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Title Date Author Time Event Body Research Area Topics File attachments Image
Training for BSF Officers (DIG level) November 03, 2008 to November 07, 2008 Training Capsules
Quo Vadis, NATO? : A Reality Check October 31, 2008 Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: P Stobdan
Discussants: Ali Adil Mahmood & Indranil Banerjie

Nuclear and Arms Control North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Global Strategic Trends: Global Perspectives October 30, 2008 Round Table

A strategic affairs workshop “Global Strategic Trends out to 2040” was held at The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) organized jointly by IDSA and DCDC (Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Center) of the Ministry of Defence (DoD), UK on 30-31 October 2008. The aim was to gain a firm understanding of global and regional defence and security issues up to 2040. The DCDC, in particular, is interested in gaining insight into the views of a region which will be a major global power within the timescale of the study. About 30 representatives of service HQs, think tanks, the business community and IDSA participated. The inaugural session was addressed by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd). It was conducted over five sessions in which the changing global power structures, resources, identity and interests, security challenges and implications and the future nature of conflicts were discussed.

As part of the UK MoD, the DCDC is engaged in updating its publication ‘Global Strategic Trends’, through a series of workshops held in the Middle East, South and East Asia. These workshops build on the seminars and studies already held in the UK and in South Africa. The aim of these workshops for the DCDC, UK, was to gather views and perspectives on the regional and global environments from a non-UK perspective. The review of DCDC Global Strategic Trends 2007-2036 applies the programme’s global analysis process to identify the key themes and drivers that are likely to have an impact on global defence and security during the next 30 years. It is available at www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk.

The DCDC team comprised Commodore Sloan accompanied by Mr. Mark Ronald, a senior civil servant employed by the MoD, UK; Wing Commander Andy Burton, Staff Officer responsible for Geo-Economics; Mr Jess Odedra, Senior Scientist with responsibility for global science and technology issues and Commander Aiken, Staff Officer responsible for Geopolitics, currently the Royal Navy’s Senior Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge. Brig. Elderton, DA, UK High Commission, was also present.

First, the DCDC introduced their work in a short presentation on results and findings so far of their study. There was a lecture by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, on Indian thoughts on strategic issues. The audio of the lecture is available for download here. Mr. Subrahmanyam complimented the DCDC on taking out a commendable publication and went on to suggest areas that the workshop could focus on. He also covered the global implications of the economic crisis underway. The workshop was conducted in two syndicates over two days.

Click on the Play button to listen to Mr.Subrahmanyam's lecture

Military Affairs
Defence Offsets October 24, 2008 Conference

National Seminar

Defence Economics & Industry
IBSA Dialogue Forum: Problems and Prospects October 15, 2008 Round Table

India will be hosting the third IBSA Summit on October 15, 2008 at New Delhi. Inaugurated in June 2003, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Dialogue Forum is a unique model of trans-national co-operation, as the three countries come from three different continents and yet share similar worldviews and aspirations. Five meetings of the Trilateral Ministerial Commission have already taken place, the last one in May 2008 at Pretoria. The first historic IBSA summit was held in September 2006 at Brasilia and the second in October 2007 at Tshwane, South Africa. Around sixteen working groups have been set up to cover diverse areas like agriculture, climate change, environment, education, energy, health, science and technology, tourism, trade, transport, culture and defence, amongst others.

The IDSA organised a round table on September 15, 2008 to discuss the problems and prospects of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. The objective of the roundtable was to generate a fresh perspective on the issue prior to the forthcoming IBSA summit.

Around twenty experts from the diplomatic corps and academia participated, including Shri Shashank, Former Foreign Secretary, Ambassador R. Rajagopalan, IDSA EC Member, Shri Amit Dasgupta, Joint Secretary, MEA, Mr. Ashok Tomar, Joint Secretary, MEA, Prof. Varun Sahni, Prof. Abdul Nafey, Prof. Hussein Solomon from JNU, Dr. Ash Narain Roy, the Institute for Social Sciences, Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA, Ms. Ruchita Beri, Research Officer at IDSA, Sujit Dutta, Senior Fellow at IDSA, Prof. P. Stobdan, Senior Fellow at IDSA, and others.

The discussion focused on several issues like possibility of long term existence and functioning of the forum, its importance and role in the international arena, the relevance of IBSA Dialogue Forum for India in the present international context and in future, as well as the challenges and limitations facing the forum.

Strategic Partnership

Is IBSA dialogue forum only a vehicle for South-South Cooperation or does it serves a larger purpose? There was a consensus that the forum is not merely a grouping for South-South Cooperation, but that it is a strategic partnership between the three countries. The contours of the partnership are being defined in respect to the changing international and regional environment. A number of factors contribute to the strategic partnership between the three countries. First, all the three member countries, India, Brazil and South Africa, are emerging powers that are also dominant in their respective regions. At the same time, for all three partners IBSA is an important tool of foreign policy. Moreover, the forum has helped fructify common positions on various strategic issues like UN reforms, climate change, fairer trade regimes etc., by the three countries. They have been able to coordinate some of their positions in the WTO. Most importantly for India, South Africa and Brazil’s backing has played a great role in the Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement passing through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

It was also felt that the dialogue forum is aimed at improving understanding among each other and the fact that its leaders meet at regular intervals and feel the need to talk to each other is a pointer towards the importance of the forum in the years to come.

Relevance for India

The IBSA forum is very important from India’s point of view. Both Brazil and South Africa are important for India, economically and strategically. India has a bilateral trade of around US$ 4.5 billion with South Africa and it is about $2.5 billion with Brazil. Indian companies are acquiring presence in Brazil and South Africa. Participants agreed that diversification of India’s foreign policy is extremely important at this moment. It is very much in India’s interest to give priority to a forum like IBSA. It was felt that, unlike India, the other two countries are regionally united and function in a cohesive regional environment. In that sense, it remains a challenge for India to deal with these two countries.

