Events

Chairperson: Dr. Arvind Gupta
Discussants: Alok Bansal and General Barmer

Dr. Sreeradha Datta, notes that Bangladesh’s maritime boundary dispute with India and Myanmar is becoming increasingly salient in their bilateral relations. It is only in recent years that the issue has gained prominence fraying relations. The un-demarcated nature of the maritime boundary line is the source of dispute between Bangladesh and its two neighbours. Both India and Myanmar have overlapping maritime boundary claims with Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the only country among littoral states not to have reached a maritime agreement. Maritime boundary delimitation implies not only the setting of limits of the state’s outer limit of maritime zones including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf, but also its maritime boundary limits vis-à-vis its opposite or adjacent state. Under the dispute settlement provisions of the UNCLOS of 1982 each littoral state is entitled to claim 200 nautical miles (nm) of sea area as its EEZ with all living and non-living resources within these areas are that state’s exclusive property; out of this, the first 12 nm are the Territorial Sea and the next 188 nm are its EEZ. The resolution of Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute entails addressing two contentious issues – that of the baselines to demarcate maritime and delimitation boundaries including the outer limit of the overlapping extended continental shelf. Following revision, the UNCLOS III stipulated that the ‘median’ or the ‘equidistance’ be the principle for maritime boundary demarcation which India supports. Bangladesh strongly opposes the ‘equidistance’ principle given the nature of its coast. With India, Bangladesh’s dispute specifically surrounds the contrasting claims over what is known as New Moore in India and South Talpatty in Bangladesh. Myanmar’s position is fairly similar to that of India. Rangoon also insists that the equidistance principle be maintained. However as Dr. Datta maintains despite the contentious issues at stake between Bangladesh and its two neighbours and given the geographical condition of Bangladesh there is ample scope in the UNCLOS III to treat Bangladesh’s case with greater flexibility and beyond the strict guidelines of equidistance. India and Bangladesh could agree on a joint survey, but for now the dispute is being mediated by an independent arbitrator. Finding a modus vivendi is possible according Dr. Datta. While Bangladesh in recent negotiations has agreed to a joint hydrological survey on Teesta River with India allowing the extreme positions over the baseline may thus be bridged.

Points of Discussion

1. Europe’s context is different from the history that bedevils the India-Bangladesh maritime dispute. History is important in Europe’s case, but this is not the case between India and Bangladesh.
2. The paper is informative.
3. Equity cannot be defined clearly and Bangladesh has its own conception.
4. Delineation of the maritime boundary must follow the equidistance principle. Even the ICJ maintains that equidistance is the rule.
5. Joint management is the best option as the author has proposed. Sea bed resources can be equally shared.
6. India is in a scientifically and technically stronger position than Bangladesh, which lacks technical resource capacities.
7. India must be magnanimous, because it will strengthen the Hasina government.
8. China’s role is increasingly worrisome.
9. The author seems to be pleading only Bangladesh’s case. The onus also lies on Bangladesh to demonstrate that it is really in need of the resources.
10. The author must highlight the strategic importance of the dispute and China’s role in trying to exploit the problem, particularly between India and Bangladesh.

Report prepared by Kartik Bommakanti, Research Assistant at the IDSA

Chair: Dr. Rajaram Panda
External Discussants: Dr. P.K. Ghosh Senior Fellow, CAPS and Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra, JNU

Presentation

• The paper’s core question “What factors influence why states make the decision to import advanced weapon systems or to develop them indigenously?”
• Both India and Japan had similar threat perceptions owing to similar kind of neighbourhood situation.
• The paper discusses the political processes behind BMD acquisition and not its scientific effectiveness or military utility.
• There is research on suppliers’ perception of arms transfer but litter research on recipients’ perspectives.
• In the case of Japan, discussion on BMD began with Reagan’s “Star Wars” address. In the late 1980s and through the 1990s Japanese defence industry conducted research in this area. There was some joint research with the United States as well.
• North Korea’s 1998 Taepo Dong I test convinced Japan of BMD’s usefulness and formal joint research with United States began.
• After the United States withdrew from ABM treaty, the Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce BMD systems. As of December 2009 4 SM-3s and 12 PAC-3s are deployed.
• Japan’s Foreign Policy concerns influenced the timing of the BMD deployment. Its perception about threats from the neighbours mattered in the decision about BMD. The Taiwan strait crisis of 1995-96 and earlier Chinese nuclear tests caused the difference. North Korean tests became an incentive to introduce BMD system, but was not a decisive factor that made Japan decide to join the American system.
• Japan did not consider self reliance because there are restrictions due to import controls and limited R&D budgets.
• In the case of India, Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11s caused it to think of BMD. Chinese and Pakistani co-operation was looked at seriously. The political decisions behind it have not been fully analysed.
• India has been aiming for self-reliance in its defence procurements.
• India’s desire for independent policy also caused it to focus on self reliance. In the cold war period, the United States and USSR had tied their arms sales to alliance partnerships and there still exist political hurdles to delivery of weapons. Thus indigenisation and diversification have been two pillars of the Indian arms policy.
• DRDO has conducted tests successfully and India should be able to deploy its BMD system by 2011.
• Even if it was economically difficult, India decided on indigenous development of BMD for political and strategic reasons.
• Thus, foreign policy and threat perceptions matter equally in decisions over BMD policies.

