Events

Chair: R Rajagopalan
Discussants: Luther Rangreji and Purnamita Dasgupta

Climate change has the potential to create conditions for changing foreign policy in a globalised world. It dares to test whether the established tenets of foreign policy are still valid. Climate change has entered the realm of negotiations. National action plans, globally binding commitments, leadership and historical responsibilities are determining countries positions and defining their foreign policy agenda. However, the mainstreaming of climate change in foreign policy due to domestic and international imperatives reflects a shift in strategic thinking. It creates possibilities for the international community to look for solutions and bring together varied policy initiatives and differing positions.

UK’s foreign policy has clearly adorned a green drape whether in helping create cross-cutting coalitions or strengthening institutions. The objective is to balance trade with climate change and climate change with development thereby enhancing its competitive position in the global economy. Climate change equally bolsters the image of Britain to take on a challenging role as it has on such critical issues like terrorism, nuclear proliferation and reducing global poverty. The UK has accepted and committed to the Kyoto Protocol and correspondingly reoriented its energy policies. Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is committed to reducing emission of six greenhouse gases by 12.5 per cent below 1990 levels and within the period of 2008-2012. However, what makes it interesting is the self-imposed pledge to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent by 2012

UK’s approach vis-à-vis the EU is not divergent but seeks to act ‘beyond the defined’ framework. Such an approach towards a low carbon economy outlines a broad outlook towards the EU and inclines towards the ‘practical’ rather than ‘integrationist’. The EU catch figure of ‘2020 by 2020’ suggesting a 20 per cent reduction in emission targets as well as an increase of renewable energy by 20 per cent by the year 2020 as been greatly determined by UK’s own initiatives. Today, climate change is a dominant theme in the UK’s foreign policy, particularly under the current government.

Current British policy has been founded on some farsighted thinking and initiated by Margaret Thatcher. In fact, there are three striking aspects that one can draw from the speech and as the article argues remains a guide to framing current UK policies on climate change. The first is the importance of research or knowledge capability. The second feature of climate change relates to the interplay between people and policies and the approach needed. The third pillar is effective environmental diplomacy and strengthening international regimes. Under foreign secretary Margaret Beckett, the UK, which held the presidency of the UN Security Council for the month of April 2007, was instrumental in bringing, for the first time, the issue of climate change to the UNSC in April 2007.

In 2006, the G8 held one of the most interesting summits, with participation from emerging economies and agreed to hold a Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Change. Thus helping create an alternative path from formal negotiations at the UN to discuss new ideas, identify common ground and practical actions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The defining feature was to bring the G5 to the table and develop a way for cooperation; a strategy that is not imposed, but develops through consultation and dialogue. This will remain a critical guidepost to the north-south divide on the issue of climate change.

In the UK, global warming and climate change have been prominent in public debates and greatly impacted policy making. The integrated approach has also been consistently backed by the leadership. For both Blair and Brown, climate change has been a priority issue. Whenever the UK has assumed a leadership role in the case of G8, or in the EU or in the Security Council, it has effectively raised the debate on climate change and gave it a forward momentum.

Points in the Discussion

• EU mandates and its directives are playing an important role to control climate change. In the eyes of EU there is split in terms of Iraq and EU trying to find space in this area.
• Need to deal with the challenges of climate change and it should not be ignored. The international community is worried about but needs to take specific steps to deal with it.
• In terms of Foreign Policy, UK is in the right direction and leading the way in areas of economics and trade.
• Need to discuss diverging views between Western and Asian countries in general and India and China in particular.
• In the UK, traditionally energy has never been an important issue. Suddenly with these ambitious targets for greenhouse reductions, it has had to do a rethink in its energy choices.
• The role of politicians in the Labour Party and their proactive approach to climate change should be highlighted.
• The UK has taken a leadership role in climate change and other countries should equally take a lead.
• Economic compulsions are vital in evaluating climate change and a precautionary approach should be taken.
• Criticism of the British approach should be further strengthened.
• Need to take into account critical issues of climate change related to technology.
• Why has Britain decided not to become a member of IRENA?
• What is the impact of the economic recession on climate change?
• To what extent does domestic politics affect climate change issue?

Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: Kanwal Sibal
Discussants: K. C. Singh and Christopher S Raj

The presentation of Professor Steven Hoffman began by examining the question “Is diplomatic style important and what impact does it have as far as Indo-US diplomatic negotiations are concerned? Professor Hoffman began by noting that diplomatic style is important enough to deserve careful attention. During the period between 1997 and 2007, he interviewed diplomats on both sides. According to him, some practitioners pointed out that tone or style naturally ranks below substance in importance, but not always. An experienced Indian diplomat called style a “force multiplier” in Indo-US relations. When the two sides engage, they do deal with the matter of ‘how do we talk to each other?’ A former American diplomat said that diplomatic style and substance intertwine. To separate style from substance for the purpose of analysis can prove useful, but is not easy and real care must be taken in doing so. His presentation puts forward some results produced by such an effort. Professor Hoffman adopts a historical narrative that analyses change and convergence in Indian and American diplomatic practices. Change in style accordingly began in June 1998, and is still taking place today.

