You are here
Events
| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evaluating the "Hybrid" Character of China's Communist Regime | June 12, 2009 | Jagannath P. Panda | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: V P Dutt The presentation began on the assertive note that the Communist regime in China is now hybrid in nature. According to Dr. Panda, the current ongoing transformation in China is clearly visible. The paper begins with conceptual formulations of ‘Hybrid regime’, ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’ and then proposes a typology for the current Chinese communist regime and concludes with attempts to highlight the progressive trends in China’s state-society transformational politics. The paper attempts to analyse the nature of the present Chinese Communist regime and outlines the quantitative measurement of democratisation in China. Conceptually categorizing various regimes, the paper utilises the regime typology presented by Larry Diamond which was published in ‘Journal of Democracy’ as a research paper titled as “Election without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes” in 2002. While applying the Diamond’s regime categorisation to China, Dr. Panda has placed the Communist regime in China close to the ‘hybrid category of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism’ than placing it in the politically closed authoritarian regime category. He however pointed out that the concept of hybrid regime is not a new one and it got popularised gradually. Changes in socio-political and legal conditions in China provide tangible evidence that the incumbent communist regime is no more authoritarian than it used to be earlier. It is a noticeable development in China that state-civil society relationship has been rationalised. Change has taken place because of reforms and electoral politics. 7, 30,000 villages elect their local leaders, though the nature of elections is semi-competitive. With increased trend of semi competitive elections since the 1980s, public participation level has been going upward. However beyond the village level, elections are not at all competitive. Analysing the democratic reforms in China, Dr. Panda applied ‘Demand and Supply Model’ and noted that in a society where public demand for democratic reforms is low, the system of governance turns into an authoritarian one. He pointed out that though doubts prevail over China’s future path to democracy, the Communist Party’s urge to nurture the ‘sprouts of democracy’ indicates its future intention of more democratic reforms. The present Chinese Communist system is facing inherent contradictions. ‘Ideological-Institutional’ progress in China remains the deciding factor in the structure of one party democracy. However Dr. Panda pointed out that new ideas such as ‘people centered principle, (yi ren wei ben), human rights (renquan), private property (siyou caichan) and harmonious society (hexie shehui) etc. have emerged in political ideology of Chinese Communist regime, which indicates the ideological-institutional progress in China. He stated that democracy in China will be very much Chinese in nature. Points raised during the discussions:
Prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
East Asia | China | ||
| A new wave of Terrorism in India | June 05, 2009 | S. Kalyanaraman | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Arun Bhagat In India, the word terrorism came to be officially used for the first time in 1984 to characterise the violence in Punjab. This followed the enactment of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act of 1984, the impulse for which was the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October that year. Before this, all armed action by the various groups in the North East or by the Naxals were referred to as extremism or militancy or Naxalism. Subsequently, the violence unleashed by domestic as well as foreign armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir came to be characterised as cross-border terrorism. The 2007-2008 Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs lists 32 different armed groups as banned terrorist organisations. Among others, these include several armed groups in the North East as well as the two Maoist groups. Yet, in the pages devoted to detailing what the report refers to as the “Current Status of Militancy in the North East” and in the section dealing with the “Naxal Situation,” the words terrorism and terrorist are not mentioned even once! The report also characterises the violence in Jammu and Kashmir as “terrorism/militancy”, in a bow towards the fact that all violence in that state does not constitute terrorism. To avoid confusion about the phenomenon being confronted, it is imperative to understand what terrorism is. Moreover, a series of events in the last few years – the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, the various bombings carried out by the Indian Mujahideen, and the involvement of Hindu radical groups in bomb-throwing – points to a new wave of terrorism focused on the Indian hinterland. This necessitates a change in India’s approach towards counter-terrorism from one focused purely on cross-border aspects to domestic issues as well. This paper explores what terrorism is. It analyses the new wave of terrorism buffeting the Indian hinterland, and excludes discussion of the Maoist insurgency, the armed activities of the various armed groups in the North East, and “militant” violence within Jammu and Kashmir. The paper also highlights some principles that should inform India’s approach to counter terrorism. While cross-border terrorism sponsored and supported by Pakistan has been a security challenge since the late 1980s, a new wave of terror has begun to batter the Indian hinterland in recent years. Three distinct sets of players are involved in this new phenomenon. The first set comprises of Pakistani terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which have since the late 1990s begun to expand their ‘jihad’ in Kashmir into the Indian hinterland. The second set is composed of a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and Indian criminal outfits, who, with the support of the first set, seek vengeance for the ‘sufferings’ inflicted upon their community. And the third set is formed by radical Hindu youth, bent on retaliating against Muslims for the terrorist attacks carried out by the other two sets of