The world is changing fast and diverse interests are emerging every day. India must learn to grow in an environment of varieties of regional cooperation, global impacts, etc. IBSA provides the forum for India to interact with important countries in different regions of the world. As an emerging global power, India must understand other countries. India should deal not only with the big powers but also with other regional powers and explore opportunities in every region. For that, India needs to significantly increase its manpower and establishment. In clear strategic terms, it is important for India to build relationships/partnerships around the world.

Limitations and Challenges

Participants felt that there were some limitations and challenges that the forum is facing at the moment. There is a visible lack of coordination among the three member countries. The three countries have to synergise their efforts and build upon mutual complementarities. The conference also felt that all three countries of the forum face severe challenges and competition from other countries of their respective regions for the leadership role. For instance, India faces challenges from Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia; South Africa from Nigeria and Egypt; and Brazil from Argentina and Mexico. Also, the agreements individual members have signed with other international organisations/entities can have an impact on the coordination and functioning of the forum. The forum can grow effectively only if it functions without any hindrances. There are several internal issues that haunt the three member countries – corruption, increasing crime rates, political violence, economic inequality, etc., which need to be addressed properly by the individual countries for the forum to be successful.

Apart from the usual channels of political and economic cooperation and development, participants felt that the involvement of civil society and business enterprises should be strengthened to make the dialogue forum more successful. Some were of the view that civil society participation should not be independent of the government. Rather, it should be a public-private partnership to be more effective. Participants also felt that further cooperation in the fields of energy, food security, transport, health, security and information technology can be mooted in the coming days and that member countries should learn from each other’s best practices in various fields.

Finally, a consensus emerged around the table that the potential of the IBSA forum as a strategic partnership between three regional powers from three different continents remains beyond doubt. Compared to other multilateral fora of which India is a member (e.g. IOR-ARC, BIMSTEC) IBSA’s record is quite creditable. However, the grouping should move in due course from being a forum for dialogue to becoming a vehicle for concrete socio-economic cooperation so that its benefits are shared by the common man as well. Awareness about IBSA is low and needs to be increased. Member countries need to address the limitations and challenges the forum faces, urgently. It remains to be seen how the forum plays a role in the international arena and influences multilateral entities like WTO and the UN.

Recommendations

The Round Table felt that given the growing importance of the IBSA dialogue forum as a vehicle of cooperation between India, Brazil and South African, IDSA jointly with the Ministry of External Affairs should establish an IBSA Strategic Dialogue, bringing together experts from these three countries to brainstorm on the path of the IBSA strategic partnership. This could be organised as a part of the larger IBSA summit outreach events, with IDSA as the nodal point in India. Further, academic exchanges amongst the universities and ‘think tanks’ of the three countries should be enhanced. This will help generate knowledge about each other and also strengthen trilateral ties.

Prepared by Ruchita Beri and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan.

Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA)
Does India Need a Federal Agency to Deal Effectively with Terrorism and Inter-State Crimes? October 15, 2008 Round Table

The spate of terror attacks in various towns and cities across the country and the subsequent debate on combating such acts of terror have brought to fore the need for a co-ordinated pan-Indian response. In this context, the IDSA’s Internal Security cluster organised a Round Table titled ‘Do we Need a Federal Agency to Deal Effectively with Terrorism and Inter-State Crimes?’, on October 15, 2008. A brief backgrounder was forwarded to all the participants prior to the discussion to set the tone for the discussion. The Roundtable was attended by eminent security analysts and former senior officials - Mr. B Raman, former Additional Secretary in the Research and Analyses Wing (R&AW), Mr. Prakash Singh, former Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF), Mr. D. C. Nath, former Special Director in the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Mr. Joginder Singh, former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Mr. P. P. Shrivastav, member of the North East Council (NEC).

In his introductory remarks, Mr. N. S. Sisodia, Director General IDSA, said that the repeated acts of terror across the country indicated that the phenomenon has not only acquired a wide geographical spread but it also appears to be much more home grown than before. There is also evidence of lack of co-ordination among investigative agencies along with considerable amount of confusion about the facts, the likely perpetrators and the masterminds. This clearly highlighted the need to take a detailed look at existing laws and agencies and configure them to combat terrorism effectively. In the last few years many committees, task forces and commissions had recommended the setting up of a federal investigative agency, but this has not been implemented.

Initiating the discussion, Brig. B. S. Sachar noted that the series of attacks in recent times has exposed the Indian state’s vulnerability to terrorist strikes and its utter inability to prevent them. The ‘Indianisation’ of jihad with the aim of destroying India’s secular and democratic ethos was a dangerous trend and needed an early and effective response. If the terrorist bombings continue in this manner, with the Indian state considered by foreign governments and investors as helpless, the inflow of FDI would dry up and travel advisories against visiting India would be issued, impacting the economy adversely. He argued that given the all India reach of the home grown terrorists and their control centre outside India, it was essential to have an all India perspective on their modus operandi, ideology, linkages and support base, to successfully prevent such attacks. A pan-Indian threat, he said, required a pan-Indian response both at the political and professional levels. He also advocated an inescapable need for the police to be given special powers.

While agreeing with the need for establishing a separate agency for investigation and prosecution of federal offences, Mr. B. Raman expressed the need to first lay down the federal offences. According to him, terrorism and white collar crimes can be considered as federal offences, but there is a need to separate the two as the latter is prone to political interference. He felt that in the wake of terrorism assuming a new gravity, there was a need to have centralised co-ordinated investigation of these cases. The establishment of a federal agency should be based on the assessment of the duration of the terrorist threat. If there is a long term threat then a new agency could be set up, but if it is considered short term then an existing agency could be invested with special powers to investigate terror related crimes. He cited several ‘best cases’ from the Indian experience as well as from experiences of law and order institutions of other countries. In the Indian milieu, the working of Tamil Nadu’s Special Task Force in investigating Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination and the Mumbai Blasts investigations were cited as models that were worth emulating. As good examples of strong and therefore effective institutions, mention was made of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which enjoyed overriding powers, authority and sanction to take the lead in investigating federal crimes. Mr. Raman also recommended special powers for interrogation and collection of technical intelligence. He highlighted the need for successful prosecution to act as a strong deterrent for terrorists. In the end he recommended that special powers should be incorporated in general laws (ordinary law of the land) instead of enacting new laws. This would allay fear in the minds of people, especially among the minority community.

