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Title	Date	Author	Time	Event	Body	Research Area	Topics	File attachments	Image
Nanotechnology: Current Global Trends and Future Military Applications for “Soldier as a System”	May 23, 2014	Sanjiv Tomar	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Dr W Selvamurthy External Discussants: Rear Admiral (Retd) S Kulshrestha and Col Deepak Kohli Internal Discussants: Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) and Dr Cherian Samuel	North America & Strategic Technologies
Indian Maritime Strategy: Drivers and Imperatives	May 16, 2014	Sarabjeet Singh Parmar		Fellows' Seminar	Chair: R Adm (Retd) K Rajamenon External Discussants: R Adm SY Srikhande, Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Cdr R Mishra Internal Discussants: Commodore Ajay Chhabra The author argues that as the world looks towards Indian Navy to deliver more it is time to take a stock of where India’s maritime strategy stands. The paper traces the evolution of India’s maritime strategy from the pre-natal days of independence and examines if the present day strategy has aided its quest to be seen as a responsible stable provider of security in the IOR and as a reliable partner in its other areas of interest. It also looks at imperatives that require re-examining. The paper also identifies imperatives that require to be included to enable a cogent maritime strategy and place India in its rightful place in the comity of nations as a responsible and stable actor. The paper tries to explain India’s maritime strategy in terms of drivers and imperatives of strategy. It defines driver as an aspect that has a long term effect; is the raison d’etre and has a direct bearing on the strategy. By imperative it means an aspect that could be temporary; impinge on the strategy and would require a solution so that the drivers are not affected. Therefore, the roles envisaged by the doctrines have been broadly acknowledged as the drivers since they have more or less remained permanent especially since 1998. The author concludes that Indian Maritime Strategy which has been based on a consistent thought process since independence could be viewed as a cognitive articulation of India’s maritime outlook limited by funding, lack of an enforceable higher directive and inherent internal dynamics of governance. The advantage bestowed by geography and the relative intra-regional balance of power equation that has weighed in India’s favour since 1947 could be lost due to the ingress of external powers like China and their ability to exert influence directly or indirectly both on land and sea. It could also be affected by reluctance of nations like the US in maintaining a safe and stable maritime environment. Either way, as India is looked upon by most of its neighbours and other IOR nations as a stability and balancing factor with reasonable capacity and capabilities there is a need to: Bolster the maritime strategy with a modern balanced naval force with adequate numbers and a smoother flowing perspective plan that would meet the cardinal dates of upgradation and replacement. This would entail a relook at funding and more importantly timely approval of acquisition plans. Connect the Indian Naval outlook with the central thought of the government. This would ensure a continued success of naval diplomacy in consonance with India’s foreign policy. Ensure a common, and when required strong, stance on issues that are both inimical and beneficial to India’s interests. This would ensure the sanctity of not only the maritime strategy but also indicate stronger internal dynamics within the various elements of the government. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: Strategy, drivers and imperatives was discussed at length. It was argued that strategy and doctrine are not the same. Strategy should be dynamic and flexible in order to absorb emerging challenges and developments. Securing peace is the ultimate aim of any military. But it must also keep itself ready for war as a last measure to secure peace. So any strategy must have these two pillars as its basis. While benign role is an important aspect of multiple roles that the Indian navy is supposed to play; it must not lost sight of the fact that it is primarily a war fighting machine and hence must keep itself combat ready. It was pointed out that Indian navy is a hybrid navy. Its software part is British whereas Russia is the major source of its hardware needs. This is both our strength and weakness. On one hand it shows our flexibility and ability to adapt, to the other makes it difficult for a hybrid navy to strategize. Prime minister’s and Defence minister’s speeches, particularly at commanders’ conferences provide important inputs to the services and it is reflected in their preparation. Since, the source of inputs flows from the highest authority, it gives legitimacy to the forces’ actions. However, these speeches can at best be valuable in policy making; they can’t substitute strategy which is about ends, ways and means. It was argued that navy can’t develop its strategy in isolation with other two services. Synergy among the services is a sine qua non for a robust and credible strategy. It is a common refrain of other countries that Indian navy should be more responsible. But the question arises that responsible from whose perspective — inimical countries or allies from India’s own perspective. If later is the case then Indian navy has definitely displayed immense maturity and responsibility as is evident in its counter-piracy efforts. It was pointed out that India must keep a tab on Chinese navy which is replicating US strategy of having a strong navy to become a world power. The