players. Two events triggered this new wave. The first was the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the communal riots that followed in parts of the country. The second event was the stalling of the separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir in the mid-1990s. Muslim youth and criminal networks were spurred by the Babri demolition and the ensuing communal riots to seek vengeance through terrorist attacks. Ten years later, the tragedy in Gujarat provided further fuel to their anger. Pakistan has been providing material support to them in this enterprise. And when the Hizbul Mujahideen’s separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir began to wane, Pakistan began to funnel its own citizens and other “graduates of the Afghan war” into the state, thus transforming a local insurgency into a transnational jihad. When neither this change in actors nor the Kargil misadventure could shake the Indian hold over Jammu and Kashmir, the jihad was extended to the Indian hinterland in the late 1990s. This in turn incensed Hindu radicals who began to plan and unleash terror against innocent Muslims. India thus has to contend with three sets of terrorist actors – one purely foreign, the second, domestic groups with linkages to these foreign players, and the third wholly domestic. The approach to counter each of these players has to be distinct, though there are bound to be commonalities in measures adopted. In the case of Pakistani terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, domestic counter-terror measures have to be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to force Pakistan into taking stringent action against these groups and even covert intelligence campaigns to disrupt the terror infrastructure in that country. India also needs to focus on domestic counter terror measures, which have indeed received a fillip in the wake of the Mumbai attack. States have responded to terrorism by adopting a combination of several responses, each of course specifically crafted to suit their particular circumstances. Though it might sound pusillanimous, “appeasement” is a most pragmatic response. Not appeasement in terms of conceding terrorist demands, but addressing the underlying causes that triggered the resort to violence in the first place. A second set of responses is in the domain of intelligence and the legal framework to deal with terrorism. The development and maintenance of databases about terrorist groups is essential. This is in turn contingent upon enhanced intelligence work and capabilities, both human and technical. Related to this are greater intelligence and surveillance efforts through a network of closed-circuit television cameras, psychological profiling, infiltration of terrorist groups, etc. Thirdly, it is crucial to identify and harden actual and potential targets like government buildings, corporate houses, vital installations like airports, power plants, and the like through security measures like x-ray baggage screeners, metal detectors, more security personnel, etc. The idea is to make it as difficult as possible for terrorists to carry out attacks, thus increasing the chances of mistakes and consequent reduction in the actual number of attacks. The creation of special counter-terrorist forces and providing them with specialised training to deal with hostage negotiations is the fourth response. This needs to go hand in hand with the modernisation of the police force. Important points raised in the discussion:
Prepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | India, Naxal, Maoist, Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, Cross-Border Terrorism, Terrorism | ||
| Dragon’s Digital Eyes beyond the Himalayas: Online Chinese Nationalism towards Pakistan And India | June 05, 2009 | Itamar Y Lee | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: S K Bhutani Since China underwent a series of reforms back in the 1970s, the world has been witnessing sporadic symptoms of its widening presence in South Asia, particularly in the contexts of India and Pakistan. It is more so in the post-Cold War period after the ‘People’s Daily Online’ connected to the Internet on January 1, 1997, utilizing cyberspace as a means to involve national sentiments and general responses on international issues in a big way. Since then, the primary focus of Chinese cyber nationalists has been to retain China’s historical status as a respected power. Today, Chinese cyberspace is often considered by many as a responsible factor in influencing Chinese policy making in relation to these two South Asian states. In this paper, the author makes an attempt to review issues like evolution of online Chinese nationalism towards Pakistan and India; the central views in online Chinese nationalism towards the two states; the influence, if any, of the nationalist expression toward India and Pakistan on the actual foreign policy-making in China. The structural change in the international system at the end of the Cold War compelled the Chinese leadership to review and reshape its foreign as well as domestic policies. Since then, while on the one hand, China has been trying to improve its relations with neighboring states to deal with the US’ rising power in the region and quell the growing fear of encirclement by a coalition led by Washington, there have also been consistent efforts by the Chinese people to revitalize China’s splendid civilization on the other. In recent years, with China having the largest netizens in the world, a certain section of Chinese nationalists have been able to intensify the offline nationalistic rhetoric within the state through online Chinese nationalism. In fact, according to Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, “the internet has emerged as possibly the most important influence on public opinion, not only accelerating the communications of news and information within China but also relaying news of unfolding events from the worldwide Chinese diaspora.” The Chinese, particularly the young generation who have much greater access to the cyber world than the elderly, have come to realize that they no longer need to secure direct or indirect interpretations from leaders, journalists and Chinese officials (all members of the CCP), when they can analyze the truth by accessing the internet. However, Chinese youths’ access to the internet has created a sort of cyber-nationalism within the state which may prove