Mr. D. C. Nath stated that terrorism has grown from individual acts of violence to group acts, organisational activity to a movement. He argued that unless the need for a centralised response is realised by all political parties, the creation of a federal investigative agency would not be possible. He, however, suggested that instead of creating a new agency either the IB or the CBI should be empowered to tackle the problem suitably. He also emphasised the need for a non-governmental approach to tackle terrorism through public education programmes of, for example, Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) to make the public aware of its responsibilities. He also recommended that the concept of 'good citizen' should be propagated by educating the people about their fundamental duties. He also said that in the absence of a declared national terrorism doctrine, India will be handicapped in tackling the menace of terrorism head-on. Finally, he stressed on the need for enabling the police to respond effectively by filling up the vacancies in various police organisations and providing them better infrastructure and equipment.

Mr. Prakash Singh said that terrorism had become a pan-Indian phenomenon and had developed linkages with global Islamic Jihad. He brought out the dangerous manifestation of organised crimes like arms smuggling, drug trafficking, counterfeit currency, etc. and recommended the need to enact special laws to deal with such crimes. The Indian Penal Code, which was enacted in the 19th century, cannot deal with present day crimes. He then gave details of the Public Interest Litigations he had filed in the Supreme Court on police reforms. He advocated that incidents of terrorist violence and organised crimes should be treated as an act of aggression and any law passed to tackle these crimes should be described as a law 'in defence of the country'. Supporting the idea of setting up a federal agency, he said that it is necessary to have an institutional framework to deal with terrorism. In his view, the setting up of a federal agency did not need an amendment but a correct interpretation of the constitution. He also clarified that the states will not lose their jurisdiction over federal crimes with the setting up of a new agency, given that both the centre and the states would have concurrent responsibility. He opined that the charter of the CBI should be enlarged to include suo moto investigation of terrorist and organised crimes and there was no need to have a separate agency to deal with such offences. He also advocated the need to enhance the capacity of the police instead of raising more paramilitary battalions.

Mr. P. P. Shrivastav said that the need for a federal agency is very well accepted by all right thinking people. He argued that the country’s internal security problems have international linkages. Hence, instead of a national response, a united international response to tackle this problem should be undertaken. Establishing a link between organised crime and terrorism, he said that wherever there is illegal accumulation of money, it would eventually lead to terrorism. He described both terrorism and white collar crime as multi-dimensional aggression perpetrated not only by non-state players but also by states. He highlighted the need for creating public awareness to fight such aggression. He recommended that the National Security Council Secretariat be entrusted with the responsibility of formulating a centralised response to terrorism. He backed Mr. Prakash Singh's efforts of approaching the judiciary to formulate a response strategy against terrorism and organised crime.

Mr. Joginder Singh also supported the establishment of a federal investigative agency. He, however, said that unless it is backed with requisite sanctions, constitutional status and infrastructure, it would remain ineffective. He highlighted the lack of proper infrastructure and equipment with the police, due to which it could not respond effectively. He said that a federal investigative agency should not be treated as a panacea and states should also build expertise to investigate and prosecute cases of federal law violations. The fear among states that once the investigation is taken over by the federal agency it will move at a pace the central government wants it to move, is somewhat justified. He recommended that only terrorism, counterfeit currency and narcotics should be included in the list of federal crimes, which he felt would be agreed to by the states. He emphasised the need to build trust between state agencies and minority communities. To improve the quality of human intelligence he recommended that more Muslims should be recruited into intelligence agencies.

Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA, said that India is faced with the terrorism problem because the state has ignored governance and police reforms. He felt that unless ground level policing, physical infrastructure of police stations and intelligence gathering are strengthened, a federal agency might not be able to deliver. He said that it is also important to create public awareness and publicise success stories of police investigation and prosecution. He concluded by saying that at the heart of things, it is a political issue.

Differing from the general view, Col. S. K. Saini argued that a holistic approach should be taken to tackle terrorism. He argued that state government agencies should be strengthened rather than centralising such crimes due to the peculiar federal nature of our polity. Mr. Ali Ahmed viewed the whole debate of increasing terrorist threats with international linkages as an exercise to justify the need to have a federal agency and tougher laws. He considered it important to trace the causes of the internal security problems facing the country. He recommended that the federal agencies should investigate all such groups that are subverting the state's authority.

In the final analysis, it can be said that there was a consensus on the need to have a centrally co-ordinated investigative response to terrorism. However, the consensus was not in favour of setting up a separate structure, but to empower existing agencies like the CBI to carry out investigation and prosecution of identified federal crimes. To achieve a consensus among the states for centrally co-ordinated investigation, it was recommended that to begin with only willing states should be co-opted. When the investigative agency becomes successful, more states would be keen to join such an arrangement. It was also felt that police reforms should be implemented without any further delay. Last but not least, the public should be made aware of its responsibilities through NGOs and trust should be built among various communities of the country, thus paving the way for harmony.

Compiled by Dr Pushpita Das, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Terrorism & Internal Security Federal Agency, Terrorism
Interaction with RCDS Delegation September 29, 2008 Round Table

IDSA organised a strategic affairs workshop for members of the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) UK, on September 29, 2008.