Comments and Discussion:

• Need to go deeper into the use of the Defence Industry perspective. 1998 alone cannot be the reason for Japanese policy on BMD. Japan favours two layered system and not two staged system.
• MTCR has been critical in decisions about BMD by different countries.
• India decided against co-development because it was turning out to be more expensive.
• Japan’s R&D numbers are impressive; in fact the United States wanted to collaborate with Japan for its own advantage.
• That Japan became more independent in its foreign policy with the end of Cold War is a very tall claim.
• Impact of the Japanese BMD is going to be same regardless of its origin.
• Economic benefit of the Japanese BMD programme is an outcome and not a cause. This has happened because the United States has subsidised Japanese BMD programme.
• There is need to elaborate on the reasons why Japan decided not to develop indigenous capacity when it could and why India decided to do so when it did not have the knowledge.
• Even while the nature of arms transfer has changed and even as marketisation has taken place, co-operation on BMD still remains a political decision.
• The author could compare the different nature of relationship that India and Japan have with the United States and its impact on their BMD policy.
• In Japan, public opinion has played an important role.
• Credibility of the Indian BMD can be questioned. One should not look at statements but the results of the tests.
• BMD is a work in progress. It is useful for its psychological and political utility. No one would share it if it was perfect.
• In India this has not been a strategic political decision but a military technical decision.

Report Prepared by Avinash Godbole, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Chairperson: Ramesh Phadke
Discussants: Swadesh Rana and Swaran Singh

Venue: Seminar Hall-1, IDSA

The relevance of India’s think tanks and the measures needed to strengthen them for meeting India’s growing need for security and foreign policy research has come under some focus in academic and media debates in recent months. Most commentators have opined that the current capacity of the academia and think tanks to contribute to policy debates and policy formulation is less than satisfactory. Our universities’ and think-tanks’ infrastructure and quality of intellectual output needs to significantly improve to meet growing challenges of India’s complex security and foreign policy needs. What can we do to improve our collective capacities to enhance qualitative contributions for informed and rational policy choices both in government and civil society sectors?

We hope to assemble in a Roundtable some experienced policy makers, academics, think-tanks analysts and media experts to discuss a way forward on 11 November 2009 from 9:30 am to 2 pm at IDSA. The objective is to generate some ideas that can help shape future strategies of think-tanks and key stake holders.

We hope to have a free and unfettered discussion in the roundtable. However, in order to focus the debate, it is proposed to organize the roundtable as under:-

0930-0940: Introductory Remarks: Shri N.S. Sisodia (DG, IDSA)

Chair: Shri K. Subrahmanyam

Panel I: Perspectives from the Policy Makers (0940 h to 1100 h)

Speakers (5-7 minutes each)

• Ambassador M.K. Rasgotra
• Ambassador K.S. Bajpai
• Ambassador Kishen S. Rana
• Air Marshal S.C. Mukul

Chair may wish to request the following also to speak should they desire to do so:

• Ms. Leela Ponappa
• Shri A.K. Pandey
• Shri Alok Prasad
• Col. Peter Garretson (CFR Fellow)

1. What are the key issues that research institutions should focus on so that they can add value and be useful for policy makers?
2. What measures can help establish better relations between the academia, think-tanks and policy makers?
3. What kind research products will the policy makers find useful?
4. General Comments

Panel II: Perspectives from Academia (1100-1200 h)

Speakers (5-7 Minutes Each)
Chair: Dr Sanjaya Baru

• Professor Amitabh Mattoo
• Professor Ajay Darshan Behera
• Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan
• Professor Madhu Bhalla
• Dr. Patrick Bratton

1. How can we make our higher education relevant for the policy world?
2. How can we design research agenda that addresses the important questions in the policy world?
3. How can we forge stronger institutional linkages between policy makers and academia?
4. What can academia do to make multi-disciplinary research viable?
5. How can think-tanks and academia establish institutional linkages that would be mutually beneficial?
6. General Comments

Panel III: Perspectives from the Media (1200-1300h)

Speakers (5-7 Minutes Each)
Chair: Mr. B.G. Verghese

• Dr. Sanjaya Baru
• Dr. Manoj Joshi
• Dr. Siddharth Vardarajan
• Shri Raj Chengappa (tbc)

1. What are the key issues that are likely to focus media and public attention in the coming years?
2. How can media and think-tanks work together to inform security policy debates?
3. What kind of institutional arrangements will help foster better flow of information and analysis between the media and the think-tanks?
4. General Comments

Panel IV: Perspectives from the Think-Tank Community (1300-1400 h)

Speakers (5-7 Minutes Each)
Chair: Professor PR Chari

• Shri N.S. Sisodia, DG, IDSA
• Amb. Rajagopalan
• Ambassador Sudhir Devare
• Brig (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal (tbc)

1. How can think-tanks make their work relevant to the key concerns of policy makers?
2. What are the core research issues think-tanks should focus on in the coming years?
3. What can be done to recruit, retain and train talent for policy relevant research work?
4. What kind of institutional arrangements will help enhance utility of think-tank research for policy work and public debates?
5. Should think-tanks develop a more focused research agenda and how should that be done?
6. How do we create multi-disciplinary research teams that can address complex policy issues? What are the key challenges in building multi-disciplinary teams?
7. Is there a case for coordination in think tanks work/activities?
8. What should be the role definition of governing structures of the think-tanks in order to increase their effective management?
9. What can think-tanks do to foster closer relations with the academic institutions?
10. General Comments