Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
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US Aid to Pakistan: Changing Rules of Engagement and Regional Implications | February 11, 2011 | Priyanka Singh | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Dr G Balachandran Dr Priyanka Singh’s present study focuses primarily on the prevailing dynamics and complexities of US aid to Pakistan, from an Indian perspective. The key issue that she tried to address in her paper was the lack of a synchronised and substantiated Indian perspective on US aid to Pakistan and its implications for the regional security. The presenter argued that since the inception of US-Pakistan relations, aid, both military and non-military, has been the key instrument of US policy towards Pakistan. However, the history of US aid to Pakistan shows that the flow and quantum of the aid has been intermittent. Nonetheless, aid to Pakistan has been subject to geo-strategic challenges which threatened the US interests in the region time and again. After 9/11, the US has flooded huge aid into Pakistan to meet its objectives, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. She noted that in the post 9/11 era, the main objectives of US aid to Pakistan are to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity for counterterrorism operations, help it to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, support it in the development of a moderate, democratic and civilian government in Pakistan. However, the author felt that because of the absence of clearly defined objectives on how to utilize the US aid has led to mismanagement and augmented complacency in Pakistan’s government. Pakistan relentlessly forestalled decisive action against the Taliban and al Qaeda inside its territory despite receiving billions in aid since 2001. Consequently, the March 2009 Interagency White Paper outlining US future strategy on Afghanistan-Pakistan enunciated a new course for US aid in the region. It stated that assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan should be aligned with United States core goals and objectives and that assistance would be limited without the achievement of results. It also stressed on capacity building of the governments in these countries as a measure to arrive at preferred goals. In addition, the US also made fundamental changes in its subsequent aid policies towards Pakistan such as through the PEACE Act which granted $ 7.5 billion to Pakistan by placing more drivers for better usage of its aid. The author said that the ongoing discourse in the US on Pakistan’s accountability regarding usage of US aid somehow converges with India’s long held view that aid is being pumped into terror infested Pakistan at the cost of regional security environment. The US aid policy towards Pakistan is also known to lack a coherent strategy being too security centric, with very little proportions of it reaching the masses out there. In this scenario, US faces the dilemma of having to increase the aid despite knowing that it may not achieve its desired ends. Therefore, there are fundamental problems in administering US assistance to Pakistan. According to Dr. Singh, the important problems among them are the constraints within USAID in staff and resources which are vital to timely and just distribution of the funds and constraints in free and safe movement across Pakistan; more aid than what can be effectively absorbed by local institutions; the case of aid failing to reach the deserving sections of Pakistani society leads to anti-Americanism in Pakistan; lack of outreach and failure of US aid to generate goodwill; resistance to various conditions in US aid policy towards Pakistan; lack of visibility and the ratio of success; lack of transparency in US Pakistan dealings and dearth of support systems to conduct monitoring and oversight of aid. Implications for India: The author pointed out two important dimensions: first, the US military aid comprising conventional weapons which are of little use in counterinsurgency operations and are borne with the possibility of being used against India; and, second, the non-military assistance and its role in Pakistan’s nation building in terms of a stable and peaceful neighbourhood has a direct bearing on the region and India in particular. According to her, another argument on India’s security concerns stems from “asymmetric warfare” noted to be a principal tool of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Assessing the US aid policy in Pakistan, she said that huge aid and redemption from several debts has helped Pakistan save itself from an economic breakdown and the resistance that Pakistan security forces offer to the Taliban in their territory which avoided a security breakdown. However, the author was of the view that any US military aid to Pakistan would be self defeating as this would quietly be absorbed by the Pakistan army. Therefore, she stressed that there is a need to reconfigure and reorient military assistance to Pakistan driving it more towards counterterrorism and counter insurgency. Finally, she suggested that US policies should direct the process of managing aid judiciously only on long term basis and it needs to make a modest and a coherent start to initiate measures of checks and balances. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions:
Report prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi, Research Assistant, IDSA |
North American | ||||
India’s Transforming Air Posture: An Emerging 21st-Century Heavyweight | February 02, 2011 | 1100 hrs | Round Table |
