development projects. We are very clear that we can not draft constitution without the support of the Maoists. At the same time, we are also aware that time is running out very fast. Though we have extended the term of the Constituent Assembly by one year, this term will also pass by soon. If we cannot formulate an acceptable constitution within the remaining eleven months, the country will plunge into an unimaginable abyss, not to mention the tarnished image and shattered credibility of the major political parties in the eyes of our people. Therefore, formulating a broadly acceptable constitution and taking the peace process to its logical conclusion are our shared responsibilities, from which no party can escape.

11. We also know it very well that, given the divergent philosophical base of the political parties, it is not easy to reach consensus and achieve our immediate objectives. There is no alternative but to reach a common minimum ground where all of us can meet, and move forward together. In view of this, we have proposed a six-point work-plan, which is very close to the aspirations of our people. This work-plan includes –

1. Management of Maoist combatants under a formula acceptable to both sides. It includes options such as integration into the society, opportunities for foreign employment, rehabilitation and integration into security agencies, and monetary incentives by the government.
2. Dismantling of the paramilitary nature and structure of the Young Communist League (YCL).
3. Constituting a Commission to look into, and solve, the problem of the properties seized by the Maoists. The properties seized by the party should be returned to their owners without delay, and those by landless squatters may be taken care of by the government.
4. Prepare specific work-plan to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Process and formulate a new constitution, and strictly adhere to it.
5. Implementation of all agreements and understandings reached under the peace process; and
6. Formulation of a national consensus government after reaching agreement on the above points.

12. My party, the Nepali Congress, has remained very open to negotiations, very flexible, and sincerely committed to the peace process. We have been urging others too not to accord high priority to forming or leading the government. This is the time for charting the right course of action for the country. Our reasoned policies and moves will give the country a right direction. This will also generate hope among our people, who deserve far better future for themselves and their children. We are also convinced that a strong and effective central government is a must for addressing the problems of the people, and leading the country to the right direction.

13. The international community, too, has a stake in Nepal’s peace process. As I said in the beginning, Nepal has strategic importance not only for its neighbours, but also for the world at large. A peaceful and prosperous Nepal will be conducive to the maintenance of peace and security, and achieving development goals of its neighbours. It will contribute to the peace, progress and prosperity of other countries and regions. We all know it well that instability in a country creates problems for others as well. We are all sailing through the same waters. This is why we expect constructive and positive response form the international community in general, and from our neighbourhood in particular.

14. I thank you all for your patience and attention.

Thank You.

A 16-member delegation from the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, led by Major General Seiichi Takeuchi visited the IDSA on May 24 and held discussions on issues of mutual interests and concerns between India and Japan.

The IDSA team was led by Dr. Thomas Mathew, Deputy Director-General of IDSA and consisted of members of the IDSA’s East Asia cluster. At the outset, Dr. Mathew extended a warm welcome to the NIDS delegation and expressed satisfaction over the growing cooperation between India and Japan in many fronts. He observed that the security interests of India and Japan converge on many fronts, with maritime security including Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) remaining an issue of paramount concern for the two countries. He noted that 90 to 92 per cent of Japan’s imports pass through the Indian Ocean. Similarly, SLOCs are important for India as a large amount of India’s exports and imports pass through the Indian Ocean. He urged greater cooperation between the two countries in the fields of security and economy. He also observed that India believes in peaceful cooperation but at the same time it wants that no country is able to dominate the Asian region. He also made the point that though India wants peace, it is concerned with China’s defence spending and its plans to build a blue water navy and highlighted the fact that Japan has also asked for transparency from China on its defence spending. As regards economic cooperation, he highlighted the fact that Japan has been the largest donor and its development assistance has made visible impacts in India, with the Delhi Metro a symbol of such cooperation. He also noted that Japan’s growing FDI in India is more than that in China and termed it a matter of confidence. He concluded that bilateral relations are satisfactory and observed that he finds the present situation between the two democracies most appropriate to take the relationship forward.

On behalf of the NIDS, Maj. Gen. Seiichi Takeuchi welcomed Dr. Thomas Mathew’s remarks by observing that “your words are very warm”. He expressed satisfaction over the growing number of Indian students in Japan and academic exchanges taking place between the two countries. He said that the incident of Allondra Rainbow, the Japanese ship that was rescued by the Indian Coast Guard from pirates, set an example for the Japanese to seek defence cooperation with India which has grown over the years. But he also highlighted that this cooperation should not be limited to the naval sphere and should go beyond so as to “deepen this relationship” further. He also expressed satisfaction over regular meetings between the Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two countries. He also suggested that both IDSA and NIDS should pick up more topics for research.

