Events

Chair: Dr. Gulshan Dietl
External Discussants: Ms. Lidya Powell and Mr. Ragunatha Mishra
Internal Discussants: Dr. Smriti Pattnaik and Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha

In the 21st century a nation’s economy thrives on its efficient and boundless use of energy. In this context, India holds one of the largest markets of energy consumption in the world. Therefore, energy security has become the paramount focus of Indian Foreign policy. To achieve this goal, India is pursuing a broad range of options to diversify its energy sources. It ranges from LNG deals, buying oil and gas spot markets, acquisition of oil and gas fields abroad, etc. One of the options is sourcing of energy supplies from neighbours (immediate and distant) through pipelines because of India’s comparative advantages in transportation costs as compared to other modes such as LNG. In this frame of reference, Government of India identified three natural gas pipeline options: IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India), TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and MBI (Myanmar-Bangladesh-India). Kulkarni’s paper focuses on the decision making process involved on these natural gas pipeline projects from 1989 to 2012 and the factors that have influenced India’s decision making on cross border natural gas pipelines.

The paper examines the decision making process in this regard by using “Rational Actor Model Theory”, which is based on cost benefit analysis and Masuda’s condition for Cross Border Pipelines. Kulkarni investigates the rationale behind India’s joining these projects which are costly and geopolitically controversial. The paper also attempts to understand India’s reasons for pursuing TAPI over IPI and MBI.

Kulkarni acknowledges that there is a clash between India’s need for energy security and its strategic interest. Hence, taking this into account, he recommends evolving a balance between the two.

Key Points from discussion:

• The paper discuss appropriate financial regime and commercial viability through cost benefit analysis. At the centre of any such decision making exercise should be the evolution of a balance between the management of geopolitical risk and commercial viability.
• The energy demand in India is huge. However, the demand is unmet because it cannot be transformed into purchasing power. Absence of stakeholders for using LNG to generate power is one example.
• Why is the government reluctant to pursue gas projects as it has simultaneously pursued projects for LNG ports?
• Any analysis of decision making must include the agencies, organisational structure and authorities involved in decision making. A critical examination of the decision making process is required.
• Whether any inter-ministerial conflict existed in the government during the course of decision making and implementation of the projects has to be taken into consideration.
• The decision on applying the Rational Actor Theory and ‘Masuda’s’ model in the context of South Asia must be taken into consideration. A special focus is needed to understand the TAPI gas pipeline given the internal dynamics of India and Pakistan. One of the decision making models that is well suited for the conditions prevailing in South Asia is Richard Snyder’s.
• The reasons for the government to opt for IPI, TAPI and MBI rather that Oman–India pipeline or SAGE Pipeline should be carefully analysed. The analysis should also include the costs involved.
• Any decision making process on energy projects must include the following:
  • Provision of providing excess to energy to every one
  • Securing energy supply
  • Trying to limit carbon emissions
  • Implementation of choices and alternatives of decision-making process must be in compliance with India’s fiscal and environment policies.
  • Gas pipeline construction must be looked at from the perspective of strategic investment. The presence of Iran and Unites States in this region should be taken into consideration.

(Report prepared by Satyam Malaviya, Research Intern, IDSA)

Chair: Prof. Girijesh Pant
External Discussants: Prof. Gulshan Dietl, Nidhi Verma
Internal Discussants: Dr. G. Balachandran, Shebonti Ray Dadwal

The paper examined the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) against Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear issue being referred to the UNSC in February 2006 and the responses and implications for India as a result of these measures. UNSC sanctions primarily involved asset freezes of and travel bans on entities and individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. India took executive actions to conform to UNSC sanctions measures and prevent possible misuse. These were however in continuation of measures it had been taking prior to 2006 as well (like the June 2005 WMD Act), which strengthened its regulatory and legislative mechanisms for preventing the sale of WMD-related materials and technology to wrong hands. The paper dwelt on some pertinent issues relating to the Iran-O-Hind shipping Company (IHSC), which was specifically targeted by UNSCR 1929 of June 2010.

US and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s crude oil exports have had a significant impact on major importers like India. These measures were based on the contention that Iran was using oil revenues to fund WMD-related programmes, a concern that was first raised in the preamble to UNSCR 1929. The foundational US sanctions legislation targeting Iran’s petroleum sector was the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, which became the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 2006. The paper gave a brief account of the legislation, as well as changes carried out in ISA as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010. CISADA further imposed restrictions on the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran, affecting Indian companies like Reliance. Section 1245 of National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) 2012 targeted the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) for the first time and called for ‘significant reductions’ of imports of Iranian crude and prescribed exemptions from sanctions if a country did so. Section 504 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA) severely curtailed Iran’s foreign exchange earnings by mandating that funds owed to Iran as a result of bilateral trade in goods and services be “credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institutions.”