The RCDS group consisted of 13 officers from the UK and other countries such as Australia, Finland, Lithuania, Japan, Rumania, France and Lebanon, and was led by Air Vice Marshal Andrew Walton who is a Senior Directing Staff at RCDS. The RCDS is over eighty years old. Its mission is to prepare senior officers and officials of the United Kingdom and other countries and future leaders from the private and public sectors for high responsibilities in their respective organisations, by developing their analytical powers, knowledge of defence and international security, and strategic vision. In fulfilment of its mission, the College runs one course a year from January to December. An optional Master of Arts degree course in International Studies at King’s College, London, based on the RCDS curriculum and open to all, is run in parallel with the full course. The curriculum consists of: international stability, security and prosperity in the 21st century; the strategic perspective of the UK; contemporary international issues; leadership in the strategic environment.

The seminar was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. B.S. Malik. Director General IDSA familiarised the RCDS delegation about the IDSA. Three presentations were given – on India’s strategic situation, internal security, and developments in the Indian military by Brig B.S. Sachar, Ali Ahmed and Col. Arvind Dutta, respectively. Brig. Sachar provided a broad overview of the situation and India’s policy response. He also dealt with each neighbouring country separately highlighting the various issues. Ali Ahmed provided the delegation with an insight into the Indian Way of tackling insurgency and terrorism and gave an overview of each of the internal security problems besetting India. Col. Dutta dealt with the military issues by going over the structure and role of each service in detail. Vice Admiral Contractor, DG Coast Guard, who was also in attendance being an RCDS alumni, gave a short brief on the Coast Guard and its interface with the Navy and national security structure.

The Q&A session saw some focused questions and comments. The first was on the Indian policy on internal security of containment of violence. Containment indefinitely into the future is under the threat of being overtaken by events and could lead to a problematic situation in the future. The questioner wanted to know how India would cope with such an eventuality. The second question dealt with India’s interest and involvement in military uses of space. The third was on India’s approach to China in terms of balance of power in the region.

The attending IDSA scholars participated in informing the delegation on India’s position on the various issues raised. It was pointed out that if allowed to extend indefinitely conflicts could become exacerbated. India’s higher defence structure and its antecedents were outlined and the benefits of the committee-based structure highlighted. It was also brought out that there is an ongoing rethinking of geopolitics in China. On the question of space, it was highlighted that a cell has been established in the service headquarters and it has been tasked to look into the issue of India’s interest and involvement in space. So far, India has limited itself to looking at space only for peaceful purposes.

Prepared by Ali Ahmed, Research Fellow at IDSA.

Military Affairs
Storming of Lal Masjid in Pakistan: An Analysis September 26, 2008 S. K. Saini 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: S K Bhutani
Discussants: Ved Marwah & Sudhir Sharma

Conversion of a religious place by terrorists into a heavily fortified safe sanctuary over a protracted period of time is a tactic largely restricted to Asia. Entrenched in this meticulously defended complex, terrorists challenge the might of the state.

This terrorist fortress is characterized by the presence of a large number of their followers. Such a situation is distinct from other scenarios where terrorists use religious places to take refuge while being chased by security forces, forcibly take innocent pilgrims as hostages or launch an attack on the assembled devotees.

Lal Masjid, a mosque complex, located in Islamabad, was being used by radical Islamist clerics and their supporters, to defy the Pakistani government and impose Islamist edicts. When the situation deteriorated, a siege was established around the Lal Masjid for over a week and finally on July 10, 2007, Pakistani army stormed it, after talks with the clergy failed. The operation was marked by fierce fighting and heavy loss of life, during which militants responded with rockets, machine gun fire and petrol bombs.

While militants occupying such hallowed precincts are in violation of international humanitarian law, security forces tasked to clear them out need to exercise utmost restraint, use minimum force, avoid collateral damage and uphold religious sentiments. Military operations launched to flush out terrorists from places of worship have far reaching political, social and religious ramifications.

While the Lal Masjid attracted its share of media coverage during the crisis, inexplicably a detailed analytical study of the episode is still awaited. This paper attempts to identify lessons at the macro level to deal with similar situations by using the storming of Lal Masjid as a case study.

Events Leading to the Siege

Following the September 11 attacks in the United States, Pakistan’s support to the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) was strongly opposed by the leadership of the Lal Masjid. In July 2005, Pakistani authorities attempted to raid the mosque in connection with the investigation into the London bombings, but the police were blocked by baton-wielding female students. Subsequently, the authorities apologized for the behaviour of the police. During 2006 and the first half of 2007, the mosque's increasingly aggressive students and leadership, supported by militants continued to challenge the authority of the government in Islamabad. They also launched an anti-vice campaign and instigated incidents such as kidnappings of alleged prostitutes, including Chinese, and burning films, following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By early April 2007, the mosque had set up a sharia court.

Talks reportedly broke down on the morning of July 10, 2007 over the militants' demand for an amnesty, leading to orders being issued to the army to flush them out. What pushed the government to undertake precipitous action was China's angry response to the killing of three Chinese workers on July 8 in Peshawar. Military intelligence reported that the militants who had carried out the killings were linked to the group in the Islamabad mosque. This coupled with the break-down of direct negotiations led to the final assault on July 10.

Analysis of Lal Masjid Episode

Reportedly, on July 8 Musharraf was presented with three options: launch an air strike, gas the compound to render the inmates unconscious or launch ground assault. The decision whether to assault a place of worship or continue with its siege, forcing the inmates into surrender is always a difficult one. Protagonists of the offensive option argue that such a siege may last a long time, even several months, as terrorists would have stocked adequate quantities of food material, water and other items of sustenance, inflaming religious passions and resulting in a mass uprising across the country. An assault on a religious place may be a relatively quicker alternative, but invariably leads to heavy loss of life and public alienation with attendant ramifications.

The Pakistan government was criticised for allowing the situation to deteriorate and being a mute spectator to the excesses committed by the Lal Masjid vigilantes. Each new episode was met with feeble government response or appeasement. There were also differences within the government about the approach to be followed in dealing with the issue.