During the meeting, Air Cmde. Ramesh Phadke presented a briefing on China. He said that China is an important neighbour for both India and Japan. The Rise of China makes it necessary to try and understand China in a better way. He also observed that India’s relationship with China was sound and based on five peaceful principles. But after events in Tibet in 1958 and 1962 border clashes, the relationship remained frozen. He also appraised the NIDS delegation about India’s official position and said that China continues to be in illegal possession of some Indian territories especially in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. He said that both countries signed two treaties during the Prime Ministership of Narasimha Rao, but after 13 rounds of negotiations on border issues, there has not been enough progress. He also highlighted the fact that India is not inclined to embark on an arms race. The un-demarcated border, however, poses concerns. He also reminded the delegation of China’s intention to increase its sphere of influence in the South China Sea and opined that “we fear that the development can cause concern for Japan and India.” He also touched upon other areas such as China’s military modernization and its cyber warfare capabilities, which are causing concern among the international community and suggested that both India and Japan need to understand China better.

Dr. Ashok Behuria presented a briefing on developments in South Asia. According to him, South Asia is passing through a critical phase at present. In the last few years, almost all the states in the region have reverted to democracy. This positive development, however, coincided with the emergence of an asymmetric threat, particularly from non-states actors. When Maldives and Bhutan adopted democracy, India encouraged that step. However, transition to democracy has not been very peaceful in the context of South Asian states. In this context, examples of Bangladesh and Nepal can be cited in particular. In Bangladesh, the current Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina is struggling to sustain democracy. The last few years have also witnessed dramatic changes in Indo-Bangladesh relations. In Nepal, the political reconciliation process with the Maoists is in turmoil. How to bring this revolutionary group into the mainstream has been an issue of concern so far. Recently, in early May, the Maoists staged a mass scale demonstration which caught the attention of international community. Being a close neighbour, India has been following the developments in Nepal closely. A similarity can be drawn between Nepal and Sri Lanka, as the island country is also facing a critical situation as far as reconciliation of the Tamil ethnic minority is concerned.

While discussing recent developments in Afghanistan, Dr. Behuria stated that so far the Af-Pak strategy of the US has failed to achieve the desired goal. It has been opined that a regional and international consensus is required to deal with Afghanistan. But due to the rivalry between India and Pakistan, such a consensus remains elusive. At present, reconciliation between the Afghanistan government and Taliban is posing a serious challenge. Both the US administration and the international community consider Pakistan as the link between the Afghan government and the Taliban in war-torn Afghanistan. But so far, Pakistan has not delivered much on this front. The reconciliation process in Afghanistan has been further affected by Taliban’s refusal to abide by the existing law of the country and its insistence on introducing Islamic Sharia law instead.

Pakistan has problems of its own. At present, it is suffering from Islamic radicalization. Over the years, Pakistan has always tried to make a distinction between good Taliban and bad Taliban, good Jihadis and bad Jihadis. The Taliban militants involved in anti-India operations are treated by Pakistan as good Taliban. Its lack of sincerity in fighting terrorism head-on can be clearly seen in its deliberate failure to capture the perpetrators of the 26/11 attack in Mumbai. This has not only slowed down the peace process between India and Pakistan, but also hampered meaningful progress in bilateral as well as regional economic cooperation. China-Pakistan nuclear missile cooperation has also been an issue of great concern to India. Over the years, Pakistan has been alleging India of harbouring a hegemonic approach towards South Asia. But it cannot overlook the fact that India has been very accommodative towards its neighbours. In fact, despite its rivalry with Pakistan, India offered the latter the status of ‘Most-Favoured Nation’. But so far, it has not been reciprocated by Pakistan. At a time when South Asia is attracting considerable international attention, Pakistan may have to change its attitude towards India and other South Asian neighbours under international pressure. A positive attitude on Pakistan’s part can go a long way in bringing peace and prosperity to the region.