recent focus of china on maritime security is quite evident. India must strike a balance between threat and capability approach in strategy making. The capability approach is politically more correct since it refrains from talking about enemy. However, real threats can’t be ignored and in this regard India must take into account Chinese game plans. The author was advised to elaborate the financial aspect of naval strategy. It needs to be explored that how budgetary side has facilitated or acted as a constraint on strategy. The paper would enrich if it provides a theoretical framework for understanding strategy. Since, India’s conditions are unique, a strategy that suits India can be chalked out only if one has in mind the unique set of problems and opportunities India faces. Since, the focus of the paper is on drivers and imperatives, the historical part of evolution of strategy should be condensed to allow more space to drivers and imperatives; the key part of research. The author could also explore how delays in procurements affect Indian navy’s strategy. Since any strategy is for a particular time frame, it is worthwhile to see whether delays warrant revisit of strategy or not. Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA	Military Affairs
Indian Army: Evolving to Adapt Military Change in CI Operations	May 09, 2014	Vivek Chadha		Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal (Retd.) External Discussants: Lt Gen D S Hooda and Maj Gen Umong Sethi (Retd) Internal Discussants: Gp. Capt. Naval Jgota and Col. Vijai Singh Rana While presenting the paper the author at the outset made it clear that this paper is part of a project that seeks to explain how the Indian army adapts to change in different arenas. The focus of this paper is to understand military change in the context of Counterinsurgency (CI) operations. The paper argues that military change in conventional wars is brought about when armies adopt an approach which is often revolutionary, driven by cutting edge technology. Its implementation is directed from the highest level, making it essentially top-down. In contrast, in CI operations, this process is evolutionary, with limited influence of technology. More often than not this is based on bottom-up adaptation, even if in some cases it manifests in top-down implementation. The paper argues that change is resisted in every organization, particularly bureaucratic organizations. Moreover, the nature of resistance is almost similar. It stands true for the military set up also. However, the Indian army is faced with a paradoxical situation of resistance to change and the utmost need thereof. In this struggle of the opposites, the later seems to be guiding the army at present and counterinsurgency (CI) operations are a clear manifestation of army’s willingness to change. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: It was pointed out by many discussants that LC fence was part of the wider goal of border management and checking counterinsurgency (CI) was just one part of it. India’s counterinsurgency (CI) Ops model is its own derived out of its unique circumstances. It was shared by many discussants that stress management is quite good in the counterinsurgency (CI) Ops areas. Given the size of armed forces personnel presence in the troubled areas, no. of untoward incidents like fratricidal killings and suicides etc. are not very alarming. It was argued that there is no tactical level in the counterinsurgency (CI) operations. Every act has got strategic implications. For example, even one civilian casualty could turn out to be a huge embarrassment for the govt. at the highest level and may bring the army’s action under serious scrutiny. It was pointed out that the North East template was applied in the case of CI operations in J&K. However, it was realized later that the modus operandi of the insurgent outfits was different in J&K from North East. The army had to adjust its counterinsurgency strategy accordingly. The Indian Military Academy devotes the entire third year to CI and therefore the army has good no. of trained officers at lower level to deal with counterinsurgency operations. It was argued that since insurgency is rebellion against the state and its policies; a counter to it cannot be a wholly militaristic approach. It must be a holistic approach. CI is manpower intensive job and hence human resource management should be the focus along with technological innovation. The author was suggested to analyze the role of failures in military operations as one of the important drivers for change; since lessons learnt could also be important drivers for change as is evident in the new US CI doctrine which is based on its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author was advised to explore the role of Special Forces in CI Ops. The role of US.S Special Forces in similar operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the effectiveness of such forces. The paper discusses change primarily in military context, whereas CI operates in politico-military environment. The role of intelligence is very important in CI Ops and hence the paper must come out with recommendations to improve our intelligence mechanism. Cultural factor is an important element of CI Ops. A thorough understanding of the local populace is important for the conduct of a successful operation. The role of neighboring countries in CI must be explored. Though, soliciting their support should be primarily a diplomatic endeavor, the scope for military to military cooperation can also be explored simultaneously and the paper should suggest ways and means to do this. Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA	Terrorism & Internal Security