quite a challenge in the long run for India’s security and strategic interests. It is evident from the anti-India sentiments overwhelmingly pouring out of a number of Chinese cyber sites. According to surveys conducted so far, most Chinese netizens attach their preference to Pakistan as a more friendly state while considering India as less friendly. In the debates within Chinese cyberspace, strong statements like how China can use Pakistan’s ‘fatal grudge’ with India for its own national interest clearly indicate how such ‘India bashing’ can create anti-India sentiments among Chinese public. It is believed that cyberspace in China has been able to bring about critical changes in its one-party dominated society. In fact, “the unique characteristics of the internet such as instantaneousness, anonymity, and lacking borders have made it a convenient and powerful vehicle for citizens to assert themselves and have their voice heard in an institutionally less liberal and democratic environment”, as rightly put by Bo Li and Yang Zhong in the book titled “The Internet and Political Participation in China.” Although it is argued that popular online nationalism has been able to set a standard of what may be called ‘true patriotism’ in contrast to ‘state nationalism’, it remains undeniably true that no alternative leaders or movements are emerging from the internet and the CCP continues to be sole political power. As regards to the size of cyberspace, although China’s internet seems to be quite open to the world, in reality, it still offers a tactfully closed cyberspace. What is all the more interesting to note here is that most of the leading commercial websites are based on China, where they continue to face a lot of pressure from the CCP. Above all, despite growing popularity of cyberspace within China, the credibility of the news on the website still remains in question. That is why, the impact of cyber nationalism in China on the decision-making process is very limited, even with the state’s foreign policy formulations in relation to India and Pakistan. Points raised during the discussion:
Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
East Asia | Cyber Security, India, Foreign Policy, Pakistan, China | ||
| The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Afghanistan | May 29, 2009 | Meena Singh Roy | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: ?K Raghunath The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) represents a major development in the strategic landscape of the Central Asian region. The inclusion of India, Iran and Pakistan as observer states in the SCO mechanism suggests that it is gradually expanding into the wider South Asian region. In the next SCO summit meeting in Russia it is expected that Sri Lanka and Belarus will become dialogue partners of the SCO. The changed attitude of the Central Asian regimes created a situation, which provided an opportunity to the SCO for a new geopolitical role. In July 2005 (during Astana Summit) the SCO member states called the US to set a deadline for withdrawing its military presence in the region. As a result, the US had to close down its air base in Uzbekistan in November 2005. In June 2006, the SCO summit took place against the backdrop of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme and both Iran and Pakistan sought full membership in the organisation. The Bishkek Summit in 2007 was important, where leaders from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan pledged to work more closely to develop energy resources and boost security efforts within the SCO framework. The Dushanbe summit in 2008 was held against the backdrop of Georgian crisis and speculations about the start of a ‘new cold war’ between Russia and the US. Afghanistan has always drawn special attention during the SCO summit meetings. The SCO Secretary – General Bolat Nurgaliev pointed out that cooperation among the member states should not only cover economy and trade but also anti-terrorism and other fields. The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was formed in November 2005 for the purpose of building cooperation between the SCO and Afghanistan on issues of mutual interest. The special conference on Afghanistan under the auspices of the SCO to discuss the issues of joint counteraction against terrorism, illegal circulation of narcotics and organized crime was proposed by the member states. Iran, which has an observer status and has been seeking full membership in the SCO has major interest in Afghanistan. Tehran views outside powers to be the cause of problems. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi argued that Pakistan has a central role in facilitating the stabilization process in Afghanistan and was committed to provide all needed help to reconstruct Afghanistan. It can be evaluated that the SCO as an organisation will focus its activities mainly on problems of terrorism and narcotic control. At the same time, Afghanistan directly influences security of the Central Asian states. Experts believe that hopefully the Obama administration with their newly declared desire of “engagement” would be more receptive in coordinating their efforts with the SCO or at least with member countries on a bilateral basis. Hopefully, there will be a stabilization program jointly developed and implemented by Afghanistan and Dialogue member countries. The current situation in Afghanistan is worrisome for India. Regional countries have greater stakes in Afghanistan because of their vested security interests. Today, India’s strong economy has the potential to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It has contributed in a major way in the past few years but its activities have been hampered due to the deteriorating security situation within Afghanistan and constant efforts of extremist groups backed by Pakistan to sabotage India’s reconstruction work. New Delhi has emphasized the importance of regional cooperation because this can help in addressing trans-border issues, developing commercial and economic opportunity and ending cross-border infiltration and terrorism. India has contributed to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan at the bilateral level. Under the SCO mechanism India remains an observer state and thus doesn’t wield the same influence as Russia or China. With the SCO’s increasing influence in the past five years within the Eurasian region, it is likely to play an