Usually such a situation is misjudged in the initial stages due to an overwhelming desire to avoid taking firm action for fear of inflaming religious passions. Militarily, the best chances of success with minimum damage are right at the beginning, before the terrorists have had time to prepare extensive bunkers and stock up weapons and supplies. With operations of this kind, the battle is as much in the mind as on the ground. The more the operation drags on, the worse it is, as the initiative passes to the terrorists.

Fears of a public backlash kept the Pakistani government from acting earlier against the radicals within Lal Masjid. Reportedly, intelligence agencies indicated that it could get help from Taliban in Waziristan and other madrassas in the vicinity, leading to large scale turbulence. While the siege of the mosque led to anti-government sentiment to fester in militant and fundamentalist communities throughout Pakistan, the response of other terrorist groups was subdued. Overall, there was widespread opinion within Pakistan that firm action should have been taken against Lal Masjid extremists at an early stage.

The assault on the Lal Masjid by the army was launched within 72 hours of the situation being handed over to it. Once the army has been requisitioned to deal with the situation, there is a tendency to expect it to launch the operation at the earliest, largely premised on the assumption that any further delay will be indicative of a weak response. Deployment of the army is an escalatory step, bringing additional pressure on terrorists and should be given time to influence the negotiations’ process. Moreover, such an operation not only requires detailed and meticulous military planning but also extensive coordination with a host of agencies, including paramilitary forces, civil police and local administrative machinery. Since the situation has already been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the army has to be called out, it is imperative that adequate time is allowed for planning and preparation to the army.

Officials hastily revised their assessment of clearing the Lal Masjid which they initially predicted would take just four hours. The militants continued to resist for over 30 hours and inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces. It has been experienced that the army always complains about lack of information to plan operations against such targets. The situation was no different in the case of Lal Masjid.

Use of Minimum Force

After the Lal Masjid military action, concerns have been expressed that the army did not comply with the principle of use of minimum force. The number of casualties suffered by the Pakistani SSG is indicative of their intent to ensure compliance with the principles of use of minimum force and avoiding collateral damage. More the number of civilian casualties during military action on a religious place, more vehement is the criticism. While Lal Masjid operation was a fairly successful operation from the military’s perspective, there was muted appreciation of the military’s role, fearing a backlash in glorifying the army after assault on a mosque.

In such situations, totally different from normal law and order problems of mob control or violent demonstrations, it needs to be appreciated that the army is called out to act against highly motivated, lethally armed and well entrenched group of terrorists who have made elaborate preparations to ward off entry by the security forces into the complex. Minimum force has to be related to the terrorists’ numbers, weaponry and strength/layout of field fortifications. However, the army has to prevent or limit damage to the religious and historically important buildings by strictly controlling the application of fire power. Fire fighting teams need to be standby in case of fire incidents occurring due to exchange of fire or attempted arson by terrorists. It requires a very high degree of discipline, leadership, motivation and moral courage on the part of troops involved in the operation to exercise restraint in the face of danger and extreme provocation, with their colleagues dying around them.

Conclusion

It is apparent that terrorists are increasingly focusing on religious places to carry out their nefarious activities and will continue to do so. Therefore, it is imperative that rather than knee jerk reactions after a terrorist incident, long term measures are taken to deter the terrorists. The Indian security establishment could study the French system of keeping the places of worship under surveillance.

In situations where fundamentalists and terrorists take control of a religious place and challenge the authority of the state, the government needs to act decisively before the pot boils over. From the military perspective, tiring out terrorists to make them surrender by besieging the place of worship is a preferred option than direct assault in certain circumstances. Storming of religious places by the security forces invariably leads to collateral damage and loss of life, despite adhering to the principle of minimum use of force. This provides an opportunity to the terrorists to exploit the situation further, which can have grave religious and political ramifications.

The seminar was chaired by Ambassador S.K. Bhutani. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma and Ved Marwah were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Colonel Arvind Dutta and Dr. Pankaj Kumar Jha.

Major points highlighted in the discussion were:

  • Air strike is unthinkable in such a situation. However, air power can be used to provide real time information to the security forces.
  • Timely action is required in dealing with such situations, as storming religious places normally hurt the sentiments of the locals.
  • The Pakistan government was fully aware of the situation, but it failed to take timely action.
  • Rather than using the army in such operations, the police force trained to handle such situations should be employed.
  • Assessment of public opinion is needed before carrying out such massive military operations against religious places.
  • Theory of the relation between state and religion needs to be thoroughly analysed.

Prepared by M. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at IDSA.

South Asia Lal Masjid, Pakistan, Military Affairs, Terrorism
The United National Front in Afghan Politics: An Explorative Study September 19, 2008 Vishal Chandra 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: P Stobdan
Discussant: Kalim Bahadur

There remains an element of ambiguity as to when the United National Front formally came into being. It is generally believed to have been formed either in March or early April (April 3?) 2007. According to Pajhwok Afghan News, the UNF was formed in Kabul on March 12, 2007. Interestingly, according to the Strategic Forecasting Inc., better known as Stratfor, a well-known Texas-based private intelligence agency, it was founded a year earlier on April 3, 2006. Whatever might have been the exact date of its formation, the conditions that led to its creation continues to haunt the Afghan polity.