Changing Patterns in Nepal-China Relations	May 09, 2014	Pushpa Raj Adhikari	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd) External Discussants: Capt (IN) Alok Bansal and Dr Abanti Bhattacharya Internal Discussants: Dr Nihar Nayak and Dr Prashant Kumar Singh	South Asia
The ULFA, the PLA, and the UNLF: Will negotiations Work?	May 02, 2014	Namrata Goswami	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Shri E N Ram Mohan External Discussants: Dr M Amarjeet Singh and Mr Bidhan S Laishram Internal Discussants: Ms Shruti Pandalai and Ms Gulbin Sultana The paper aims to understand whether the peace negotiations with the armed groups, i.e., the UNLF and the PLA of Manipur, are viable, and also underlines the debates generated in Assam as a result of the peace negotiations with the ULFA. The author argues that within the framework of peace negotiations, it is important to understand the discourse that exists in these societies before negotiating with the armed groups. This is because protracted conflicts play a very significant role in determining the kind of debates that take place in the public sphere. The process of identity formation, for instance, would depend on the conflict that an individual has witnessed over time. Taking the Naga peace process into consideration, a major reason for its efficacy was due to the discourse that existed in the civil society, i.e., one in which the people were demanding that the armed groups should go for peace talks to end the restrictions of the AFSPA in the state. Along with this, the NSCN (IM) felt that the status quo was not in their favour, and for its leaders, projecting the peace process at a high level of visibility was itself an achievement. The situation in Manipur and Assam is very different as compared to this. One reason why the peace process is so problematic is because of existing categorizations of friend and enemy that have been the basis of identity of an individual from the beginning, which consequently are very difficult to counter. The public discourses in these societies are very narrow and full of assumptions that result in the use of a particular kind of language to describe the other. Let us take a few examples of these existing discourses: The Meitei public discourse is energized by a language of seeing themselves as different and alienated, such that their rights are threatened by other communities and also by the Indian state. This identity and discourse is projected in the two armed groups of Manipur, the UNLF and PLA. The ULFA discourse also projects the discourse of Assam, i.e., the resources of Assam are not used for purposes that will benefit its people. Additionally, it questions the basis of Assamese annexation given that the Treaty of Yandaboo of 1826 did not include the Ahom king and was only signed between the Burmese and the British army. The Tangkhul discourse focuses on maintaining their uniqueness and denies the existence of pluralism in its society vis-à-vis the Meiteis. This discourse of difference is evident, such that an acceptance of the Meiteis would question their demand of a separate state. Therefore, given these existing discourses it becomes very disorienting for the armed groups to have peace talks with the government. A ceasefire with the state would pose a question to their authenticity and would mean changing their entire frame of reference. In order to deal with this problem, it becomes important to begin by challenging these existing discourses of difference. And to counter these exclusivist categorizations, new frames have to come into existence. Along with these there are other specific challenges that need to be considered. In the ULFA case, the group has been involved in peace talks with the Government of India since 2011. However, the legitimacy of these talks has been questioned as most of the leaders who were brought to the table were arrested, and hence ‘coerced’ into the peace process. Another challenge to the peace talks is the anti-talk faction of Paresh Barua who is not willing to join the negotiations. While looking at the UNLF and PLA’s contention for peace talks, the most important challenge is an embedded belief that the peace negotiation process is not about conflict transformation or about dealing with the root causes of the problem, but only a counter-insurgency strategy. They feel it is to ensure the group gets divided, weakened and militarily dominated. To counter these challenges, it is important to ensure a significant pre-negotiations stage. Such a stage would involve: A common understanding of the problem between the government and the armed group Identifying leaders or cadres who would be willing to talk or might influence the top leader Use of back channel negotiations, i.e., use of government negotiators to talk actively with the armed group without much of media coverage. This is a significant tool for conflict resolution, however, a drawback of this is that the groups that may not be involved might act as spoilers to the process. It is also important to remember that negotiations are complex and susceptible to transformation. Four things that are important for the success of a negotiation process are – leadership; the right kind of incentive structures and a common vision; institutional structures that enable the negotiations to succeed; and finally the right kind of implementation. Key points that were raised during the discussion: In Manipur, there are various overarching factors that hinder the negotiations between the government and the armed groups. This includes a lack of seriousness on both the sides as both consider status quo as beneficial to them. While it is true that ethnic identities are being