important role in the future as well. The SCO’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan particularly, with the Central Asian countries, will necessitate that neighboring countries engage Afghanistan bilaterally as well as through the SCO in specific areas like controlling drugs and terrorism. However, the Russia –US and Russia-NATO and the US-Iran relations will determine future developments of the SCO. Points in the Discussion: The main focus of SCO in Afghanistan is in three areas: counter terrorism, drug trafficking and provision of infrastructure to rebuild Afghanistan. SCO is used as a tool by big member states to maintain their geo-political status. China is worried about the influence of other member states in the region particularly in the area of energy. China and Russia do not want to accept the American presence in the Central Asian region because both countries have great influence and they are not ready to curtail their influence in the region. At the bilateral level Russia and the Central Asian Republics try to engage more with Afghanistan. SCO is focusing regional countries such as India, Iran and Pakistan to engage more on Afghanistan issues. Russian believes that America is not keen to resolve Afghan issues swiftly because America and NATO have military bases only in Afghanistan to protect their interest in the South Asian region. The SCO is a China dominated organisation. Moreover, China may try to limit and balance India’s influence by supporting Pakistan. India needs to take a collective approach to resolve Afghanistan’s problem, because India is also observer state of the SCO. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is a crucial issue for India, and India must be taken seriously. Need to examine China’s dominance in the region and is really protecting its interest in CARs through SCO. Need to examine if the SCO is really formed to counter NATO. Why SCO did not offer Afghanistan observer status? Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | Afghanistan, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia, China | ||
| Nuclear India – A Decade Later | May 26, 2009 | 1100 hrs | Workshop |
IDSA Nuclear Issues Workshop/Roundtable Series 2009-10Venue: IDSA Seminar Room, 1 Development Enclave, Delhi Cantonment Today, nuclear issues are once again gaining prominence. Issues relating to nuclear proliferation would take the centre stage and India would sooner or later be called upon to review its position on both the NPT and the CTBT. The pressure on these two issues can have far-reaching implications for India. India would have to steer a rational course to ensure that its vital interests are protected. But the policy would have to be well articulated. IDSA is proposing to host a series of workshops/roundtables designed to enrich the debate. The first roundtable of the series, titled “Nuclear India – a decade later” will be held on 26th of May 2009 at 1100hrs in the IDSA Seminar Room, to coincide with India’s nuclear tests of 1998 which heralded the recognition of India as a nuclear power. Eleven years after the India nuclear tests in May 1998, it is imperative to examine how far India has progressed in setting up a credible minimum deterrent, and on how effective has been India’s nuclear deterrence capability. Similarly, it has to be debated whether India’s nuclear doctrines and postures have been effective enough, and whether they have served the purpose of going nuclear. Well-known experts primarily based in Delhi will join these deliberations. Shri. K Santhanam will chair the first of the series on 26th May. Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Prof. Bharat Karnad and Air Marshal T M Asthana will speak on the topic. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | India, Nuclear | |||
| Myanmar’s Relations with Bangladesh since 1988 | May 15, 2009 | Udai Bhanu Singh | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Ranjit Gupta During the 1980s, when Myanmar was the largest opium producer in the world, the basic goal behind Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral relationship was to cooperate in anti-drugs cooperation. But, over the years, the relationship started facing a lot of complications with the emergence of issues like maritime border demarcation, Rohingya refugees and drug trafficking. As far as economic aspect of Myanmar-Bangladesh relationship is concerned, the signing of the border trade agreement of May 1994 legalizing the informal border trade between the two states; the inauguration of Teknaf-Maungdaw trade in September 1995; Bangladeshi trade delegation’s visit to Myanmar in 1998; Sr. Gen Than Shwe’s visit to Bangladesh in December 2002 and consequent agreement between the parties to cooperate in road and water transportation; can be pointed out as significant developments. However, on strategic issues, a lot remains to be done. The very fact that Myanmar-Bangladesh border offers a safe haven to terrorist organizations in the region makes it necessary for both countries to cooperate in counter insurgency activities. But ironically, not much has been initiated by either side in this respect. The refugee problem in Myanmar is another significant aspect which needs to be addressed adequately by both Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to a recent estimate, even today, around 19,200 remain in Bangladesh. Smuggling of arms and ammunitions is considered another area in which both Myanmar and Bangladesh need to cooperate. Factors like recovering of arms and ammunition of the insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Organization (ARSO) by the Bangladeshi Army and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in September 2005 and the recovering of a large amount of heavy weapons from the Naikhangchari sub-district in Bangladesh in the last eleven months clearly indicate lack of cooperation between Myanmar and Bangladesh in tackling smuggling issue. Despite lack of cooperation on certain strategic issues, both Myanmar and Bangladesh have been trying to improve bilateral ties through certain regional and sub-regional forums, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC), the ARF, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum (BCIM). Over the years, besides Rohingya and smuggling, issues like land border demarcation and maritime order demarcation have emerged as two major areas of friction. Tensions have arisen particularly over