The EU Decision of July 2010 and the subsequent EU Regulation of October 2010 (specifically Article 10) impacted payment mechanisms like the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) which India was using to pay for Iranian oil. Further, prohibition on the provision of insurance services (Article 12) by European-based insurance providers for ships transporting Iranian crude had a negative impact on Indian refineries. The paper briefly described the impact and responses of Indian oil companies like the Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL) and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (MRPL) to these measures, as indicated in their annual reports.

The US and EU sanctions measures led to a significant reduction in India’s import of Iranian crude, which came down to less than five per cent of the total imports in 2014-15, from 13 per cent in 2009-10. Indian policy makers have also often cited the prevailing sanctions regime as negatively affecting India’s investments in Iran’s energy sector. The paper gave a brief account of the status of the agreements signed between Indian and Iranian companies including the December 2009 agreement for the South Pars Phase-II and Farzad-B gas field, IOCL ‘s investments in the Farsi Block, among others. The paper closed by noting some of the pertinent developments in the post-Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) period, including the significant role played by Indian oil companies in JPOA sanctions relief. It ended by noting that the sequencing of sanctions relief as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would have a bearing on the nature of Iran’s oil trade with key energy partners like India.

Discussion and Suggestions to the Author

• India is not the only state affected by sanctions. It will be interesting to know how other countries have coped with these measures.
• China for instance seems to be more adept at engaging economically with Iran, though it is also circumscribed by the same sanctions and it is also part of the P5+1. China has also apparently built a business centre and is in the process of building a petrochemical complex in Chabahar.
• Aspects regarding India’s recent decision to go ahead with investing in Chabahar could be explored. What material changes if any has resulted in this decision?
• An exploration of the context surrounding these various sanctions measures would be useful. What were the reasons underpinning the increase in the nature of sanctions targeting Iran’s petro-chemical sector from 2010 onwards? An examination of US as well as Iran’s domestic political and energy context would throw more light on the issue.
• The author was urged to conduct interviews with retired or serving policy makers to the extent possible to get inputs on some of the aspects covered in the paper.
• Some forward-looking aspects in terms of policy recommendations could be incorporated into the paper, including on such issues like the possible impact of an impending deal on Indian businesses and oil companies as well as on India’s balance of trade with Iran. It was pointed out that India would be dealing with a ‘different Iran’ in the aftermath of a nuclear deal.
• The paper could explore US-EU interaction on the issue of sanctions vis-à-vis Iran and see if there were any divergences or convergences over the issue, especially since EU countries were significant importers of Iranian oil prior to 2012.
• Regional dynamics specifically the role of Saudi Arabia and the nature of increase in its oil exports in the aftermath of sanctions targeting Iran could be highlighted.
• US pressure on India vis-à-vis its energy trade with Iran as well as investments in Iran’s energy infrastructure and view towards projects like IPI can be included.

Report prepared by Sourabhi Mukherjee, Research Intern, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, IDSA.

Chairperson: Lt. Gen. J.S. Bajwa (Retd.)
External Discussants: Commander Lalit Kapur, Gp. Capt. Ravinder Singh Chhatwal
Internal Discussant: Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.)

China embarked on its ‘four modernizations’ drive in the late 1970s. However, it was only over the past two decades that China carried out a comprehensive military modernization program. China gave special impetus to joint operations and informationization. The paper argues that China’s ability to project combat power depended on coordination across all domains — air, land, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

This paper analyzed the Chinese military transformation with special reference to joint operations. Specifically, it sought to answer questions relating to the Chinese concept of joint operations, evolution of its strategy and thinking on joint operations, initiatives it has undertaken and the degree of success in achieving its goals.

The paper concluded that China’s modernization drive has resulted in its growing military prowess, co-terminus with its emergence as a global economic power. As part of their thinking on revolution in military affairs (RMA), the Chinese identified fighting ‘local war under the conditions of informationization’ as its strategy with focus on joint operations. This approach prompted China to undertake reforms to conduct integrated joint operations and to establish joint commands, prioritize technology-intensive capabilities like space, cyber space and the electro-magnetic spectrum.

The rapid pace of Chinese military modernization and increasing technological gap evident vis-à-vis India has serious consequences, which needs to be prepared to tackle the emerging threat from China. The author noted that India needs to reduce the gap in technological and strategic capabilities. This would entail building strategic partnerships with neighboring countries and countries with common strategic interests and at the same time focusing on modernization of its armed forces including enhanced integration and capability development.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author