The roots of the pronounced tribal-ethnic character of the present Afghan politics can be traced back to the formation of the modern Afghan state during 18th and 19th centuries. It is important to bear in mind the way ethnic and tribal dynamics played out in the face of externalization of the Afghan civil war through the 1980s and 1990s. Until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and the 1978 coup by the Afghan communists, the modern Afghan state was strongly dominated by the Pashtuns belonging to a certain tribe/clan considered as one of royal origin or high in the Pashtun social hierarchy. The minority ethnic groups from the north and parts of western and central Afghanistan – especially Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turkmen – had very limited participation in the Afghan national/state politics which remained a Pashtun bastion. Historically, the ruling elites of the minority ethnic groups were allowed to retain their autonomous or semi-independent status provided they accepted the suzerainty, often nominal, of the Pashtun dynasties ruling from Kabul and agreed to pay revenue to the state treasury or provide with men and resources in times of war. The above political understanding not only defined/institutionalised the relationship between the power structure in Kabul and the ruling elites in the far-flung provinces, but also between Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns. Such traditional mechanisms of power-distribution and resource-sharing, however asymmetric, ensured peace and stability in the country for decades until the beginning of the civil war in the late 1970s. The traditional balance of power in the Afghan politics finally withered away as the ideologically adversarial proxy politics of the Cold War era militarized and internationalized the Afghan civil war. Soviet Union’s armed intervention in Afghanistan beginning December 1979 in support of the communist government in Kabul, led to a further polarization between the state and the people. As part of its strategy to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the United States (US) along with China, Pakistan, Iran and a host of West Asian and West European countries began sponsoring and arming the fragmented but popular anti-Soviet resistance building up in the Afghan countryside. This led to intense weaponisation and subsequent jihadisation of the civil war. Interestingly, it also led to the empowerment of the hitherto marginalised Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups who later came to have stakes in the national politics of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal by early 1989, they were among the key players in the struggle for control over Kabul.

End of Taliban Interregnum

The emergence of a Taliban movement with full backing from the Pakistan state in mid-1990s had a strong Pashtun dimension to it. The minority ethnic factions responded to the rapidly expanding Pashtun Taliban by forming a loose anti-Taliban alliance called the United Front (better known as the Northern Alliance, NA) in late 1990s which in turn was backed by Russia, Central Asian republics, Iran and India. Being new and relatively well-organised, the Taliban movement was often viewed by the Pashtuns as the return of Pashtun rule over Kabul; and an effective counter force to the Tajik militia.

However, the events of 9-11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 proved to be a yet another turning point in the Afghan civil war. It led to the ouster of a Pashtun force from power, re-establishment of Tajik dominance in Kabul, re-emergence of factional politics, and West’s return to Afghanistan. Interestingly, it had also led to the US re-engagement with the former anti-Soviet mujahideen factions, especially with the NA.

Return of Factional Politics

Soon confronted with the huge challenge of raising a non-Taliban multi-ethnic Afghan leadership, a conference involving diverse Afghan factions (minus Taliban and Hezb-e Islami) was held at Bonn, Germany. The dramatic Bonn Conference (November 27-December 5, 2001) was a prelude to a new round of factional politics. The nine-day long gruelling negotiations had all the trappings of the factional politics of the early 1990s. It can be best summed up in the words of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell who while reacting to the possible collapse of the Bonn Conference had stated, “Do not let them break up. Keep them there. Lock them up if you have to. We do not want this to go anywhere else. We’re almost there, and this is the time to grind it out on this line. If they go off, I don’t know when I’ll get them all back together.” The signing of the Bonn Agreement (December 5, 2001) which laid out a road map for stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan thus facilitated and legitimized the role of mujahideen factions in the new political process.

Hardening of Pashtun-NA Divide

The hardening ethno-political divides and competing agendas of the diverse constituents of the Karzai-led provisional governments was best reflected during the proceedings of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (December 14, 2003 - January 4, 2004) and the presidential election (October 9, 2004). The 502-member Jirga, which was called for the approval of the new draft constitution, was marred by severe differences among delegates from diverse factions on issues concerning nature of the Afghan state, the form of government, status and role of Islam, centre-province relations, double citizenship, status of minorities, human rights and the linguistic rights. The idea of a highly centralised presidential form of government with overriding powers over the bicameral legislature came to be strongly contested by the non-Pashtun delegates.

Marginalising NA

It is noteworthy that since the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and the subsequent formation of the Afghan transitional administration, Karzai had been trying to deal with the strong influence of the NA leaders and commanders in his government. Karzai’s assertive tone against the NA reached a new pitch in July 2004 when he declared that the private militia of the warlords constituted a bigger threat to Afghanistan than the Taliban insurgency. Karzai’s frustration over lack of direct control in areas outside Kabul has since been a constant feature. Despite all rhetoric and attempts to marginalise NA, Karzai at the same time kept the option of dealing with them open. It is noteworthy that prior to the presidential election, at a time when Karzai was easing out powerful Tajik ministers from his transitional government, he was also trying to woo the Taliban and the Hezb-e Islami cadres to join the electoral process.

The National Understanding Front

Though much of the NA leadership was out or on the margins of the governing structure in Kabul by end of 2005, it failed to augment the position of Karzai in the Afghan politics in any substantive manner. With their presence in the government diminished, Tajik leader Yunus Qanuni on March 31, 2005 announced the formation of National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli (JTM) as the main opposition group to the central government, which was welcomed by President Hamid Karzai. The Front, comprising about 12-14 political parties, was also formed in view of the September 2005 parliamentary elections.

The UNF: Composition and Agenda

The UNF is said to be an agglomeration of about 15-18 political parties. Though there is not much information available on its exact size in terms of membership, the Front claims to have the backing of 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s Parliament. It reportedly has two governing councils with Mohammad Naim Farahi, a parliamentarian from Farah, currently leading the executive council. Many of the members of the UNF are either parliamentarians or former ministers from the Karzai-led interim and transitional governments. Few of them are still occupying senior positions in the central government which lends certain legitimacy to their “government-cum- opposition” status. Interestingly, the UNF argues against being an opposition coalition or bloc though its members constantly refer to the weaknesses in Karzai’s leadership. In view of the strong presence of the former NA members, the Pashtuns are by and large suspicious of the political agenda of the UNF, especially over the idea of strengthening the powers of the provincial governors.