Myanmar’s planned construction of a 40 kilometre fence along the border, ostensibly to check cross-border smuggling. Recently in October 2008, a standoff between Myanmar and Bangladesh occurred when Myanmar not only permitted a South Korean ship to explore natural gas in the disputed area between the two countries, but also sent its naval vessel. Claims and counterclaims of the two neighbours in the Bay of Bengal continue to occur regularly. It is quite interesting to note that in case of Myanmar-Bangladesh relations, the demographic factor plays quite a different role. Over the years, while flow of refugees from Bangladesh has been a source of trouble for its neighbours, in case of its relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh is the affected party. The burden of refugees seems to be particularly high in case of Bangladesh due to its poor economic condition and limited resources. In addition, there are constant assessments that some of the refugees may be associated with terror groups. For India, both Bangladesh and Myanmar have their own special significance from geopolitical as well as strategic points of view. On the Indian side, terrorism prone states like Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram shares border with Myanmar. The problem of insurgency and economic underdevelopment in this region cannot be addressed adequately without India’s cooperation with Myanmar on these issues. Indo-Myanmar relationship is also significant due to India’s emphasis on Look East policy. Growing Myanmar-China relations may affect India’s interest in the region until and unless we too start improving our relations with Myanmar. Besides, an amicable relationship with resource rich Myanmar will also help India to improve its energy security in the long run. However, it remains undeniably true that the success of New Delhi’s policy toward Myanmar would be incomplete if its objectives with regard to Bangladesh were undermined. Whether to tackle the growing insurgency problem in the region or to deal with rise of China, India needs to have a region wide comprehensive policy, including positive policies toward its immediate neighbours. Important points raised in the discussion:
Prepared by Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South East Asia and Oceania | Bangladesh, Myanmar-Bangladesh Relations, Myanmar | |||
| Coastal Security Arrangement in Maharashtra: An Assessment | May 15, 2009 | Pushpita Das | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Rajaram Panda The paper discusses the overall coastal security arrangement in Maharashtra. The first part of the paper deals with the evolution of the coastal security mechanism in the state. Section two evaluates the deficiencies, inadequacies and shortcomings in this mechanism. An assessment of the security measures that were announced by the central and state governments in response to the Mumbai attack is also highlighted in the paper. The paper argues that awareness about the vulnerability of the country’s coasts first arose in the wake of the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts, when it was established that the explosives used were smuggled in through the coast at Raigad in Maharashtra. This led to the launch of ‘Operation Swan’ with the aim of preventing the landing of contraband and infiltration along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. Further attention to coastal security was given after the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendations for a comprehensive reform of the security set-up. It came in the form of a Task Force on Border Management, with coastal security being a part and parcel of it. The Task Force recommended, inter alia, the setting up of a specialised marine police in the form of coastal police stations, augmentation of the strength of the Coast Guard in terms of personnel and material, the formation of fishermen watch groups, and the establishment of an apex body for management of maritime affairs. On the recommendation of the Task Force, the central government launched the Coastal Security Scheme in 2005-06. A three-layered patrolling system is operational to secure the Maharashtra coast. At the outermost layer, the Indian Navy patrols the high seas and carries out aerial reconnaissance with ship-based aircraft. The intermediate layer comprising of the Exclusive Economic Zone (between 12 and 200 nautical miles) is patrolled by the Coast Guard. And the territorial waters are patrolled by joint coastal patrolling teams comprising personnel drawn from the Customs, the State Police and, till 2006 from the Indian Navy. 26/11 happened in spite of this multi-layered coastal security mechanism. Lack of ‘actionable’ intelligence has been widely attributed as the main reason for this failure. But there are certain inherent inadequacies in the coastal security mechanism, making it incapable of preventing infiltration through the coast. These deficiencies are:
To address these issues, the paper put forward some policy recommendations to the Maharashtra government. Some of these are:
Further, the central government needs to clearly spell out areas of jurisdiction of different agencies engaged in coastal security and ensure coordination among all agencies by establishing a central command system. Issues Raised in the Discussion: Prepared by M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | India, Mumbai attack, Maharashtra, Coastal Security | ||
| Trends in Thinking about Warfare | May 08, 2009 | P. K. Gautam | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: M. S Chowdhury “Trends in thinking about warfare” presented at the IDSA Fellow Seminar on 08 May, 2009 at IDSA New Delhi by Col. PK Gautam( Retd) was well received and critically reviewed by external discussant and internal peer discussants. The proceedings were chaired by Brigadier MS Chowdhuri, VSM ( Retd) Chief Instructor United Service Institute (USI) of India. External discussants were Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retired), author and analyst, and Dr Chandar Sundaram from the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, USI of India. Internal discussant were Wg Cdr Ajey Lele and S. Rajsimman. The paper identifies the following areas as unexplored or absent from Indian strategic community. The paper further argues that absence of these factors from Indian discourse may have its repercussion at both the level of research and policy making.