Speaker: Benjamin S. Lambeth The Indian Air Force (IAF) is currently the world’s fourth-largest air arm, operating more than 1,300 aircraft out of some 60 bases nationwide. Until the early 1990s, it was almost entirely a support entity for the Indian Army and, as such, was imbued with a narrow tactical mindset and mission orientation. Today, in marked contrast, it has acquired independent strategic missions, including that of nuclear deterrence and retaliation, and it is a diversified force with aspirations to global reach and status. It also is a full-spectrum combat air arm with a precision conventional strike capability, fielding not only fourth-generation multirole fighters, but also force-extending tankers, a recently-acquired Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) capability, intertheater airlifters, remotely-piloted aircraft with multispectral sensors, and the beginnings of a military space surveillance capability. In both content and vector, the institutional “flight plan” now being followed by the IAF’s leadership shows remarkable parallels to the USAF’s transformation that began after Vietnam and that has continued ever since. The IAF is mainly a fighter force, with the Russian-designed and indigenously-produced Su-30MKI multirole combat aircraft its current pride of inventory. A service in which fighter pilots have traditionally ruled the roost, it projects a deeply-ingrained “can-do” attitude. Among the main features of its operational culture are strong traditions, an educated and technically literate officer corps, an ability to absorb and operate high-technology equipment quickly, and able aircrews trained to Western standards of proficiency and inculcated in the manner of the British Royal Air Force, of which the IAF was an offshoot. With respect to doctrine and concepts of operations, the IAF now stands at the forefront of air power thought worldwide, with its leaders increasingly convinced that any future conflict involving India will be “air-led” and that its chances for success will hinge heavily on what the IAF can contribute to the joint fight. High-profile international training exchanges have become an especially welcome focus of IAF activity over the past decade. The service first opened up to the outside world of military aviation in a major way in 2003 when it invited a detachment of French Air Force fighters to Gwalior to take part in an air-to-air exercise called Garuda. A year later, Exercise Cope India 2004 involving six USAF F-15Cs from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska was held at Gwalior. That evolution represented the IAF fighter community’s first opportunity to interact closely with American airmen since an earlier exercise in 1963 brought a small detachment of F-100s to India from the USAF’s Pacific Air Forces. The IAF’s participation in the USAF’s Red Flag exercise in August 2008 was by far its most elaborate involvement in such international events since that practice first began on a regular basis. In addition to its sought-after value of offering training for IAF aircrews in a complex operating environment, an important collateral goal of the effort was to test the IAF’s capability for deployment and force sustainment on a global scale. Until recently, India’s relations with the United States were distant at best. For decades, the Indian government had serious political problems with its American counterpart, mainly because of Washington’s close ties with Pakistan going back to the early Cold War years. The long-standing American inclination to favor Pakistan geopolitically created a major disincentive against the pursuit of cooperative bilateral ties with India by the United States, as did the predominant American image of India for years as merely half of the annoying “India-Pakistan problem.” Today, both countries live in a changed world of increasingly shared security concerns, with a rapidly developing China and an unstable Pakistan, as well as radical Islamist extremism and its associated threats of international terrorism, ever more worrisome as both present and more long-term challenges. In this new context, mutual understanding and a mutual willingness on the part of the two countries to pursue a more cooperative relationship have improved substantially as New Delhi’s former insistence on strict nonalignment has given way to closer interaction with the West. In light of these considerations, the USAF was well-advised in its recent decision to engage the IAF as its next candidate for participation in bilateral Operator Engagement Talks. These and other talks should be pursued with determination at all levels, from the respective service chiefs on down the rank hierarchy, wherever there may be value-added to be gained from such interaction. To be sure, American leaders must understand and accept that the improving U.S.-Indian relationship has little chance of growing, at least in the near term, into anything approximating a more formal alignment of shared security interests. Short of that, however, closer institutional ties between the USAF and IAF are worth pursuing in any event simply because the IAF has become a world-class air force in the service of a vibrant democracy that has every likelihood of being a significant player in 21st-century regional and global security affairs. |
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National Strategy Lecture - British Military Transformation and the War in Afghanistan | April 13, 2011 | Theo Farrell | Speeches and Lectures |