proliferated in the North East, one must also carefully consider the reasons behind this proliferation – structural as well as political. Peace processes are empowering and disorienting. In order to know the reason why the armed groups are not ready for peace talks, it would be crucial to look into the question as to why is the disorienting part of the peace process more deterring than the empowering part. There is a need to address issues of narrow political discourses within the North East and the absence of informed debate/consciousness on these issues in the rest of the country. Narratives that have become the base of grievances of armed groups need to be counter challenged. There exists a need to challenge the lack of response of the Indian state and the issue of racist administrative behaviour that has been a cornerstone in terms of the way Indian establishment behaves with the people in the North East. Over time, there has been a shift of the focus of the armed groups from the ideologies they were formed with, towards increasing criminal activities. It is important to create more employment opportunities and encourage people to people contact between the population in the North East and the rest of the country. Report prepared by Ms. Husanjot Chahal	Terrorism & Internal Security
Egypt’s Faltering Transition: Domestic and Regional Dynamics and Challenges for India	May 02, 2014	Rajeev Agarwal		Fellows' Seminar	Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati Ghose External Discussants: Shri Sanjay Singh and Professor Gulshan Dietl Internal Discussants: Dr P K Pradhan and Ms Ruchita Beri The paper is an attempt to analytically examine the intricacies of Egypt’s transition, its domestic-regional dynamics and nature of Indo-Egyptian relations. In the introductory remarks, author briefly discussed Egypt’s geographic, demographic, civilizational and geo-political significance and highlighted Egypt’s centrality in West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region’s strategic landscape. Author raised four concise research questions which form the major premise of this study; Factors responsible for faltering transition, Major domestic stake-holders in Egypt’s transition, External factors influencing the Egyptian transition and reverberations of transition on the region, and India’s key interests in Egypt. In the first section, author identified four factors responsible for the flawed transition of Egypt. As per author’s contentions, SCAF in its short political existence of sixteen months failed to address the popular demands of Egyptians and thus its political miscalculation proved to be an obstruction in Egypt’s democratic ambitions. Author further elaborated how multiple elections and constitutional referenda post-2011 created an element of ambiguity and frustration, and led to a directionless transition. The third factor responsible for transition’s failure was Muslim Brotherhood’s confusion, contradiction and hurry in managing the new democratic Egypt. Lastly, with reference to certain important economic variables, author affirmed that deplorable economic conditions and inability to revive the Egyptian economy further impeded the transitional movement. In the next section, author dealt with the major domestic players involved in writing the script of Egypt’s transition. Role played by Egyptian Armed forces, Political parties (Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic and secular political parties) and Youth Movements (April 6 movement, Revolutionary Youth Coalition, Tamarod) was analytically elaborated by the author. Third section of the paper was centered on external dynamics of the transition. Author classified the influences under two major sub-heads; Regional and extra-regional camps. Based on ideological differences and state of diplomatic relations, author established that Saudi-UAE-Kuwait formed the Anti-Muslim brotherhood lobby, and Turkey-Iran-Qatar group was labelled as the Pro Muslim Brotherhood camp. Under Extra-regional stake holders, the case of Russia and U.S. was studied in greater detail. To evaluate Egypt’s impact on the region, author studied the spread of Political Islam emanating from Egyptian territory, reaction of neighbours such as Iran and Turkey, probable trade-effects along Suez Canal and changing US policies. Last section of the paper focused on Indo-Egyptian relations by examining the cultural, civilizational, diplomatic, and economic-trade linkages. Special emphasis was laid on nature of bilateral ties in face of the Arab Spring. In conclusion, author emphatically articulated Egypt’s importance for India and deliberated upon challenges facing New Delhi while dealing with changing regimes in Cairo. Shri Sanjay Singh congratulated the author for producing a well-structured and analytically sound paper. He stated that developments in WANA region deserve a more detailed mention in the introduction section of the paper to place Egypt in the regional context. He further suggested the author to examine the impact of Iran P5+1 talks and Iraq elections on Egypt. He appreciated author’s detailed analysis of Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Egyptian transition and asked the author to further address intra Muslim Brotherhood clefts. Furthermore, Shri Sanjay Singh highlighted the centrality of domestic economic forces in shaping the transition. Lastly, it was stated that even though Egypt is important to India, GCC remains the centre of attention and thus labelling Egypt as the “vital cog” in India’s foreign policy matrix seemed to be an exaggeration. Prof. Gulshan Dietl appreciated the cogent and focused study undertaken by the author. She opined that the three years of