The protracted nature of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan compels one to think about the nature and character of war. While the nature of war continues to be enduring, the character has changed to that of a counterinsurgency campaign. The paper recommends strategic thinkers concerned with the military “use of force” in resolving “inter-state” and “intra-state” be sensitive to the available literature on the subject which debates whether modern war fighting capabilities enabled by hi-tech weaponry based on science and technology have ensured “victory”. The paper argues the importance for certain constructivist approaches to help research in this area. It begins its argument by stating that military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon have overemphasized modern military operations while ignoring other factors that may eventually decide the result of operations. The paper also stresses the “way of fighting” and highlights the “Maratha way” to underline this point.
Observations by Discussants Brig Bhonsle recommended more references to Indian literature. He mentioned that the US has now achieved asymmetry in Iraq. Counter insurgency is always difficult in foreign lands and he recalled the Indian experience in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. As regards 4GW, he traced its origins to 1980s through the work of William Lind and others. Foreign literature he agreed was mostly about marketing products. As regards civil- military relations, he mentioned that one has to introspect within the services and noted that the Chief of Defence Staff was stymied by the Air Force. Blame thus is shared by all in lack of synergy in system. Dr Sundaram desired greater focus and suggested the replacement of warfare with warfighting. He traced how the British who were familiar with “guilds” where the concept of class had originated improvised to cement the regimental system in India based on its society, which rather cemented the units. One new and challenging area of research over the century was via content analysis of the USI journal which needs to be done for further research by scholars. The journal has been published since 1870- being the oldest surviving journal on defence issues in India – it would give a good idea on ways of thinking on warfare in the Indian context. Observing a tendency not to look at history, he also explained how political scientists have got the better of the topic than historians in general.. It is evident that historic lessons have been ignored – such as those of Vietnam, or of Iraq. Societies can not be treated as water, but as cultures. On the Chinese sources, they need to be treated with caution as they have very strict censorship laws. He lamented that in Indian democracy, there is excessive delay to get hold of even non classified historic papers which is counter productive. It is time that official war histories of 1962, 1965 and 1971 are made public Wg Cdr Lele suggested that ways of warfare are contextual – theater based, or guerrilla war or present state of asymmetric warfare. He opined that there is nothing Western or Eastern as regards RMA. In shock and awe and effect based operations he mentioned that winning war is not enough, but winning the peace is important . Subject is not only military, but involves policy makers, think tanks and academia. He noted that nanotechnology will usher in fifth generation warfare and we need to prepare. Mr. S.Rajasimman exemplifies on this aspect by arguing that the paper captures this phenomenon at two important levels. These are at 1) operational level 2) doctrinal level. Conceptualization at these two levels differs. The paper for instance does not assume a clear distinction between the both. Both “Iraq War” and “Afghan War” have been claimed and argued to be unsuccessful. The paper argues that the “protracted-insurgency based operations” in Iraq and Afghan has proven that Shock and Awe lost its sting. Here distinction needs to be made how the concept of “shock and awe” functions at operational level and doctrinal level. Operational success need not necessarily mean doctrinal success. In other words the overwhelming fire power and high-tech weapon systems used may have been successful at the operational or tactical level by achieving the “military objectives” against “political-social objectives” as part of the next phase in the war. Discussion Comments by E mail: Disagreeing on some issue such as 4GW, US performance and high end warfare capability, Colonel Peter Garretson, USAF concluded that the paper also manifests what is the central debates in the US which is : What is the future of warfare, and what should be our organizational emphasis Right now the forces to reform in favor of irregular prevail in power and noise But they are strongly checked by the services and existing budget Other concerns of Col. Garretson were about long-range conventional missiles, and cruise missiles, which he thought will change high-end warfare. Trends which he thought need to be highlighted since World War II were: An increase in examination of the future, at least organizational, from individual theorists, to VonKarman's New Horizons, to AF2025... The increase in capability of airpower, and the counters by those who don't have it The de-civilization of warfare by the disadvantaged Namrata Goswami wrote : “that unlike what George Tanham or Ashley Tellis would have us believe, Indian military is rather good at attrition warfare, if you take its long drawn engagement in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir as a success story - then the rather valid question would arise: why are they still there? . Therefore, I beg to differ with you on this aspect. I strongly argue that the growing militant violence in the North East especially Assam and Manipur is sign enough about the failure of countering insurgency effectively with devastating effect on overall way of life in these areas. Just managing violence between the security forces and the militants while turning a blind eye to extortion networks, social violence, and political instability tells badly on our military's way of warfare, if there is any at all”. Comments by Participants Commander Ranjit Rai (Retd) wanted more emphasis on strategic thinking. Dr Arvind Gupta, from his experience noted that much more coordination and work is needed including original Indian work on the Indian way of warfare including text books. Dr Uttam Sinha felt the need to pull out military writings of Indian authors which must include culture, history and trend analysis. Brigadier SP Sinha ( Retd) explained from his 1965 war experience on EBO as to how raw troops who were initially paralysed by artillery fire, got used to or inoculated to it after few days of shelling. Lesson was effect based must be understood in context and for time period. It does not last permanently. . Concluding Remarks of Chairman Chair highlighted the following