Chair: V. Krishnappa Revolution in military affairs (RMA) has been bringing about unprecedented changes in the conduct of warfare. Professor Theo Farrell was invited to IDSA to share his thoughts on transformations in the British military. In his introductory remarks, Professor Farrell pointed out the relevance of his research for India by stating that both India and Britain possess a medium sized military with similar structural patterns. The transformation of the British military was inspired by American ideas on changing character of warfare. Farrell elaborated on the US military transformation and specifically pointed to the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that considered transformation at the cornerstone of a “new strategic approach”. Transformation was rooted in the RMA of the 1990s. The US transformation was aimed towards creating a network empowered and effects oriented expeditionary forces through technology combined with new concepts and organization. Farrell argues that this ongoing socio-technological change is set to alter the conduct of warfare in the future. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic imperative to fight wars has also changed to finding more discreet ways to use force and to fight wars of choice including humanitarian wars. Farrell outlined two core concepts of transformation, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Operations (EBO). NCW integrates shooters, sensors and decision makers scattered all around the globe to a single framework during warfare. A well established network provides information that can then be utilised to ascertain situational awareness, thereby helping to synchronise scattered forces to achieve military effectiveness. EBO is based on finding more effective ways to employ force to achieve better outcomes. The effects of US military transformation were evident during the Iraq war, where despite having fewer numbers than the Iraqi forces the US military was able to defeat them in a short span of time. However, over time, escalating counterinsurgency operations required a new set of warfare - Human Centric Warfare. Professor Farrell then moved on to the European case, especially focusing on the British Military Transformation. Surveys of NATO officers showed that there was a favourable reception for transformation, using both NCW and EBO. He noted that European countries were simulating the US model of transformation to keep pace with the changing times, albeit with little success. This was due to various reasons such as cost constraints and bureaucratic hurdles. The British military adopted a slightly different version of NCW called Network Enabled Capability (NEC), which focuses more on the human component. NEC is designed to achieve the desired results by linking together sensors, decision-makers, weapon systems and support capabilities. He noted that future operations will be characterized by Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) which will involve a combination of military and non-military instruments to achieve the end result. Changing nature of conflict has forced military forces not only to fight wars, but also establish the groundwork for sustained governance. Moving on to his case study of the British campaign in the Helmand province in Afghanistan, he said that due to indecisive actions during the earlier periods of conflict, there was insignificant progress. Professor Farrell highlighted the subsequent changes in tactics, brought about by transformation in the British military, which have shaped the conduct of operations after 2008. Operations in the Helmand province have been characterized by a new approach of Clear, Hold and Build. The British Military in Afghanistan applied EBAO by using military instruments to achieve non military tasks that they termed as soft effects. Increasingly, the British military has begun to establish effective communication with the local population, based on cultural understanding, in order to win over their support. In his concluding remarks, Professor Farell argued that the future character of conflict will be typified by hybrid warfare; a combination of conventional and irregular warfare. In this context, he stressed on the importance of developing an adaptable posture. He commented that Britain can no longer remain a vigilante authority and therefore must become an adaptable force that weighs in the consequences of conflict. In the subsequent discussion, questions were raised regarding the triggers of transformation and why success had not been achieved yet in Afghanistan despite the transformations. Professor Farrell replied informing the audience that the Russians were the first to emphasize RMA. However techno-centric culture in the United States propelled it. With regard to Afghanistan, he said that transformation is essentially conventional that brings about reduction in troop strength which is not in line with counter-insurgency operations where boots are required on the ground. The Chair thanked Professor Farrell for his insightful lecture and for highlighting the transformation, in terms of technology and organization, currently going on in the British military, which could be reflected upon by the Indian defence establishment. Event report prepared by Pratik Jhakhar, Research Intern at IDSA. |
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National Strategy Lecture - India's Defence Cooperation with its major traditional & New Strategic Partners | April 01, 2011 | Ronen Sen | Speeches and Lectures |