turbulence have changed the status quo in Egypt and thus the argument that “Egypt is back to square one” remains contestable. While commenting on Egypt’s contemporary relevance, Prof Dietl mentioned that Cairo as headquarters of Arab league exemplifies Egypt’s centrality to the West Asian region. Additionally, author was urged to examine the role of Egyptian films and TV in evoking and influencing the public sentiment, in order to catch the pulse of Egyptian revolution. Ms. Ruchita Beri acknowledged author’s efforts. She mentioned that though Egypt geographically falls under the African continent, Egyptians generally alienate themselves from their African identity. She suggested that the author accommodate the issue of Egypt’s participation in the African Union within the subject-matter of this paper, and also briefly examine Sino-Egypt trade relations. Dr. P.K. Pradhan complimented the author. A succinct reference to Elie Kedourie’s work on Arab political culture was made to suggest that reminiscence of Mubarak still echoes across Egypt, even after his ouster from Egyptian political theatre. Sharing his insights on military dominance in Egypt, Dr. Pradhan asserted that even though the military leader has been removed, the institutional structures remain intact. He agreed with the author’s contention that military will dominate the domestic politics, and civilian misrule will not be tolerated by military in Egypt. Amb. Arundhati Ghose: The neutral, non-judgmental and objective approach of the paper was highly appreciated by Amb Ghose. The author was advised to include “people or masses” as another major internal player in Egyptian transition. Demographic profiling of protestors while examining the youth movements was strongly recommended. Amb Ghose emphatically stated that jihadis have contributed to the failure of transition, and thus the role of Jihadi elements in shaping the transition deserves a mention, if not detailed scrutiny. The discussion was followed by comments and questions from the floor. The need to examine the future of Egypt was underlined; in order to extrapolate whether Egypt will deteriorate into a failed state or will it bounce back and retain its influence on the region. Questions were raised on US policy towards Egypt post-Mubarak and Israeli view of Arab Spring and Egyptian transition. The issue of Egypt’s excessive dependence on foreign funds was debated and the need to study economic dynamics of Egyptian transition was duly acknowledged.	Eurasia & West Asia
Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation: Will India Lead?	April 11, 2014	Lee Cordner		Fellows' Seminar	Chairperson: R Adm (Retd) K Rajamenon External Discussants: Professor Baladas Ghoshal, Dr. Vijay Sakhuja Internal Discussant: Cmd SS Parmar The paper focusses on the prospects of Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India’s role in it. Maritime security has become a central issue for regional and extra-regional actors. Emerging traditional and non-traditional security challenges largely converge at sea as they impact economic, environmental, energy, human, food and national security. There are compelling drivers for enhancing maritime security cooperation in the IOR and considerable obstacles to be overcome. The author argues that as the major regional power and an emerging Asian great power India’s willingness and capacity to provide strategic leadership is critical. However, in view of the alleged civil-military dissonance and the demonstrable lack of political will for reform raises questions about India’s strategic competence and influences perceptions of India’s prospects as a regional leader. Moreover, India’s strategic policy ambiguity undermines regional trust and confidence. Notwithstanding India’s reluctance, the paper argues that regional actors will increasingly look to India to provide strong, proactive and coherent leadership; to engender a spirit of cooperation and shared destiny. The paper concludes that India’s strategic leadership presents a key regional security risk, and an opportunity. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: The presence of a large no. of actors espousing different cultural values and strategic attitudes makes the leadership position very challenging and difficult to sustain. Lack of regional cooperation in the IOR is not as much the result of lack of political will as it is the result of lack of material capabilities and consensus. India is trying to evolve that eluding consensus. MILAN is an effort in that direction. It was argued that currently the priority of foreign policy of India is to maximise economic gains to internally stabilise and power-projection therefore, has been put on the backburner. To aspire for great power status without developing matching capabilities to fulfil the obligations that come along this status would fail us. India’ reluctance to engage in expeditionary activities or in security architectures can be partly explained thus. One reason for India’s reluctance to look beyond its borders is its troubled neighbourhood. Leadership role has to begin with neighbours and it was pointed out by discussants that India’s neighbours are not conducive to India playing an important role at the regional and global level. India is accused of nursing big brotherly attitude towards its neighbours. The China factor is also very important in India’s foreign policy and its quest for leadership role. China is both a determinant and constraint on India’s foreign policy. Significantly, it was brought up during the discussion that India has to play an important role I the IOR as abdicating its responsibility will allow China to take control of the situation to the detriment of