Over all observations All policy recommendations pertaining to study of war, theory building, nature of force employment study, more focus on conduct of war rather than just IR, not getting over awed by foreign literature, doctrines based on combat experience need to retain cultural values and renew debate on civil military relations. It was generally opined that the paper in terms of its idea was important in itself and also as a guide to future research in this area. Future research could benefit from the discourse analysis that this paper has attempted to highlight. Prepared by S.Rajasimman, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Military Affairs | India, Strategic Thinking, Warfare, Fourth Generation War (4GW), Military Affairs | ||
| Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions: Analysing the India-Pakistan Theatre | May 08, 2009 | A. Vinod Kumar | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
India and Pakistan were again on the verge of a military confrontation following revelation of Pakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Pakistan reluctance to act against its perpetrators had forced India to plan punitive responses against terror camps, prompting Pakistan to project a capability to repulse an Indian attack. After weeks of underdone posturing, both realised the possibility of a stalemate and de-escalated the conflict. Such responses have been the template of the India-Pakistan dynamics, especially after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Of all characteristics, the most discernable element is what is perceived to be an asymmetric nuclear deterrence equation that seems skewed against India, restricting its pro-active responses. The paper reviewed a problematic element in the India-Pakistan strategic competition – the scope for low intensity conflict under nuclear conditions. It examined whether the execution of a protracted low-intensity conflict by Pakistan is a negation of the nuclear deterrence equation between the two countries, and the reasons why India has failed to suitably respond to this strategy. The concept of Low Intensity Conflict has constantly evolved along with the transformations in the nature of warfare. When quantified by intensity and nature of conflict, all confrontations remaining below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war could be classified as low-intensity conflicts. Generally, LIC is a genre embracing many types of sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare including insurgency, counter-insurgency, and even terrorism and counter-terrorism The chunk of debate on nuclear South Asia is centred on two issues: (a) has nuclear weapons caused instability, raising potential for escalation; (b) is it a stability-instability paradox, whereby Pakistan used the assumed stability at the nuclear level to create instability at the lower level. In this dialectical spectrum, both schools converge on the stability-instability paradox, which states that the stability created by nuclear weapons at the top would cause or facilitate instability at the sub or conventional levels. Pakistan seeks to deter at all levels – nuclear, conventional, sub-conventional and does not want India to share the same equation. It fears Indian pre-emptive attack against nuke capability. In this regard it has two objectives (i) gain parity against India’s conventional superiority (b) existential deterrence against India’s nuclear capability. Pakistan fears the asymmetry with India in force levels and believes space for conventional war exists, which India would exploit. India could crush insurgency at limited conventional levels and threaten second strike if Pakistan contemplates nuclear response. Linked with this thinking is the utility of nuclear weapons in achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Kashmir. Pakistanis had always believed that its nuclear capability could neutralise the Indian conventional as well as nuclear forces while providing the umbrella to reopen the Kashmir issue. Through every opportunity of brinkmanship, Pakistan seeks to internationalise the Kashmir dispute, project it as a nuclear flashpoint and pressure India to initiate a dialogue. The Indo-Pakistan peace process could have in some ways validated this strategy. However, it had mixed results as India managed to repulse the insurgency through successful counter-insurgency, forcing Pakistan to push in foreign mercenaries to hype the theatre. The paper concluded with the assertion that Pakistan is an irrational actor. It is a hub of terrorism and proliferation and a theological nuclear weapon state primarily controlled by military. It exploits global paranoia to its advantage. However it is equally apprehensive about being bombed back to Stone Age. It realizes that tactical first-strike is unfeasible and would invite massive Indian retaliation. As for India’s limited responses, despite repeated breaches, India never expanded theatre and instead used economic and military might. Also, it never allowed space to internationalise Kashmir. India has yielded political gains through responsible behaviour. The moot question is- Has this approach been fruitful - political timidity and reluctance to use military power? India believes in the scope for Limited War under Nuclear Conditions. Pakistan found space for LIC without hitting Indian threshold and Pakistan’s first-use posture restricted Indian response. Finally, these options will materialise only if the Indian political leadership mandates the security establishment to execute such radical responses to the three-decade old proxy war, which has cost thousands of lives and destruction of national resources. There is need for political will and audacity to exploit the turbulence in Pakistan and signal to Pakistan the futility and failure of its LIC strategy. Pakistan should be reminded of the fact that its survival should not be at the cost of promoting subversion and instability in South Asia. This would also mean a change of mindsets in Indian security establishment and the willingness to transcend traditional security approaches to explore radical solutions to this perennial security challenge. The important points raised during the discussion were