Chair: Mr. N. S. Sisodia The Director General of IDSA, Mr. N.S. Sisodia introduced Ambassador Ronen Sen to the audience by briefing them about his impressive career and the positions that he held in vital countries at the time of political transition after the fall of the Berlin Wall. After paying his personal tribute to late K. Subrahmanyam, Ambassador Sen began by stating that his talk’s focus on defence cooperation with the erstwhile USSR and then Russia, and with the United States did not imply in any way his lack of appreciation of the importance of cooperation with Western Europe and Israel. Defence cooperation and partnership in high end technologies need to be viewed from the perspective of dynamics in geo-politics. Convergence of interests in the long run informs countries deciding to pursue strategic partnerships. In India’s case, security and economics – trade and market access - drive such long term partnerships. Ambassador Sen then provided a historical perspective on India’s defence cooperation with major powers. After independence, India was supplied defence equipment by the British and it was supplanted by the Soviet Union which remained predominant till the eighties when the Government of India began to diversify the sources of its defence supplies. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union posed many challenges to India’s defence preparedness. Successfully transiting this tumultuous phase, India cemented its partnership with Russia. In the present phase, cooperation with the US and Israel has coincided with a peak in defence modernization program. The common element in all transitions, according to Ambassador Sen, has been the resistance to change inside the establishment. India’s current defence modernization program is taking place in the context of Chinese force projection. Ambassador Sen analyzed the evolving positions of Russia, US and Western European powers in this regard. India, due to its impeccable track record in fulfilling the contractual obligations with regard to technology transfer, will continue to receive defence supplies from the United States unlike Pakistan. In the case of China, despite the economic interdependence, Washington continues its arms embargo policy against the country. Defence cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is strong, but not immune to mistrust and future difficulties. Focusing on defence cooperation with the erstwhile Soviet Union ambassador Sen stated that there were troubles even through the 1970s and 80s despite mutual goodwill and robust assistance by the Soviet. Defence cooperation and convergence on various international issues between the two countries did not stop the Soviets from seeking leverage with Pakistan through clandestine supplies of armaments. With regard to Kashmir, the Soviet position was not aligned with India as they persisted seeking a mediatory role, and incorrectly depicted Indian borders similar to Western maps. Restoring defence cooperation with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most difficult tasks according to Ambassador Sen. After initial difficulties largely due to domestic factors within Russia, success was achieved by revival of efforts to build a long term partnership involving joint research and development, and co-production. Over time, Brahmos missile joint venture was finalized along with cooperation on nuclear submarine and the deal on Sukhoi-30 MK I multi role combat aircraft. In the years ahead, the challenge lies in imparting greater economic content and in modernizing the Russian defence industry to sustain cooperation between both the countries. India has big stakes in Russia overcoming the challenges facing its defence industry. Defence cooperation with the United States began in the eighties initiated by Prime Minsiter Rajiv Gandhi. At that time, General Electric engines were supplied for India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The real impetus to the relationship however was given during the tenure of President Bush and Prime Minsiter Vajpayee. They jointly announced Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) which envisaged cooperation in civil nuclear, civilian space, high technology trade and missile defence. After the NSSP, the most important agreement was the India – US New Framework in defence cooperation signed during the visit of the then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee in June 2005. In the process of deepening the engagement, the US is learning to deal with a partner that is particular about its strategic autonomy in spite of shared values and convergent interests. At the domestic level, perceptions of unreliability of the US need to be balanced by increasing public awareness about the extent of American support to India’s national security interests. In addition, Ambassador Sen felt that there is a need for better understanding of the broader benefits that would result out of technology cooperation with the United States. Service to service cooperation has become a strong component of Indo-US defence partnership. So far, there have been fifty joint exercises between the armed forces of both the countries. However, at the command level, the same level of cooperation that exists with PACOM (Pacific) does not exist with CENTCOM which covers Af-Pak and the Middle East. Despite approval for having India’s liaison officers at both the commands, there has been no follow-up yet. In addition, perceptual differences remain in case of Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). India’s approach to pending issues including Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) reflects not only India’s own perceptions but relates to self-perception as well. There is a need for less ideological posturing and a more open debate on participation in global regimes for self interests. Aspiring a global role does not match with the tendency to remain fence-sitters. In the Q&A session that followed, Ambassador Sen said that each transition phase brings with it its own set of difficulties. But with passage of time, things change so rapidly that it is important to read the pattern in a holistic manner and avoid analyzing each change in isolation. To a question of attitudinal change of the US Congress