Reactions to the Emergence of ‘Rainbow Alliance’

The emergence of the UNF had elicited reactions from the entire political spectrum of Afghanistan. Most of the Afghan political observers and analysts believe that the UNF would not survive long due to the extreme diversity of its constituents (jihadis, ex-khalqis, ex-parchamites, royalists, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, shias and sunnis) and the ideological contradictions flowing from it. The Front is said to lack in common ideology and that its members have conflicting interests. The UNF is often believed to have been formed by former NA along with some ex-communists to legitimize their political existence in view of alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by them in the past. Though they are covered under general amnesty made from time to time, nevertheless, the fear of Kabul coming under international pressure to conduct war trials in future remains. Otherwise, the only factor which is said to unite such diverse constituents of the Front is their shared opposition to Karzai’s leadership.

UNF Woos the Taliban

In March 2008, the UNF announced that it had been secretly talking to the Taliban at least since last five months as part of its efforts for national reconciliation. UNF spokesperson had revealed to the Associated Press that Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani and Mohammad Qasim Fahim had been meeting “important people” from Taliban and other anti-government groups to seek reconciliation. It is interesting to note here that within days of the launching of UNF, Karzai for the first time admitted on April 6, 2007 (according to some sources April 7) that he had been talking to the Taliban. With UNF trying to woo the Taliban, a new dimension has been added to the ongoing politics of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Taliban are more likely to use divisions between Karzai and UNF to their advantage. It would strengthen their bargaining capacity in case of any serious negotiations with Kabul or the UNF. It is also indicative of the growing fragmentation of reconciliation process in the country. Interestingly, purported Taliban spokespersons have constantly denied talking to either the Afghan government or the UNF.

Perspectives

The UNF is a typical Afghan political experiment. It has all the trappings of Afghanistan’s ethno-regional dynamics and factional power politics, obviously interspersed with the interests of external powers. The UNF may be a recent entity, but it is also a manifestation of tendencies with a long and a varied past to it. Like any other grouping it draws its characteristics from both historical and prevailing socio-political tendencies in the space in which it originated and is fighting for survival. At a more nuanced level, it may be said that the UNF is struggling to legitimize and mainstream itself in the Afghan politics. It is striving to raise its profile both at the regional and international level by being an effective and a relevant force in the domestic politics. The key objective seems to be to evolve as a viable alternative to the faltering political structure in Kabul. The outcome of the 2009 elections, provided it is held, would be a major challenge to its growth and survival. As regards its alleged foreign backers, they would be far more interested in its peace initiatives for national reconciliation. Since the limitations of the military option against the Taliban have come to be realized, some of the neighbouring or even Western countries might be backing UNF’s efforts to engage the Taliban. The UNF may have also been formed in response to growing Taliban challenge. The impetus might have come from the weak position of Kabul and the growing divide in the trans-Atlantic coalition. As political discontentment and insecurity grows, the UNF is likely to gain ground despite its limitations and contradictions. It is also likely to be challenged by other mini-fronts that might be sponsored by groups inimical to its existence. As for its future prospects, the UNF is not meant to be a long-term venture.

***

The seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA. Amb. Ugendra Kumar, Joint Secretary, and currently with NDC, and Professor Kalim Bahadur were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants - Dr. Ashok Behuria, Research Fellow IDSA and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, Associate Fellow IDSA.

Major points that were highlighted in the discussion were:

  • The UNF is limited to ethnic politics and did not put forward economic and social policy.
  • Like elsewhere, as in Iraq for example, it is the minority community that rules over the larger society.
  • Pashtuns have been dominant only for a short time in Afghan politics.
  • Two contrasting views were expressed about the UNF. One view was that the UNF has no social power and mandate and therefore the possibility of its coming into power is less. The other view was that the UNF has a multi-ethnic forum which may enable it to gain power and provide stability.
  • The future political structure in Afghanistan will essentially depend on the America-Taliban-Pakistan triangle.
  • UNF has not taken political shape.
  • Pakistan is now alienated in the process and India’s future role is far too delicate.
  • It was suggested that the paper should include a debate on the movement from Presidential to Parliamentary type of government in Afghan politics.

Prepared by Gunjan Singh, Research Assistant at IDSA.

South Asia Afghanistan, United National Front (UNF), Taliban
Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position September 19, 2008 Uttam Kumar Sinha 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar

Chair: R Rajagopalan
Discussants: Ashutosh Varshney & Sunil Chauhan

Climate change and security as a subject of enquiry is now being pursued by the IDSA in a comprehensive manner. Scholars from the non-traditional security cluster, since 2008, have been presenting papers and delivering talks on the topic. In April 2008 a run-up workshop was held on the security implications of climate change for India. A national workshop on security implications of climate change for India is planned on October 30, 2008. A working group under Dr Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA comprising nine IDSA scholars and three outside members (a climatologist, a disaster expert and an economist) has been formed for the purpose. It is intended that the draft report will be presented in the roundtable discussion. There has also been interaction with MEA officials on the various aspects of climate change.

Uttam Kumar Sinha who is working on the bilateral aspects of the climate change and also on international negotiations has recently authored a chapter in the re-launched IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008 titled “Asia and Climate Change”. His paper “Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position” in the fellows’ seminar was a logical movement from regional analysis to a global one.

The seminar was chaired by Ambassador R. Rajagopalan, who is a member of the IDSA Executive Council. The two external discussants were Prof C.K. Varshney, former Dean of School of Environmental Science, JNU, and former Chairman Environmental Research and Wetland Research Committee, Ministry of Environment and Forests, and Commander Sunil Chauhan, from the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India. The internal discussants were Vinod Kumar and Medha Bisht. The participant-level was high reflecting the interest in the topic and the growing concern over climate change. Over 20 scholars and members of IDSA attended the proceedings.