India. The domestic compulsions of India also inhibits India’s leadership role. India’s Israel policy or West Asia policy has largely been hostage to the minority politics. Similarly, in recent times politics of federalism has acted as a constraint on our foreign policy particularly the neighbourhood policy. The absence of track II in IOR was lamented. It was argued that track I lacks the guidance and inputs of track II and it hampers cooperation among the IOR members. India does not have a written strategic doctrine and this does not instil confidence in the other countries. In the absence of a well-articulated strategic doctrine ulterior motives can be attributed. The issue of Civil-military relations was discussed in detail. It was agreed that contrary to the western writings on CMR, which portray as the situation has reached a dead end; the civil-military relations in India is not actually the problem between the civilian leadership and military establishment, rather it can be described best in terms of higher defence management. It was suggested to the author that an empathetic appreciation of the problems that constrain India’s foreign policy would present a more balanced view of the so called reluctant power. For instance, one of the primary reasons for this reluctance on part of India stems from its historical experience of the NAM days when India’s idea of Asia was not taken forward. On the question of CMR the author would benefit if he explores the reasons for its overarching presence in the system. One reason could be the role it played in the nation-building in the transitional phase of Indian democracy. India’s view of IOR should be dealt with in the paper in order to understand its position on the leadership issue. Moreover, who all support India’s leadership and who not should be listed out. The paper would enrich if it prepares two separate list of problems that India face; one under the heading internal problem and the other external problems. It was brought up during the discussion that multi polarity is the key in the region. In view of this the paper should bring forth India’s role as one of the key players in the region and not hegemon or dominant power. Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA	Military Affairs
Coping with a Rising China: An Analysis of the Indian Official Discourse 1996 - 2012	April 25, 2014	Peter Van Der Hoest	1030 to 1300 hrs	Fellows' Seminar	Chair: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) External Discussants: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) and Ambassador S K Bhutani Internal Discussants: Group Captain Naval Jagota and Mr Avinash Godbole	East Asia
International Conference on A Nuclear Weapon-Free World: From Conception to Reality	April 02, 2014 to April 03, 2014			Conference	DAY I: Wednesday, April 02, 2014 0900 hrs Registration 1000 – 1045 hrs INAUGURAL SESSION CHAIR: Shri Shivshankar Menon, NSA. Welcome Remarks by Dr Arvind Gupta, Director-General, IDSA. Remarks by Shri Shivshankar Menon, NSA. Inaugural Address by Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India. 1045 – 1100 hrs Tea Break 1100 – 1300 hrs SESSION 1: ROLES AND DOCTRINES RELATED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS CHAIR: Dr Sverre Lodgaard, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Theme I - Changes in Nuclear Arsenals and Evolution of Nuclear Doctrines Dr Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique, France. Prof Arvind Kumar, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, India. Prof Rajesh Rajagopalan, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Theme II - Reconciling the Moral and Security Imperatives Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma, Former Indian Ambassador to Austria and Governor on the IAEA Board of Governors. Dr Rebecca E Johnson, Acronym Institute, UK. 1215 – 1300 hrs Q&A 1300 – 1400 hrs Lunch 1400 – 1545 hrs SESSION 2: NUCLEAR RISKS AND THREATS CHAIR: Dr WPS Sidhu, Senior Fellow, Brookings India. Theme I - Addressing Today’s Risks of Proliferation Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director for International Security at Chatham House, UK. Dr Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, Institute for Defence and Analyses, New Delhi. Theme II - Tackling the Challenge of Nuclear Terrorism Dr William C. Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterrey, USA. Prof Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow for South Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK. Brigadier (Retd) Feroz H. Khan, Lecturer, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, USA. 1500 – 1545 hrs Q&A 1545 – 1600 hrs Tea Break 1600 – 1800 hrs SESSION 3: CHALLENGES OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE WORLD CHAIR: Dr Theresa Hitchens, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland. Theme I - Deterrence and Stability On The Road To Nuclear Zero Dr Manpreet Sethi, Senior Fellow, Center for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan, Ambassador-At-Large for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. Theme II - Verification Challenges Dr James Acton, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, USA. Dr Arun Vishwanathan, Assistant Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. Dr K L Ramakumar, Director, RC&IG, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, Mumbai. 