towards India over time, Ambassador Sen elaborated on how bipartisan support in Washington was built during his stint. Individuals were reached out to with tailor-made presentations to make them feel part of the process. In addition, the embassy and the consulates reached out to the local media to influence congressmen in a positive manner. To another question, he said the perception that the Indo-US relationship was bad during the cold war is wrong. The reality is that the cooperation was significant even at the height of the Cold War. Green revolution, skilled migration and people to people contacts were cited as examples. He also emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication with all countries including China. In his view, a clinical appraisal is required of all relationships from New Delhi’s perspective. The Director General of IDSA, Mr. Sisodia concluded the event by thanking Ambassador Sen for his insider views and for sharing his experiences about conduct of diplomacy. Report prepared by Sundar M.S, Research Assistant at IDSA. |
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Getting Published | February 14, 2011 | 1600 hrs | Special Address |
Speaker: Dr. Sean Lynn-Jones (Editor, International Security) |
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National Strategy Lecture - Critical Perspectives on China’s Economic Transition | January 27, 2011 | Anthony P. D'Costa | Speeches and Lectures |
A critical look at the major social and economic transitions that have been taking place since the economic reforms might aid in deriving answers for questions that concern with China’s capital accumulation, political legitimacy, plurality in policy making apparatus and the implications of the country’s rise for the rest of the world. The evolution of Chinese model took place in three phases. In the period from 78- 92, the changes, although imperceptible, began to manifest through foreign investments. An interesting point to note here is the similarity of Post – Mao Chinese policies to industrialization and import substitution measures followed in India during the fifties and sixties. But the difference lies in re-orienting the economy towards exports through establishing special economic zones in the south. During the second phase from 1992 to the millennium, the focus was on integration with the world economy through encouraging Foreign Direct Investments, and at the same time becoming the manufacturing hub of the world. Nevertheless nationalism persisted in that national brands were promoted and domestic industries were protected. In the present phase the emphasis is more on harmony, which in Prof. D’ Costa’s view is an admission of social and economic polarization. In spite of the infinite labeling of the Chinese model, it is a capitalist economy because of two characteristics viz. formation of wage labour and increase in private property in the form of foreign invested enterprises and small businesses. As a matter of fact, free enterprises and capitalists have been creatures of the Chinese state. With the reform of state owned enterprises, managers who are well connected to the party have become owners of varied industries. Relentless industrialization’s demand for labour force has however led to rural displacement. About 150 million people have moved to the urban areas in the last twenty years to be absorbed by the industrial units, especially those located in the coastal belt. Even though this process is not unusual for a country undergoing industrialization, this unprecedented scale has had its impact on urban growth and real estate development. Furthermore, this has led to rise in wages thus contributing to increased momentum in the domestic economy. This is being aided by rising consumption of industrial goods including in rural areas. In the present phase of economic development, inward foreign direct investment as a proportion of gross capital formation has been falling. This indicates that FDI no longer plays a critical role in the Chinese economy. In other words, China has come to have an economic dynamism of its own. A shift share analysis of World Bank data throws light on the emergence of Asia and China in particular. Extrapolation of the same leads to the conclusion that the size of their economies will only grow bigger in the future. Despite the dynamic growth, the issue of stagnation in rise of Per Capita income has captured the attention of Chinese policy makers as in India. The emphasis on profit driven growth has resulted in a squeeze in private consumption. This might be linked to prevent social upheaval. However, this is unsustainable. Addressing economic growth generated domestic problems related to rising income inequality, employment generation, inflation and real estate bubble and deficiency in technology has become a priority for policy makers. Despite the commitment to research and development with the objective to attain technological competence, sub-optimal quality of education is testing China’s ambitions in the same way as it is affecting India’s attempt at leveraging the opportunity of the demographic dividend. Multiple challenges remain for China as its economy expands. The creation of an underclass due to the existing hukou system has created major social problems in the urban side.1 They are unable to even send their children to school because of illegal immigration. Similar to India, China has a large informal sector that adds little value to the economy. In addition, corruption has been a problem in China especially at the provincial and the local level. However, unlike in India, it is due to different incentives at the provincial and the local level. They lie in promotion of growth which in turn aids