The paper by referring to the debate in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2007 explained how the issue of climate change is being “securitised” and how a counter argument is being built up to “desecuritise” it. India strongly criticized the “catastrophic scenarios” posited by the Stern Report and articulated a more “immediate and quantifiable threat from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resources for development and poverty eradication as well as competition for energy.” The author identified loosely structured blocks of states with their own mix of concerns and actions on climate change. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with concerns and fears of rising sea levels and large submergence of the coastlines think from an “ecological effectiveness” and finds a willing partner in EU. The second group is of OPEC and various industrialized countries that look at climate change from an economic angle. Such groups are seeking “economic effectiveness”. The third group is the developing countries echoing the north-south divide and articulating concerns from a “social justice and equity”. There is also the G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) which in the recently concluded G-8 summit challenged the economic dominance of the West and pivoted mostly around south-south cooperation.

At the heart of India’s position on climate change is the notion that it must be allowed to pollute on a per capita basis equally with the West. India has thus been propounding the “per capita emission” line. It is a strong unconditional position that immediately shifts the responsibility on to the shoulder of the developed countries to drastically cut emissions. It also allows India the space and time to grow at a sustained pace and strengthen its poverty alleviation and developmental programmes. But even more significant is the assurance that its per capita emissions will never exceed that of developing countries. It is a position of confidence and self belief in its economic policies, a challenge and a message to the developed world that it will not be pressurized in the negotiation process. While the per capita argument is quite justified for India, it also suggests a dogged resistance in its approach, a grandstanding of its newly acquired international status. But to be a serious player in global politics requires finely balancing self interest with certain global responsibilities and commitment (at least to be seen doing). This is not a moralistic position that India so pitifully pursued in the 1960s and suffered so seriously.

While the ‘per capita emission’ is being largely accepted including the UN, there is a certain perception that India’s position is one of extreme rigidity with no allowance for even a self determined gradual carbon emission reduction quota. India here is missing out on a positive leadership role. Another critical element of this leadership is to dehyphenate itself from China. India’s approach to climate change is based on energy security and sustainable development while the Chinese plan focused on emission reduction. China has overtaken the US in total emission, though its per capita pollution is lower than that of the US.

India’s other position on climate change is that it does not considers it a “threat” and particularly not in the sense of considering military options as a response. India’s stress on “collaborative action at the global level both through mitigation and adaptation in accordance with the common and differentiated responsibilities of the different countries” points to its faith in the UNFCCC as the agency for carrying out negotiations. So clearly for India an effective climate regime with equitable burden sharing can help tackle the adverse impacts and linking climate change with security is far-fetched and unnecessarily alarmist. Climate change is a concern but India would rather be worried about freer and fairer trade particularly of agricultural products and correcting the distorted trade practices of powerful countries.

The geopolitics and domestic political considerations will remain critical determinants to the negotiation process leading to 2012. The changing power equation and a predominant shift towards Asia will see new groupings and alignments that will impact the existing climate change regimes. In the coming years, the spotlight will increasingly fall on India, China and also the US, the chief protagonists in the emission targets. Since the new agreement needs to be concluded by the end of 2009 (Copenhagen Summit) so as to give countries adequate time for ratification, the politics will intensify. For India, however much it digs to its position, pressures will come from different directions on different interlinked issues. Before the G8 summit, India braced itself from the US on imposition of tariff barriers against exported goods from India that are seen as products with large carbon footprints, such as iron and steel. The Japanese at the recently concluded Accra Climate Change Summit took the issue of “sectoral approaches” with India, in order to establish “international energy efficiency standards” for polluting industries across the world. Has India given itself limited space for negotiations thereby constricting its ability to manoeuvre? If India is interested in world emissions, its own emissions are important. There lies the challenge and the dilemma. India has long experience in negotiation on climate change and has been at the forefront of the debate ever since Mahatma Gandhi made the ‘greed and need’ connection. India will have to reconfigure its position. ‘Greed’ and ‘poverty’ are powerful arguments in the climate change debate but will not help clinch the emission issue. It has to be seen whether India will reconfigure its position. Of equal interest will be to observe whether other regimes, groupings and alliances will challenge the Kyoto Protocol. At the end it is not about the sacrosanct nature of the Kyoto Protocol or which other regime should come into existence. The challenge is to be proactive, innovative and find solutions to the problems.

Professor C.K. Varshney commented the real issue was that of the extra carbon in the natural cycle due to fossil fuel use. Much more scientific work needs to be done. As far as India’s position, he felt that it only served the purpose of short- term. In the long- term we need to focus more on issues of energy intensity and efficiency. He reminded that we often are too much human centric and neglect loss of biodiversity, which in any case will not permit the current lifestyles. There was a discussion on the geopolitics and security aspect. Some members from the audience felt that it is the “politics” and not “geopolitics”. Cdr Sunil Chauhan mentioned that in a globalised world contiguous borders are not relevant any longer and thus the term “geopolitics” is in order. Medha Bisht mentioned that we need to take into account the environmental, human and social costs of big infrastructure projects such as dams as they can be counter productive.

There was also an exciting discussion on the referent object. While the author had taken it as climate, Vinod Kumar felt that it should be survival. While others felt that the nation-state is the ultimate referent even from the human security perspective.

Professor C.K. Varshney also elaborated on the uncertainties and dangers of geological sequestration of carbon. He mentioned that land-to-plant forests are also limited and too much reliance on aforestation thus has its own limits. Elaborating on Gandhian thought, he mentioned that it in no way, means to go backward in the past, but instead to find alternative solution, which necessarily may not be technology driven. What economic model India is following was also discussed. Some felt that we are blindly aping the West and we need to see how vulnerable we are internally due to the weather beaten economic path we are opting for. Enormous ecological challenges and social stresses are evident in the future.

The paper generated considerable discussion and well overshot the defined time. Importantly it did not drift from the core feature of the paper. The chairman in agreement with the speaker summed up the proceedings by mentioning how important the topic is and how critically important it is for India to be proactive and not only posturing and grandstanding.

Prepared by P.K. Gautam, Research Fellow at IDSA and Co-ordinator of Non-Traditional Security cluster.

Non-Traditional Security Climate Change, India, United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

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