1715 – 1800 hrs Q&A 1900 hrs CULTURAL PROGRAMME FOLLOWED BY DINNER AT IDSA (By Invitation) DAY II: Thursday, April 03, 2014 0930 – 1230 hrs SESSION 4: PATHWAYS TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE WORLD CHAIR: Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Theme I - Moving from Bilateral US-Russia Deep Cuts to Multilateralism Dr Fan Jishe, Research Fellow of Institute of American Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China. Dr Anton V. Khlopkov, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies, Moscow. Theme II - Existing Treaty-based Regimes and Limitations Prof Ramesh Thakur, Director, Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation & Disarmament, ANU, Australia. Dr Mu Changlin, Senior Research Fellow, China Institute for International Studies, China. Theme III - New Stakeholders and New Approaches Mr Akira Kawasaki, Co-Chair of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Dr C Raja Mohan, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Mr Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND). 1130 – 1230 hrs Q&A 1230 – 1400 hrs Lunch 1400 – 1545 hrs SESSION 5: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS CHAIR: Dr Arvind Gupta, Director General, IDSA Reports by Session Chairpersons Chair I: Dr Sverre Lodgaard Chair II: Dr WPS Sidhu Chair III: Dr Theresa Hitchens Chair IV: Ambassador Rakesh Sood 1445 – 1545 hrs Exchange of Views on Reports and Follow-up. > 1545 – 1600 hrs Tea break Event Photographs [+]	Nuclear and Arms Control
Visit of Young Parliamentarians from African Countries to IDSA	March 13, 2014			Other	Facilitated by the Ministry of External Affairs, a nine member delegation of young parliamentarians from Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, South Sudan and Uganda visited the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses on March 13, 2014 for an interaction with Scholars. During the deliberations, following issues were discussed: Military and Defence related issues The young parliamentarians were very keen to discuss issues related to defence and military. They were interested in knowing the possibility and nature of co-operation between defence establishments of India and Africa. They were interested in the recruitment practices of Indian Army, the possibility of military co-operation with African countries and co-operation in terms of defence equipment and capacity building. Specifically, they wanted to know that how the Indian Military can help in building African militaries capacity to operate military equipment and about the system of monitoring atrocities committed by Armed personnel; the young parliamentarians wanted to know about possibility of co-operation with Indian defence establishments in terms of restructuring of Armed forces especially in countries going through post-conflict transition. The parliamentarians wanted to know whether women are recruited in the Armed Forces in India. Deputy-Director General, Brig. Dahiya said that in Indian military, women are present in non-combat roles, although the Central Police Reserve Force has women contingent. Women contingents are also sent as part of United Nations Peace Keeping Force. The DDG pointed out that India and Africa have long standing military co-operation. Indian military has been involved in military training in Lesotho and Botswana. India has established a Military Staff College in Tanzania. Cadets from Ghana, Kenya and Uganda have been coming for training in the Indian Military Academy. There is strong possibility of establishing military training with other countries like South Sudan. India-Africa Relations Regarding India-Africa relations Ms. Ruchita Beri, Research Fellow and Centre co-ordinator of ALACUN cluster at IDSA, acknowledged that there were historic ties between India and Africa since Independence. India does not view Africa as a hopeless continent and has co-operated with Africa at both bilateral and African Union level. An important facet about Indian co-operation is that it does not come with any conditionality attached to it. Moreover, India attunes its co-operation to suit African requirements. Indian government has provided financial support to African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somali and African led International Support Mission in Mali. India has supported African counties in defence training and capacity building. Globally there is a rethinking on the definition of “Security”. At present it encompasses both traditional and non-traditional security concerns. In this context, India may enhance its cooperation with African countries in counter–terrorism, energy security and space technology. Dr. G. Balachandran, Senior Research Fellow at IDSA, said that there were excellent historical as well as people to people relations between Africa but they have not fully capitalized it. The knowledge dissemination about Africa in India is done by third parties rather that African themselves. IDSA Research The parliamentarians were interested in knowing IDSA’s research on issues related to terrorism, militia violence and illegal immigration. The Director General of IDSA, Dr. Arvind Gupta while briefing the delegation on the overall role and functioning of IDSA, touched upon these issues. In relation to terrorism, the Director General said that IDSA has an Internal Security Centre and interacts with various stakeholders to understand the issue of terrorism which includes a project with Ministry of Home Affairs. India has struggled with problem related to militias some of which have operated in India with outside support. India also faces problem of illegal migration which occurs due to economic reasons as well as other reasons like natural calamities and trafficking. IDSA with its engagement with law enforcement agencies attempts to understand the root causes of the problem of illegal migration. Report prepared by Nachiket Khadkiwala, Research Assistant, IDSA.	Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN

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