The session was chaired by Air Marshall (retd) Vinod Patney. The two external discussants were Brig Arun Sahgal and Maroof Raza. Prepared by Priyanka Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | India, Mumbai attack, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Nuclear Weapons, India-Pakistan Relations, Pakistan | ||
| Can Renewables Enhance Energy Security? | May 01, 2009 | Shebonti Ray Dadwal | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: B S Malik Though the case for incorporating renewable energy into national energy policies has been around for decades, the growing debate on climate change has enhanced the profile and brought the issue of renewable energy to the forefront as a means of tackling global warming. However, more than climate change issues, it is energy security and the access to and control of fossil fuel sources that are the main drivers of the West’s policy. Given the critical place energy holds for economic growth, retaining their positions in the global economic order is a major factor for the traditional powers, particularly in the event of a scramble for non-renewable energy resources taking place. While it is true that the current global financial crisis and economic recession have seen the demand for energy falling substantially across the world, it is generally believed that once the recession is over and demand picks up the price of oil and gas could once again become prohibitive. There are several reasons why this may occur, including production cuts by OPEC, but mainly due to depleting reserves from mature oil and gas fields. According to the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, 80 out of 84 oil and gas exporting countries have reached a point where their field reserves have reached a plateau and production is decreasing. Hence, the Europeans took the lead in raising the issue of climate change as the most crucial national security issue, with the European Commission publishing what is termed as the “2020 by 2020” package, which includes proposals for not only reducing the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20 per cent by 2020, but also to ensure that 20 per cent of their energy is obtained from renewable energy resources. With Barack Obama’s election to the US Presidency, it is generally believed that the climate change issue has received a fillip. However, the US’ underlying concern is clearly about the country’s reliance, indeed, growing dependence, on imported energy resources. As President Obama stated in his presidential memorandum on January 26, 2009, “America’s dependence on oil is one of the most serious threats that our nation has faced.” Yet when one looks at the future plans for energy in the US as well as other developed countries, it is interesting to note that all of them are based on fossil fuels, as well as nuclear power, with renewable energy comprising only a small proportion of the energy mix. Despite the hype about renewable energy, developed countries will continue to rely on fossil fuels. It is a fact that major international oil companies such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil are freezing their research and investments in renewable energy, while continuing to invest in the petroleum sector, including carbon-intensive energy sources like tar sands and natural gas from shale. As the momentum for the negotiations on working out a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 picks up, countries like India and China are coming under increasing pressure from the rich countries to commit to binding emissions cuts. Some of the developed countries are also raising the bogey of employing “retaliatory mechanisms” through the WTO forum against China and India if they don’t adhere to binding emission cuts. However, though India is not giving in to such pressures and has adopted the position that since it is the developed countries that are responsible for most of the current levels of carbon emissions they should make the requisite technology and funding available for mitigating emissions, it is taking necessary action by putting in place projects that will allow it to further improve its energy efficiency and decrease the rate of emission increase. There is no doubt that renewable energy resources are required to deal with climate change and global warming. However, to increase the share of renewables in national energy mixes, particularly in the poor and developing countries, cooperative methods will have to be employed, not threats and trade-related pressures. Moreover, the developed countries have to acknowledge the responsibility for the current increase in emission levels and take steps to mitigate the same. Yet, the rich countries demand that developing countries take measures to accept binding cuts on emissions by cutting down on their fossil fuel consumption and employ renewable energy systems that are either inaccessible or too capital intensive for most poor countries to adopt without funding. However, the developed countries are not agreeable to technology transfers or adequate funding required to deploy such technology. Points in the Discussion:
Prepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Non-Traditional Security | Climate Change, Financial Crisis, Renewable Energy, Energy Security |