in raising one’s profile within the CCP. Legal excesses have often raised concerns about human right standards, which necessitate reform. Lastly, aggressive posturing by China has caused disquiet amongst the international community which if unaddressed would not augur well for the country’s image. Prof. D’ Costa is unsure of the prospect of Yuan becoming a global currency considering Chinese resistance to deregulation and absence of capital account convertibility. To another question on the attractiveness of the Chinese model of capitalism, he opined that the world is moving towards democracy and not the other way. In addition, he suggested democracy promotion measures by the Government of India which at present is inappreciable. Though he gave credit to the country’s administrators for testing waters before moving ahead, he felt the real test for the Chinese lies in reorienting their growth to ensure internal and external harmony. As for the question of using currency reserves to exercise power and influence, he believes that they would not be able to go beyond a limit due to complex interdependence and prospect of backlash. In the next twenty years, China will have to tackle issues related to environmental degradation where there is a potential for co-operation with India. How to ensure inclusiveness as the Chinese growth story progresses is another major challenge Beijing faces in the context of social polarization. Political legitimacy will be in greater doubt if the strains in the society caused by breakneck growth are not addressed. Their final challenge lies in reassuring the international community about their pursuit of growth and political issues such as rule of law and human rights. Report prepared by Sundar M.S , Research Assistant, IDSA
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National Strategy Lecture - The Shifting Politics of Identity in Islam and Modernity | January 24, 2011 | Abdulkader Tayob | Speeches and Lectures | ||||||
Special Lecture by Dr. Idesbald Goddeeris on the Belgian crisis: from a local Brussels problem to a European and global issue? | January 20, 2011 | Round Table |
Speaker: Dr. Idesbald Goddeeris is an assistant Professor at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, where he teaches courses on European and colonial history. He is also a senior member of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and coordinator of its Leuven India Focus. Dr. Idesbald Goddeeris, Coordinator of Leuven India Focus Chair of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies in Belgium, addressed an informed audience at IDSA on the subject of the massive political crisis that Belgium has been facing for the last three years and the deep political and financial implications for not just the stability of Belgium but also for the entire European Union. Ms. Smita Purushottam of IDSA chaired the session. Dr. Goddeeris initiated the talk by focusing primarily on the historical background of the current state of affairs in his country. He also emphasized the significance of Belgium from the geographical point of view. Belgium is at the heart of Europe and Brussels is the capital of not just the European Union but also of its chief security apparatus: the NATO. Thus, while Greece and Ireland may still be considered as peripheral in Europe, the sheer centrality of Belgium makes it one of the principal countries that shape the policy decisions of the European Union. Financial and political difficulties of Belgium are bound to have repercussions for the rest of the continent. Historical BackgroundThere are predominantly two communities in Belgium -the French speaking Walloons and the Dutch speaking Flemings. Belgium is an artificial state of 10.5 million inhabitants. It is joked that the things which bind the citizens of Belgium together are the ‘King, Beer and Soccer’. However the country has survived a century and half since it was put together in 1830-31 by the international powers as a political compromise. It consists of 6 million Dutch-speakers in Flanders, its northern half bordering the Netherlands, 3 million French-speakers in Wallonia, its southern half bordering France, and 1 million people in its capital Brussels, which is also the capital of the European Union. Brussels was a Dutch speaking town, until the middle of the last century, when the deliberate “frenchification” policy of the Belgian authorities succeeded in turning it into a predominantly French-speaking city. In the early 20th century, when the country gradually began to democratize, the political establishment feared that the Flemings would become the rulers of the state. Hence, Belgium was federalized giving Wallonia a constitutionally guaranteed veto over all major decisions and a guaranteed share of half the seats in government and major administrations. The conservative, free-market oriented Flemings had been complaining for decades that they were forced to subsidize the allegedly “Socialist” south, while no improvement of the economic situation of the Walloons has been visible, which has been weighed down by the legacy of coal and steel industries. On the contrary, Wallonia has become a stagnant region in Europe with hardly any economic growth. Though Wallonia has 33% of Belgium’s population, it has 46% of its unemployed and it accounts for only 24% of Belgian GDP and 13% of its exports. 