Report prepared by Shamshad Ahmad Khan and Pranamita Baruah

Dr. Nihar Nayak began by offering some basic facts about the Madhesi movement. Although there exist a number of versions about what the word ‘Madhes’ stands for, the most popular or accepted version is that it refers to ‘Madhya-desh’, a region between the hills and the plains. Also known as ‘Terai’, Madhes region consists of twenty districts, all of which share their borders with India. Many Madhesis are of Indian origin and thus have strong socio-cultural ethnic linkages across the border. In the paper, Dr. Nayak flagged three questions: Is the Madhes issue likely to bring in deep-rooted conflict in Nepal? Can external forces take advantage of the situation to India’s detriment? How will Madhesi politics determine the future of Nepal politics and India-Nepal relations in the future?

Over the years, Madhesis have suffered from a sense of discrimination and consequent deprivation. They also feel exploited and discriminated against by the upper caste Pahadi migrant communities. Hindi-speaking Indian Madhesis particularly feel discriminated against by the Nepali state due to the following factors. Firstly, Indian Madhesis, under the Citizenship Act of 1964 and the Constitution of 1990, were debarred from citizenship certificates, due to which they could neither acquire land ownership nor could avail government benefits. Although the Citizenship Law was amended in November 2006 making it possible for people born in Nepal before 1990 and those residing there permanently to acquire Nepali citizenship, it has been alleged that many Madhesis and Dalits are still deprived of citizenship. It has also been alleged that instead of taking into consideration the Madhesis’ cultural affiliation with India, the Nepali government has adopted a discriminatory attitude towards this group by trying to introduce compulsory Nepali language for both official work and as the medium of education in the Madhes region. Despite the fact that the Madhesi population constitutes nearly one-third of the Nepali population, their share at the level of gazetted level employees is merely 9.9 per cent. Madhesi people have also voiced concerns about the economic exploitation of the resource-rich Madhes region by the Nepali government. Although Madhes contributes 70 per cent of the agricultural production of Nepal, 65 per cent of the GDP, and 76 per cent of the country’s total revenue, the infrastructure in this region is considered to be much poorer than in the hill areas. Allegations have also been made regarding how during the monarchy, in the name of land reform, land belonging to Madhesi people were given away to Pahadis.

A feeling of deprivation and exploitation made the Terai or Madhes region a hub of the pro-democratic movement during the 1950s and 1960s. During that time, perceiving India as anti-establishment and the Madhesis as India’s agents, and fearing that Indian immigrants in Terai might prompt India to claim it as Indian territory, the Nepali elite adopted stringent policies to curb the Madhesis’ activism. But this led to the emergence of identity-based movement in Madhes, particularly with the formation of two groups: the Nepal Terai Vongress led by Vedanta Jha in 1951 and the Madhesi Mukti Andolan led by Raghunath Thakur in 1956. At present, numerous political parties and non-state actors are involved in the Madhesi cause. In this context, examples of Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP), etc., can be particularly cited. There also exist a number of major armed groups in the Terai region, such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), Terai Cobra, Nepal Defence Army (NDA), Nepal Janatantrik Party (NJP), and Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj (CBES). Although all these forces are involved in armed revolution in Nepal, there seems to be a divergence in the goals each of them aspires to achieve. While JTMM demands the establishment of an autonomous Terai region, and Terai Cobra aspires to launch an armed separatist struggle for a sovereign Terai state, the objective of NDA is to form a Hindu army with suicide bombers to fight against religious extremism, conversion, as well as Maoists. Similarly, while as a royalist outfit, the NJP aspires to retain constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy in Nepal, the CBES basically demands the establishment of a Chure Bhawar federal region in Terai and is opposed to ‘one Madhesh one Pradesh’ demand.

There are reports of ‘internal tensions and lack of clarity on immediate demands and long term strategy’ of Madhesi groups. While the Madhes-based parties take a soft stand on the issue, the armed groups are demanding nothing less than sovereignty. Moreover, the Madhesi political parties are in a dilemma especially regarding whom to take sides with among the major parties. They cannot support a liberal democratic government in Kathmandu as their autonomy demand would be lost. They cannot really support the Maoists basically due to the prevailing fear of losing a multi-party democratic system in Nepal under a Maoist led government. In the meantime, due to their involvement in kidnapping, killing and extortion, some armed groups involved in the Madhesi cause are often dismissed as criminals by most Madhesis themselves. In this scenario of diffused leadership and objectives, the future of the Madhes cause remains uncertain.