• It was argued that joint operations are mainly conducted by US, which has global interests and power projection capabilities. China claims that its armed forces are for defensive purposes. However, focus on joint operations and China’s posturing conveys a contrary message that Chinese military build-up is more for power projection than for defensive purposes. The Chinese naval projects and acquisitions specifically are robust in nature and geared up more towards offensive actions.
• The implication of China’s military modernization for India was discussed at length. It was argued that Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions, which have operational responsibility for the Sino-Indian border, do not have naval component limiting any Chinese joint operations. Similarly, air borne operations cannot succeed in the absence of air superiority. Though China’s enjoys air superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan, vis-à-vis India, such a capability is suspect. China has limitations in operating from Tibet due to high altitude. It was pointed out that undertaking a sustained air campaign required good infrastructure, particularly air fields, which China currently lacked.
• It was pointed out that in China’s quest for jointness, parochial interests are likely to hamper its efforts. The PLA for instance was the dominant force in the Chinese military set up and this could affect jointness.
• India’s preparedness to meet any threat depended on its armed forces’ ability to operate jointly. However, deficiencies on this front included lack of integration as regards communication devices used by the three services. It was argued that integration should start at the functional level instead of just focusing at the Service Headquarter level.
• The paper would be enriched by examining aspects such as limitations of the Chinese Air Force, which highlight gaps in China’s quest for jointness.
• The strategic environment surrounding China should be analyzed in order to understand what really drove Chinese efforts. Is it the nature of threats that China was facing or was it Chinese ambitions that is the driver behind such efforts?
• The author could explore the manner in which these efforts were driving China’s overall military modernization programme and the lessons that India could learn in this regard.
• The author would do well to explore the extent of integration in the Chinese armed forces, specifically whether it was only at the command level or whether it is present also at the combat level.

Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA

Chairperson: Prof. Charan Das Wadhva
External Discussants: Amb. H. H. S. Viswanathan, Dr. Deepshikha Shahi
Internal Discussants: Dr. S. Kalyanaraman, Saurabh Mishra

Major Arguments of the Paper:

One of the fundamental aims of political science in Indian traditions was to create the cultural conditions necessary for the pursuit of the four great ends of life, the purusharthas – ethical goodness (dharma), wealth and power (artha), pleasure (kama), and spiritual transcendence (moksha). The final or fourth individual aim of moksha or liberation/spiritual transcendence is at a personal level of self-realization and is not being included in this paper. Without moksha the concept is of the three goals of human existence consisting of dharma, artha and kama or trivarga. Each goal is a deep philosophical subject. In statecraft, the most important ones are dharma and artha, and it is on these that the author deliberates upon.

The paper argues that in ancient Indian traditions dharma and artha play an important role as they relate to statecraft. It has not changed with time. Simplistically, this is akin to what we may today understand as principle and power. Only artha by itself is insufficient to understand the philosophy of statecraft of the Indian traditions. The author argues that for statecraft and international relations as practised in India, dharma is an important limb. Kautilya, the author cum editor of Arthasastra, never suggested to be selective. He did not ever mention to ignore dharma. It is only later commentators who have given their understanding where the holistic interpretation of dharma with artha is underdeveloped; more so in the domain of statecraft and diplomacy. This paper engages with the concepts in the text and the commentaries and opinions of a number of authors who have dealt with this topic. The paper argues that both dharma and artha are integrated and linked. If artha is like surface water surely dharma is like ground water. Their meaning need to be contextualized in the present milieu and a combination of these two concepts should be judiciously applied in statecraft to herald lasting peace and prosperity.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:

• Dharma with a capital D signifies the overarching principles of life governing the universe, whereas dharma with a small d is for specific circumstances. Indian scholars of politics have mostly deliberated upon the latter. Kautilya’s Arthasastra also falls into the second category.
• Kautilya was secular in his outlook. His personal religious belief did not affect the conduct of statecraft. It was evident when Chandragupta, his disciple, leaned towards Jainism and Kautilya did not get perturbed by this or come in his way.
• The general western perception of India is that of a land and people who are concerned with other-worldly affairs. However, it is a fallacy as we know that in the Indian philosophical tradition all four aspects of life, that is, Dharma, Artha, Kama, Moksha, have been given adequate attention.
• Kautilya is considered to be immoral and lacking in ethics because of its prescriptions for statecraft. However, a proper understanding of the Arthasastra suggests that he was very mindful of ethics and morality even in the conduct of state affairs. For instance, he gives precedence to Dharma Vijaya over Asura Vijaya.
• The study of Arthasastra and other ancient Indian political texts have assumed significance in the backdrop of the possibility of India emerging as a world Power.
• Existing ‘Western’ IR theories are inadequate to explain India’s rise.
• Kautilya’s Arthasastra is a more holistic work than Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. Kautilya was the first scholar to establish a link between domestic and foreign policy. He argued that although the policy options before the king for the conduct of the two are different, there is a direct correlation between the domestic and foreign policies of a state.
• For Kautilya dharma was limited to the end and did not apply to the means. The king must set his goals in consonance with dharma. Adoption of unethical means to achieve a pious end has not been ruled out. In this he differs from Gandhi who advocated the purity of means as well as end.
• It was argued that Indian scholars should avoid the tendency of exalting Kautilya and denigrating Western scholarship. A synthesis of the best scholarly tradition of east and west will lead to the furtherance of true knowledge.
• The author was advised to give current examples to argue his case as to how the Indian state has sought to practice dharma and artha in the conduct of statecraft. That will generate more interest in Arthasastra.
• Since the morality of individual may not be in sync with the state’s morality, the author needs to deliberate upon different aspects of morality and resolve the dilemma.