20% of the Walloons are unemployed and 40% work for the government. There is an enduring period of communitarian tension and political instability which is rooted in the differing opinions on state reform, and in the continuing existence of the controversial electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV). Parties from the Dutch-speaking Flanders are in general strongly in favour for devolution of powers to the regions and the splitting of the unconstitutional BHV district, while the French-speaking Wallonia in general insists on retaining the status quo. Every attempt to liberalize the Belgian economy and to reform the generous Belgian welfare system has been vetoed by the Walloon Socialists. This has led to increasing Flemish frustration, resulting in the growth of the Flemish-secessionist movement. It is extremely difficult and unpopular for the political establishment of Flanders to foot the ever increasing social and health care bills. Recent EventsThe collapse of Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme's five-month-old government risks paralyzing politics at a time when vital economic decisions need to be made and an agenda set for Europe. Belgium’s bickering political leaders have failed to restart seven-party negotiations to form a government, prolonging the deadlock for more than 207 days and thus breaking a European government formation record, previously held by Netherlands. Some of the major problems and issues that will need to be tackled on a priority basis are: Till date, speculators analyzing debt markets have focused their attention on Greece and other southern euro-zone members, but the political crisis could push Belgium, Europe’s third most indebted country after Greece and Italy, onto their radar screens. The questions put forward by the audience revolved around the immigration issues faced by Belgium and the public perception of the citizenship act of the country which has often riled the intellectuals. The nature of European reaction needed to tackle the prevailing crisis, the rise and emergence of China, European Union as a modern entity capable of meeting the needs and aspirations of its citizens and the future of the Euro as a common currency were also discussed. There was a debate on the success of the European integration project with different views proposed by the speaker and German experts present in the audience. Ms. Purushottam thanked Dr. Goddeeris on behalf of the experts present and IDSA for his presentation and observed that it was imperative for India to deepen its understanding of developments within the European Union and its member countries and vice versa, in order to better understand the future direction of the global events. It was a pity that neither India nor Europe felt a need to better understand each other’s strategic thinking and greater exchange of experts and students was required for this purpose. She also praised the effort of Dr. Jakub Zajarczkowsky of the Centre for Contemporary India Research and Studies of the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw in facilitating the meeting with Professor Goddeeris. Report prepared by Rajorshi Roy, Research Assistant, Eurasia Cluster, IDSA. |
Eurasia & West Asia | |||||
Talk by Dr. Oliver Stuerkel on "Emerging Powers: A View from Brazil" | January 18, 2011 | 1100 hrs | Other |
Venue: Room No. 005, IDSA Speaker: Dr. Oliver Stuerkel, Visiting Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Sao Paulo (USP), Brazil |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | ||||
India-Indonesia: Is there a Case for a Special Relationship? | January 13, 2011 | Workshop |
Chair: Ambassador Shyam Saran Opening remarks: Mr. N.S. Sisodia Speakers: Ambassador Navrekha Sharma, Rear Admiral A.K. Chawla, Prof. Man Mohini Kaul, Prof. Baladas Ghoshal, Dr. Pankaj Kumar Jha A half day workshop was organised by IDSA to discuss whether there is a case for a special relationship between India and Indonesia. The workshop was held in the context of the upcoming visit of the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the chief guest at this year’s Republic Day parade. The workshop centred mainly on suggesting policy options for India on a range of issues concerning its relationship with Indonesia. In his opening remarks, Mr. N.S. Sisodia, DG, IDSA, said that the historical legacy of India-Indonesia relations is remarkable. He added that even though Indonesian democracy suffered for a while, the fact that the current president is in his second term is significant. Like India, Indonesia is a diverse society that follows moderate Islam in a multiethnic society. It is trying to advance economically. In the recent past, it has seen growth of about 6 per cent. Like India, it faces the threat of terrorism, and both have a similar outlook on China. Due to these similar interests and perspectives a case for special relations can be argued for. The chair, Amb. Shyam Saran, said that it would not be an overstatement if India-Indonesia relationship is called as one of the most important relationships for India. He added that with regard to China, both countries have similar problems and perspectives. Both are engaged with China, yet are reluctant to raise conflicting issues. Better bilateral engagement is possible as there are various strong reasons for that. The following points were made by the speakers and the participants, in the course of their presentations, and in the discussions that followed.
The Chair, in his concluding remarks, said that while Indonesia is very important for India strategically and economically, the energy partnership holds an equally important place in the relationship. The historical cultural affinity is an obvious but powerful diplomatic tool that is still underutilised. There is certainly a case for a special relationship not only due to military-strategic reasons but also because of the fact that the two countries are struggling with a number of common challenges. Report prepared by Rahul Mishra, Avinash Godbole and Gunjan Singh, Research Assistants at IDSA, New Delhi |
East Asia |