In his presentation, Dr. Nayak tried to draw attention to the fact that unstable Nepal, particularly the border regions of Terai, can provide avenues for both China and Pakistan to encourage anti-India elements there, through arms and fake currency trafficking, madrasas, terrorist outfits, etc. Reportedly, China has already extended its support to the faction of the MFJ led by Upendra Yadav. In recent time, the United States too has taken particular interest in the developments of Madhesi region. Although it has listed JTMM on the US terrorist list, it granted a visa to Upendra Yadav to attend the Terai Diaspora event held in Washington.

Over the years, while treating Madhesi issue as an internal matter of Nepal which can be resolved by accommodating minority rights within the new Constitution, India has largely taken a stance of non-interference. Even then, the Pahadis often allege India of encouraging the ‘one Madhes, one Pradesh’ demand. According to Dr. Nayak, if such perceptions gain further ground, it would aggravate the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal and consequently give more space to China and Pakistan to use Nepal as a hotbed for anti-India activities. Ironically, the Madhesis accuse India of neglecting the Madhesi movement. Recently, in June 2009, allegations were raised regarding India’s involvement in engineering divisions in the MJF. Debate has also been brewing in the Terai that the Madhesis have failed to take any concrete decision about their future because of India’s support for the liberal democratic parties opposed to ethnic-based federalism.

According to Dr. Nayak, anti-Indianism of the Madhes movement is likely to affect India’s economic interests in Nepal. Frequent protests will affect India’s trade and commercial relations with Nepal. It will also affect India’s hydroelectric projects and the business operations of Indian investors in Nepal. Since the Terai is the link between India and northern Nepal, a troubled Terai may affect “every major highway, custom point. The industrial, economic, and other fertile resources of Nepal are in Madhesh, helping circulate trade relationship.”

Under the prevailing circumstances, India is faced with certain difficult choices. Any constructive attempt by India to salvage the Terai situation through proactive involvement is likely to be interpreted as unnecessary intervention in the internal affairs of Nepal and upset its Pahadi constituency and Nepal Army. At another level, passive indifference to developments in Terai will be misconstrued as shirking of responsibility by observers at home as well as by the Madhesis themselves. India cannot possibly afford to ignore developments in Nepal and especially the discrimination in Terai. At present, the best approach for India seems to be to work as a positive facilitator to strengthen the capacity of various democratic institutions to resolve the social tensions in Nepal in general and in Terai in particular. Given India’s leverages in Nepal, India could also make an earnest effort to bring all political parties together to have a dialogue on the contentious issues.

Important points raised during the discussion of the paper:

1. From a topographical point of view, Nepal is vulnerable to both India and China. Terai is not only important for India, but also for Nepal itself. Over the years, the Nepali government has been trying to make this place inhabited by people ‘friendlier to them’ and people who look like them. The sentiment behind taking such stance by the Nepali government should be respected by the Indian government.
2. In this paper, more space should be devoted to analyse the impact of the Madhesi movement on India.
3. India’s concern about the Madhesi problem cannot be anything more than neighbourly.
4. Nepal suffers from paranoia of being encircled by India. But it does not seem to have a similar problem with respect to China. India has to understand this psyche among the Nepalese.
5. The Madhesi problem should be studied in relation to the challenge of governance that Nepal is currently facing.
6. The strong sense of opportunism among Madhesi leaders makes it difficult for India to get involved in this movement.
7. Indian policy vis-à-vis Nepal since the Maoist uprising in 1997 has been to keep other players out of it. But this policy seems to have misfired particularly because of the involvement of so many external actors in it.
8. Geo-strategic importance of the Terai region should be analysed in the paper.
9. There is a need to mention the Jan Andolan III.
10. The clash between Madhesis and Maoists in which 21 Maoists were killed should be mentioned.
11. Due to Madhesi identity, Maoist influence in Terai has weakened considerably. Madhesis are expected to become future kingmaker of Nepal. India needs to take that factor into account.
12. With the advent of democracy, the Muslim vote bank in the Terai has become important.
13. The paper needs to clarify the significant factors for the potential of conflict in Terai. Those factors are basically identified as intra-Madhesi conflict, Pahadi-Madhesi conflict, and elements of communal violence.
14. India should try to harmonize Madhesi politics. It should particularly take interest in brining about economic development in Terai region.
15. India’s role in brokering the 8-point agreement between the Madhesis and the government should be highlighted.
16. Future of Madhesi politics should be analysed in the paper.
17. The paper also needs to bring out ordinary Madhesi people’s perception about India.

Report prepared by Pranamita Barua, Research Assistant, IDSA