Professor Hoffman divided his presentation into five parts. First, he described problematic practices on both sides. For instance, Americans could be overbearing, demanding, arrogant and deadline imposing, etc. and similarly the Indian side could be self-righteous and arrogant as well. Professor Hoffman got this sense after examining published sources and interviews.

Secondly, he provides two historical illustrations on diplomatic style. The first being Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit’s diplomatic negotiations with George Bush Sr’s. administration in 1992, and second the dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott during the period 1998 to 2000. Professor Hoffman says that in diplomatic style, there is a learning process underway. In every negotiation, substance comes first and when basic parameters set in well then style matters. In the last ten years, India and the United States sustained a momentum but episodically there were problems during the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal. He noted that the Obama administration is sending the right signals to carry forward the momentum built by the Bush Administration.

Thirdly, Professor Hoffman describes US diplomatic practices during the George W. Bush administration and refers to US ambassador India Robert Blackwill’s statement about the adoption of a radically new diplomatic style. Blackwill had said that “America will not be a nagging nanny” and that the Bush administration does not intend to lecture India on its national interests. According to Professor Hoffman, the Ambassador’s public comments and phraseology did reflect a real ideological and policy change in Washington.

Fourthly, Professor Hoffman points out that in fact India and the United States were developing a set of mutually accepted practices that may also be called rules that came into existence in the mid-2000s. Professor Hoffman pointed out the developing shared rules of engagement in Indo-US relations: No Naggy Nanny, India to be treated with respect, recognition of India’s major power status, avoidance of vitriol, and developing rules to maintain momentum in the US-India relationship, avoiding surprises from either side, shaping issues jointly, deepening and broadening the range of interaction, establishing personal relationships and institutionalizing the relationship.

In the last part, Professor Hoffman puts forward his interim conclusions. Shared or common diplomatic practices make communication of substance easier, increases mutual understanding, allows each side to educate the other, enhances trust, acts as a force multiplier, and helps ease if not eliminate historical resentments paving the way for substantive mutual gains. He emphasizes that no matter how bilateral ties between India and the United States evolve during the next few years, this study makes a case that diplomatic style is important, in this particular relationship. What has been learned and gained should be maintained, and even built upon further. One may hope that a reasonably common set of guiding diplomatic practices will characterize the full range of US-India ties in the future.

Points raised during the discussion

• It is important to understand whether style reflects substance. If practitioners are frank and enjoy a level of trust and also do not question the other’s fundamentals, then style matters.
• One cannot have different style while dealing with different countries. It is substance and issues which make the difference, not style. If the United States and China can develop without changing their diplomatic style, then why should India change its diplomatic style. The substantive nature of India-United States relations began with the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. It was not change of style but in substance.
• Systemic differences between India and the United States also lead to differences in negotiating style.
• Differences in negotiating style between India and the United States is also the result of systemic differences; an Indian Foreign Minister is invariably a politician whereas in the United States Secretaries of State are frequently drawn from academia, business, armed forces, etc.
• In the United States behavioral sciences have taken a major lead in shaping policies. Style reflects behaviour and in this process selection of words used during negotiations plays an important role.
• Diplomacy carries historical baggage. Personalities like Henry Kissinger played a crucial role. Their personality and diplomatic style prove influential as Kissinger was successful in United States-China rapprochement process in 1971.
• Diplomatic style matters and works so long as diplomats are sensitive to substance.
• Diplomats respond to the leaders. Leaders set the substance and diplomatic style works accordingly.
• For success in negotiations, parties need to understand the bottomline well.
• While understanding the change in Indo-US relations, it is important to note that India’s economic progress and new found prosperity have played a major role in this process.
• India is a major power and it is interesting to analyse where the United States places India in its ‘Grand Strategy’.
• Sometimes diplomatic behaviour or style only works as a lubricant.
• Factors like culture, personalities and national identity should be kept in mind and engagement should be in terms of principles.
• Style certainly matters in Indo-US Relations as in any relationship. But it has been observed that when core issues are discussed, style takes a back seat. Style becomes different when contentious issues are discussed.
• Diplomatic style works in negotiations if it is carried out with a certain degree of caution and care.
• It is important for Indian diplomats to have a good knowledge about the United States, and a good way is to gain exposure in American universities.
• Charisma of personalities involved in diplomatic negotiations works because it builds trust and enhances confidence, as happened in the case of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue.

Prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Chair: Rajiv Sikri
Discussants: Arun Sahgal and K. P. Vijayalakshmi

The debate on strategic autonomy makes a conceptual contribution about how India as an emerging power seeks to forge a partnership with the United States. The Indian imperative is to keep a sufficient degree of autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. Within the framework of India-US rapprochement the dynamics of power acquisition by India clash with its effort to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy. Consequently, the concept of strategic autonomy, which is a mutation of realism and India’s traditional non-aligned posture, can be described as a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure. For India strategic autonomy necessitates the association between an autonomous foreign policy/security decision making capability and the preservation of material assets (both technical and economic). Strategic autonomy can only be a relative principle.

Pragmatists and maximalists among India’s strategic elites agree that the concept must accept some compromises to advance larger foreign policy goals. Some pragmatists have argued that India’s deeply held notions of autonomy must move towards responsibility. If India is to rise as a great power there must be a greater emphasis on responsibility in its foreign policy. Others have contested this, noting that while autonomy is malleable so is the principle of responsibility. Maximalists argue that other great powers are unwilling and incapable of advancing India’s great power aspirations. Both maximalists and pragmatists agree that the 1998 nuclear tests by India reinforced its strategic autonomy. In this respect deterrence and autonomy are intimately linked. This was most evident during the debates about the civil nuclear deal between the United States and India. The pacifists, Indian Leftists and Nehruvians use the concept of strategic autonomy within a discursive framework characterized by an ideological anti-Americanism antagonistic to any kind of rapprochement with Washington.

A strategic partnership necessarily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners. The potential for a strategic partnership encompassing all security and defence issues needs a convergence of interests which is lacking given both partners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy, the security context of South Asia and the importance for India to retain its strategic autonomy. Thus despite the discourse within the United States on the transformation of the relationship, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective partnership. The necessity for a relationship with the US is understood by all decision-makers and commentators in India who prefer an ‘issue based’ partnership configured for two countries which have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’. Practically, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance in the strictest sense, for New Delhi it means not to be linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security structure constraining India to intervene in support of its own interests.

From an Indian perspective, divergent agendas with the US suggest a double necessity: to identify those divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to reintegrate them. The necessity to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy and engage all major power centres is recognized by all Indian analysts. This is the surest and best way to maintain strategic autonomy. The Indian dilemma pertains to balance: the rapprochement with the US is improving faster than the partnerships with other countries such as China and Russia. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of the Indo-US relations are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. A second of asymmetry insists on parallel engagements. Given the complexity and diversity of its international and security agendas, India needs to pursue multifaceted diplomacy especially vis-à-vis Russia, China and Iran. Energy supply, membership to the UN Security Council and quest to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which potentially collide with US interests and require relations with alternative powers.

Some scholars argue that India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with its accession to great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of autonomy’. This vision seems to conceive autonomy only as a power-transition imperative and sets aside the emphasis on autonomy which manifests itself when an emerging power becomes a great power. Great powers tend to strive for maximization of their influence. For instance, the EU is today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its dependence on the United States. Will India become an ‘Asian France’, as one US expert asked? The major lesson of the French experience for India is that autonomy works efficiently when combined with power. France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to keep power, not to create it. In the past India tried to pursue autonomy without sufficient power, but the growth of its power gives it more latitude.

Points raised during Discussion:

• Historically non-alignment enshrined a pragmatic approach; India wished to avoid entanglements.
• India’s policy in the 21st century will have to cater for the rise of China and the shift in the locus of power and international politics towards Asia.
• Non-alignment under such a circumstance when great power rivalry will rage all around India is an unviable option. Neither is the prospects for a China-India-Russia arrangement likely given deep Indian and Russian ambivalence towards China.
• India could follow Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy and spin a web of alliances with India holding all the strands in its hands, though this would prove difficult given that it is not geopolitically central to Asia. An alternative is to forge partnerships with US, Japan, and possibly Russia to countervail the growth of Chinese power.
• Over time asymmetry between the US and India is bound to decline, and so would fears about loss of ‘independence’.
• India too defensive and excessively prickly.
• Tendency on the part of Indian officials to literally read/interpret every US document and policy statement.
• India’s involvement in the UN institutionalizes India’s participation in global institutions and thereby advances Indian and American common objectives.
• It is important for India to create a peaceful periphery and ensure regional stability necessary before it goes on to become a major player.
• India cannot become aligned with the US.
• It is too early to decide on the extent of alignment with the US.
• Strategic autonomy must be premised on national interest.

Remarks made by the Chairperson Ambassador Rajiv Sikri:

• There is a need to look into the other dimensions of the India-US relationship.
• Strategic Community in India wields little influence; politicians call the shots.
• The US is too meddlesome in India’s relations with third countries eg., Iran. It does not know how to deal with Pakistan and must pay greater heed to the United Nations.

Prepared by Kartik Bommakanti, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.